Patna High Court
Raghunath Sharma And Ors. vs The State on 23 January, 1963
Equivalent citations: AIR1963PAT268, 1963CRILJ42
ORDER S.N.P. Singh, J.
1. This application in revision is directed against the order dated the 20th of December, 1961 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Monghyr, Sadar, taking cognizance of a case against the petitioners under Sections 144 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. It appears that, on a first information report filed by one Parmeshwari Singh on the 2nd of April, 1961 the, police officer of Barahiya police station registered a case and took up investigation. It is not necessary to state in any detail the allegations made in the first information report. After completing the investigation, the police, at the first instance, submitted final report false. That final report is dated the 21st of September, 1961. On the 1st of November 1961, the police, however, submitted a charge-sheet against the petitioners under Sections 144 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code. It appears from the order sheet of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that the final report which had been submitted by the police did not reach him till the 15th of November, 1961, and, on that date, the Magistrate adjourned the case for the 1st of December, 1961. On the 1st of December 1961, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed the following order:
"Three accused filed hazri and 19 accused are represented through their lawyer. Final report -- civil dispute --under Section 144/379, I. P. C. has been submitted by the I.O. in this case. But from office notes of the D.I. it appears that under orders of the S.P., I.O, has been directed to submit C.S. A petition has been filed on behalf of the accused stating that F.R. has been received in this case and pray that it may be accepted and they may be discharged.
A protest petition on behalf of the informant has already been filed in this case. Put up on 20-12-61. Accused as before."
On the next date, that is the 20th of December, 1961, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed the impugned order, taking cognizance of the case under Sections 144 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners raised only one contention, namely, that the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate taking cognizance is bad in law because the police had no authority to submit a charge-sheet when the investigation had been closed and a final report had already been submitted. It was submitted that after that, after completing the investigation, the police has submitted the final report on the 21st of September, 1961 tinder Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thereafter, the police had absolutely no power to submit the charge sheet on the basis of which the Sub-Divisional Magistrate took cognizance in the case. It appears that the charge-sheet was subsequently submitted by the officer in charge of Barahyia police station on the direction of the Superintendent of Police. The question, therefore, which falls for consideration is whether the Superintendent of Police, who was an officer superior In rank to the officer in charge of the police station, had the authority to direct the submission of a charge-sheet when the officer In charge of the police station had already submitted the final report as directed by the Divisional Inspector of Police. In support of his contention that the Superintendent of Police had no such power, Mr. Sinha cited the cases of Umesh Chunder Roy v. Satish Chundra Roy, 22 Cal WN 69 : (AIR 1918 Cal 485), Shukadeva Sahay v. Hamid Miyan, AIR 1928 Pat 585, Hanuman v. Raj, AIR 1951 Raj 131 and Emperor v. Air, AIR 1932 Lah 611. Mr. Sinha also relied on certain observations In the case of H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi. (S) AIR 1955 SC 196. In my opinion, none of the cases cited by learned counsel Is directly on the point In the Calcutta case, 22 Cal WN 69 : (AIR 1918 Cal 485), there was only an observation that It was doubtful whether the discretion vested in the investigating officer by the provisions of Section 170 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be controlled by the Superintendent of Police, or could be controlled after the discretion had been exercised, in that case, after the submission of the charge-sheet by the Police, cognizance was taken. Subsequently on an application tiled by the Public Prosecutor, the prosecution was allowed to be withdrawn under Section 494 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Probably, one of the reasons which the Magistrate gave for allowing the prayer of the Public Prosecutor was that the Superintendent of Police had moved in the matter. Certainly, the High Court, on the facts of that case, rightly took the view that that was not a valid reason for allowing the prayer for withdrawal. In the Patna case, AIR 1928 Pat 585, referred to above, It was held that the District Magistrate had no power under the Code of Criminal Procedure to call for a charge-sheet after the final report was put up before a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and was disposed of by him. Reference was made to the following observation made in that case:
"The report in question was submitted to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in the usual and legal way. It was the final report in the case, final in the sense that the investigation had been 'completed', to use the word of Section 173. That section requires that the police officer shall submit his final report to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report."
