Uttarakhand High Court
Laxmi Datt Binwal vs State Of Uttarakhand And Others on 31 May, 2019
Equivalent citations: AIR 2019 UTTARAKHAND 148, AIRONLINE 2019 UTR 112
Author: Alok Kumar Verma
Bench: Ramesh Ranganathan, Alok Kumar Verma
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT
NAINITAL
Special Appeal No. 551 of 2019
Laxmi Datt Binwal ..............Appellant
Vs.
State of Uttarakhand and others ...........Respondents
Citations:
(1) (2018) 5 SCC 462
(2) (2007) 8 SCC 418
(3) (2014) 3 SCC 760
(4) AIR 1996 SC 11
(5) AIR 1994 SC 393
(6) (2007) 4 SCC 517
(7) (2006) 10 SCC 236
(8) 2005 7 JT 214
(9) 1991 1 JT 605
(10) (2012) 6 SCC 464
(11) (2004) Suppl. 1 JT 502
(12) (1993) 1 SCC 445
(13) (2000) 2 SCC 617
(14) AIR 2006 SC 469
(15) AIR 2007 SC 437
(16) (2016) 15 SCC 272
(17) 1990 4 JT 601
(18) (1985) 8 SCR 909
(19) (2016) 8 SCC 622
(20) (2005) 1 CTLJ 353 (Delhi)
(21) (2003) 4 SCC 579
(22) AIR 2012 SC 2915
(23) AIR 2005 Delhi 247
(24) (1988) 1 AC 858
(25) (2001) 8 SCC 491
(26) Bernard Schwartz, in Administrative Law, 2nd Edn., p.584
(27) (2005) 6 SCC 138
(28) (2010) 14 SCC 253
(29) (1990) 3 SCC 280.
(30) (1990) 3 SCC 287
(31) (1997) 7 SCC 592.
(32) (1981) 1 SCC 568.
(33) (1997) 1 SCC 738.
Coram : Hon'ble Ramesh Ranganathan, C.J.
Hon'ble Alok Kumar Verma, J.
Ramesh Ranganathan, C.J. (Oral) Heard Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. B.S. Parihar, Standing Counsel for 2 the State/respondent No.1, Mr. S.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.2 to 4 and Mr. Sanpreet Azmani, learned counsel for respondent No.5.
2. This appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.2982 of 2018 (M/S) dated 08.05.2019. The appellant herein invoked the jurisdiction of this Court seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the Tender Technical Committee dated 06.09.2018 whereby the technical bid submitted by the petitioner, pursuant to the notice inviting tender dated 08.06.2018, had been rejected in an illegal and arbitrary manner; a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to declare the petitioner as a qualified bidder, and consider the claim of the petitioner for allotment of the road construction work from Takkhandak to Blatari under the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana, as the financial bid submitted by him was the lowest.
3. The appellant-writ petitioner participated in the bids invited by the Uttarakhand Rural Road Development Agency (the "URRDA" for short). The said notice inviting tenders dated 08.06.2018 was published by the office of Chief Engineer, URRDA inviting bids through electronic tendering system for relaying of the road under the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana for the work indicated in the notice, including their maintenance, from eligible and approved contractors registered with the Public Works Department or the Central Public Works Department or its equivalent. The petitioner submitted their bid for package No.UT-04-35 3 Takkhandak to Balatari MR State-I, which is an XVI stage work, having a length of 12.600 kms. The estimated cost of construction of the work was Rs.753.65 lakhs, and the maintenance cost was Rs.45.80, i.e. a total cost of Rs.799.45 lakhs.
4. The tender process consisted of a two bid system, the first relating to technical evaluation, and the second stage for evaluation of the financial bid. Only those bidders who stood qualified in the first phase (technical evaluation) were eligible to be considered for evaluation of their financial bids. The appellant-writ petitioner's bid was rejected at the technical evaluation stage. Aggrieved by the proceedings dated 06.09.2018, the writ petition was filed resulting in the order under appeal being passed.
5. In the order under appeal, the Single Judge has recorded that Section 3 of the Standard Bidding Documents (SBD) related to information regarding bid capacity (works for which bids had been submitted and works which were yet to be completed) as on the date of this bid. The table below Clause 1.3.3 read as under :-
Existing commitments and on-going
construction work:
Description Place & Contract Name & Value of Stipulated Value of Anticipated
of work State No. & Address Contract period of works Date of
Date of (Rs. In completion remaining completion
Employer lakhs) to be
completed
(Rs.
