Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Erukala Yadaiah Goud Alias Giri vs Union Of India on 17 September, 2025
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
****
CRIMINAL PETITION No.7885 of 2025
Between:
Erukala Yadaiah Goud Alias Giri
...PETITIONER
AND
Union of India
...RESPODENT
****
DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED : 17.09.2025
2
Dr.YLR,J
Crl.P.No.7885/2025
17.09.2025
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes/No
2. Whether the copy of Judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No
3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the
fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No
_________________________
Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
3
Dr.YLR,J
Crl.P.No.7885/2025
17.09.2025
* THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
+ CRIMINAL PETITION No.7885 of 2025
% 17.09.2025
# Between:
Erukala Yadaiah Goud Alias Giri
...PETITIONER
AND
Union of India
...RESPODENT
! Counsel for the Petitioners : Pardha Saradhi A V
^Counsel for the Respondent : Suresh Kumar Routhu (SPL PP FOR NCB)
< Gist:
The Order of the Court was delivered by
Dr. Justice Y.Lakshmana Rao :-- For the convenience of exposition,
this order is divided into the following parts :--
A. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION
B. CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER
C. ARGUMENTS OF THE STATE
D. POINT FOR CONSIDERATION
4
Dr.YLR,J
Crl.P.No.7885/2025
17.09.2025
E. ANALYSIS
F. CONCLUSION
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1) Crl.R.C.No.781 of 2024 dated 30.09.2024
2) Special Leave Petition (Crl.).No.13320 of 2025
3) Crl.A.No.42896 of 2023
4) Crl.P.No.5439 of 2024 dated 01.10.2024
5) W.P.No.21912 of 2024
6) 1996 A.P.L.J.370 (HC)
7) W.P.No.5444 of 2025 dated 11.03.2025
8) 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4073
9) 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346
10) (2020) 12 SCC 122
11) (2022) 18 SCC 374
12) (2007) 7 SCC 798
13) (2021) 10 SCC 100
14) (2021) 20 SCC 50
15) (2022) 12 SCC 633
16) (2019) 2 SCC 466
17) (2008) 3 SCC 222
5
Dr.YLR,J
Crl.P.No.7885/2025
17.09.2025
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION No:7885 of 2025
ORDER:
The Criminal Petition has been filed under Sections 437 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity 'the Cr.P.C.')/ Sections 480 and 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity 'the BNSS'), seeking to enlarge the petitioner/Accused No.3 on bail in Cr.No.48/1/6/2023/NCB/SUB-ZONE/HYD registered against the petitioner/Accused No.3 herein for the offences punishable under Sections 8 (c) read with 22 (C), 27-A, 28 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for brevity 'the NDPS Act'). CASE OF THE PROSECUTION:
2. The case of the prosecution is that on 05.06.2023, the Intelligence Officer of the Union of India's NCB received information regarding the manufacturing of a large quantity of Alprazolam in the production block of CPR Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. in Atchuthapuram APSEZ, Rambilli Mandal.
Acting on this information, the Intelligence Officer, along with mediators, found A.1 to A.3 at the production block, where they were packing materials in drums. Subsequently, 119.5 kgs of light yellow powder, suspected to be Alprazolam, were seized from the drums, along with equipment, in the presence of the laboratory owner, under 'the NDPS Act'. A.1 to A.3 6 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 confessed to their involvement in the manufacturing, possession, and attempted transportation of the substance.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER:
3. Sri A.V.Pardhasaradhi, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner is innocent of the alleged offence and has been falsely implicated by the police. It is further submitted that the petitioner is the sole earning member of the family and, therefore, his incarceration would cause undue hardship to his dependents. It is further submitted that the accused No.1 has a background as a chemist and has held positions such as shift-in-charge and production manager in pharmaceutical companies. Accused No.2 holds a Ph.D in Chemistry and has worked as a senior scientist in various laboratories. Accused No.3, on the other hand, has been a petty worker, previously employed in a cement factory and seeds shop until 2020. The accused were arrested while working in a laboratory run by Accused No.4, and they have been detained in Central Jail, Visakhapatnam, since 07.06.2023. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that in the instant case, Alprazolam is a prescription drug which figures at Entry No.15 in Schedule 'H' of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (for short, 'D & C Act'). Though it is a psychotropic substance as per Entry No.30 in the Schedule to 'the NDPS Act', it is not a psychotropic substance mentioned in Schedule I of the Rules appended to 7 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 'the NDPS Act'; when a psychotropic substance does not find mentioned in the Schedule I to the Rules, the prohibition concerning its possession contained in Rule 64 does not apply. Since the powder involved in the present case find mention in Schedule 'H' of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (for short 'the D & C Act'), the Alprazolam will be covered under 'the D & C Act' and not under 'the NDPS Act'. The Petitioner is a resident of Chamalonibavi, Vattikoda, Gurrampode, Nalgonda District. Telangana State.
