Sri Prafulla Shil vs The State Of Tripura & Others on 12 May, 2020

[Cites 6, Cited by 0]

Tripura High Court

Sri Prafulla Shil vs The State Of Tripura & Others on 12 May, 2020

Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 TRI 145

11. In the case of State of U.P. vs. J.P. Chaurasia, [1989) 1 SCC 121] it was pointed out that whether two posts are equal or should carry the equal pay, depends on several factors. It does not depend just upon either the nature of work or the volume of work done. Primarily it requires among others, evaluation of duties and responsibilities of the respective posts by the competent authorities constituted for the purpose and courts cannot ordinately substitute themselves in the place of those authorities. The quantity of work may be the same but the quality may be different. That cannot be determined by relying upon averments in affidavits of interested parties. It must be determined by expert bodies like Pay Commission and the Government, who would be the best judges, to evaluate the nature of duty, responsibility and all relevant factors. The same view was reiterated in the case of State of M.P. vs. Pramod Bhartiya, [(1993) 1 SCC 539] by a three-Judge Bench of this Court. In the case of Shyam Babu Verma vs. Union of India [(1994) 2 SCC 521] a claim for equal pay by a group of Pharmacists was rejected saying that the classification made by a body of experts after full study and analysis of the work, should not be disturbed except for strong reasons which indicate that the classification made was unreasonable."

[18] In the same judgment, it was further observed as under:

"19. Having considered the authorities and the submissions we are of the view that the authorities in the cases of Jasmer Singh, Tilak Raj, Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology and Tarun K. Roy lay down the correct law. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a Court of law. But equal pay must be for equal work of equal value. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" has no mechanical application in every case. Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against Page 25 of 29 those who were left out. Of course, the qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. The very fact that the person has not gone through the process of recruitment may itself, in certain cases, make a difference. If the educational qualifications are different, then also the doctrine may have no application. Even though persons may do the same work, their quality of work may differ. Where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons who are evaluated by competent authority cannot be challenged. A classification based on difference in educational qualifications justifies a difference in pay scales. A mere nomenclature designating a person as say a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he is doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsman in regular service. Page 9 of 11 The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities made a difference. Thus normally the applicability of this principle must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body. These are not matters where a writ court can lightly interfere. Normally a party claiming equal pay for equal work should be required to raise a dispute in this regards. In any event the party who claims equal pay for equal work has to make necessary averments and prove that all things are equal. Thus, before any direction can be issued by a Court, the Court must first see that there are necessary Page 26 of 29 averments and there is a proof. If the High Court, is on basis of material placed before it, convinced that there was equal work of equal quality and all other relevant factors are fulfilled it may direct payment of equal pay from the date of the filing of the respective Writ Petition. In all these cases, we find that the High Court has blindly proceeded on the basis that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work applies without examining any relevant factors."

[19] Bearing in mind the above principles thus enunciated, this Court may conclusively hold that determination of parity or disparity in duties and responsibilities is a complex issue and the same should be left to the expert body. When the expert body considered revision of pay for various posts, it did not revise the pay scale of Jr. Electricians/Jr. operators that of Jr. Surveyors/Jr. Draftsman. When the expert body has taken such a view, it is not for the court to substitute its views and interfere with the same and take a different view.

[20] In the context of the present case, in my opinion, the forceful submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that since in the year 1975, the posts of Junior Draftsman/Junior Surveyors (Surveyor or Draftsman before re-

designation) and the posts of Electricians/Operators re-designated Junior Electricians/Junior Operators, were carrying the same scale with a pay structure of Rs.300-600/- the State Government is under Page 27 of 29 obligation to maintain pay parity of those posts in future pay revision, is bereft of any merit.

[21] In furtherance thereof, similar mode of recruitment and similar qualification prescribed also cannot be the determining factor to demand equal pay scale. The Apex Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Limited v. Dibyendu Bhattacharya, reported in AIR 2011 SC 897 has held at para-24 that:

"29. It is a well legal proposition that it is not always impermissible to provide two different pay scales for the same cadre on the basis of selection based on merit with due regard to experience and seniority"(vide State of U.P. and Others v. J. P. Chaurasia and Others (1998) 1 SCC 121; (AIR 1989 SC 19) AND Mew Ram Kanojia v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences and Others (1998) 2 SCC 235; (AIR 1989 SC 1256) "Non-uniformity would not in all events violate Article 14". Thus, a mere difference does not always amount to discrimination (vide Madhu Kishwar and Others v. State of Bihar and Others (1996) 5 SCC 125". (AIR 1996 SC 1864), Associate Banks Officers‟ Assn. v. SBI and Others (1998) 1 SCC 428: (AIR 1998 SC 32) and Official Liquidator v. Dayananda and Others (2008) 10 SCC 1:

(AIR 2008 SC (Suup) 1177).

[22] In the instant case, the petitioners have failed to produce any materials to justify how the duties and responsibilities discharged by them are similar and identical to those of holding the posts of Junior Surveyors/Junior Draftsman under the TSECL. Mere statement, in the petition, cannot serve the purpose that the Page 28 of 29 petitioners being Junior Electricians/Junior Operators discharge similar and identical duties and responsibilities as those of Junior Draftsman/Junior Surveyors under the TSECL.

[23] In furtherance thereof, this Court has no expertise to evaluate the similarities to the nature of duties performed by the petitioners as Jr. Electricians/Jr. Operators to those of Jr. Draftsman/Jr. Surveyors. From the nomenclature of the posts as stated above, in my considered view, the nature of duties and responsibilities performed by the Jr. Draftsman/Jr. Surveyors cannot be equated with the duties and responsibilities assigned to the Jr. Electricians/Jr. Operators. The Government in its own wisdom classified the posts of Jr. Surveyors/Jr. Draftsmen as a separate entity and put them with a higher pay scale than that of the petitioners having holding the posts of Jr. Electricians/Jr. Operators. In that case, in considered view, interference of this Court with such exercise of the State authority would tantamount to over-step the well-thought decision of the Government and its functionaries which exclusively are within their domain. As I said earlier, this Court has no such expertise or mechanism to examine the parameters evolved by the expert body as well as Pay Anomaly Committee appointed by the Government to determine the adequate pay scales of the Page 29 of 29 employees holding different category of posts or different cadres under different organisations of the government. [24] For the same reason, I cannot accept the submission of Mr. S. Deb, learned counsel for the petitioners that the duties and responsibilities performed by the petitioners as Jr. Electricians/Jr. Operators are similar and identical to that of Junior Draftsman/Jr. Surveyor or that of Overseer (Garden)/Jr. Overseer/Jr. Overseer (Garden) having the benefit of higher pay scale. The petitioners have failed to establish their functionalities and activities are equal to those of Jr. Surveyors/Jr. Draftsman. Even if the functions are same, by no stretch of imagination, this Court in exercise of its plenary jurisdiction under Article-226 of the Constitution of India would not measure the difference or evaluate the degree of responsibilities which matters a lot in determining the pay scales.

[Emphasis supplied] [25] In the above conspectus, I find no merit in this bunch of writ petitions and accordingly, all the writ petitions are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

JUDGE A.Ghosh

Unlock Advanced Research with PRISMAI

Tripura High Court