Lakhs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
6. Among the certificates, enclosed to the bid
document, in terms of clause 1.3.3, was the certificate issued by the Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam in which the 4 last column (relating to anticipated date of completion) was left blank. By the order dated 06.09.2018, impugned in the writ petition, the appellant-writ petitioner's technical bid was non-suited only on the ground that the experience certificate furnished by him was not in terms of the prescribed format in clause 1.3.3. While the other objection related to income tax return for the year 2015- 16 to be submitted by the petitioner alongwith the balance sheet, the appellant-writ petitioner's reply thereto appears to have been accepted. The only ground of rejection of the bid was that the certificate enclosed by him was not in the format stipulated in clause 1.3.3.
7. In the order under appeal dated 08.05.2019, the learned Single Judge observed that non- furnishing the information, contemplated in clause 1.3.3 pertaining to the particulars regarding ongoing existing work, amounted to the petitioner failing to supply complete information; and the Technical Evaluation committee has not committed any error which called for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge upheld the impugned order of rejection dated 06.09.2018 in terms of the order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No.999 of 2018 dated 04.01.2019 wherein it was held that non furnishing of correct and complete income tax particulars for the last three years, which was mandatory in terms of Clause 4.4.B for the bidders, was fatal. This order of the Division Bench was affirmed by the Honb'le Apex court in SLP No.4318-4319/2019 vide judgment dated 15.02.2019. The learned Single Judge concluded that, since the appellant-writ petitioner had not enclosed 5 information in terms of the format prescribed in clause 1.3.3, his bid was rightly rejected by the Technical Evaluation Committee.
8. Shri Rakesh Thapliyal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellant-writ petitioner, would submit that the certificate produced by the petitioner was in strict compliance with the format prescribed in clause 1.3.3; while it is true that the column, relating to anticipated date of completion of the work, was left blank, rejection of the appellant-writ petitioner's bid was not for leaving the column blank, but on the ground that it was not in the prescribed format; the experience certificate was, in fact, furnished in the prescribed format; failure on part of Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam (which had issued the certificate) to fill up the last column, in terms of the format prescribed in clause 1.3.3, cannot result in the appellant-writ petitioner's bid being rejected for no fault of theirs; the petitioner's bid was rejected only to benefit the successful bidder; while the earlier objection related to the failure to furnish income tax returns, the subsequent rejection was on a different ground altogether; and with respect to the successful bidder, the authority had accepted the affidavit filed by him later.
9. On the other hand Mr. S.S. Chauhan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the URRDA, would submit that the format, prescribed in terms of Clause 1.3.3, has relevance to the execution of the work; the said table requires the bidders to furnish details of the description of the work, the place & state, the contract No. and date, 6 the value of the contract (in lakhs) (construction cost), the stipulated period of completion; the value of the work remaining to be completed (in Lakhs) (Construction Cost), and the anticipated date of completion; the purpose of calling for such an experience certificate is to ascertain the previous experience of the bidder including regarding the timely execution of the work; the petitioner has conveniently left the last column "anticipated date of completion" blank; a bare reading of the certificate would show that, though the contract was entered into with the petitioner on 11.09.2017, he had not even commenced the work when he had submitted the present bid; and, while the order of rejection does state that the previous experience certificate is not in the prescribed format, what the authority meant was that the certificate submitted, in terms of clause 1.3.3, was not complete as the last column was left blank.
10. While we find considerable force in the submission of Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, learned counsel for the appellant, that the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court, in SPA No. 999 of 2018, dated 04.01.2019, has no application to the case on hand, since in that case the bidder had challenged only certain grounds of rejection as against the several grounds on which his technical bid was rejected; and while the court found merit in his contention, regarding the bid conditions which had been challenged in the writ petition, he was not granted relief on the ground that the other defects, pointed out by the Technical Evaluation Committee, had not even been subjected to challenge in the writ petition.
711. Let us now, albeit in brief, examine the scope of interference, in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, with the evaluation of tenders, and awarding of contracts pursuant thereto. Courts must remain conscious that the scope of judicial review in matters, regarding the validity of the qualification requirements stipulated in the tender notification, is extremely limited. In economic and commercial matters, decisions are taken by the government or its instrumentalities keeping in view several factors, and it is not possible for the Courts to consider competing claims and conflicting interests, and conclude which way the balance tilts. There are no objective, justiciable or manageable standards to judge these issues nor can such questions be decided on a priori considerations. (Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal2). All that the participating bidders are entitled to is a fair, equal and non discriminatory treatment. (Maa Binda Express Carrier v. North- East Frontier Railway3; Tata Cellular v. Union of India4; Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd.5; and Jagdish Mandal6).
