Madras High Court
Rajendran vs The Commissioner Of Police on 6 July, 2017
Author: S.S.Sundar
Bench: S.S.Sundar
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED: 06.07.2017
RESERVED ON :15.06.2017
DELIVERED ON: 06.07.2017
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.S.SUNDAR
W.P.(MD).No.19093 of 2014
and
M.P.(MD)No.1 of 2014
Rajendran ...Petitioner
Vs.
1.The Commissioner of Police,
Trichy City, Trichy.
2.The Deputy Commissioner of Police,
(Crime and Traffic),
Trichy City, Trichy. ...Respondents
PRAYER: Writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
to issue a Writ of Certiorari to call for the records of the impugned charge
memo issued by the first respondent in C.No.H1/PR-19/2014, dated 29.05.2014
and quash the same as illegal.
!For Petitioner :Mr.S.Subbiah
Senior Counsel
for Mr.K.Sivabalan
For Respondent :Mr.N.S.Karthikeyan
Additional Government Pleader
:ORDER
The above Writ Petition is filed challenging the charge memo issued by the first respondent dated 29.05.2014 to the petitioner. The brief facts which are necessary for the purpose of disposing of the Writ Petition are as follows:
The petitioner was joined as Junior Assistant on 21.02.1983 in the office of the Director General of Police, Chennai. He was promoted earlier as Assistant on 01.01.1992 and thereafter as Superintendent on 02.09.2004. The petitioner was transferred to the Office of the Superintendent of Police, Trichy. While he was working in this station, the petitioner was impleaded in a Vigilance and Anticorruption case, based on the complaint given by one Anthony Raj. The petitioner was suspended from service with effect from 03.07.2007. Later, he was reinstated in service on 27.01.2010. Pursuant to the criminal case that was registered based on the complaint, the trial of the Criminal case ended in acquittal in Special Case No.8 of 2011. Based on the finding that the prosecution has not proved the case that the petitioner demanded the bribe, the criminal case was closed. However, after the judgment in the Criminal Case on 28.12.2012, the impugned charge memo dated 29.05.2014 was issued to the petitioner on the same set of facts on the basis of which the criminal case was registered and the charge memo is impugned in this Writ Petition.
2. Sum and substance, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted the following arguments:
(a) the impugned charge memo is liable to be quashed, since on the very same set of facts, the criminal Court has rendered the judgment holding that the charges are not proved and acquitting the petitioner from the charges;
(b) The delinquency alleged was of the year 2007. However there is a long delay of seven years to issue charge memo and in view of the long delay, the charge memo itself is liable to be quashed;
(c) After the final verdict of the criminal Court, the disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated for the very same vexatious and false allegations;
(d) When the department of the Vigilance and Anticorruption did not file any appeal as against the judgment rendered by the Criminal Court, the initiation of the departmental proceedings is not maintainable. When the Criminal Court has rendered a judgment after a full pledged trial on the same set of charges and on the appreciation of the evidence of the same witnesses, it would be unfair to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings rendering the criminal Court's verdict ineffective. The impugned charge memo is therefore, cannot be sustained.
3. The charges against the petitioner as found in the impugned charge memo are as follows:
?F.m.1 jpU.Mh;.uhn$e;jpud;> fz;fhzpg;ghsh;> khefu fhty; Mizah; mYtyfk;> jpUr;rp vd;gth; 29.06.2007k; njjp kw;Wk; 03.07.2007 md;W 12.10 Kjy; 12.30 kzp tiu jpUr;rp khefu fhty; Mizah; mYtyfj;jpy; gzpapypUe;jnghJ> ehfg;gl;lozk; Chy; jLg;g[ kw;Wk; fz;fhzpg;g[ gphptpy; fhtyuhf gzpg[hpa[k; me;njhzprhkp vd;gthpd; gjtp cah;t[ tHq;f Vw;ghL bra;a ntz;oa[k;> mij mtuJ gzpg;gjpntl;oy; gjpt[ bra;J Chy; jLg;g[ kw;Wk; fz;fhzpg;g[j; Jiw ,af;Fdufk; brd;idf;F mDg;gp itf;f ntz;oa[k; jdf;F yQ;rkhf U:.1500/-k; F.m.-2 jpU.v];.uh$;Fkhh;> A6 ,sepiy cjtpahsh;> khefu fhty; Mizah; mYtyfk;> jpUr;rp vd;gtUf;F yQ;rkhf U:.500/-k; nrh;j;J> U:.2000/-ifa{l;L nfl;L bgw;wjd; K:yk; jkpH;ehL muR gzpahsh; elj;ij tpjpfs; 1973 tpjpfspy; tpjp (20)(1)-I kPwp elj;Js;sjd; K:yk; fz;fhzpg;ghsh; vd;w mtRg; gzpf;F fsq;fk; Vw;gLj;jpajhf Fw;wr;rhl;L.?
4. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on the findings of the Criminal Court viz., the Special Court for the trial of the cases under the Prevention of Corruption of Act, Trichirappalli in Special Case No.8 of 2011, dated 28.12.2012. After elaborate trial, the Special Court was of the view that the prosecution has not proved their case beyond all reasonable doubts as against the accused. It was further held that the accused viz., the petitioner should be given the benefit of doubt in respect of the charges under Section 7, 12(2) r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
5. In the judgment of the Special Court, several lacunas were pointed out by the Special Court while setting aside the trap and other defects like delay in lodging the F.I.R., etc. Thereafter, the Special Court observed that it is inevitable to conclude that the prosecution has not brought home the charges against the first and second accused beyond all reasonable doubts and that it is necessary to give the benefit of doubt to them.
6. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Capt.M.Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., and another reported in 1999(II) CTC 579. After referring to the various judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court, the conclusions arrived from the analysis of various decisions has been extracted in Paragraph No.22 of the judgment which is as follows:
22. The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this Court referred to above are :
(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately.
(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.
(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge sheet.
(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the Departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed.
(v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, administration may get rid of him at the earliest.?
7. In the same judgment, it was further held as follows:
34. There is yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the respondents. As pointed out earlier, the criminal case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts, namely, 'the raid conducted at the appellant's residence and recovery of incriminating articles therefrom.' The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by Police Officers and Panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the Inquiry Officer and the Inquiry Officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the "raid and recovery" at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex- parte departmental proceedings, to stand.
35. Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case.
36. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge, in so far as it purports to allow the Writ Petition, is upheld. The learned Single Judge has also given liberty to the respondents to initiate fresh disciplinary proceedings. In the peculiar citcumstances of the case, specially having regard to the fact that the appellant is undergoing this agony since 1985 despite having been acquitted by the criminal court in 1987, we would not direct any fresh departmental inquiry to be instituted against him on the same set of facts. The appellant shall be reinstated forthwith on the post of Security Officer and shall also be paid entire arrears of salary, together with all allowances from the date of suspension till his reinstatement, within three months. The appellant would also be entitled to his cost which is quantified as Rs.15,000/-.?
8. The learned Senior Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in G.M.Tank Vs. State of Gujarat and another reported in 2006(3) CTC 494. In this judgment, even the first judgment relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner was referred and it has been held as follows:
24. The Judgment in the case of State of A.P. & Ors. Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, was cited for the purpose that the High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant, it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are not distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a Departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the Criminal Court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer, Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by his judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved.
25. It is also to be noticed the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the department as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony's case (supra) will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed. In the instant case, the appellant joined the respondent in the year 1953. He was suspended from service on 8.2.1979 and got subsistence allowance of Rs.700/- p.m. i.e. 50% of the salary. On 15.10.1982 dismissal order was passed. The appellant has put in 26 years of service with the respondent i.e. from 1953-1979. The appellant would now superannuate in February, 1986. On the basis of the same charges and the evidence, the Department passed an order of dismissal on 21.10.1982 whereas the Criminal Court acquitted him on 30.1.2002. However, as the Criminal Court acquitted the appellant on 30.1.2002 and until such acquittal, there was no reason or ground to hold the dismissal to be erroneous, any relief monetarily can be only w.e.f. 30.1.2002. But by then, the appellant had retired, therefore, we deem it proper to set aside the order of dismissal without back wages.?
9. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner also relied upon a judgment of Division Bench of this Court in R.Rajkumar Vs. The Commissioner of Police, Trichy City, Trichy reported in 2014(2) CTC 769. After referring to the facts in detail, the Honourable Division Bench of this Court held as follows:
?13.The impugned proceedings is liable to be interfered with for the following reasons:
(i) Comparison of two Charge Memos clearly reveals that both the charges are framed based on the same Complaint dated 8.11.2001 given by the complainant -A. Roche.
(ii) The materials forming basis of the second Charge Memo was also available at the time of framing the first Charge Memo.
(iii) The Respondent cannot conduct the Departmental enquiry in a peace meal manner, according to their whims and fancies.
(iv) The delay in framing charges will definitely cause prejudice to the Appellant, as he has put forth his defence during the first enquiry and also in the trial before the Criminal Court.
