Jharkhand High Court
Chhavi Ranjan vs Union Of India Through Directorate Of ... on 21 August, 2024
Author: Rongon Mukhopadhyay
Bench: Rongon Mukhopadhyay
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
B.A. No. 10833 of 2023
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Chhavi Ranjan, S/o Sh. R.D. Pandit, R/o 2/4 Senior Officers‟ Colony, P.O. Morabadi, P.S. Bariatu, District Ranchi, Jharkhand ... ... Petitioner Versus Union of India through Directorate of Enforcement, represented by Assistant Director, Ranchi Zonal Office, Plot No. 1502/B, Airport Road, P.O. Hinoo, P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi, Jharkhand-834002.
... ... Opposite Party
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Adv., Mr. Abhishek Choudhary, Adv., Mr. Rishav Raj, Adv.
For the Opp. Party : Mr. Anil Kumar, A.S.G.I., Ms. Chandana Kumari, A.C. to A.S.G.I.
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C.A.V. on 17/05/2024 Pronounced on 21/08/2024 Heard Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Anil Kumar, learned Additional Solicitor General of India for the Enforcement Directorate.
2. In this application the petitioner prays for grant of bail in connection with ECIR Case No. 05/2023, arising out of ECIR/RNZO/10/2023 instituted u/s 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
3. The prosecution case in brief is that a First Information Report bearing No. 399 of 2022 was registered by Sadar Police Station u/s 406, 420, 467, 468, 447, 504, 506, 341, 323/34 of the IPC against the accused persons including the petitioner for illegally acquiring 01 acre of land at Cheshire Home Road, Ranchi. Since the offences u/s 420 and 467 of the IPC are Schedule Offences under Part A of the Schedule of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (in short PMLA, 2002) and since prima facie offence of money laundering u/s 3 of PMLA, 2002 which is punishable u/s 4 of the PMLA, 2002 Page 1 of 16 B.A. No. 10833 of 2023 was made out, an ECIR Case bearing No. RNZO/10/2023 was recorded on 07.03.2023 and an investigation under the provisions of the PMLA, 2002 was initiated.
4. It has been submitted by Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that an application was preferred by the petitioner u/s 88 Cr.P.C. on 15.09.2023 since the petitioner was not arrested by the Prosecuting Agency during the period of investigation and, therefore, he was not to be remanded in judicial custody consequent to the filing of the charge-sheet and taking of cognizance. This submission of Mr. Sinha, however, has been preceded by him by giving a narration of the factual aspects so far as the petitioner is concerned, to the effect that ECIR Case No. 05/2023 was registered by the Court vide order dated 04.07.2023 and though the petitioner was arrayed as an accused in the said case but the power of arrest was not exercised during the investigation by the Agency against the petitioner who was already in custody in connection with another case being ECIR Case No. 01/2023 though with respect to the case of Prem Prakash who is a co-accused and who was already in custody in connection with another case was arrested by the Directorate of Enforcement in ECIR Case No. 05/2023 by exercising the powers u/s 19 of the PMLA, 2002. It has been submitted that after completion of investigation in ECIR Case No. 05/2023 a prosecution complaint was filed by the Directorate of Enforcement, in which, a prayer was made for remand of the petitioner even though he was not arrested in course of investigation. On 27.09.2023, the learned Special Judge had passed an order of taking the petitioner into custody in spite of an application filed on behalf of the petitioner wherein a prayer was made that since the petitioner had not been arrested during the investigation he ought not to be taken on remand and instead Page 2 of 16 B.A. No. 10833 of 2023 should be guided by the provisions of Section 88 Cr.P.C. read with Section 170 Cr.P.C. Mr. Sinha, in such context, has referred to the case of "Siddharth vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another" reported in (2022) 1 SCC 676, while submitting that Section 170 Cr.P.C. does not have reference to any form of remand but refers merely to the appearance of the accused before the Magistrate at the time of filing of charge-sheet. Mr. Sinha has also referred to the case of "Satender Kumar Antil vs. CBI", reported in (2022) 10 SCC 51 and "Rana Kapoor vs. Directorate of Enforcement" in Bail Application No. 559/2022. In the case of an accused who has not been arrested during investigation and is taken into custody at the instance of the learned Special Judge such accused is not required to pass the twin test as envisaged in Section 45 of the PMLA, 2002. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the case of "Tarsem Lal vs. Directorate of Enforcement Jalandhar Zonal Office" in Criminal Appeal No. 2608 of 2024. It has been submitted that the petitioner has cooperated in the investigation and there is no necessity of any custodial interrogation by the Enforcement Directorate and hence taking into consideration the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the judgment referred to by him, he has submitted that the petitioner deserves to be released on bail.
