Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Talib Khan And Etc. Etc. vs State Of Rajasthan And Anr. on 9 June, 1987
Equivalent citations: 1988CRILJ266, 1987(2)WLN209
ORDER N.C. Sharma, J.
1. This order will decide 13 Habeas Corpus Petitions Numbers 831, 909, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 966, 1030, 1037 and 1177 of 1987 filed respectively by Talib Khan, Gazi Khan, Gulsher, Meette Khan, Haleem Khan, Sawan Khan. Kande Khan, Achar Khan, Allahrakhia, Jumme Khan, Rahim, Lakhe Khan and Govind Lal in this Court against their detention under 13 separate detention orders, all passed by the District Magistrate, Jaisalmer, on Jan. 7,1987 under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (for short, hereinafter, 'the Act'), in the Central Jail, Jodhpur, as common questions of law and facts are involved in them.
2. In all these 13 Habeas Corpus petitions, the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the respective petitioners revolved around following points:
(i) In all these cases, all the 13 detenus were served detention orders Annexure 1 on the same day i.e. Jan. 7, 1987 and they were detained on that very day. The order of detention Annexure 1 in all these cases, mentions that the District Magistrate was satisfied with respect to the petitioner in each case that with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State, it was necessary to detain him and, accordingly, the District Magistrate directed that each of these 13 petitioners be detained under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act. Although all these detenus were detained under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act on Jan. 7, 1987, but they were not served with the grounds of detention within five days as provided for in Sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act and, thus the grounds of detention were not communicating to them within the statutory period and the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the orders of detention and their continued detention was not afforded to them. No exceptional circumstances existed and no reasons were recorded and communicated to the petitioners for non-communication to them of the grounds on which the orders for their detention had been made before Jan. 16, 1987. Thus, the petitioners were deprived of the earliest opportunity of making a representation against their detention orders to the State Govt. It was on 10th day of the date of detention that the petitioners were communicated by the respondent 2 of the grounds on which the orders for their detention had been made but without there being exceptional circumstances and without recording and communicating the reasons for delay in not communicating the grounds of detention to the detenu within 5 days for their detention;
(ii) The District Magistrate Jaisalmer by virtue of the direction given or delegation made to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 by the State Govt. was only empowered to pass orders of detention for the limited purpose for preventing any person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and not for any other purpose. The reason argued was that while making the direction or delegation, the State Govt. recorded its satisfaction that with a view to prevent any person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order that it was necessary to direct that during the period from Dec. 3, 1986 to Feb. 28, 1987, all the District Magistrates of 27 Districts in Rajasthan, if satisfied as provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 3, exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section. Respondent No. 2 could not, therefore, detain any person except on his satisfaction that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it was necessary to detain him. However, in all these 12 cases, the detention order Annexure 1 specifies that the respondent No. 2 had made orders directing detention of the detenus after being satisfied that with a view to preventing them from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State that it was necessary to detain them;
(iii) The grounds and the basic facts and materials which influenced the respondent 2 in making the orders of detention, were nonexistent, too remote, stale and without basis. There was no proper application of mind and the detention orders were passed mechanically. In most of the grounds communicated by the respondent 2 to the detenus, either the police itself had given the final reports or the detenus had been acquitted after trial by the criminal courts. Even alleged incidents, which are 15 years old, have been included in the grounds. The ground of espionage was very vague and lacked essential particulars and was non-existent;
(iv) The detenus did not know Hindi or English language and the grounds of detention have not been supplied to them in local or Rajasthani language and they have been deprived opportunity of making effective representation; and
(v) The orders of detention have been passed by the respondent 2 mala fide because he had given a press statement that he wanted to give a New Year's gift to the State by way of detention of 35 persons on one single day under the National Security Act, 1980. The satisfaction recorded was only to achieve praise from the State Govt. and despite the fact that satisfaction was based on remote, non-existent, stale and vague grounds.