12. The Court does not sit in appeal, but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. Although the terms of the invitation to tender is not open to judicial scrutiny as it is in the contractual realm, Courts can examine the award of contract, by the Government or its agencies, to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. (Noble Resources Ltd. vs. State of Orissa7; Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan8; G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council9; Tejas Constructions & Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Council, Sendhwa10; Directorate of Education v. Educomp Datamatics Ltd.11). There are inherent limitations in the exercise of judicial review of contractual powers as the Government must have the freedom of contract and a free-play in the joints. The duty to act fairly will vary in extent, depending upon the nature of cases to which the said principle is sought to be applied. The State has the right to refuse 8 the lowest or any other tender, provided it tries to get the best person or the best quotation, and the power to choose has not been exercised for collateral purposes or in infringement of Article 14. (Tata Cellular4).
13. When the power of judicial review is invoked, in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. The limited scope of judicial review by the High Court envisages examination of the question whether there is any material irregularity in the decision making process or whether the decision to reject the tender is irrational, unreasonable or arbitrary. If the decision relating to the award of contract is bonafide and in public interest, Courts will not interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer is made out. The power of judicial review will not be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or a contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. (Jagdish Mandal6; Sterling Computers Ltd12; Tata Cellular4; Raunaq International Ltd.5; Air India Ltd. vs. Cochin International Airport Ltd13; Association of Registration Plates vs. Union of India14; and B.S.N. Joshi v. Nair Coal Services Ltd15).
14. Commercial transactions, of a complex nature, involve balancing and weighing all relevant factors, and a final decision is taken on an overall view of the transaction. (Air India Ltd.13). It is common knowledge, in the competitive commercial field, that technical bids, pursuant to the notice inviting tenders, are scrutinised by technical experts and sometimes third-party assistance from those unconnected with the owner's organisation is taken. This ensures 9 objectivity. Bidder's expertise and technical capability and capacity must be left to be assessed by experts. (Municipal Corporation, Ujjain and another1; Montecarlo Ltd. v. NTPC Ltd.16).
15. The High Court should, normally, exercise judicial restraint unless illegality or arbitrariness, on the part of the employer, is apparent on the face of the record. (B.S.N. Joshi15; Jagdish Mandal6). The award of contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision, considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. (Air India Ltd.13). But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down, and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. The Court can examine the decision making process, and interfere if it is found vitiated by malafides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. (Air India Ltd.13). While contractual matters are not beyond the realm of judicial review, its application is limited (Noble Resources Ltd.7; Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service17; and LIC of India v. Escorts Ltd.18) primarily to the infirmity in the decision making process, and whether it is reasonable and rational or arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (Sterling Computers Ltd12).
16. The lawfulness of the decision of the Tender issuing authorities can be questioned on very limited grounds, but the soundness of the decision cannot be questioned, otherwise this Court would be taking over the function of the tender issuing authority, which it cannot. (Central Coalfields Ltd. vs. SLL-SML19; Municipal Corporation, Ujjain1). Exercise of power of judicial review would be called for, if the approach is arbitrary or mala fide, or the procedure adopted is meant to favour some one. The decision-making process should 10 ensure that the said maladies are kept at bay. But where a decision is taken that is manifestly in consonance with the language of the tender document, or subserves the purpose for which the tender is floated, Courts should exercise restraint. Technical evaluation or comparison by the Court is impermissible. The owner should be allowed to carry out the purpose, and should be allowed some free play in the joints. (Montecarlo Ltd.16; Municipal Corporation, Ujjain1).
17. Courts are generally, slow to interfere in such matters, unless it is shown that the decision is tainted by lack of fairness in procedure, illegality and irrationality. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision by an executive authority, but the decision making process itself. (Gharda Chemicals Limited vs. Central Warehousing Corporation20; Indian Railway Construction. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar21). The actions of the State or its instrumentalities are amenable to judicial review only to the extent that they must act validly for a discernible reason, and not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably, fairly and in public interest in awarding the contract, interference by the Court is limited. (M/s. Michigan Rubber (I) Ltd. vs. The State of Karnataka22). A discretion should be conceded to the authorities, entering into contracts, giving them liberty to assess the overall situation for the purpose of taking a decision as to whom the contract should be awarded, and on what terms. If the decisions have been taken in a bona fide manner, although not strictly following the norms laid down by Courts, such decisions are upheld on the principle that Courts, while judging the validity of executive decisions, must grant certain measure of freedom of "play in the joints" to the executive. Judicial interference, in such cases, would amount to encroachment on the exclusive right of the executive to take a decision. (Sterling Computers Ltd.12; Municipal Corporation, Ujjain1).