4. The Panchanama dated 05.06.2023 at 10:00 a.m., clearly reflects that the Petitioner was taken into custody from that time, with proceedings concluding by 06:00 a.m., on 06.06.2023. However, the arrest is officially recorded at 5:15 p.m., on 06.06.2023 an apparent attempt to circumvent the statutory mandate under Sections 56 and 57 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' and Article 22(2) of the Constitution, which require production before a learned Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. The Petitioner was produced before the XIII Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Anakapalli (I/c Additional Judicial Magistrate First Class, Yelamanchili) only on 07.06.2023 at 1:30 p.m., as per the remand report. This delay of nearly 48 hours from initial detention constitutes a clear violation of procedural safeguards.
5. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Petitioner was not informed of the grounds of arrest at the time of apprehension, contravening constitutional and statutory requirements and causing 8 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 prejudice to his legal rights. The Petitioner's wife is hospitalized with a leg fracture; her mother passed away on 26.08.2023 and her brother on 27.06.2025. As the sole earning member, his continued detention imposes severe hardship on the family. With investigation concluded and complaint filed, further incarceration serves no prosecutorial necessity.
6. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that the Petitioner has a fixed residence, no prior criminal antecedents, and is engaged in the teaching profession. He undertakes to comply with any conditions imposed by the Court. He assures non-interference with evidence or witnesses and is willing to furnish sureties, ensuring his release will not prejudice the trial and it is urged to allow the petition.
ARGUMENTS OF THE STATE:
7. On the other hand, Sri Suresh Kumar Routhu, learned Special Public Prosecutor for NCB, representing the Respondent/State, filed a detailed counter wherein it is mentioned that on 05.06.2023, NCB, Hyderabad received credible information that four individuals were manufacturing large quantities of Alprazolam at the lab. Acting on the information, NCB officials raided the premises with independent witnesses and intercepted three persons namely B. Nageswara Rao (A2), Erukala Yadaiah Goud @ Giri (A3), Gonepelly Nagaraju (A4). During the search, 119.5 Kgs of light yellow powder (suspected Alprazolam) was seized along with equipment used for 9 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 manufacturing. The accused gave voluntary statements under Section 67 of 'the NDPS Act', admitting involvement for easy money. They were arrested on 06.06.2023 and produced before the learned Magistrate at Yellamanchili on 07.06.2023. The contraband seized (119.5 Kgs) is 1,195 times the commercial quantity (100 gms) under NDPS law. The petitioner/Accused No.3 (E. Yadaiah Goud) has filed multiple bail petitions earlier, all of which were dismissed on merits. Prosecution strongly relies on Section 37 of 'the NDPS Act' which places a statutory embargo on granting bail in cases involving commercial quantities unless stringent twin conditions are satisfied. Courts including the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts have repeatedly held that custody length, filing of charge sheet, or trial commencement are not sufficient grounds for granting of bail under 'the NDPS Act'. Hence, it is contended that the petitioner is not entitled to grant of bail and prays for dismissal of the petition.
8. It is further submitted that the contraband was seized from the accused person, and all relevant provisions of 'the NDPS Act' were adhered to. The accused voluntarily admitted to manufacturing a substantial quantity of Alprazolam, which exceeds the commercial quantity stipulated under 'the NDPS Act'. Additionally, they confessed their previous involvement in producing Alprazolam using the same modus operandi. Phone call transactions between the accused was also noted prior to his 10 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 arrest, indicating his involvement in illegal activities, and it is urged to dismiss the petition.
9. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Special Public Prosecutor. Perused the record.
10. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the both the learned Counsel. I have perused the record. POINT FOR CONSIDERATION:
11. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the learned Counsel for both the sides, now the point for consideration is:
"Whether the Petitioner is entitled for grant of bail?"
ANALYSIS:
12. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of the High Court of Telangana State in Guntupalli Srinivas Rao v. State of Telangana1 wherein at paragraph No.16 it is held as under:
"16.Perusal of remand report and remand application reveals that upon reliable information regarding the whereabouts of the absconding accused/petitioner herein, the investigating officer visited the spot by 07.30 p.m. on 17.07.2024, intercepted and brought him along with his car to EOW Police Station, Cyberabad at 09.30 p.m. and effected his arrest. It is further revealed that due to late night, the investigating officer could not record the confessional statement of the accused. It is also revealed that after giving information to the father of the petitioner viz. G.Purnachandra Rao to his phone No.08632246788, after informing the grounds of arrest and 1 Crl.R.C.No.781 of 2024 dated 30.09.2024 11 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 after following the procedural aspects, the investigating officer effected arrest of the petitioner. It is further revealed that the petitioner was produced before the Magistrate at 09.45 p.m. on 18.07.2024. When the time of arrest and production of accused before the Magistrate concerned is observed, no doubt, the production of the accused is beyond the period of 24 hours. The proposition of law is settled that while calculating 24 hours, the time taken for transit of the accused shall be excluded. It is an admitted fact that upon reliable information with regard to the whereabouts of the absconding accused, the investigating officer intercepted the petitioner/A2 at 07.30 p.m. on 17.07.2024 near Red Rose Mart, Engine Bowli, Falaknuma, Hyderabad and after completing all the required formalities, he produced the petitioner/A2 before the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-Metropolitan Magistrate, Ranga Reddy District at LB Nagar at 09.45 p.m. on the next day i.e. on 18.07.2024. Admittedly, both the place of interception of the petitioner/accused and the location of the Court where the petitioner/accused was produced are not at a distance which can invariably result-in occurrence of delay in production of the accused beyond the period of 24 hours of his arrest and hence, the delay in production of the accused caused, cannot be waived under the guise of transit. Further, except stating that due to late night confessional statement of the accused could not be completed, no plausible explanation is offered by the investigating officer to give leverage or support to the delay occurred in production of the accused before the Magistrate concerned. Even otherwise the confessional statement of the accused was recorded on the next day, it does not take much time as pleaded by the investigating officer to produce the accused before the Magistrate concerned for being forwarded him to the judicial remand. Apropos, it can safely be held that there is apparent error on the findings of the trial Court warranting interference of this Court in exercise of its revisional powers while setting aside the impugned order."
13. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on another decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana2 wherein at paragraph Nos.11, 12, 16, 18 and 21 (f) it is held as under: 2
Special Leave Petition (Crl.).No.13320 of 2025 12 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025
11. The view taken in the case of Pankaj Bansal was reiterated by this Court in the case of Prabir Purkayastha In paragraphs nos. 28 and 29, this Court held thus:
28. The language used in Article 22(1) and Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India regarding the communication of the grounds is exactly the identical. Neither of the constitutional provisions require that the "grounds" of "arrest" or "detention", as the case may be, must be communicated in writing. Thus, interpretation to this important facet of the fundamental right as made by the Constitution Bench while examining the scope of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India would ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India insofar as the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is concerned.
29. Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating that the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached under any situation.
Non-compliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be." (emphasis added)
12. This Court held that the language used in Articles 22(1) and 22(5) regarding communication of the grounds is identical, and therefore, this Court held that interpretation of Article 22(5) made by the Constitution Bench in the case of Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra, shall ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India insofar as the requirement to communicate the ground of arrest is concerned. We may also note here that in paragraph 21, in the case of Prabir Purkayastha, this Court also dealt with the effect of violation of Article 22(1) by holding that any infringement of this fundamental right would vitiate the process of arrest and remand. Paragraph 21 reads thus:
21. The right to be informed about the grounds of arrest flows from Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and any infringement of this fundamental right would vitiate the process of arrest and remand. Mere fact that a charge-sheet has been filed in the matter, would not validate the illegality and the unconstitutionality committed at the time of arresting the accused and the grant of initial police custody remand to the accused." (emphasis added) 3 1962 SCC OnLine SC
117. 16 ...Accepting such arguments, with great respect to the learned senior counsel, will amount to completely nullifying Articles 21 13 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 and 22(1) of the Constitution. Once it is held that arrest is unconstitutional due to violation of Article 22(1), the arrest itself is vitiated. Therefore, continued custody of such a person based on orders of remand is also vitiated. Filing a charge sheet and order of cognizance will not validate an arrest which is per se unconstitutional, being violative of Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. We cannot tinker with the most important safeguards provided under Article 22.
18. In the present case, 1st respondent relied upon an entry in the case diary allegedly made at 6.10 p.m. on 10th June 2024, which records that the appellant was arrested after informing him of the grounds of arrest. For the reasons which will follow hereafter, we are rejecting the argument made by the 1 st respondent. If the police want to prove communication of the grounds of arrest only based on a diary entry, it is necessary to incorporate those grounds of arrest in the diary entry or any other document. The grounds of arrest must exist before the same are informed..."
21(f)... When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The statutory restrictions do not affect the power of the court to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution is established."
14. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on another decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)3 wherein at paragraph No.49 it is held as under:
"49.It may be reiterated at the cost of repetition that there is a significant difference in the phrase 'reasons for arrest' and 'grounds of arrest'. The 'reasons for arrest' as indicated in the arrest memo are purely formal parameters, viz., to prevent the accused person from committing any further offence; for proper investigation of the offence; to prevent the accused person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tempering with such evidence in any manner; to prevent the arrested person for making inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the Investigating Officer.3 Crl.A.No.42896 of 2023 14
Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 These reasons would commonly apply to any person arrested on charge of a crime whereas the 'grounds of arrest' would be required to contain all such details in hand of the Investigating Officer which necessitated the arrest of the accused. Simultaneously, the grounds of arrest informed in writing must convey to the arrested accused all basic facts on which he was being arrested so as to provide him an opportunity of defending himself against custodial remand and to seek bail. Thus, the 'grounds of arrest' would invariably be personal to the accused and cannot be equated with the 'reasons of arrest' which are general in nature."
15. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on another decision of the this Court in Eepu Ramana v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Visakhapatnam4 wherein at paragraph No.8 it is held as under:
"8...It requires a mention here that the respondent seems to be aware of the legal mandate. In the remand report, it is mentioned in the following words:
"The entire Panchanama proceedings were conducted in a peaceful manner and concluded at 09.00 hours of
16.02.2024 and allowed the accused freely by informing that a summons would be issued for personal appearance"
This would make one to think that the respondent having arrested the petitioners without warrant from the court, having completed the necessary investigative work of seizure and preparation of Panchanama left the petitioners to their liberty even without obtaining any bonds. If that be the case, how were they produced before the learned Magistrate is a matter for consideration. In the next page of the remand application, the following is noticed..."
16. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on another decision of the High Court of Telangana State in T.Ramadevi v. State of Telangana5 wherein at paragraph No.8, the learned Single Judge while referring the 4 Crl.P.No.5439 of 2024 dated 01.10.2024 5 W.P.No.21912 of 2024 15 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 decision of the High Court Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Iqbal Kaur Kwatra v. Director General of Police, Rajasthan State6 and mentioned at Paragraph No.23 as under:
"23. Thus it is seen that a police officer cannot detain any person in custody without arresting him and any such detention will amount to a wrongful confinement within the meaning of Sec. 340 of the Penal Code, 1860. Actual arrest and detention do not appear to be necessary, A person incustody cannot be detained without producing him before a Magistrate under the colourable pretension that no actual arrest is made and the burden of proving the reasonable ground is on the arrester that the time occupied in the journey was reasonable with reference to the distance traversed as also other circumstances and in case of continuation of detention for twenty four hours, particularly, when the police officer has reason to believe that the investigation cannot be completed within twenty-four hours, he must produce the accused forthwith before the magistrate and cannot wait for twenty-four hours."
17. The High Court of Telangana in T.Ramadevi case supra at Paragraph Nos.11 and 12 it is held as under:
"11. In the aforesaid backdrop, when we look into the provisions of Section 57of Cr.P.C, the very first line of the said provision refers to the term detention. It does not use the term "from the time of arrest", which further strengthens the case of the petitioner when they say that period of detention starts the moment they stand apprehended by the police, as from that moment itself there is a restraint so far as personal liberty of the concerned person and there is also an arrest of his movement, as he remains under confines of police personnel. Thus, it would amount to a detention of a person right from the time he is apprehended by the police personnel. Thus, in terms of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ashak Hussain (supra), the arrest of a person commences from the time restraint is placed on his liberty and not from the time of the arrest officially recorded by the arresting officers.6
1996 A.P.L.J.370 (HC) 16 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025
12. Accordingly, this Bench has no hesitation in reaching to the conclusion that question No.1 as regards the commencement of the period of apprehension is concerned, it is held that the period of apprehension is also to be taken into consideration for the purpose of calculating the period of 24 hours as is envisaged under Section 57 of Cr.P.C. In other words, 24 hours is not to be calculated from the time of the official arrest being shown by the police personnel in the arrest memo, but from the time he was initially apprehended or taken into custody."
18. The High Court of Telangana in Vishal Manoher Mandrekar v. State of Telangana, at Paragraph Nos.10 and 12 it is held as under:
"10.... Article 22 (2) of the Constitution of India mandates that every person who is arrested and detained in police custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of 24 hours, excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of the arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.
12. The above two provisions came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court on several occasions and the Hon'ble Apex Court in certain terms held that without the authorization of the Magistrate, no accused can be detained in the custody of the police beyond 24 hours from the time of arrest excluding the time taken for the journey from the place of arrest to the court."
19. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on another decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Motakatla Jhansi Vani Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh 7 wherein at paragraph Nos.10 to 15 it is held as under:
10. Non-intimation, required under Section 47 (1) of BNSS, would render any further detention of the person illegal. The word "forthwith" makes it amply clear that intimation under Section 47 (1) of BNSS has to be served at the time of arrest or immediately thereafter. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prabhir Purkayastha Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) had held that 7 W.P.No.5444 of 2025 dated 11.03.2025 17 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 violation of such provision would render the arrest illegal. The Judgment in Prabhir Purkayastha (1-supra) came to be delivered under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. A Division Bench of this Courtin the case of Pappula Chalama Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, had held that the principles laid down in the case of Prabhir Purkayastha (1-supra) would be applicable to even cases under BNSS. The principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prabhir Purkayastha (1-supra) is extracted below:
"28. The language used in Article 22(1) and Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India regarding the communication of the grounds is exactly the identical. Neither of the constitutional provisions require that the 'grounds of "arrest" or "detention", as the case may be, must be communicated in writing. Thus, interpretation to this important facet of the fundamental right as made by the Constitution Bench while examining the scope of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India would ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India insofar the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is concerned.
29. Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating that the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached under any situation. Noncompliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be."
11. The further question of the maintainability of the Writ Petition, in view of the fact that there is an order of remand by the appropriate Magistrate, would also arise. A Divison Bench of this Court, in the case of Pappula Chalama Reddy (2-supra), had held, following the Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that in the normal course, a Writ of Habeas Corpus would notbe maintainable where an order of remand has already been passed by the appropriate Magistrate. However, the Division Bench had also held that the said bar would not operate where the Magistrate has passed an order without application of mind.
