Kerala High Court
Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs West Coast Industrial Company Limited on 25 March, 1987
Equivalent citations: [1987]168ITR72(KER)
Author: T. Kochu Thommen
Bench: T. Kochu Thommen
JUDGMENT T. Kochu Thommen, J.
1. Pursuant to the direction of this court in O.P. No. 9391 of 1982, the following two questions have been referred to us by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench :
"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the subsidy received from the Rubber Board is income of the assessee ?
2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the reopening of the assessment under Section 147(b) is valid ?"
2. In the light of our decision in I.T.R. Nos. 352 and 353 of 1982 (CIT v. Malayalam Plantations Ltd. [1987] 168 ITR 63), we answer question No. I in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
3. For the assessment year 1974-75, the assessment was completed without taking into account the sum of Rs. 12,280 received by the assessee during the relevant accounting year as rubber replantation subsidy. The officer subsequently received from the Central Board of Direct Taxes ("the Board") Circular No. 75(DI)(IT)(F. No. Audit-9/78-79) DIT, dated February 28, 1979, containing information regarding the decision of the Supreme Court in V.S.S.V. Meenakshi Achi v. CIT [1966] 60 ITR 253, to the effect that rubber replantation subsidy received by an assessee was income in his hands. On receipt of that information and pursuant to the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ("the Act"), the officer reopened the assessment and added the subsidy amount as income of the assessee. The assessee appealed against that order. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner reversed the order stating that there was no valid ground for sustaining it. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal by the Revenue stating that, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT [1979] 119 ITR 996, the Income-tax Officer was not justified in acting upon the circular of the Board as it did not contain any information within the meaning of Section 147(b) of the Act, but only an opinion.
4. We have carefully considered the circular. Although an opinion is mentioned in a certain portion of the circular, the principal object of the circular is to convey the information that the Supreme Court has in V.S.S.V. Meenakshi Achi v. CIT [1966] 60 ITR 253, held that rubber replantation subsidy is income in the hands of the recipient, and is, therefore, assessable as such. This is the judicial pronouncement on the point by the highest court of the land and the object of the Board's circular is to convey that information. It is not the object of the circular to express an opinion, for no such opinion was called for. Once the Supreme Court has pronounced upon the matter, the question is, in the absence of subsequent overriding legislation, concluded and the opinion of any other person is of no relevance. Whatever opinion may have been expressed in the circular, whether it is the opinion of the Board or any other agency, such opinion is of no consequence or relevance, apart from a mere reference to the authoritative pronouncement on the matter by the Supreme Court. The object of the circular is, therefore, merely conveyance of the information regarding that pronouncement by the highest court of the land. We do not, therefore, see any inconsistency between the decision of the Income-tax Officer to reopen the assessment and the principle stated by the Supreme Court in Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT [1979] 119 ITR 996. The principle is that while the Income-tax Officer should not be influenced by the opinion of the Board or the audit party, he can take note of the information communicated to him. He acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and must, therefore, act independently and on the strength of the information available to him. The mere fact that a circular contains, apart from the information, the opinion of the writer, would not by itself make the information invalid or unacceptable, provided it is separable from the opinion. While the officer must eschew the opinion, he is entitled to act on the information communicated.
5. The officer acted, in our view, perfectly within his jurisdiction when he issued notice under Section 148 and proceeded to reassess in terms of Section 147(b). We have no doubt that he acted independently and on the basis of information within the meaning of Section 147(b).
6. Accordingly, we answer question Mo. 2 in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
7. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in this tax referred case.
8. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.