1118. The Government must have freedom of contract. A free play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere. The decision must, however, be free of unreasonableness or arbitrariness. It must not be affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. The Court is entitled to investigate the action taken by the authority to ascertain whether or not they have taken into account matters which they ought not to have taken into account or, conversely, have refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matter which they ought to take into account. Once this question is answered in favour of the authority, it may still be possible to say that, although the authority had confined its decision within the four corners of matters which they ought to consider, they have, nevertheless, come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to. In such a case also, the Court can interfere. (Dhingra Construction Co. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi23; Tata Cellular4; R. v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council, ex p Chetnik Developments Ltd24).
19. Even in contractual matters, a public authority does not have unfettered discretion, and while some extra discretion is to be conceded to such authorities in contracts with a commercial element, they are nonetheless bound to follow the norms recognised by Courts, while dealing with public property, to avoid unreasonable and arbitrary decisions being taken by them. While the authority has certain elbow room in exercising its discretion in contractual matters, the discretion conferred on them must be exercised within the four corners of the law, and not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. (Union of India v. Dinesh Engineering Corpn25; Dhingra Construction Co.23).
20. If the scope of review is too broad, agencies are turned into little more than a medium for transmission of cases to the Courts. That 12 would destroy the value of the agencies created to secure the benefit of special knowledge acquired through continuous administration in complicated fields. At the same time, the scope of judicial inquiry must not be so restricted that it prevents full inquiry into the question of legality. If that question cannot be properly explored by the judge, the right to review becomes meaningless. 'It makes judicial review of administrative orders a hopeless formality for the litigant. It reduces the judicial process in such cases to a mere feint. (Bernard Schwartz, in Administrative Law, 2nd Edn., p.58426; Dhingra Construction Co23).
21. Before interfering in tenders or contractual matters, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court should pose to itself the following questions : (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is malafide or is intended to favour someone or the process adopted or the decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the Court can say : 'the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with the relevant law could have reached'; and (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (Jagdish Mandal6; M/s. Michigan Rubber (I) Ltd.22; Master Marine Services (P) Ltd. v. Metcalfe & Hodgkinson (P) Ltd.27; Himachal Pradesh Housing and Urban Development Authority v. Universal Estate28; and Tejas Constructions & Infrastructure (P) Ltd10). In the absence of allegations of malafides in their conduct, the Court must proceed on the footing that the State or its instrumentalities have acted bonafide. (Star Enterprises v. City and Industrial Development Corpn. of Maharashtra Ltd29).
22. Courts can interfere when the terms of invitation to tender or the award of contract is arbitrary, discriminatory or malafide, or if it has no nexus with the object it seeks to achieve. The power of judicial 13 review should be exercised with great care and circumspection, and not merely because it feels the measure to be incorrect. Judicial intervention would be warranted only when overwhelming public interest so requires it. (Dhingra Construction Co.23; Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corpn30; Educomp Datamatics Ltd.11; MP Oil Extraction v. State of MP31; Air India Ltd13).
23. The Court cannot usurp or abdicate, and the parameters of judicial review must be clearly defined and never exceeded. If the Government has acted fairly, even if it has faltered in its wisdom, the Court cannot, as a super auditor, take them to task. The function of judicial review is limited to testing whether the action has been fair and free from the taint of unreasonableness, and has substantially complied with the norms. (Fertiliser Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.), Sindri v. Union of India32; Raunaq International Ltd5). There are inherent limitations in the exercise of the power of judicial review. The right to choose cannot be considered as an arbitrary power. Judicial quest has been to find the right balance between discretion to decide matters and the need to remedy any unfairness. (Tata Cellular4; Raunaq International5 Ltd.). Judicial review of contractual transactions by Governmental bodies is permissible only to prevent arbitrariness, favouritism or use of power for collateral purposes. (Asia Foundation & Construction Ltd v. Trafalgar House Construction (I) Ltd33).
24. It is not open to the Court to independently evaluate the technical bids and financial bids of the parties as an appellate authority in coming to its conclusion. The Court should, ordinarily, exercise judicial restraint unless the threshold of malafides, intention to favour someone or bias, arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity are met. (Municipal Corporation, Ujjain1).Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial 14 transactions/contracts. If the decision relating to award of contract is in public interest, the Courts will not, in the exercise of the power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in awarding the contract is made out. Attempts by unsuccessful bidders with an artificial grievance, and to get the purpose defeated by approaching the Court on some technical and procedural lapses, should be handled by Courts with firmness. Exercise of the power of judicial review should be avoided if there is no irrationality or arbitrariness. (Municipal Corporation, Ujjain1).
25. Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind, let us now examine whether the learned Single Judge was justified in refusing to interdict the action of the respondents in rejecting the appellant-writ petitioner's bids at the technical evaluation stage.
26. A bare reading of the experience certificate, submitted by the appellant-writ petitioner, would show that he had left the last column of the table, which related to the anticipated date of completion, blank. While Shri Rakesh Thaplilyal, learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner, would submit that it was not possible for the bidder to state with precision as to when the work would be completed, the fact remains that the appellant-petitioner has, himself, furnished yet another certificate issued by the Executive Engineer, Champawat dated 03.08.2018 wherein the anticipated date of completion has been shown as 03.01.2019. It is evident, therefore, that the appellant-writ petitioner has not filled up the column relating to the anticipated date of completion, in the certificate issued by the Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam, only because he had not adhered to the stipulated period of completion.
1527. We find considerable force in the submission of Mr. S.S. Chauhan, learned counsel appearing for the URRDA, that a bare reading of the said experience certificate would show that the appellant-writ petitioner has not even commenced execution of the work even by June, 2018, though the contract was entered into on 11.09.2017. The said certificate issued by Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam records the contract date as 11.09.2017, and the stipulated period of completion as nine months which, from the contract date, ended on 11.06.2018 even before the petitioner had submitted his bid in the first week of August, 2018. Further the value of the contract, as recorded in the certificate, is Rs.1,37,43,357.18, and the value of work, remaining to be completed, is the very same amount i.e. Rs.1,37,43,354.18. This clearly shows that, as per the certificate, though the period stipulated for completion is nine months, the appellant-writ petitioner had not even commenced the work even on the date on which the experience certificate was submitted by him along with his bid document. If information, regarding the anticipated dated of completion, had been furnished, it would have reflected the extent of delay in executing the work; and since the experience of the contractor in timely execution of the work was sought for, in the aforementioned table, the respondents cannot be faulted for refusing to accept the appellant-writ petitioner's technical bid since the certificate furnished by him was not complete.
1628. The appellant-writ petitioner has produced an experience certificate, one of whose columns are blank, along with their bid documents, resulting in their being disqualified at the technical evaluation stage. In Municipal Corporation, Ujjain1, the tenderers were required to disclose the show-cause notices issued against them in the column specified in the bid document. Respondent no. 1 had left the said column blank, though show-cause notices had been issued against them. It is in this context that the Supreme Court observed:-
"...It was clearly stated in the NIT that the tenderer was required to reveal the show-cause notices against it. Despite the specific column pertaining to the same in the bid document, Respondent No. 1 had left the said column blank. Once there is a specific Clause requiring the mentioning of the show-cause notices for the breach of contract, it was incumbent upon the tenderer to provide accurate information. As Respondent No. 1 has not done so, and has suppressed vital information, Respondent No. 2 has rightly allotted it 5 marks for the same..."
(emphasis supplied).
29. As held by the Supreme Court in BVG India Ltd.1, by providing an experience certificate, leaving the column regarding the anticipated date of completion of the work blank, the appellants-writ petitioner has failed to disclose relevant information. The respondents were, therefore, entitled to reject the bids of the appellants-writ petitioners, even at the technical evaluation stage, for not disclosing vital information in the enclosures to their bidding form.
30. Whether the appellant-writ petitioner should have been disqualified on this score, or whether a lenient view ought to have been taken, are matters for the respondents to decide, and not for this Court to direct. Having failed to disclose relevant information, 17 by leaving a column blank the appellant-writ petitioner cannot, thereafter, be heard to contend that their technical bids should have been treated as responsive.
31. Even otherwise the jurisdiction which this Court exercises, in an intra-court appeal, is extremely limited. The learned Single Judge is not a Court subordinate, since both he and the Division Bench exercise jurisdiction only under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If two views are possible, and the Division Bench is satisfied that the view taken by the learned Single Judge is a possible view, it would refrain from interference even if it is satisfied that the other possible view, canvassed before it by the appellant-writ petitioner, is more attractive. It is only if we were to hold that the view taken by the learned Single Judge is not a view which could have been taken at all, would interference be warranted. We find it difficult to hold that the view taken by the learned Single Judge, in upholding the action of the respondents in rejecting the technical bid submitted by the appellant-writ petitioner, is not even a possible view.
32. The special appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.
33. Let a certified copy of this order be furnished to the parties concerned today itself on payment of usual charges.
(Alok Kumar Verma, J.) (Ramesh Ranganathan, C.J.) 31.05.2019 JKJ/Sanjay