12. In the present case, the Magistrate after finding that intimation of arrest, under Section 47 (1) of BNSS had not been given, should have immediately set the detenue at liberty. Instead of taking this step, the Magistrate returned the remand report for subsequent compliance.
18
Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025
13. The action of the Magistrate, in returning the remand report, for subsequent compliance, is an act of clear non-application of mind. The provisions of Section 47 (1) of BNSS are mandatory and peremptory. Violation of this provision can only result in a declaration that the arrest and subsequent detention is invalid.
14. The learned Government Pleader would further contend that even if the initial arrest is invalid, the Investigating Officer can always re-arrest the detenue and relied upon a Judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad in the case of Rama Kant vs. State. He would contend that there was a re-arrest of the detenue.
15. A perusal of the remand report does not show that there was a re-arrest. In fact, the remand report continues to show only the arrest at 9.00 P.M. on 24.02.2025. In the circumstances, the order of remand passed by the Learned III Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class FAC, Vijayawada, dated 25.02.2025, is set aside and the detenue is to be set at liberty.
20. It is not out place to mention that the learned Trial Court, pursuant to the directions of this Court, based on the petition filed by the respondent in Crl.M.P.No.483 of 2024 in N.S.C.No.7 of 2024 dated 22.08.2025 had cancelled the bail granted to the accused No.1 and directed respondent to arrest and produced him before the learned Trial Court.
21. In State v. B. Ramu8, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in a case of recovery of a huge quantity of narcotic substance, the Courts should be slow in granting even regular bail or anticipatory bail more so when accused is alleged to have criminal antecedents. In this regard, paragraph Nos.9 & 11, relevant paragraphs, are extracted hereunder:
"9. A plain reading of statutory provision makes it abundantly clear that in the event, the Public Prosecutor opposes the prayer for bail 8 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4073 19 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 either regular or anticipatory, as the case may be, the Court would have to record a satisfaction that there are grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence alleged and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
11. In case of recovery of such a huge quantity of narcotic substance, the Courts should be slow in granting even regular bail to the accused what to talk of anticipatory bail more so when the accused is alleged to be having criminal antecedents."
22. In Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh9, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that no person accused of offence involving trade in a commercial quantity of narcotics is entitled to be released on bail unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence.
23. The learned Counsel for the Respondent further relied on the decision in State of Kerala V. Rajesh10, wherein at paragraph Nos.17, 19 and 20 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"17. The jurisdiction of the court to grant bail is circumscribed by the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It can be granted in case there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence, and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It is the mandate of the legislature which is required to be followed.
19. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 Cr.P.C, but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37 which commences with non obstante clause. The operative part of the said section is in the negative form prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person accused of commission of an offence under the Act, unless twin conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the application; and the second, is that the court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds 9 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346 10 (2020) 12 SCC 122 20 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 for believing that he is not guilty of such offence. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the ban for granting bail operates.
20. The expression "reasonable grounds" means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that in addition to the limitations provided under the Cr.P.C, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for."
24. In Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal11, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the length of the period of judicial custody and the fact that the charge sheet has been filed and the trial has commenced are by themselves not considerations that can be treated as persuasive grounds for granting relief to the respondent under Section 37 of 'the NDPS Act.' In that regard, the relevant paragraph Nos.18 and 19 are extracted hereunder:
"18. Even dehors the confessional statement of the respondent and the other co-accused recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, which were subsequently retracted by them, the other circumstantial evidence brought on record by the appellant-NCB ought to have dissuaded the High Court from exercising its discretion in favour of the respondent and concluding that there were reasonable grounds to justify that he was not guilty of such an offence under the NDPS Act. We are not persuaded by the submission made by learned counsel for the respondent and the observation made in the impugned order that since nothing was found from the possession of the respondent, he is not guilty of the offence for which he has been charged. Such an assumption would be premature at this stage.11
(2022) 18 SCC 374 21 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025
19. In our opinion the narrow parameters of bail available under Section 37 of the Act, have not been satisfied in the facts of the instant case. At this stage, it is not safe to conclude that the respondent has successfully demonstrated that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is not guilty of the offence alleged against him, for him to have been admitted to bail. The length of the period of his custody or the fact that the charge-sheet has been filed and the trial has commenced are by themselves not considerations that can be treated as persuasive grounds for granting relief to the respondent under Section 37 of the NDPS Act."
25. In Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari12, the Hon'ble Apex Court held about recovery of 400 kgs. of poppy straw from possession of accused respondent that two conditions to be satisfied under Section 37 of 'the NDPS Act.,' for granting bail: First, the satisfaction of the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that accused not guilty, and second that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. If either of conditions are not satisfied, the accused cannot be granted bail. In that regard, the relevant paragraph Nos.6, 7 and 11 are extracted here under:
"6. As the provision itself provides no person shall be granted bail unless the two conditions are satisfied. They are; the satisfaction of the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Both the conditions have to be satisfied. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the bar operates and the accused cannot be released on bail.
