Bombay High Court
Ganesh Kachru Sonawane (Sonne) And Anr vs Khushalrao Sukhdeo Sable And Ors on 5 December, 2023
Author: Mangesh S. Patil
Bench: Mangesh S. Patil
2023:BHC-AUG:25386
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 9745 OF 2011
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.1615 OF 2020
1. Ganesh s/o Kachru Sonawane (Sonne)
2. Bhivsan Kachru Sonawane (Sonne) ...Petitioners
Versus
1. Khushalrao s/o Sukhdeo Sable
2. Sarjerao s/o Santukrao Sable
Died, Through LRs.
a. Shilabai w/o Sarjerao Sable
b. Manisha d/o Sarjerao Sable
c. Akash s/o Sarjerao Sable
d. Vikas s/o Sarjerao Sable
3. Bayajirao s/o Raoji Shinde
Died his LRs.
Bhagwan s/o Bayajirao Shinde
4. Anna s/o Dattatrya Lokhande
5. Ramrao s/o Fakirrao Lokhande
a. Dnyandeo s/o Ramrao Lokhande
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912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc
b. Sukhdeo s/o Ramrao Lokhande
c. Namdeo s/o Ramrao Lokhande
6. Fakirba s/o Shamrao Lokhande ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 2755 OF 2023
1. Ananda s/o Ragho Puri (Died)
Through his Legal heirs :
1A. Somwar s/o Ananda Puri
2. Shivram s/o Ananda Puri
Deceased through legal heirs.
2A. Suman Wd/o. Shivram Puri
2B. Mahesh @ Manoj s/o Shivram Puri
2C. Rajesh @ Satish s/o Shivram Puri
3. Haranpuri s/o Ananda Puri ...Petitioners
Versus
1. State of Maharashtra
Through its Secretary
Revenue & Forest Department, Mumbai.
2. Sudhakar s/o Ananda Khandhare
3. Bhimrao s/o Ananda Khandhare
4. Kaushlya s/o Shrirang Khandhare
5. Ashok s/o. Shrirang Khandhare
6. Ramdas s/o Shrirang Khandhare ...Respondents
WITH
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912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc
WRIT PETITION NO. 289 OF 2018
1. Dinaji s/o Laxmanrao Navghare
2. Bapurao s/o Ramrao Navghare ...Petitioners
Versus
1. Kishan s/o Laxman Kokate
2. Girji s/o Laxya Athwale
Deceased through L.Rs.
3. Parasram s/o Dattatraya Dhutraj
4. Kamlabai d/o Kishan Gache
Deceased through L.Rs.
4A. Satvashila Yashwant Thorat
5. Khemaji s/o Raghoji Pohare
6. Subhadrabai w/o Bramhaji Dhutraj
7. Pramilabai d/o Srinivasrao Deshpande
(Deleted as per Order dated 29.03.2019) ...Respondents
******
Mr. P. R. Katneshwarkar alongwith Mr. Avinash Khande
alongwith Mr. Mahesh P. Kale, Advocate for the Petitioners in
WP-9745/2011.
Mr. S. B. Yawalkar, Addl. G.P. for Respondent/State in all
matters.
Mr. H. P. Jadhav, Advocate for Respondent No.1 in WP-
9745/2011.
Mr. S. R. Sapkal, Advocate for the Petitioners in WP-
2755/2023.
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912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc
Mr. G. L. Deshpande, Advocate for Respondent Nos. 2 to 6 in
WP-2755/2023.
Mr. A. B. Jagtap, Advocate for Petitioners in WP-289/2018.
******
CORAM : MANGESH S. PATIL &
SHAILESH P. BRAHME, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 13 October 2023
PRONOUNCED ON : 5 December 2023
JUDGMENT [SHAILESH P. BRAHME J.] :
. Rule.
2. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard, finally with
the consent of parties.
3. We are called upon to answer an issue referred to us which is as follows :
"Whether any period of limitation is applicable for preferring an application under Section 98 of Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as Act )?"