3. In all these cases, respondent No. 2 has filed his counter-affidavits in reply to the petitions, Respondent 2 in his counter-affidavit, has admitted that the detenus were detained on January, 7, 1987 and the grounds of detention were not served on them within 5 days of making the order but were served on 10th day i.e. Jan. 16, 1987. He has sworn that there was heavy volume of work as papers concerning 35 detenus were to be photostated. The photostat machine at Jaisalmer was hand operated and the dealer was not in a position to give the photostat copies in time. Consequently, the papers were taken to Jodhpur for getting the photostat copies. At Jodhpur also, owing to power failure and heavy volume of work, it took a lot of time to get the papers photostated. He has denied that the grounds, communicated to the detenus for their detention were vague, nonexistent, irrelevant or remote. It is stated that grounds of detention and copies of the documents served on the detenus go to show that respondent No. 2 passed the order of detention on the basis of adequate material available before mm after due application of mind. The confidential reports submitted by various intelligence agencies were withheld under Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act. According to respondent 2, the detenus cannot question his right to claim privilege under Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act and the sufficiency of the grounds on which the privilege has been claimed. He passed the detention orders after considering the documents placed before him and drew reasonable inferences that the activities of the detenus were, prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State and public order. According to respondent 2, the detenus knew Hindi. They never made a request to him that they neither knew Hindi nor English and as such, there was no question of supplying the grounds of detention to the detenus in local or Rajasthan language.
4. One interesting feature in all these cases is that the National Security Act, 1980, was enacted for the reason that at the relevant time, there were prevailing situations of communal disharmony, social tensions, extremist activities, industrial unrest and increasing tendency on the part of various interested parties to engineer agitation on different issues. It was also felt that the antisocial and anti-national elements including sectional, communal and pro-caste elements and also other elements, which adversely influenced and affected the services essential to the community, posed grave challenges to the local authority and sometimes even hold the society to ransom. Considering the complexity and the nature of the problems, particularly in respect of defence, security, public order and services essential to the community, it was considered that the administration will be greatly handicapped in dealing with them in the absence of power of detention, Section 3 of the Act authorises detention of persons with a view to preventing them from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, of the security of India, regulating the presence of any foreigner in India or to make arrangements for his expulsion from India and further with a view to preventing persons from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order OP from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, to make an order directing such persons to be detained. These were the grounds of satisfaction, on the basis of which the detailing authority could order for the detention of persons under the Act to prevent them from acting in any of the above prejudicial manners and preventing them from acting in that manner in a prejudicial way to endanger the above concepts of national security, State security, maintenance of public order and maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. Preventive detention with a view to preventing any person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange and with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods or abetting smuggling of goods, or engaging in transporting, concealing and keeping smuggled goods or dealing in smuggling goods otherwise than by transporting, concealing or keeping smuggled goods or harbouring persons engaged in smuggling goods or in abetting the smuggling of goods do not, at all, fall within the ambit of the National Security Act, 1980. For that purpose, the Parliament enacted a separate legislation commonly called as the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (Central Act No. 52 of 1974). Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act provides for preventive detention of persons indulging in the abovementioned smuggling activities and activities connected or incidental thereto. The power of detention under COFEPOSA Act has been given to the Central Govt. or any officer of the Central Govt. not below the rank of Joint Secretary of the Central Govt. specially empowered for Section 3 by the Central Govt. or the State Govt., or any officer of the State Govt., not below the rank of a Secretary to the State Govt., specially empowered for the purpose of Section 3 by the State Govt. The District Magistrate has no jurisdiction to detain a person under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act with a view to preventing that person from smuggling goods or abetting the sumggling of goods or engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods or harbouring persons engaged in smuggling of goods or in abetting the smuggling of goods. Even the State Govt. cannot delegate powers under the COFEPOSA Act to the District Magistrate nor it has done so. The State Govt. could only delegate the powers under the COFEPOSA Act to an officer of that Govt. not below the rank of Secretary specially empowered for the purpose. If we examine the grounds of detention communicated to all the 13 detenus it is crystal clear that substantially and largely the grounds relate to smuggling of goods by detenus to Pakistan or into India, transporting smuggled goods and harbouring Pak smugglers. To elaborate this, reference may be made to the grounds of detention of Talib Khan (petitioner in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 831/87). The grounds of detention as against him, inter alia, mention that 114 caskets of betal were being smuggled in truck No. RJT 1645 and Talib Khan gave shelter to Pakistani national Lal Mohammed who had entered the territory of India without passport. The other ground is that Talib Khan was challenged sometime in the year 1979 for giving shelter to Pakistani national Rana S/o. Thula Khan, who entered the territory of India without a valid passport for smuggling goods in India from Pakistan and vice versa. There is also a ground that Central Customs Department had registered cases No. 52/1979 and 42/1984 for summoning the petitioner Talib Khan in connection with his special aptitude and involvement in smuggling. There is also allegation that the petitioner was caught by the Border Security Force while sending bottles containing wine to Pakistan. There are also allegations against him that he gave shelter or harboured Pak smugglers. Similarly, some of the grounds of detention against Gazi Khan alias Chhotiya (petitioner in Habeas Corpurs Petition No. 909/87) are that Gazi Khan had not stopped the jeep which was carrying smuggled goods and that he was indulging in smuggling of Narcotics. Grounds of detention communicated to Gulsher (petitioner in Heabeas Corpus Petition No. 919/87), inter alia are that according to the intelligence reports, it had been found that he illegally went to Pakistan, indulged in smuggling and harbouring of smugglers. Grounds given to Mitthe Khan (petitioner in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 920/87), inter alia, were that according to confidential reports, he was indulging in smuggling and harbouring Pak smugglers. It was also mentioned that he went to Pakistan and indulged in smuggling. For Haleem Khan (petitioner in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 921/87), it was mentioned that according to history sheet opened on April 2, 1986, he was indulging in smuggling and carrying of smuggling activities. Similar allegations were made against Sawan Khan (petitioner in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 922/87). For Kande Khan (petitioner in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 923/87), it was, inter alia, alleged that Kande Khan gave shelter to dangerous Pak smugglers. For Achar Khan (petitioner in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 924/87),the grounds given, inter alia, were that he harboured smugglers on Feb. 7, 1978, that he indulged in smuggling, heroine, charas and other narcotics. It was further mentioned that on June 1, 1980, Pak smugglers came with goods at village Bandha and Achar Khan harboured them. For Allaharakhia (petitioner in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 925/87), Rahim (petitioner in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1030/87), Lakhe Khan (petitioner in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1037/87) and Govind Lal (petitioner in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1177/87) also, some of the grounds are that they indulged in smuggling of goods and harboured smugglers. It is thus, clear that in relation to all the 13 detenus, some of the grounds of detention consistently are that they were smuggling goods or abetting the smuggling of goods or indulging in transporting, concealing or keeping smuggled goods or harbouring persons indulged in smuggling goods. These grounds can be grounds of preventive detention under the COFEPOSA Act and not under the National Security Act, 1980. As already stated, the authorities competent to preventively detain persons under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act could either be the State Govt. or an officer of the State Govt. not below the rank of Secretary of that Govt. specilly empowered for the purpose of Section 3 by the State Govt. apart from the Central Govt. The District Magistrate could never be a detaining authority for activities covered by COFEPOSA Act. The detention orders passed by the District Magistrate, Jaisalmer, on Jan. 7,1987, so far as they relate to grounds, which are covered by COFEPOSA Act, are, therefore, clearly without jurisdiction.