5. Mr. Anil Kumar, learned Additional Solicitor General of India for the Enforcement Directorate has submitted that during investigation under PMLA, 2002 the direct complicity of the petitioner in the illegal transfer of the property has come to light. In the year 2021, a false deed was manufactured and after sometime the property was acquired in the name of Punit Bhargava for an amount of Rs. 1,78,55,800/- and the mutation of the property was done in his name on 25.02.2021. The said Punit Bhargava has Page 3 of 16 B.A. No. 10833 of 2023 transferred the property in a very hurried manner in the name of the petitioner on 01.04.2021 for an amount of Rs. 1,80,00,000/-. Mr. Anil Kumar, learned ASGI has submitted that the investigation further revealed on the statement of Manoj Kumar, the Circle Officer that he was pressurized by the petitioner to complete the mutation of the property situated at Cheshire Home Road, Ranchi ignoring the claim of one Umesh Kumar Gope. The mutation of the property in the name of Punit Bhargava was done in one day by the Circle Officer, Baragain with the connivance of the petitioner, Prem Prakash and Afsar. The Circle Officer, Baragain vide letter No. 587 dated 17.08.2023 informed that the property was acquired by the Government of Bihar under the Urban Land Ceiling Act in Case No. 371/1976. It has been submitted that the petitioner was the Registrar, District Magistrate and Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi during the period when the offence of money laundering was committed. He had misused his official position and supressed and concealed facts and records to extend undue favours to his accomplices Bishnu Kumar Agarwal, Prem Prakash and others and the close proximity of the petitioner with the other accused persons gains strength from their WhatsApp chat. The petitioner by misusing his official position had influenced Government officials in obtaining favourable reports and selectively relied upon vague explanations and unreliable reports to give orders favouring Bishnu Kumar Agarwal and assisted him in acquisition and possession of "proceeds of crime". Mr. Anil Kumar, learned ASGI has strongly refuted the submission of Mr. Indrajit Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner that the twin conditions necessary to be fulfilled u/s 45 PMLA, 2002 will not act as a deterrent for an accused who had not been arrested during investigation and was taken into custody by the order of the Court by submitting that in a case of bail the Page 4 of 16 B.A. No. 10833 of 2023 stringent conditions which unfolds in Section 45 PMLA, 2002 have to be mandatorily followed and in no circumstances any relaxation is permissible. He has referred to the case of "Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors." reported in „2022 SCC OnLine SC 929‟. It has, therefore, been submitted that the learned trial court had correctly applied the law and denied bail to the petitioner.
6. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner, in reply, has drawn the attention of the Court to Para 36 of the counter affidavit filed by the Directorate of Enforcement, wherein, it has been admitted that the twin conditions in special statute would apply after incarceration and does not apply only in cases where the accused is not arrested and appeared before the Court against the summons.
7. I have heard the learned counsels for the respective sides and have also perused the affidavits filed on their behalf.
8. What would transpire from the sequence of events as drawn from the factual aspects of the case is that on 04.05.2023 the petitioner was arrested by the Directorate of Enforcement by invoking the provisions of Section 19 PMLA, 2002 in course of investigation into another case (ECIR/RNZO/18/2022) giving rise to ECIR Case No. 01/2023, in which, the predicate offence was encapsulated in Bariatu P.S. Case No. 141/2022. On the basis of a Schedule offence as in Sadar P.S. Case No. 399/2022, ECIR/RNZO/10/2023 was registered which culminated in filing of a prosecution complaint being ECIR Case No. 05/2023 which is the captioned matter in the present bail application. The prosecution complaint was filed on 01.09.2023 and the cognizance was taken by the learned Special Judge on 04.09.2023. The application preferred by the petitioner u/s 88 Cr.P.C. read with Section 170 Cr.P.C. was rejected on Page 5 of 16 B.A. No. 10833 of 2023 27.09.2023 and the petitioner was remanded in ECIR Case No. 05/2023. The pertinent question which, therefore, falls for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to the grant of bail without fulfilling the twin conditions as envisaged in Section 45 of the PMLA, 2002 on account of the petitioner not having been arrested during investigation and was sent to custody only on account of the prosecution complaint filed against him and cognizance taken subsequently.