(v) Pending Writ Appeal, the Appellant was acquitted by a Competent Criminal Court after full fledged trial. But acquittal in Criminal proceedings is not a bar for the Department to initiate Departmental proceedings on the same set of facts. But, in the present case, the acquittal in Criminal case has to be considered in favour of the Appellant, as he has faced domestic enquiry on earlier occasion and suffered punishment and the issue raised in the present Charge Memo was given up seven years ago.
(vi) If the present Charge Memo is not quashed, the Appellant will be forced to another enquiry on the basis of the Complaint dated 8.11.2001 and on the same set of facts and materials.?
10. The learned Senior Counsel has further relied upon the judgment of the Honourable Single Judge of this Court in the case of Marimuthu Vs. The State represented by the Inspector of Police, Uthamapalayam Police Station, Theni District reported in 2013-1-L.W.(Crl.) 312, wherein it has been held as follows:
?22.Be that as it may, the fact remains that the Petitioner/A6 has been acquitted by the trial Court in S.T.C.No.219 of 2012 based on the reason of 'benefit of doubt' being granted to him, on the footing that the prosecution has not established the charges levelled against him and other Accused. The acquittal of the Petitioner/A6 based on 'benefit of doubt' (about which we are concerned in this revision), in the considered opinion of this Court, it is to be construed as one of 'Honorary Acquittal'. Viewed in that backdrop, the Criminal Revision Petition succeeds.?
11. On the question of delay, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on my own judgment in the case of M.Ramanathan Vs. The Secretary to Government, Environment and Forest Department, Secretariat, Chennai ? 600 009 and others reported 2017-1-Writ L.R.726. In the facts of the case, this Court held that there was unexplained delay of 10 years in issuing charge memo and in that case, the long unexplained delay would vitiate the whole proceedings.
12. Having regard to the lengthy arguments that was advanced by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, this Court is inclined to consider the scope of judicial review while entertaining the writ petition as against the charge memo or show cause notice. This Court has already discussed the issue elaborately in W.P.(MD)No.5252 of 2017, dated 25.04.2017 with reference to several judgments of Honourable Supreme Court and has held as follows:
?a) A charge sheet or show cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects or infringe the rights of any party.
b) Ordinarily a Writ Petition should not be entertained against a mere show cause notice or charge sheet as interference at that stage would be premature.
c) However, in some very rare and exceptional cases, the High Court can quash a charge sheet if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or on the ground of unreasonably long unexplained delay causing great prejudice to the delinquent or for some strong reason if the charge memo is wholly illegal.
Even in such cases the gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor that should be taken into consideration before quashing the charge memo.
(d) Charge sheet cannot be quashed on the ground that the facts stated in the charges are erroneous since it is the function of the disciplinary authority to find the correctness or truth of the charges. Court or Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charges as there is no infringement of any fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution.
(e) The question whether the show cause notice was founded on any legal premises is a jurisdictional issue which can also be decided by the authority issuing the charge memo or show cause notice before the aggrieved approach the Court.
(f) In a Writ Petition challenging charge memo, issue is not whether the charge memo can ultimately be sustained.?
13. On the question of delay, even in one of the judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner viz., in Capt.M.Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., and another reported in 1999(II) CTC 579 , it has been categorically held that it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case and in certain cases, of course, the departmental proceedings and the proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously. In the case on hand, the departmental proceedings was not immediately initiated as the petitioner was placed under suspension pursuant to the registration of the criminal case and the criminal case was commenced soon after the alleged incident. However after the criminal trail was over and the verdict, the disciplinary proceedings was initiated. Though there is some delay in the disciplinary proceedings, the delay appears to be on the ground of administrative reasons due to pendency of criminal case. However, it is not the case of the petitioner that serious prejudice was caused to the petitioner on account of the delay. Having regard to the fact that the criminal case was pending, the initiation of disciplinary proceedings after the decision of the criminal Court cannot be faulted especially the respondents in such circumstances are expected to stay the disciplinary proceedings even as per the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Capt.M.Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., and another reported in 1999(II) CTC 579.
14. The next issue was about the sustainability of the charge memo in the light of the petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case, which was filed on the same set of facts and on the basis of the same materials. In the case of Capt.M.Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., and another reported in 1999(II) CTC 579, the Criminal Court has given a categorical finding that the raid conducted at the residence of the accused and the recovery of incriminating articles therefrom are false and that the criminal Court came to the firm conclusion that no search was conducted and there was no recovery made from the residence of the delinquent/accused. However the departmental proceedings were based only on the so called raid conducted and the recovery of incriminating articles therefrom. Hence, there was a basic defect which lead to the Honourable Supreme Court to hold that the department proceedings cannot be allowed to continue based on the raid which was never conducted and the alleged recovery which was found not true by the Criminal Court.