5. The Supreme Court in the case of A. K. Roy v. Union of India , made the following observations with regard to the implementation of the law of preventive detention contained in the National Security Act and they may usefully be reproduced:
(1) the concepts "Defence of India" "Security of India", "Security of the State" and "Relations of India with Foreign Countries" are not of very great certainty or definiteness. But in the very nature of things they are difficult to define. Courts must strive to give to those concepts a narrower construction than what the literall words suggest. While construing law of preventive detention like the National Security Act, care must be taken to restrict their application to as few situations as possible. Indeed, that can well be the unstated premise for upholding the constitutionality of clauses like those in Section 3 which are fraught with grave consequences to personal liberty, if construed liberally;
(2) the normal rule is that grounds of detention must be communicated to the detenu without avoidable delay. It is only in order to meet the practical exigencies of the matter that the detaining authority is permitted to communicate the grounds of detention not later than five days ordinarily and not later than ten days if there are exceptional circumstances. If there are any such circumstances, the detaining authority is required by Section 8(1) of the Act to record its reasons in writing. Clause (5) of Article 22 confers upon the detenu the right to be informed of the grounds of detention and the right to be afforded an earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. That right has undoubtedly to be effective.
6. In Shaikh Hanif v. State of West Bengal , the rule of interpretation has been stated thus:
The Act restricted citizen's personal liberty which is a fundamental right under the Constitution. It has, therefore, to be construed strictly as far as possible, in view of the situation and in a manner that does not restrict that right to an extent greater than is necessary to effect that object. The provisions of the Act have, therefore, to be applied with watchful care and circumspection. It is the duty of the Court to see that the efficacy of the limited yet crucial safeguard provided in the law of preventive detention is not lost in mechanical routine, dull casualness and chill indifference on the part of the authorities entrusted with their application.
7. In Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal , the Supreme Court has explained what is meant by "grounds" on which the order is made in the context of the duties cast upon the detaining authority and the corresponding rights accruing to the detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. His Lordship Bhagwati J., speaking for the Court, observed:
The constitutional imperatives enacted in Article 22 are twofold : (1) the detaining authority must, as soon as may be, i.e. as soon as practicable, after the detention order is communicated to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and (2) the detaining authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. These are the barest minimum safeguards which must be observed before an executive authority can be permitted to preventively detain a person and thereby drown his right of personal liberty in the name of public threat. What is the content of these safeguards? What does the word "grounds" mean? Does it mean only the final conclusions raised by the detaining authority on which alone the order of detention can be made or does it include the basic facts and materials from which the conclusions justifying the order of detention are drawn by the detaining authority. What is the natural relation between the requirements of the first and the second safeguards? ...The detaining authority cannot whisk away the person and put him behind bars at its own sweet will. It must have grounds for doing so and both grounds must be communicated to the detenu... If the grounds of detention are not communicated to him, how can he make an effective representation? ...The communication of the grounds of detention is, therefore, also, intended to subserve the purpose of enabling the detenu to make an effective representation. If this be the true reason for providing that the grounds, on which the order of detention is made should be communicated to the detenu, it is obvious that the "grounds" mean all the basic facts and materials which have been taken into account by the detaining authority in making the order of detention and on which, therefore, the order of detention is based.
8. To quote the words of Sarkaria, J. in Golam Malik v. State of West Bengal :
In the context, "grounds" does not merely mean a recital or reproduction of a ground of satisfaction of the authority in the language of Section 3 of the Act, nor is its connotation restricted to the bare statement of conclusion of a fact. It means something more. That something is the factual constitution of the grounds on which the subjective satisfaction of the authority is based. The basic facts and materials particulars, therefore, which are the foundation of the order of detention will also be covered by "grounds" within the contemplation of Article 22(5) and Section 8 and are required to be communicated to the detenu unless their disclosure is considered by the authority to be against the public interest.