4. The issue under the reference is emanating from the proceedings under Section 98 of the Act, initiated by the 4/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc petitioners in Writ Petition No.9745/2011. The petitioners were dispossessed in the year 1978 whereas the application seeking possession was filed on 22.03.2002 before the Deputy Collector. It was allowed. Being aggrieved, Appeal No.38/A/2003 was preferred before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The appeal was allowed by the Tribunal on 31.03.2010 holding that the application seeking possession under Section 98 submitted by the petitioners was beyond three years. Petitioners should have filed application within reasonable period of three years.
5. Against the decision of Revenue Tribunal, Writ Petition No.9745/2011 was preferred by the petitioners which was partly allowed by the learned Single Judge by judgment and order dated 21.06.2018. Against that Special Leave Petition was preferred before the Supreme Court. By order dated 14.12.2018, the Supreme Court requested High Court to refer the issue to the larger bench. That is how the present issue is framed and referred to for consideration.
6. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has made following submissions :
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912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc
(i) The issue which is referred to, has already been dealt with by direct pronouncement in the matters of Laxman Shankar Bandgar, Mesaji Laxman Ubare, Kisan Sayaji Shelke, Hasan Bin Salam. It has been consistently held that no period of limitation has been provided for invoking powers under Section 98 of the Act.
(ii) As there is already decision rendered by the Division Bench (R.M. Borde and V.K. Jadhav JJ.) in the matter of Hasan Bin Salam Vs. Madhavrao Ranganathrao Shinde covering the issue under reference the contrary decision rendered in the matter by Single Judge, is not a good law.
(iii) The scheme of the Act and the objects sought to be achieved by Section 98 of the Act are required to be considered for deciding the issue.
(iv) The period of limitation has consciously been excluded. It is not permissible to read any reasonable period for invoking powers under Section 98.
7. The learned Counsel for the petitioners referred to following judgments :
(i) Laxman Shankar Bandgar (died through LRs.) Vs. Venkat s/o Rama Bandgar (died through LRs.) in WP No.623/2021.
(ii) Mesaji Laxman Ubare Vs. Dr. Ramchandra Laxminarayan and Others, WP No.473/2000.6/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc
(iii) Limbaji Shankar Munde Vs. Bhaurao Baliram Munde, 2010(3) Mh.L.J. 138.
(iv) Kisan Sayaji Shelke Vs. Madhukar Mohan Deshpande and Others, 2010(12) LJSOFT 97
(v) Uttam Namdeo Mahale Vs. Vithal Deo and Others
(vi) Hasan Bin Salam Salam Bin Abdul Habib Vs. Madhavrao Ranganathrao Shinde, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4617.
(vii) Radhu Gokul Gawali and Others Vs. Mohan Kishan Gawali and Others, 2007 SCC OnLine Bom 503.
(viii) Ram Chand Vs. Union of India and Others, (1994)1 SCC 44.
(ix) Ranganath Vishnu Mulluck Vs. Vithoba Rama Rahane
8. The learned Counsel for the respondents made the following submissions:
(i) The authority under the Act has to exercise powers within a reasonable period though the limitation has not been provided under Section 98. The reasonable period has been interpreted by the Supreme Court from time to time which is normally of three years.
(ii) The persons occupying land cannot be kept waiting 7/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc endlessly. There has to be certainty and conclusiveness to the proceeding and therefore any application under Section 98 beyond three years cannot be entertained.
(iii) Considering the nature of the statue and its scheme, the application has to be filed within a reasonable period.
9. The learned Counsel for the respondents relied upon following judgments :
(i) State of Punjab Vs. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd., (2007) 11 SCC 363
(ii) Prakash Vs. Deorao
(iii) State of Gujarat Vs. Patil Raghav
(iv) Chhedi Lal Yadav and Others Vs. Hari Kishore Yadav
(v) Mohammad Kavi Mohammad Amin Vs. Fatimabai Ibrahim
(vi) Shardadevi Vs. State of Bihar
(vii) Santosh Kumar Vs. Balasaheb
(viii) Ram Chand Vs. Union of India and Others, (1994)1 SCC 44.
