Jharkhand High Court
Rudol Beck vs State Of Jharkhand on 19 April, 2012
Author: R. K. Merathia
Bench: R. K. Merathia, D. N. Upadhyay
Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 343 of 2004
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Against the judgment of conviction dated 15.7.2003 and order of
sentence dated 16.7.2003 passed by Shri Raj Narayan Tiwari,
Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C. No. IV, Gumla in Sessions Trial No.
250 of 2000.
Rudol Beck ... ... Appellant
Versus
The State of Jharkhand ... ... Respondent
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For the Appellant : Mr. Ravi Prakash, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Amaresh Kumar, A.P.P.
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PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R. K. MERATHIA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D. N. UPADHYAY
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By Court: This appeal has been filed against the judgment of conviction
dated 15.7.2003 and order of sentence dated 16.7.2003 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C. No. IV, Gumla in Sessions Trial No. 250 of 2000 convicting the appellant under Section 302 of I.P.C. and sentencing him to undergo R.I. for life.
2. The prosecution case in short is that Khristina Minz (P.W. 2) lodged a fard beyan on 6.8.2000 at 9:30 A.M. that on 5.8.2000 the wife of Ranjan Yayak - Rajmait Devi (P.W. 1) informed her that some body has killed her husband. Then she went at the place of occurrence and found the dead body of her husband. In the meantime, Suman Kumari, one of the villagers (P.W. 3) told her that the appellant has killed her husband by causing Kulhari injury. Then other three persons including P.W. 9 also told her that the appellant has killed her husband. It was further alleged that in the year 1999 Indira Awaas was alloted to the husband of the informant in which the appellant was asking for commission of Rs. one thousand and was threatening with dire consequences, and therefore, he has killed the deceased.
3. Mr. Ravi Prakash, learned counsel appearing for the appellant assailed the impugned judgment on various grounds.
4. On the other hand, Mr. Amaresh Kumar supported the impugned judgment.
5. The prosecution examined 10 witnesses. P.W. 1 is a hearsay witness. She did not say anything about P.W. 3 or that she told her that she had seen the occurrence. Similarly though, P.W. 2 - the informant said in her fard beyan that P.W. 3 Suman Kumari told her that the appellant has killed her husband, but during her evidence, P.W. 2 has not said anything about P.W. 3 or that she told her that the appellant has killed her husband or that she has seen such occurrence, rather the name of P.W. 3 has not come anywhere in the evidence of P.W. 2. P.W. 3 is projected as an eye-witness, but she was aged about five years at the time of alleged occurrence and she was a student of class
1. She said that the appellant assaulted the deceased by Tangi once due to which he fell. She saw the occurrence from a distance of about 100 yards. She identified the appellant. She said that while returning from school, she saw the occurrence. She lastly said that she did not tell anyone about the occurrence. P.W. 4 is a hearsay witness. P.W. 5 and 6 are hostile witness. P.W. 7 is he doctor who conducted post- mortem on the deceased. He found three incised wounds - on the back of neck, over right scapular region and on upper back. Injury no. 1 on the neck was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. The injuries w=ere caused by sharp cutting weapon, might be Tangi. P.W. 8 and 9 have not said anything relevant. P.W. 10 is a formal witness. The other persons named in fard beyan has not been examined, who are said to have told the informant that the appellant killed her husband.
6. Thus, the whole prosecution case is based upon the sole testimony of P.W. 3. who is a child witness. She said that she did not tell about the occurrence to anybody. But in the fard beyan, P.W. 2 said that she was informed by P.W. 3. Then P.W. 2 also did not say anything in her evidence about P.W. 3. In these circumstances, it is not safe to uphold the conviction only on the testimony of P.W. 3 as an eye-witness.
7. In our opinion, the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts, and the appellant deserves the benefit of doubt. Accordingly, the impugned judgment is set aside. The appellant appears to be in jail for about 12 years, is directed to be released, if not wanted in any other criminal case.
(R. K. Merathia, J.) (D. N. Upadhyay, J) Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi The 19th day of April 2012 R.Shekhar/NAFR/Cp.3.