7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is "reasonable grounds". The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged and this reasonable belief contemplated in turn points to existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged.12
(2007) 7 SCC 798 22 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025
11. The Court while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act is not called upon to record a finding of not guilty.
It is for the limited purpose essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail that the Court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. But the Court has not to consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty."
26. In Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan13, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that given the seriousness of offences punishable under 'the NDPS Act.,' and to curb the menace of drug-trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for grant of bail under 'the NDPS Act.,' have been prescribed.
27. In Bharat Chaudhary v. Union of India14, another decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner the Hon'ble Apex Court held at paragraph No.14 as under:
"14. In the absence of any psychotropic substance found in the conscious possession of A-4, we are of the opinion that mere reliance on the statement made by A-1 to A-3 under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is too tenuous a ground to sustain the impugned order dated 15-7-2021 {Union of India Vs. Bharat Choudary, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 6554}. This is all the more so when such a reliance runs contrary to the ruling in Tofan Singh {Tofan Singh Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1}. The impugned order qua A-4 is, accordingly, quashed and set aside and the order dated 2-11-2020 passed by the learned Special Judge, EC & NDPS cases, is restored. As for Raja Chandrasekharan (A-1), since the charge-sheet has already been filed and by now the said accused has remained in custody for over a period of two years, it is deemed appropriate to release him on bail, subject to the satisfaction of the trial court."13
(2021) 10 SCC 100 14 (2021) 20 SCC 50 23 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025
28. In Narcotics Control Bureau v. Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta15, another decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the Hon'ble Apex Court held at paragraph Nos.11 and 12 as under:
"11. Having gone through the records along with the tabulated statement of the respondents submitted on behalf of the petitioner NCB and on carefully perusing the impugned orders passed in each case, it emerges that except for the voluntary statements of A-1 and A-2 in the first case and that of the respondents themselves recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, it appears, prima facie, that no substantial material was available with the prosecution at the time of arrest to connect the respondents with the allegations levelled against them of indulging in drug trafficking. It has not been denied by the prosecution that except for the respondent in SLP (Crl.) No. 1569 of 2021, none of the other respondents were found to be in possession of commercial quantities of psychotropic substances, as contemplated under the NDPS Act.
12. It has been held in clear terms in Tofan Singh v. State of T.N. that a confessional statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act will remain inadmissible in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act. In the teeth of the aforesaid decision, the arrests made by the petitioner NCB, on the basis of the confession/voluntary statements of the respondents or the co-accused under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, cannot form the basis for overturning the impugned orders releasing them on bail. The CDR details of some of the accused or the allegations of tampering of evidence on the part of one of the respondents is an aspect that will be examined at the stage of trial. For the aforesaid reason, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the orders dated 16-9-2019 passed in SLP (Crl.) No. arising out of Diary No. 22702 of 2020, SLP (Crl.) No. 1454 of 2021, SLP (Crl.) No. 1465 of 2021, SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 1773-74 of 2021 and SLP (Crl.) No. 2080 of 2021 respectively. The impugned are, accordingly, upheld and the special leave petitions filed by the petitioner NCB seeking cancellation of bail granted to the respective respondents, are dismissed as meritless."
29. The learned counsel for the Respondent relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Rakesh Kumar16, wherein at paragraph Nos.13, 14 and 15 it is held that:
15
(2022) 12 SCC 633 16 (2019) 2 SCC 466 24 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 "13....we note that Section 80 of the NDPS Act, clearly lays down that application of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act is not barred, and provisions of the NDPS Act can be applicable in addition to that of the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. The statute further clarifies that the provisions of the NDPS Act are not in derogation of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. This Court in Union of India v. Sanjeev V. Deshpande,, has held that:
"35. essentially the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 deals with various operations of manufacture, sale, purchase, etc. of drugs generally whereas Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 deals with a more specific class of drugs and, therefore, a special law on the subject. Further, the provisions of the Act operate in addition to the provisions of the 1940 Act."
14. The aforesaid decision in Sanjeev V. Deshpande case [Union of India v. Sanjeev V. Deshpande, (2014) 13 SCC 1: (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 496] further clarifies that, the NDPS Act, should not be read in exclusion to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Additionally, it is the prerogative of the State to prosecute the offender in accordance with law. In the present case, since the action of the respondent-accused amounted to a prima facie violation of Section 8 of the NDPS Act, they were charged under Section 22 of the NDPS Act.
15. In light of the above observations, we find that the decision rendered by the High Court holding that the respondent-accused must be tried under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 instead of the NDPS Act, as they were found in possession of the "manufactured drugs", does not hold good in law."