9. In "Siddharth vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr." (supra), it has been held as follows:
"9. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view of the High Courts and would like to give our imprimatur to the said judicial view. It has rightly been observed on consideration of Section 170 CrPC that it does not impose an obligation on the officer-in-charge to arrest each and every accused at the time of filing of the charge-sheet. We have, in fact, come across cases where the accused has cooperated with the investigation throughout and yet on the charge-sheet being filed non-bailable warrants have been issued for his production premised on the requirement that there is an obligation to arrest the accused and produce him before the court. We are of the view that if the investigating officer does not believe that the accused will abscond or disobey summons he/she is not required to be produced in custody. The word "custody" appearing in Section 170 CrPC does not contemplate either police or judicial custody but it merely connotes the presentation of the accused by the investigating officer before the court while filing the charge-sheet."
10. The law laid down in the case of "Siddharth vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr." (supra) has been reiterated in the case of "Aman Preet Singh vs. CBI through Director" reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 941 [(2022) 13 SCC 764], in the following manner:
"9. In our view, the purport of Section 170CrPC should no more be in doubt in view of the recent judgment passed by us in Siddharth v. State of U.P. [Siddharth v. State of U.P., (2022) 1 SCC 676 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 423] In fact we put Page 6 of 16 B.A. No. 10833 of 2023 to the learned Senior Counsel whether he has come across any view taken by this Court qua the said provision. The learned counsel also refers to judgments of the High Court which we have referred to in that judgment while referring to some judicial pronouncements of this Court on the general principles of bail. The only additional submission made by the learned counsel is that while the relevant paragraphs of the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Court on its own motion v. CBI [Court on its own motion v. CBI, 2004 SCC OnLine Del 53 : (2004) 72 DRJ 629] have received the imprimatur of this Court, the extracted portions from the judgment [Court on its own motion v. CBI, 2004 SCC OnLine Del 53 : (2004) 72 DRJ 629] of the Delhi High Court did not include para 26."
10. The said paragraph deals with directions issued to the criminal courts and we would like to extract the portion of the same as under : (Court on its own motion case [Court on its own motion v. CBI, 2004 SCC OnLine Del 53 : (2004) 72 DRJ 629] , SCC OnLine Del para 26) "26. Arrest of a person for less serious or such kinds of offence or offences those can be investigated without arrest by the police cannot be brooked by any civilised society.
Directions for criminal courts:
(i) Whenever officer-in-charge of police station or investigating agency like CBI files a charge-sheet without arresting the accused during investigation and does not produce the accused in custody as referred in Section 170CrPC the Magistrate or the court empowered to take cognizance or try the accused shall accept the charge-sheet forthwith and proceed according to the procedure laid down in Section 173CrPC and exercise the options available to it as discussed in this judgment. In such a case the Magistrate or Court shall invariably issue a process of summons and not warrant of arrest.
(ii) In case the court or Magistrate exercises the discretion of issuing warrant of arrest at any stage including the stage while taking cognizance of the charge-
sheet, he or it shall have to record the Page 7 of 16 B.A. No. 10833 of 2023 reasons in writing as contemplated under Section 87CrPC that the accused has either been absconding or shall not obey the summons or has refused to appear despite proof of due service of summons upon him.
(iii) Rejection of an application for exemption from personal appearance on any date of hearing or even at first instance does not amount to non-
appearance despite service of summons or absconding or failure to obey summons and the court in such a case shall not issue warrant of arrest and may either give direction to the accused to appear or issue process of summons.
(iv) That the Court shall on appearance of an accused in a bailable offence release him forthwith on his furnishing a personal bond with or without sureties as per the mandatory provisions of Section 436CrPC.
(v) The Court shall on appearance of an accused in non-bailable offence who has neither been arrested by the police/Investigating Agency during investigation nor produced in custody as envisaged in Section 170CrPC call upon the accused to move a bail application if the accused does not move it on his own and release him on bail as the circumstance of his having not been arrested during investigation or not being produced in custody is itself sufficient to entitle him to be released on bail. Reason is simple. If a person has been at large and free for several years and has not been even arrested during investigation, to send him to jail by refusing bail suddenly, merely because charge-sheet has been filed is against the basic principles governing grant or refusal of bail."