(ix) Hukumdev Narain Yadav Vs. Lalit Narain Mishra AIR 1974 SC 480
10. Before addressing the issue under consideration, it would be appropriate to refer to Section 98 of the Act which is as follows :
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912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc "Section 98 :
Any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land -
(a) the transfer of which either by the act of parties or by the operation of law is invalid under the provisions of this Act, or
(b) the management of which has been assumed under the said provisions, or
(c) to the use and occupation of which he is not entitled under the said provisions, may, if the said provisions do not provide for the eviction of such person, be summarily evicted by the Collector."
11. Pertinently, the judgment rendered in the matter of Hasan Bin Salam (supra) is authored by a Division Bench. The judgments in all other matters referred to above are authored by the learned Single Judges. The judgment rendered in the matter of Mesaji Laxman Ubare (supra) is referred to in the matter of Laxman Shankar Bandgar (supra). In the matter of Mesaji Laxman Ubare (supra), learned Single Judge was considering similar situation as in the present matter. In that matter petitioner was the applicant under Section 98 who was dispossessed before 28 years. The Deputy Collector allowed his application, Being aggrieved appeal was preferred before Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. It was allowed. Against that writ petition was filed. One of the submissions was to the effect that the application of the petitioner was barred by time. 9/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc The issue was dealt with in following manner :
"21. In Kisan Sayaji Shelke V/s Madhukar Mohan Deshpande and others (supra), question of limitation/reasonable time was also pressed into service and attention was specifically invited to the judgment of this Court in "Radhu Gokul Gawali and others V/s Mohan Kishan Gawali and others (supra). This Court has noticed that in Radhu Gokul Gawali and others V/s Mohan Kishan Gawali and others (supra) , learned Single Judge has not laid down proposition that in every case application under Section 98 of the 1950 Act will not be maintainable after lapse of 18 to 19 years. It is also noticed that the applicability of relevant provision or its availability needed to be decided looking to the facts available at hand. Court has then noticed that remedy is required to be availed within reasonable period but then absence of any limitation in Section 98 has been noted. It is found that statute prescribes no limitation to avail remedy against person in wrongful possession unauthorisedly. Then, the Judgment in case of "Ganpat S/o Sakharam Deshmukh V/s Yeshwant S/o Digambar Deshmukh"
(supra) has been considered in paragraph no.8. Thus, the said judgment relied upon by the respondents is already distinguished by this Court in "Kisan Sayaji Shelke V/s Madhukar Mohan Deshpande and others". In Ganpat S/o Sakharam Deshmukh V/s Yeshwant S/o Digambar Deshmukh" (supra) the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at (1997) 6 S.C.C. 71"-Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin V/s Patmabai Ibrahim is also looked into. Not only this earlier judgment of this Court reported at 1992 Mah.L.J. 541-- Eknath Raghoba vs. Somla Lalu Lamani has also been considered. In this judgment which is under 1950 Act only, a claim for recovery of possession by protected tenant who was dispossessed prior to 01.10.1957 has been considered in the light of provisions of Section 38E(1). His case is found covered by Explanation to Section 38E(1) and contention that his application for recovery of possession tendered after more than 13 years could not have been entertained has been rejected observing that in absence of any specific provision debarring that remedy only alternative available 10/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc to authority was to entertain it and to pass appropriate orders. In paragraph no.5, this Court has noted the contention of the petitioner that remedy of Section 38E (1) Explanation was not available to that tenant and he ought to have presented application under Section 98. The other objections raised was in respect of limitation. In paragraph no.6 old judgment reported at Eknath Raghoba vs. Somla Lalu Lamani (supra) is looked into and it has been noted that the said precedent did not support the case of petitioners but then supported the case of respondents in that matter. The facts of that matter are also noted and because of notification under Section 38E in Beed District it was held that land stood transferred in the name of tenant w.e.f. 01.02.1957. That tenant lost possession subsequently, therefore, he presented application under Section 98. It may be noted that this Court in the said judgment (Eknath Raghoba vs. Somla Lalu Lamani ) has in paragraph no.3 noted the objections raised and thereafter observed that there was no other remedy available. The transfer in favour of the said petitioners (in Eknath Raghoba vs. Somla Lalu Lamani) were effected on 16th July, 1957 i.e. the day on which their transferrers had no title because of operation of Section 38E. Clause (a) and clause (c) of Section 98 were therefore found to be applicable in it. The aspect of limitation is looked into in paragraph no.4 and it has been noted that limitation can not be applied by analogy. Limitation either bars the remedy or extinguishes right of party and hence, such bar can not be thought of when legislature has not prescribed it. When there is no limitation provided by the Legislature, the only thing that the Tribunal has to do is to permit application to be made irrespective of passage of time. These observations are noted in paragraph no. 6 of the judgment supra i.e. Limbaji Shankar Munde vs. Bhaurao Baliram Munde and answered against the petitioners therein. In paragraph no.7 the provisions of Section 38E(1) or then contention about reasonable time are looked into. In view of the discussion above, I find more reference to this judgment not necessary."