15. The Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police and another Vs. S.Samuthiram reported in (2013)1 Supreme Court Cases 598 has categorically held as follows:
23. We are of the view that the mere acquittal of an employee by a criminal court has no impact on the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Department. The respondent, it may be noted, is a member of a disciplined force and non examination of two key witnesses before the criminal court that is Adiyodi and Peter, in our view, was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case by the Prosecution. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the possibility of winning order P.Ws.1 and 2 in the criminal case cannot be ruled out. We fail to see, why the Prosecution had not examined Head Constables 1368 Adiyodi and 1079 Peter of Tenkasi Police Station. It was these two Head Constables who took the respondent from the scene of occurrence along with P.Ws. 1 and 2, husband and wife, to the Tenkasi Police Station and it is in their presence that the complaint was registered. In fact, the criminal court has also opined hat the signature of PW 1 (husband -
complainant) is found in Ex.P1 -Complaint. Further, the Doctor P.W.8 has also clearly stated before the Enquiry Officer that the respondent was under the influence of liquor and that he had refused to undergo blood and urine tests. That being the factual situation, we are of the view that the respondent was not honourably acquitted by the criminal court, but only due to the fact that PW 1 and PW 2 turned hostile and other prosecution witnesses were not examined.?
24. The meaning of the expression ?honourable acquittal? came up for consideration before this Court in Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions ?honourable acquittal?, ?acquitted of blame?, ?fully exonerated? are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression ?honourably acquitted?. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.
25. In R.P. Kapoor v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787, it was held even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam and another v. Raghava Rajgopalachari reported in 1972 SLR 45, this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in (1934) 61 ILR Cal. 168 which is as follows:
?The expression ?honourably acquitted? is one which is unknown to court of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extra judicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the Government authorities and by the magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what Government authorities term ?honourably acquitted??.
26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rule for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a Criminal Court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so.?
16. In the light of the judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court, the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Marimuthu Vs. The State represented by the Inspector of Police, Uthamapalayam Police Station, Theni District reported in 2013-1-L.W.(Crl.) 312 is no longer good law. Even the observation of the Honourable Division Bench of this Court in the case of R.Rajkumar Vs. The Commissioner of Police, Trichy City, Trichy reported in 2014(2) CTC 769 is distinguishable on facts and the principles extracted in paragraph No.13 of the Honourable Division Bench cannot be applied to the present case particularly having to the facts in the present case and the subsequent judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police and another in S.Samuthiram, reported in (2013)1 Supreme Court Cases 598.
17. Coming to the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of G.M.Tank Vs. State of Gujarat and another reported in 2006(3) CTC 494, in this judgment, of course, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that it wold be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow findings recorded in departmental proceedings to stand in a case when the honourable acquittal of the employee in the criminal case on the same set of facts was not considered. In the case before the Honourable Supreme Court, the nature of case launched against the appellant is on the basis of evidence and materials collected against the delinquent in criminal case and the disciplinary proceedings are one and the same.
18. In the present case, the departmental proceedings is yet to commence. It is too early to predict the nature of evidence and materials that will be placed before the disciplinary authority, while holding enquiry. In such circumstances, it is very difficult to accept the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for quashing the charge memo. In none of the judgments referred to above and relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel, it has been held that the findings of the Criminal Court is binding on the disciplinary authority while proceeding with the departmental enquiry. Even the word honorary acquittal has been explained in the later judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Deputy Inspector General of Police and another Vs S.Samuthiram, reported in (2013)1 Supreme Court Cases 598. It has been held in the case of Southern Railway Officers' Association Vs. Union of India and Others reported in 2009(9) SCC 24 that the acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary Authority. The Honourable Supreme Court also reiterated that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent Officer was discharged from all the criminal charges. Since the standard of proof in a criminal case is high and in the departmental proceedings, findings can be based on the preponderance of probabilities, this Court has no other option, but to follow the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court referred to above.
19. Having regard to the over all view of the facts in the present case and the various judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court cited before this Court and considered by this Court, this Court is of the firm view that the present Writ Petition challenging the charge memo cannot be entertained, as there is no valid reason at this stage to interfere with the departmental proceedings. Hence, this Writ Petition is devoid of any merits and the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to cots. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is also dismissed. Having regard to the delay which had occurred already, this Court directs the respondents to complete the departmental proceedings within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
To
1.The Commissioner of Police, Trichy City, Trichy.
2.The Deputy Commissioner of Police, (Crime and Traffic), Trichy City, Trichy.
.