9. Again, what would be comprised in "all the basic facts and materials", has been elaborately dealt with by the Supreme Court in Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India where the Court has taken the view that documents, statements and other materials referred to or relied upon in the grounds of detention by the detaining authority in arriving at a subjective satisfaction get incorporated and become the part of the grounds of detention by reference and the right of the detenu to be supplied with the copies of such documents, statements and other materials flows directly as a necessary corollary from the right conferred to the detenu to be afforded an earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention because unless the former right is available, the latter cannot be meaningfully exercised and in that behalf the Supreme Court has gone on to observe that a proper construction of Clause (5) of Article 22 read with Section 3(2) of the COFEPOSA Act, it is necessary for the authority ordering for continued detention that subject to Clause (6) to Article 22, copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention should be furnished to the detenu along with the grounds of detention or in any case even not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded, not later than fifteen days from the date of detenion. If this requirement, of Clause (5) to Article 22 read with Section 3(2) is not satisfied, the continued detention of the detenu would be illegal and void.
10. In Shalini Soni v. Union of India , the Supreme Court had taken the view that Icchu Devi's case (supra) is a further development and elaboration of what was said earlier in Khudiram Das's case (1975 Cri LJ 446) (supra) and the Court confirmed the position that the grounds communicated to the detenu must reveal the whole of the effectual materials considered by the detaining authority and not merely the inferences of the facts arrived at by the detaining authority and that copies of the documents, to which reference is made in the grounds of detention, must be supplied to the detenu as a part of the 'grounds'.
11. In Lallu Bhai Jogi Bhai v. Union of India , the Court observed:
'communication' is a strong word which means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds should be imparted effectively to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands.... If the grounds are only verbally explained to the detenu and not in writing, in a language which he understands, then that purpose is not served and the constitutional mandate in Article 2(5) is infringed.
12. A Division Bench of this Court had occasion to deal with the question of communication of grounds of detention with delay in Peeru v. State of Rajasthan, Habeas Corpus Petition No. 834/87, decided on May 21, 1987, to which I was also a party, along with Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. S. Byas. That case also was a case where the District Magistrate, Jaisalmer, had detained Peeru by an order of detention dt. Jan. 2, 1987 and grounds of detention dt. Jan. 15, 1987 were actually communicated to the petitioner on Jan. 16, 1987 as in all these present Habeas Corpus petitions. In view of the decision given by the Bench of this Court in Peeru's case with regard to the delay in communication of the grounds of detention, it is needless to go into other grounds, on which the detenus have challenged-their detention under the National Security Act, 1980. In Peeru's case, the Bench of this Court had held that it was necessary for the District Magistrate to communicate the grounds of detention to the detenus within five days and if the grounds of detention were not communicated within five days, then it was necessary for the District Magistrate to inform the detenus about the existence of exceptional circumstances and what they were for delay in supplying the grounds of detention and/or documents and statements incorporated therein. As the reasons as to why the grounds of detention were not communicated to the detenus within five days on account of some exceptional circumstances, were not furnished or communicated to the detenus, they were entitled to be released on that ground alone. In arriving at this conclusion, the Bench of this Court had followed the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ibrahim Ahmad Bhatti v. State of Gujarat . Exactly the same thing has happened in all these 13 Habeas Corpus petitions. In all these cases, grounds of detention dt. Jan. 15, 1987 were communicated admittedly to the detenus on Jan. 16, 1987 i.e. on the 10th day of the date of their detention. In none of these cases, the District Magistrate, Jaisalmer, communicated the exceptional circumstances to the detenus for the delayed supply of the grounds and concerned documents and thus the detenus were deprived of their right to satisfy the superior authority or the Advisory Board that the delay which had occurred in the supplying of material documents to them was not justified because either the exceptional circumstances did not exist or those put forward were unreal or invalid. This alone is sufficient to vitiate the detention orders passed against all these 13 petitioners.