"22. In scheme of various sections noted above by me, whenever Legislature 11/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc thought it fit to prescribe period of limitation, the said period has been specifically mentioned. In Section 98 only Collector has been enabled to summarily evict a person in unauthorised occupation or wrongful possession. It does not contemplate filing of any application by any party to initiate proceedings under Section 98. Thus, it only casts obligation on the Collector to evict such unauthorised or wrongful occupant. The fact of such wrongful or unauthorised occupation may come to knowledge of Collector belatedly through different sources & in various situations. It is therefore obvious that Legislature has only conferred the powers upon the authority to act in furtherance of provisions and for the purposes of 1950 Act to see that its aims and objections are achieved & preserved. No period of limitation therefore has been deliberately prescribed as such fact of unauthorised occupation or wrongful possession may also be deliberately suppressed by the parties from the Collector by adopting various means and measures. When the legislature has vested title in protected tenant on tiller's day against the wishes of landholder, it is obvious that its design to advance the said cause, to protect or preserve that title from unscrupulous influences whenever it comes across such instances can not be allowed to be defeated by such technical pleas. I find the absence or non-prescription of any period of limitation in Section 98 is deliberate and in tune with that object."
12. The Division Bench in matter of Hasan Bin Salam (supra) had also occasion to hold that limitation is not applicable for the proceeding under Section 98 of the Act. It was dealing with Letter Patent Appeal. In Letter Patent Appeal respondent was original applicant under Section 98 of the Act who was dispossessed before 45 years. The appellant was ex-landlord. 12/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc Tahasildar allowed his application but the Deputy collector on appeal reversed the order. Against that appellant had preferred Revision before Revenue Tribunal. It was allowed. Against that writ petition was preferred which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. Being aggrieved Letter Patent Appeal. The Division Bench made following observations :
"8. So far as limitation for entertaining application under section 98 of the Act is concerned, said section does not provide for bar of limitation. Issue raised by appellant in the instant appeal is no more res intigra in view of judgment delivered by this Court (Justice R.M. Borde) in the matter of Limbaji Shankar Munde Vs. Bhaurao Baliram Munde reported in 2010(3)Mh.L.J. 138. This Court relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Ram Chand Vs. Union of India reported in (1994) 1 SCC 44 has turned down the contention raised by petitioner in the writ petition as regards bar of limitation. The observations made by the Supreme court are quoted in the judgment thus :
"In the absence of any specific limitation provided thereunder, necessary implication is that the general law of limitation provided in the Limitation Act (Act 2 of 1963) stands excluded. The Division Bench, therefore, has rightly held that no limitation has been prescribed and it can be executed at any time, especially when the law of limitation for the purpose of this appeal is not there. Where there is statutory rule operating in the field, the implied power of exercise of the right within reasonable limitation does not arise. The cited decisions deal with that area and bear no relevance to the facts."
9. Similar question arose as to whether there is any limitation provided for 13/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc tendering application under section 84 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and the same was considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ghanshyamprasad Natwarlal Bhatt vs. Gendalsingh Vakhatsing and others in Speical Civil Application No.764/1955. The Division Bench has observed thus :
"You cannot apply limitation by analogy. Limitation either bars a remedy or extinguishes a right of a party and it is unthinkable that any Court would bar a remedy or extinguish a right when the Legislature has not done so by importing the principles of some other statute and drawing analogy from some other provision of law. If there is no limitation provided by the legislature then the only thing that the Tribunal has to do is to permit the application to be made irrespective of passage of time."