30. Sri A.V.Pardha Saradhi, learned Counsel for the Petitioner's prime contention is that the Petitioner was produced before the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate after 24 hours of his arrest, thereby violated the provisions of Section 52 of 'the NDPS Act'. In fact, on six occasions, the bail applications filed by the petitioner/Accused No.3, before the learned Trial Court, were dismissed. This Court on several occasions dismissed the petition filed by the Accused No.3 vide Crl.P.No.6272 of 2024 dated 04.12.2024; Crl.P.No.9252 of 2023 dated 19.04.2024. 25
Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025
31. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Dinesh Kumar17, at paragraph Nos.20, 21, 23 & 27 held as under:
"20. Mr Patwalia referred to certain decisions of the Allahabad High Court, the Punjab High Court and the Madras High Court which apparently supports his submissions. Of the said decisions, the one in which the meaning of the two expressions "arrest" and "custody" have been considered in detail is that of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Roshan Beevi case [1984 Cri LJ 134 (Mad)]. The said decision was, however, rendered in the context of Sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act, 1962. Sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act authorise a Customs Officer empowered in that behalf to require a person to attend before him and produce or deliver documents relevant to the enquiry or to summon such person whose attendance is considered necessary for giving evidence or production of a document in connection with any enquiry being undertaken by such officer under the Act. In such context the Full Bench of the Madras High Court returned a finding that "custody" and "arrest" are not synonymous terms and observed that it is true that in every arrest there is a custody but not vice versa. A custody may amount to "arrest" in certain cases, but not in all cases. It is in the aforesaid circumstances that the Full Bench came to the conclusion that a person who is taken by the Customs Officer either for the purpose of enquiry or interrogation or investigation cannot be held to have come into the custody and detention of the Customs Officer and he cannot be deemed to have been arrested from the moment he was taken into custody.
21. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion, the Full Bench had occasion to consider in detail the meaning of the expression "arrest". Reference was made to the definition of arrest in various legal dictionaries and Halsbury's Laws of England as also Corpus Juris Secundum. In para 16 of the judgment it was observed as follows : (Cri LJ p. 142) "16. From the various definitions which we have extracted above, it is clear that the word 'arrest', when used in its ordinary and natural sense, means the apprehension or restraint or the deprivation of one's personal liberty. The question whether the person is under arrest or not, depends not on the legality of the arrest, but on whether he has been deprived of his personal liberty to go where he pleases. When used in the legal sense in the procedure connected with criminal offences, an arrest consists in the taking 17 (2008) 3 SCC 222 26 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 into custody of another person under authority empowered by law, for the purpose of holding or detaining him to answer a criminal charge or of preventing the commission of a criminal offence. The essential elements to constitute an arrest in the above sense are that there must be an intent to arrest under the authority, accompanied by a seizure or detention of the person in the manner known to law, which is so understood by the person arrested. In this connection, a debatable question that arises for our consideration is whether the mere taking into custody of a person by an authority empowered to arrest would amount to 'arrest' of that person and whether the terms 'arrest' and 'custody' are synonymous."
23. We are unable to appreciate the views of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court and reiterate the decision of this Court in Niranjan Singh case [(1980) 2 SCC 559 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 508 :
AIR 1980 SC 785] . In our view, the law relating to the concept of "arrest" or "custody" has been correctly stated in Niranjan Singh case [(1980) 2 SCC 559 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 508 : AIR 1980 SC 785] . Paras 7, 8 and the relevant portion of para 9 of the decision in the said case state as follows : (SCC pp. 562-63) "7. When is a person in custody, within the meaning of Section 439 CrPC? When he is in duress either because he is held by the investigating agency or other police or allied authority or is under the control of the court having been remanded by judicial order, or having offered himself to the court's jurisdiction and submitted to its orders by physical presence. No lexical dexterity nor precedential profusion is needed to come to the realistic conclusion that he who is under the control of the court or is in the physical hold of an officer with coercive power is in custody for the purpose of Section
439. This word is of elastic semantics but its core meaning is that the law has taken control of the person. The equivocatory quibblings and hide-and-seek niceties sometimes heard in court that the police have taken a man into informal custody but not arrested him, have detained him for interrogation but not taken him into formal custody and other like terminological dubieties are unfair evasions of the straightforwardness of the law. We need not dilate on this shady facet here because we are satisfied that the accused did physically submit before the Sessions Judge and the jurisdiction to grant bail thus arose.
8. Custody, in the context of Section 439, (we are not, be it noted, dealing with anticipatory bail under Section 438) is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the court.
9. He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before a Magistrate and gets a remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when he surrenders before the court and submits to its directions."
27. The interpretation of "arrest" and "custody" rendered by the Full Bench in Roshan Beevi case [1984 Cri LJ 134 (Mad)] may be 27 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 relevant in the context of Sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act where summons in respect of an enquiry may amount to "custody" but not to "arrest", but such custody could subsequently materialise into arrest. The position is different as far as proceedings in the court are concerned in relation to enquiry into offences under the Penal Code and other criminal enactments. In the latter set of cases, in order to obtain the benefit of bail an accused has to surrender to the custody of the court or the police authorities before he can be granted the benefit thereunder. In Vol. 11 of the 4th Edn. of Halsbury's Laws of England the term "arrest" has been defined in Para 99 in the following terms:
"99. Meaning of arrest.--Arrest consists in the seizure or touching of a person's body with a view to his restraint; words may, however, amount to an arrest if, in the circumstances of the case, they are calculated to bring, and do bring, to a person's notice that he is under compulsion and he thereafter submits to the compulsion.""