13. We had in Peeru's case relied upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ibrahim Ahmed Batti's case (supra) and Hemlal Bhandari v. State of Sikkim AIR 1987 SC 702 : 1987 Cri LJ 718. In Ibraham Ahmad Batti's case (supra), with respect to exceptional circumstances and reasons for delay in communicating the grounds of detention, it was observed as follows:
Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and normal methods open to a person charged with commission of any offence to disprove the charge or to prove his innocence at the trial are not available to a person preventively detained and, therefore, in preventive detention jurisprudence whatever little safeguards the. constitution and the enactment authorising such detention provide assume utmost importance and must be strictly adhered to and one of such safeguards is that, unless exceptional circumstances really obtain delay in supply of grounds of detention as also the documents and statements incorporated therein by reference beyond the period of five days, would be fatal... It is true that neither Article 22(5) nor does the COFEPOSA Act contain any provision which casts such a duty upon the detaining authority in express terms; it is also true that the court will, of course, go into and satisfy itself about these matters when any issue in that behalf is raised before it. But the question is whether such a duty is cast on the detaining authority by necessary implication? Does it or does it not flow from the rights conferred upon the detenu to make representation against his detention?... The detenu is entitled to satisfy either the superior authority or the Advisory Board that the delay that has occurred in the supplying of material documents to him, was not justified because exceptional circumstances did not exist or those put forward were unreal or invalid. Obviously the detenu would not be in a position to do so if the alleged exceptional circumstances are not communicated to him. In our view, therefore, a duty is to inform to the detenu about the existence of exceptional circumstances and what they were for delay in supplying grounds of detention, documents and statement incorporated therein arises by necessary implication and flows from the right which is conferred upon the detenu to make representation against his detention... In the instant case, for instance, if the alleged exceptional circumstances were communicated to the detenu at the time of the delayed supply of the concerned documents and statements in Urdu language, he could have satisfied the superior authority or the Advisory Board that the exceptional circumstances do not really obtain in the case and the delay had vitiated his decision.
14. Their Lordships approved of the view ultimately taken by the Patna High Court in the two decisions Bishwa Mohan Kumar Sinha v. State of Bihar ILR (1974) 53 Pat 884 and Bishwanath Prasad Keshari v. State of Bihar ILR (1975) 54 Pat 72, where both the aspects have been dealt with Their Lordships concluded that the impugned failure in that case constituted another breach of the safeguards contained in Article 22(5) read with Section 3(3) of the Act and vitiated the continued detention of the petitioner.
15. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in Hemall Bhandari v. State of Sikkim pointed out that "it is not permissible, in matters relating to personal liberty and freedom of a citizen to take either a liberal view or a generous view of the lapse on the part of the matters. In matters where the liberty of the citizen is involved it is necessary for the officers to act with utmost expedition and in strict compliance with the mandatory provisions of law. Expeditious action is insisted upon as a safeguard against the manipulation."
16. It is not necessary for me to detail out the reasonings given in the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Peeru's case (supra), in which this aspect of the matter has been discussed in detail.
17. Before parting with this order, it would be worthwhile to observe that if the District Magistrate, Jaisalmer, was so enthusiastic to present to the State Govt., the detention of as many as 35 detenus under the National Security Act, 1980, as a gift on the eve of New Year's day of 1987 (in which he delayed himself by seven days even in passing the orders of detention), he should have foreseen and realised the responsibility and duty cast upon him by law to communicate the grounds of detention with all basic materials and statements to the detenus within five days from the date of their detention, but here also he delayed just as he delayed in giving the New Year's gift. After coming into force of the Constitution on Jan. 26,1950, the period thereafter is not the Tudor period of British history during which persons could be thrown in jail without trial. The period after the Constitution is not a period of Stars Chambers or their prototypes. If we wish to retain the fundamental liberties which we have so anxiously proclaimed in our Constitution and remain free and independent people with the human dignity and human rights inherent in the democratic way of life, we have to scotch at the outset tendencies which may easily widen, as precedent is added to precedent, into that which in the end will be the negation of freedom and liberty.
18. As a result of the above discussion, the detention of all the 13 detenus (petitioners) in the above-mentioned Habeas Corpus Petitioners detained under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980, by the District Magistrate, Jaisalmer, are illegal and it is ordered that all the 13 detenus, on whose behalf the above Habeas Corpus Petitions have been filed, be set at liberty forthwith.