10. In this context, reliance can also be placed on a judgment in the matter of Kisan Sayaji Shelke Vs. Madhukar Mohan Deshpande and others reported in 2010(7) Mh.L.J. 347. This Court has held in the aforesaid matter that provisions of section 98 do not prescribe for any limitation and as such, there can be no impediment for entertaining the application under section 98 of the Act by the competent authority at any point of time."
13. It can be seen that in the matters of Limbaji Shankar Munde (supra), Laxman Shankar Bandgar (supra), Eknath Raghoba Vs. Somla Lalu Lamani (supra), Hasan Bin Salam and Radhu Gokul Gawali (supra) there was reference to the orders passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the matter of Ghanshyamprasad Natwarlal Bhatt Vs. Gendalsing 14/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc Vakhatsing and Others in Special Civil Application No.764/1955. The following are the relevant findings.
"You cannot apply limitation by analogy. Limitation either bars a remedy or extinguishes a right of a party and it is unthinkable that any Court would bar a remedy or extinguish a right when the legislature has not done so by importing the principles of some other statute and drawing analogy from some other provision of law. If there is no limitation provided by the Legislature then the only thing that the Tribunal has to do is to permit the application to be made irrespective of passage of time."
14. It is relevant to notice that the order passed in the matter of Uttam Namdeo Mahale Vs. Vithal Deo and Others (1997)6 SCC 73 by three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court has been relied upon in the matters of Mesaji Laxman Ubare (supra) & Hasan Bin Salam (supra). Following are those observations.
"4. It is seen that the order of ejectment against the applicant has become final. Section 21 of the Mamalatdar's Court Act does not prescribe any limitation within which the order needs to be executed. In the absence of any specific limitation provided thereunder, necessary implication is that the general law of limitation provided in Limitation Act (Act 2 of 1963) stands excluded. The Division Bench, therefore, has rightly held that no limitation has been prescribed and it can be executed at any time, especially when the law of limitation for the 15/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc purpose of this appeal is not there. Where there is statutory rule operating in the field, the implied power of exercise of the right within reasonable limitation does not arise. The cited decisions deal with that area and bear no relevance to the facts."
15. Learned Single Judge in the matter of Radhu Gokul Gawali (supra), has taken a contrary view. The followings are the relevant paragraphs in the matter of Radhu Gokul Gawali (supra).
"27. A bare look to the provisions of Section 98 of the Act of 1950 and Section 84 of the Act of 1948 would show that these two provisions are virtually identical. Marginal note for these two sections is common i.e. "Summery Eviction".
Under Section 84 of the Act of 1948, one expression "or acquisition" under sub- clause (a) of Section 84 seems to have been added / inserted by the Bombay Act XIII of 1956. This expression "or acquisition" is not available under Section 98 of the Act of 1950. Under Section 84, three contingencies have been provided, which are listed as Sections 84(a), (b) and (c). Section 84(a) is followed by (b) and thereafter "or" is provided and thereafter (c) has followed. Under Section 98 of the Act of 1950, after Section 98(a) "or" is provided and after Section 98(b) also "or" is provided. Thus,Sections 84 can be said to be pari materia to that of Section 98 of the Act of 1950. The silent feature of both these sections is regarding absence of any period of limitation. In other words, any person can move such authority, provided under Section 84 and 98 at any point of time. Thus, absence of clause of limitation under Section 98 and Section 84 is also identical. In this premise, the judgment of the apex Court in the 16/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc matter of Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim MANU/SC/1261/1997 : (1997)6SCC71 is relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
28. The apex court in the said case has held that where no time limit is prescribed for exercise of power under a statute, it should be exercised within a reasonable time. Factually, in the said case, it appears that the action was initiated by the competent authority under Section 84-C of the Act of 1948 after about 3-1/2 years post sale deed. It is in this background, the apex court has held that suo motu action or bar has to be exercised by the authority concerned within a reasonable time, despite the fact that no time limit is prescribed by the statute i.e. Section 84-C of the Act of 1948.