11. In "Satender Kumar Antil vs. CBI" (supra), the principle laid down in the case of "Siddharth vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr." (supra) was once again taken into consideration and it was held as follows:
Page 8 of 16 B.A. No. 10833 of 2023"43. The scope and ambit of Section 170 has already been dealt with by this Court in Siddharth v. State of U.P. [Siddharth v. State of U.P., (2022) 1 SCC 676 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 423] This is a power which is to be exercised by the court after the completion of the investigation by the agency concerned. Therefore, this is a procedural compliance from the point of view of the court alone, and thus the investigating agency has got a limited role to play. In a case where the prosecution does not require custody of the accused, there is no need for an arrest when a case is sent to the Magistrate under Section 170 of the Code. There is not even a need for filing a bail application, as the accused is merely forwarded to the court for the framing of charges and issuance of process for trial. If the court is of the view that there is no need for any remand, then the court can fall back upon Section 88 of the Code and complete the formalities required to secure the presence of the accused for the commencement of the trial. Of course, there may be a situation where a remand may be required, it is only in such cases that the accused will have to be heard. Therefore, in such a situation, an opportunity will have to be given to the accused persons, if the court is of the prima facie view that the remand would be required. We make it clear that we have not said anything on the cases in which the accused persons are already in custody, for which, the bail application has to be decided on its own merits. Suffice it to state that for due compliance of Section 170 of the Code, there is no need for filing of a bail application."
12. The interpretation of Section 170 Cr.P.C. was clarified in the aforesaid judgment and the same is quoted as under:
"89. We may clarify on one aspect which is on the interpretation of Section 170 of the Code. Our discussion made for the other offences would apply to these cases also. To clarify this position, we may hold that if an accused is already under incarceration, then the same would continue, and therefore, it is needless to say that the provision of the Special Act would get applied thereafter. It is only in a case where the accused is either not arrested consciously by the prosecution or arrested and enlarged on bail, there is no need for further arrest at the instance of the court.Page 9 of 16 B.A. No. 10833 of 2023
Similarly, we would also add that the existence of a pari materia or a similar provision like Section 167(2) of the Code available under the Special Act would have the same effect entitling the accused for a default bail. Even here the court will have to consider the satisfaction under Section 440 of the Code."
13. In "Rana Kapoor vs. Directorate of Enforcement"
(supra), it was held as follows:
"33. The applicant was not implicated in FIR bearing RC No. 2232021A0005 registered by CBI. The applicant was implicated in present criminal complaint filed by the respondent/ED and arrayed as accused no 2. The investigating officer consciously did not arrest the applicant. The applicant participated in investigation as his three statements under section 50 PMLA were recorded. The respondent also did not allege that the applicant neither participated nor cooperated in investigation. The concerned Special Court after taking cognizance on present criminal complaint ordered for summoning of the accused persons including the applicant. The investigating officer even after filing of present complaint did not apply for custody of the applicant. The co-accused Gautam Thapar was arrested consciously by the investigating officer during investigation and was denied bail by the Special Court and High Court and as such the applicant is standing on different footing from co-accused Gautam Thapar. The applicant was taken into custody due to dismissal of bail application vide order dated 20.01.2022 passed by the court of Sh. Sanjeev Aggarwal, Special Judge (PC Act)(CBI)-02 Rouse Avenue District Court, New Delhi. The applicant primarily not seeking bail on merit but on basis of observation made by the Supreme Court in para no 65 of Satinder Kumar Antil decision and as such applicant is not required to pass the test of section 45 PMLA. The conditions as per section 45 PMLA would be applicable, had the applicant filed an application either under section 439 of the Code after arrest during investigation or under section 438 of the Code apprehending his arrest Page 10 of 16 B.A. No. 10833 of 2023 during investigation. As mentioned in present criminal complaint filed by the respondent, the applicant was not arrested during investigation by the investigating agency. There is legal force in argument advanced by the learned Senior Counsel of the applicant that applicant is entitled to bail in view of observations/legal proposition as laid down by the Supreme Court in Satinder Kumar Antil. It is not mandate of section 170 of the Code that if the accused is not taken into custody or arrested during investigation can be arrested or taken into custody after appearance in court post summoning order particularly when neither investigation agency nor prosecution agency sought arrest of accused.