Learned counsel, on the above observation, contended that, in the instant case also, as the investigation had been "completed", the subsequent charge-sheet by the police was incompetent. In my opinion the observation made in that case does not in any way lend support to the contention raised by learned counsel. As I have already indicated, what was held in that case was that once the Magistrate who was competent to take cognizance of the offence under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had disposed of the final report submitted by the Police, the District Magistrate had no power under the Code of Criminal Procedure to call for a charge-sheet. In that connection, Jawala Prasad, J. referred to the provisions of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the Lahore case, AIR 1932 Lah 611, it was held that, when a case had been put up before a Magistrate under Section 173 of the Code and was pending before him, the District Magistrate could not, from information received from outsiders or otherwise direct the police to make further Inquiries and, as a result of those inquiries, direct the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the case. It was further observed that the police had no power to Institute further investigation with a view to find evidence in favour of accused. With due respect, I do not agree with the observation made in that case that the police had no power to institute further investigation even with a view to find evidence in favour of accused. Apart from that, the Lahore case, AIR 1932 Lah 611 is not at all directly on the point, as there was no question of submission of another report by the police after the submission of the final report. Following the decision of the Lahore case, AIR 1932 Lah 611, It was held In the Rajasthan case, AIR 1951 Raj 131, also that the action of police in resuming Investigation and putting up a new challan against the accused as a result of further Investigation was unauthorised and unlawful. In the Division Bench decision of this Court In the case of the State of Bihar v. Sher Bahadur, (Criminal Revn, Nos. 673 and 675 of 1957, disposed of on the 2nd February I960) (Pat), It was observed as follows:
"Further Investigation, subsequent fo the submission of charge-sheet has nowhere been prohibited In the Code of Criminal Procedure, and there are several authorities to support such a course. It depends upon the information that the investigating police officer may get after ho submits a charge-sheet."
It is, therefore, not possible to accept the view of the Lahore High Court and the Rajasthan High Court that, in no case, after the submission of the report under Section 173 of the Code, there can be further investigation. Mr. Sinha, however, submitted before me that, in the instant case, the charge-sheet was submitted not as a result of further investigation but simply because the Superintendent of Police directed the submission of a charge-sheet. In the case of AIR 1955 SC 196, it was held that, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, investigation consists generally of the following steps: (1) Proceeding to the spot, (2) Ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case, (3) Discovery and arrest of the suspected, offender, (4) Collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence which may consist of (a) the examination of various persons (including the accused) and the reduction of their statements into writing, if the officer thinks fit, (b) the search of places or seizure of things considered necessary for the investigation and to be produced at the trial, and (5) Formation of the opinion as to whether on the material collected there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and if so taking the necessary steps for the same by the filing of a charge-sheet under Section 173. On the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court, it must, therefore, be held that the formation of the opinion on the materials already collected and taking steps for the filing of a charge-sheet are also steps towards the investigation of a case. If the police officer was competent to investigate the case even after the submission of the final report and if the formation of opinion on the materials available and the filing of a charge-sheet are nothing but steps towards the investigation of the case, I find no justification to hold that the officer in charge of the police station had no power to submit the charge-sheet. Section 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:
"Police-officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station may exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station."
It cannot be doubted that, under the provisions of this section, the Superintendent of Police was competent to supervise the Investigation and to give any direction to the officer in charge of the police station regarding the investigation of the case. In the instant case, the Superintendent of Police has done nothing but to give a direction to the officer in charge of the police station for submission of a charge-sheet which was nothing but a step towards the investigation of the case. In my opinion, therefore, the submission of the charge-sheet by the officer in charge of the police station on the direction of the Superintendent of Police was not illegal.
4. I may mention here that the Magistrate had not passed any order on the basis of the final report. On the date the Magistrate passed the impugned order, there ware three materials before him, namely, the final report the charge-sheet and the protest petition filed by the complainant. In his order, however, he only mentioned about the charge-sheet. My considered view is that it was within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to act on the basis of the charge-sheet submitted by the Police. I have already given my reason for holding that the charge-sheet which was subsequently submitted by the police was not illegal. In the view which I have taken, I am fortified, by a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Rama Shanker v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 All 525. It was held in that case that no illegality was committed by an investigating officer in submitting a charge-sheet after previously submitting a final report.
5. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any substance in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners. This application is, accordingly, dismissed.