32. As seen from the record and also from the averments of the charge sheet, the officials of the respondent reached the laboratory on 05.06.2023 at 9:45 A.M. At 10:00 A.M., they found the petitioner/Accused No.3. It was recorded in arrest memo that the entire proceedings were concluded at 1715 hours on 06.06.2023. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, as per the remand order, the petitioner was produced before the learned Jurisdictional Court on 07.06.2023 at 1:30 P.M., which means nearly more than eight and a half hours after conclusion of the entire proceedings. It is argued that during the said period, the petitioner was in the illegal custody of the respondent officials. On the other hand, the learned Special Public Prosecutor for the respondent contends that the petitioner was shown as arrested on 06.06.2023 at about 5:15 P.M., and he was produced before the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate for judicial 28 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 remand on 07.06.2023 at 1:30 P.M. i.e., within 24 hours from the time of arrest after exclusion of journey period. Therefore, the petitioner was produced before the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate within 24 hours, after exclusion of the time taken for journey and for complying with other legal formalities. Infact, the petitioner has been in judicial custody ever since his arrest on 07.06.2023.
33. In the complaint/chargesheet the Investigating Officer at paragraph No.13 mentioned that the entire proceedings concluded peacefully at around 06.00 a.m., on 06.06.2023. It does not mean that he had also arrested the Petitioner at that time. The chargesheet further mentioned that after completion of all the panchanama proceedings, summons under Section 67 of 'the NDPS Act' were issued to the Petitioner and other Accused on 06.06.2023. On receiving summons, the Petitioner and other Accused tendered their voluntary statements, those were recorded vividly. Basing on those voluntary statements material objects and incriminating documents were seized from the possession of the Petitioner and other Accused. At paragraph No.19 of the complaint it was clearly mentioned that S.P.Naqui, Intelligence Officer, NCB, Hyderabad, sub-zone arrested the Petitioner, Accused No.3 at 05.15 p.m., on 06.06.2023 for contravention of the provisions of 'the NDPS Act'.
29
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34. It was also mentioned that the Petitioner and other Accused were allowed to talk to their family members to intimate about their arrest to their families. Arrest intimation under Section 50 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' was also issued to the Petitioner. Arrest intimation under Section 50A of 'the Cr.P.C.,' was also issued to the wife of the Petitioner on 06.06.2023 itself. Petitioner and other Accused were taken to Government Hospital, Anakapalle on 07.06.2023 for medical examination and later they were produced before the learned Additional Judicial First-Class Magistrate, Yelamanchili within twenty-four hours.
35. As seen from the arrest memo, which was signed by the Petitioner/Accused, he was informed that he was arrested on 06.06.2023 at 05:15 p.m. The Petitioner was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate at 01.30 p.m., on 07.06.2023 i.e., within a period of twenty-four hours as such there was no violation of the provisions of 'the Cr.P.C.,' and also the Constitution of India. The learned Magistrate remanded the Petitioner to the judicial custody. The Petitioner's plea of non-production of the Petitioner before the learned Magistrate within twenty-four hours was taken by the Petitioner before the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge. However, the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge vide order dated 27.06.2025 in Crl.M.P.No.1728/2025 rejected the said plea. As seen from the record carefully, for the above reasons, it can be held that the Petitioner 30 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 was produced before the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate within twenty four hours and there was no violation of any procedure.
36. In view of the material placed on record and the statutory mandate under Section 37 of 'the NDPS Act', this Court is constrained to observe that the present bail application is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. The contraband allegedly seized from the possession of the Petitioner, 119.5 kilograms of Alprazolam, exceeds the commercial quantity threshold by an astronomical margin, thereby invoking the rigours of Section 37(1)(b) of 'the NDPS Act'. The twin conditions therein, namely (i) the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty of the offence, and (ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, have not been satisfactorily met. The Petitioner's voluntary inculpatory statement under Section 67 of 'the NDPS Act', coupled with the seizure of manufacturing equipment and corroborative telephonic evidence, prima facie establish his complicity in the illicit manufacture and possession of a psychotropic substance.
37. Furthermore, the contention regarding procedural irregularities in arrest and delay in production before the learned Magistrate, while not condoned, cannot be determinative of bail in a case governed by the stringent provisions of 'the NDPS Act'. It is well settled that the length of custody, personal hardships, or completion of investigation do not ipso 31 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.No.7885/2025 17.09.2025 facto dilute the statutory embargo under Section 37 of 'the NDPS Act'. The period of detention, however prolonged, remains immaterial unless the twin conditions are demonstrably satisfied. In light of the gravity of the offence, the quantum of contraband, and the potential ramifications on public health and safety, this Court finds no compelling reason to enlarge the petitioner on bail. Accordingly, the bail petition stands dismissed. CONCLUSION:
38. In the result, the Criminal Petition is dismissed.
As a sequel, Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.
_________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 17.09.2025 Note: LR copy to be marked.
B/o RSI/VTS