34. The arguments advanced by the learned Special Counsel for the respondent that the applicant has misinterpreted para no 65 of Satinder Kumar Antil is misplaced. There is no force in argument advanced by the learned Special Counsel for the respondent that the applicant before grant of bail required to pass test of 45 of PMLA. The position would have been different, had the applicant arrested during investigation. The investigating agency as mentioned hereinabove consciously preferred not to arrest the applicant during investigation or post filing of charge sheet. The arguments advanced and case law relied on by the Special Counsel for the respondent are considered in right perspective to the given facts and circumstances but they do not provide much legal help to the respondent in opposing present bail application."
14. Mr. Anil Kumar, learned ASGI has referred to the case of "Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors." (supra), while submitting that non-arrest of the petitioner in the captioned matter will not dilute the fulfilment of the twin conditions and the following is being quoted in support of such contention:
"411. Suffice it to observe that it would be preposterous and illogical to hold that if a person applies for bail after arrest, he/she can be Page 11 of 16 B.A. No. 10833 of 2023 granted that relief only if the twin conditions are fulfilled in addition to other stipulations predicated in the 1973 Code; but another person, who is yet to be arrested in connection with the same offence of money laundering, will not be required to fulfil such twin conditions whilst considering application for grant of bail under Section 438 of the 1973 Code. The relief of bail, be it in the nature of regular bail or anticipatory bail, is circumscribed by the stipulations predicated in Section 45 of the 2002 Act. The underlying principles of Section 45 of the 2002 Act would get triggered in either case before the relief of bail in connection with the offence of money-laundering is taken forward. Any other view would be counterproductive and defeat the purposes and objects behind the stringent provision enacted by the Parliament for prevention of money-laundering and to combat the menace on account of such activity which directly impacts the financial systems, including the sovereignty and integrity of the country.
412. As a result, we have no hesitation in observing that in whatever form the relief is couched including the nature of proceedings, be it under Section 438 of the 1973 Code or for that matter, by invoking the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, the underlying principles and rigors of Section 45 of the 2002 must come into play and without exception ought to be reckoned to uphold the objectives of the 2002 Act, which is a special legislation providing for stringent regulatory measures for combating the menace of money-laundering."
15. In "Tarsem Lal vs. Directorate of Enforcement Jalandhar Zonal Office" (supra), it has been held as follows:
19. Based on the submissions made across the Bar, there are three issues concerning Section 88, which are as under:
19.1.(i) Whether Section 88 applies to an accused who has been served with a summons or applies to an accused who appears before the court before the summons is issued or served?
19.2.(ii) Will Section 88 apply to a complaint under PMLA?
19.3.(iii) Whether an order issued by a criminal court to the accused to furnish Page 12 of 16 B.A. No. 10833 of 2023 bonds in accordance with Section 88 amounts to a grant of bail?
20. Firstly, after examining the provisions of PMLA, it is apparent that Section 88 is in no manner inconsistent with the provisions of PMLA.
Therefore, Section 88 will apply after filing of a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) PMLA. If Section 88 is to apply even before a summons is issued or served upon a complaint, there is no reason why it should not apply after the service of summons. A discretionary power has been conferred by Section 88 on the court to call upon the accused to furnish bonds for his appearance before the court. It does not depend on the willingness of the accused. The object of Section 88 is to ensure that the accused regularly appears before the court. Section 88 is a part of Chapter VI CrPC under the heading "Processes to Compel Appearance". Section 61, which deals with the form of summons and mode of service of summons, is a part of the same Chapter. When a summons is issued after taking cognizance of a complaint to an accused, he is obliged to appear before the criminal court on the date fixed in the case unless his presence is exempted by an express order passed in the exercise of powers under Section 205CrPC. Therefore, when an accused appears pursuant to a summons issued on the complaint, the court will be well within its powers to take bonds under Section 88 from the accused to ensure his appearance before the court. Therefore, when an accused appears before the Special Court under a summons issued on the complaint, if he offers to submit bonds in terms of Section 88, there is no reason for the Special Court to refuse or decline to accept the bonds. Executing a bond will aid the Special Court in procuring the accused's presence during the trial.