29. The Division Bench of This Court in the matter of Gulabrao Bhaurao Kakade v. Nivrutti Krishna Bilare MANU/MH/0166/2001 : (2001)2BOMLR664 , has considered the provisions laid down under Section 32 of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act. There also no period of time limit is prescribed under Section 32 for the Settlement Commissioner to exercise the powers. The Division Bench of This Court has held that what would be reasonable period to exercise a bar under Section 32(1) by the Settlement Commissioner may depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, said bar can only be exercised within reasonable period in any case. Factually, exercising such power by the authority in that case after about 15 years was not approved of by the Division Bench of This Court to be exercise of power within the reasonable time."
16. In above matter, the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court by three Judges Bench in the matter of Uttam Namdeo 17/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc Mahale (supra) has not been referred to. Only judgment of Division Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Mohammad Kavi is referred. The judgment in the matter of Radhu Gokul Gawali (supra) has been considered in the matters of Laxman Shankar Bandgar (died through LRs.) (supra), Mesaji Laxman Ubare (supra), Kisan Sayaji Shelke (supra). It was sought to be distinguished.
17. The view taken in matter of Radhu Gokul Gawali (supra) has not been approved in the matter of Laxman Shankar Bandgar (died through LRs.) (supra), Mesaji Laxman Ubare (supra) & Kisan Sayaji Shelke (supra), all rendered by the learned Single Judges. The Division Bench's judgment in the matters of Ghanshyamprasad Natwarlal Bhatt (supra) & Hasan Bin Salam (supra) are contrary to the judgment in Radhu Gokul Gawali (supra). The Divison Bench's judgments obviously would prevail. Thus considering the judgments rendered in the matters of Hasan Bin Salam (supra), Ghanshyamprasad Natwarlal Bhatt (supra) and Uttam Namdeo Mahale (supra), the judgment rendered in the matter of Radhu Gokul Gawali (supra) is no more good law & has no binding effect.
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912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc
18. The judgment in the State of Punjab (supra), pertains to Section 21 of Punjab General Sales Tax Act which provides remedy for revision. No limitation is provided in Section 21(1). It was interpreted that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, the statutory authority must exercise jurisdiction within reasonable period. In the matter of Ram Chand Vs. Union of India and Others (supra), the provision of Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act was interpreted in paragraph no.14 which casts duty on Collector to make award. It is held that an award has to be made within reasonable period.
19. In the matter of State of Gujarat Vs. Patil Raghav, the revisional powers under Section 65 and 211 of Bombay Land Revenue Code were under consideration. Section 65 provides for the application to be submitted by the occupant. Section 211 is the revisional power of the State Government. It was held that the authority concerned should exercise power within reasonable time. In the matter of Chhedi Lal Yadav Vs. Hari Kishore Yadav, it was held that when there is no period of limitation prescribed, action must be taken within a reasonable 19/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc period. In paragraph no.13 it was observed as to what is a reasonable period would depend on the circumstances of each case and the purpose of the statute.
20. In the matter of Mohammad Kavi Vs. Fatimabai, Section 84(C) of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act was under consideration. It was held that when no time limit is prescribed for exercise of power under the statute it did not mean that it can be exercised at any time. Such a power has to be exercised within reasonable period. In the matter of Shardadevi Vs. State of Bihar, the above principles are reiterated. In the matter of Santosh Kumar Vs. Balasaheb, the time limit for exercising revisional power under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code was under consideration. In paragraph no.11 and 12 of the judgment, it was held that if the period of limitation is not provided by the statute then powers could be exercised within reasonable period and the normally reasonable period would be three years.
21. The upshot of the various judgments cited by the parties is that if limitation is not provided by the statute, it cannot be 20/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc readily inferred that the things would be done or the right would be exercised within reasonable period. Whether the period of limitation is consciously excluded from the statute has to be examined by taking into account the object and the legislative intent. When the remedies are provided, normally their exists period of limitation, either expressly or impliedly. The judgment in the matter of State of Punjab, State of Gujarat, Mohammad Kavi, Shardadevi and Santosh Kumar referred to the remedies to the parties. In the matter of Ram Chand, Section 11 was interpreted to infer reasonable period to ensure that the claimant who was deprived of the land need not have to wait unreasonably to get compensation. We appreciate that this exercise has been correctly done by the learned Single Judge in paragraph no.21 and 22 of the judgment in the matter of Mesaji Laxman Ubare (supra) to understand true purport of Section 98 of the Act.