"21. A decision of this Court in Pankaj Jain v. Union of India [Pankaj Jain v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 743 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 867 : (2018) 9 SCR 248] had an occasion to deal with the issue. The occasion to consider the provision of Section 88 was the word "may" used in the Section. We may conveniently reproduce paras 21 and 22 of the said decision, which reads thus :
(SCC pp. 754-55)
21. This Court in State of Kerala v.
Kandath Distilleries [State of Kerala v. Kandath Distilleries, (2013) 6 SCC 573] came to consider the use of expression Page 13 of 16 B.A. No. 10833 of 2023 "may" in the Kerala Abkari Act, 1902. The Court held that the expression conferred discretionary power on the Commissioner and power is not coupled with duty.
Following observation has been made in para 29 : (SCC p. 584) „29. Section 14 uses the expression "Commissioner may", "with the approval of the Government" so also Rule 4 uses the expressions "Commissioner may", "if he is satisfied" after making such enquiries as he may consider necessary "licence may be issued". All those expressions used in Section 14 and Rule 4 confer discretionary powers on the Commissioner as well as the State Government, not a discretionary power coupled with duty.‟
22. Section 88CrPC does not confer any right on any person, who is present in a court. Discretionary power given to the court is for the purpose and object of ensuring appearance of such person in that court or to any other court into which the case may be transferred for trial. Discretion given under Section 88 to the court does not confer any right on a person, who is present in the court rather it is the power given to the court to facilitate his appearance, which clearly indicates that use of the word "may" is discretionary and it is for the court to exercise its discretion when situation so demands. It is further relevant to note that the words used in Section 88 "any person"
have to be given wide meaning, which may include persons, who are not even accused in a case and appeared as witnesses."
(emphasis in original and supplied)
16. It is an admitted case that the petitioner was not arrested during investigation and he was remanded post- filing of the prosecution complaint and taking of cognizance by the learned Special Court. As held in Rana Kapoor vs. Directorate of Enforcement (supra), "there is no force in the argument advanced by the learned Special Counsel for the respondent that the applicant before grant of bail required to pass test of 45 of the PMLA, 2002". There is nothing to suggest Page 14 of 16 B.A. No. 10833 of 2023 that the Directorate of Enforcement had sought for custodial interrogation of the petitioner in the captioned case. If, at all, such a necessity arose the only remedy for the Investigating Agency is to seek for such custody by making an application before the Special Court. This view has been taken in the case of "Tarsem Lal vs. Directorate of Enforcement Jalandhar Zonal Office" (supra).
17. The record suggests that the prosecution complaint was filed on 01.09.2023 and cognizance was taken on 04.09.2023. The petitioner who was already in custody in connection with ECIR Case No. 01/2023 had filed an application on 16.09.2023 under Section 88 Cr.P.C. read with Section 170 Cr.P.C. which however was rejected on 27.09.2023. A similar plea was taken by the petitioner when he had moved for grant of bail before the learned trial court in Misc. Criminal Application No. 3230 of 2023 which however was dismissed vide order dated 03.11.2023.
18. The learned trial court in both the orders had primarily concentrated on the merits of the case and as to whether the twin conditions required u/s 45 of the PMLA, 2002 have been fulfilled or not. The pre-dominant element of the case as discussed above has not been appropriately considered by the learned trial court.
19. It is also to be noted as an additional feature of this case that the petitioner is in custody since 27.09.2023 and the trial has not yet commenced and there is a least possibility of the trial being concluded in the near future. In this connection reference is made to the case of "Ramkripal Meena Versus Directorate of Enforcement" in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 3205/2024, wherein it has been held as follows:
"7. Adverting to the prayer for grant of bail in the instant case, it is pointed out by learned Page 15 of 16 B.A. No. 10833 of 2023 counsel for ED that the complaint case is at the stage of framing of charges and 24 witnesses are proposed to be examined. The conclusion of proceedings, thus, will take some reasonable time. The petitioner has already been in custody for more than a year. Taking into consideration the period spent in custody and there being no likelihood of conclusion of trial within a short span, coupled with the fact that the petitioner is already on bail in the predicate offence, and keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, it seems to us that the rigours of Section 45 of the Act can be suitably relaxed to afford conditional liberty to the petitioner. Ordered accordingly."
20. Thus on consideration of the circumstances noted above, I am inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. The petitioner is, therefore, directed to be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) with two sureties of the like amount each, to the satisfaction of learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-I- cum-Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in connection with ECIR Case No. 05/2023, arising out of ECIR/RNZO/10/2023.
21. This application is allowed.
(Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J.) Alok/AFR Page 16 of 16 B.A. No. 10833 of 2023