22. Section 98 of the Act is a power of the Collector. It pertains to summary eviction of the person unauthorizedly occupying or wrongly in possession of the land. The purport of Section 98 is to remove an unauthorized occupant. A 21/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc tresspasser is always a tresspasser and cannot be heard to contend that because of lapse of time his possession culminates into valid possession. Only exception is a person claiming right by way of adverse possession. But the provisions of the Act do not contemplate situation of adverse possession. The judgments cited by the respondents do not commend us to hold that even if the limitation is not provided still it should be treated as a reasonable time.
23. We have already referred to the three judges bench order of the Supreme Court in the matter of Uttam Namdeo Mahale (supra) as well as Division Bench judgment of our High Court in the matter of Ghanshyamprasad Natwarlal Bhatt (supra). It is impermissible to read anything in statute which is not provided. While interpreting Section 98 literal interpretation has to be adopted. The literal interpretation does not permit us to read the reasonable period into the provision. We may refer to judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of B Prem Anand Vs. Mohan Goykal, to demonstrate the rules of literal or strict construction. The following paragraphs are relevant :
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17. No doubt in some exceptional cases departure can be made from the literal rule of the interpretation, e.g. by adopting a purposive construction, Heydon's mischief rule, etc. but that should only be done in very exceptional cases. Ordinarily, it is not proper for the Court to depart from the literal rule as that would really be amending the law in the garb of interpretation, which is not permissible vide J.P. Bansal v.State of Rajasthan and Anr. MANU/SC/0235/2003 : AIR 2003 SC 1405, State of Jharkhand and Anr. v. Govind Singh. It is for the legislature to amend the law and not the Court (vide State of Jharkhand Vs. Govind Singh).
19. In Shiv Shakti Co-operative Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers MANU/SC/0335/2003 : AIR 2003 SC 2434, this Court observed:
It is a well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent.
24. The literal rule of interpretation really means that there should be no interpretation. In other words, we should read the statute as it is, without distorting or twisting its language. We may mention here that the literal rule of interpretation is not only followed by Judges and lawyers, but it is also followed by the lay man in his ordinary life. To give an illustration, if a person says "this is a pencil", then he means that it is a pencil; and it is not that when he says that the object is a pencil, he means that it is a horse, donkey or an elephant. In other words, the literal rule of interpretation simply means that we mean what we say and we say what we mean. If we do not follow the literal rule of interpretation, social life will become impossible, and we will not understand each other. If we say that a certain object is a book, then we mean it is a book. If we say it is a book, but we mean it is a horse, table or an elephant, then we will not be able to communicate with each other. Life will become impossible. 23/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::
912.WP 9745-2011 with Ors.doc Hence, the meaning of the literal rule of interpretation is simply that we mean what we say and we say what we mean.
24. Adopting literal and strict interpretation, we disapprove the proposition that even when no limitation is provided in Section 98 of the Act, it is to be construed as reasonable period and the reasonable period would be three years. We approve the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge (Justice B.P. Dharamadhikari J. as he then was) in the matter of Mesaji Laxman Ubare (supra) from paragraph no.22. To avoid the repetition, we reiterate that it is a sound reasoning.
25. The learned Counsel Mr. Gaurav Deshpande has relied upon the judgment in the matter of Hukumdev Narain Yadav (supra). Our attention is drawn to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. We are unable to approve the proposition that Section 29(2) is applicable. Hence the judgment does not enure to the benefit of either of the parties.
26. For the reasons and the analysis stated above, we answer the issue as follows :
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(i) No period of limitation is applicable for preferring application under Section 98 of the Act and it is not permissible to read a reasonable time of limitation into the Section.
(ii) We dispose of the reference accordingly. (iii) The Registry is directed to place the matter before the
learned Single Judge for disposal in accordance with law.
(SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J.) (MANGESH S. PATIL, J.) Najeeb 25/25 ::: Uploaded on - 05/12/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 06/12/2023 14:01:21 :::