Madras High Court
M/S.Patel Roadways Ltd vs Manali Petrochemical Ltd on 23 July, 2010
Author: K.Chandru
Bench: K.Chandru
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 23.07.2010 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.CHANDRU A.S.No.879 of 2004 and C.M.P.No.12007 of 2004 M/s.Patel Roadways Ltd., No.173, Broadway, Chennai-600 108. .. Appellant Vs. 1.Manali Petrochemical Ltd., SPIC Centre, Annexe, No.97, Anna Salai, Guindy, Chennai-600 032. 2.Divisional Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd., Divisional Office-V, Plot No.C-20, AD-1, 2nd Avenue, Anna Nagar, Chennai-600 040. .. Respondents These appeal suits have been preferred under Section 96 of CPC against the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court No.IV), Chennai in O.S.No.3208 of 2001, dated 31.3.2003. For Appellant : Mr.T.D.Selvam Babu For Respondents : Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan for R-2 Not served for R-1 - - - - JUDGMENT
Heard the arguments of Mr.T.D.Selvam Babu, learned counsel appearing for appellant and Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, learned counsel for the second respondent.
2.This is an appeal filed under Section 96 of C.P.C. challenging the judgment and decree made in O.S.No.3208 of 2001, dated 31.3.2003 on the file of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court No.IV), Chennai. The appellant is the defendant in O.S.No.3208 of 2001. The suit was filed by respondents against the appellant for recovery of sum of Rs.5,31,012/- together with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of the plaint till the date of payment and for costs.
3.The appellant and both respondents are public limited companies. The firs respondent had despatched 28 drums of three different varieties of chemicals/products to M/s.Hindustan Level Ltd., Bangalore against the purchase order, dated 12.3.1998. The goods were entrusted to the appellant for safe carriage and delivery at Chennai under Lorry Receipt Nos.1267506, 1267507 and 1267508, dated 20.3.1998. The consignment was found to have been transported by the appellant by vehicle No.KA 16 2421hired by the defendant. It was found that the said consignment did not reach Bangalore. In view of non delivery of consignment, the first respondent by letter dated 7.4.1998 lodged a claim for non delivery and assessed the value of loss at Rs.5,99,286/-. By letter, dated 9.4.1998, the appellant informed the first respondent that the consignment was not traceable and the truck itself was found missing. The appellant also informed that they had lodged a FIR with the police and promised to keep the first respondent about informing of developments. Accordingly, the FIR in crime No.291 of 1998, dated 16.5.1998 was registered at Manali Police station coming under the then Chengalpat District (presently Tiruvallur district) in respect of loss of consignment as well as the loss of truck.
4.Thereafter, the appellant, by a letter, dated 12.5.1998 informed the first respondent that with the active assistance of police at Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, 18 out of 26 barrels were recovered. But, it was found that the Propylene Glycol kept in the barrel were sold and only empty barrels were recovered. The first respondent was informed by the appellant that they would arrange to get the release order of the consignment through Court and on obtaining such permission, will inform to the first respondent. On 6.11.1998, the appellant informed the first respondent that they had got the conditional release order by which it was directed that the consignment should not be removed or disposed of or altered and should be produced as and when required and that a cash security of Rs.6 lakhs and another guarantee for an equivalent amount should be provided to the satisfaction of the Court for the removal of goods. Therefore, it was alleged that the appellant did not keep their obligation by safely carrying out the consignment and delivering it to the Bangalore address. Since the chemical contents in those barrels had only a fixed life time and time for delivery was essential, the conditional order granted would have resulted in parting with heavy amount. Further, since the consignment was not delivered to the consignee, either consignor or consignee were deprived of use of chemical, which had limited time span. It is the appellant who was responsible for the loss to the first respondent who had insured the consignment in respect of transit. When a claim was lodged with the second respondent, an independent licensed Surveryor was appointed to inspect the loss and damage and also to assess the same. The Surveyor had filed a report dated 16.2.2000 assessing the loss and damage at Rs.5,90,412/-. In fact for the inspection of the consignment, permission was obtained from the Court. On inspection it was found that the materials kept in the consignment was no longer useful as it lost its purity. Even the salvage could not be realised. Hence the suit was filed on the basis of the right guaranteed under the Carriers' Act, 1865 as well as both common law and contractual obligation. The cause of actin for the suit was said to have arisen at Chennai where the consignment was entrusted to the appellant by lorry receipt. On 7.4.1998, a notice of claim was also lodged on the appellant for non delivery.
5.The appellant being the defendant filed a preliminary written statement reserving his right to file an additional written statement. It was claimed in paragraph 3 of the written statement, which is as follows:
"3.This Defendant states that this Hon'ble Court has no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit in view of the provisions contained in Sec.19 C.P.C. This Defendant states that the suit is for wrong to moveable property. The wrong having been committed at Manali as admitted in the plaint, the suit can be filed only at Manali and not in Chennai, which court has no jurisdiction at all."
According to him, in view of the jurisdictional error, they have not filed written statement on merits.
6.Before the trial court, on behalf of the first respondent, three documents were filed and they were marked as Exs.A.1 to A.3. The trial court having found that it has jurisdiction to try the suit and documents Exs.A.1 to A.3 were marked by consent, it found in paragraphs 7 and 8 as follows:
"7.The counsel for the plaintiff apart from submitting the documents original Marine Loss Voucher dated 25.1.01 exhibit A.1. Letter of Subrogation and Special Power of Attorney dated 26.2.2001 exhibit A.2 and Marine Cargo Inland Transit Policy produced the Judgment in 2000 (III) C.T.C. Page 129 in which it was clearly held that once the letter of subrogation executed in Madras the Courts in Madras have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In view of the above judgment of our Hon'ble High Court, the contention of the defendant cannot be accepted. The plaintiff has submitted the documents. The defendant has not submitted any documents and wanted to decide the jurisdictional issue and to give an opportunity to raise his defence by way of additional written statement. The contention of the defendant cannot be accepted because the after filing the written statement issues have been framed and the suit is taken up at the time of trial. If at all the defendant intended to raise his other defence he would have filed them long before. He has not done so. Hence this court is of the view that the defendant has failed to defend the case at the right time and no time need be granted to him. Therefore this court decides all the issues in favour of the plaintiff.
8.In the result, this suit is decreed as prayed for with costs."
7.In view of decreetal of the suit, the respondents filed E.P.No.173 of 2004 to execute the decree. It was thereafter, the present appeal was filed.
8.The contention raised by the appellant was that the court below ought to have given permission to file an additional written statement and ought not to have decreed the suit without providing for additional opportunity especially when the appellant had reserved their right. It was also argued that the cause of action arose in Manali outside Chennai City and therefore, there is no jurisdiction.
9.Printed pleadings were made ready and were circulated. Original records were summoned and perused.
10.The counsel for the appellant referred to Order 8 Rule 9, which is as follows:
"O.8 R.9.Subsequent pleadings.- No pleading subsequent to the written statement of a defendant other than by way of defence to set-off or counter-claim shall be presented except by the leave of the Court and upon such terms as the Court thinks fit; but the court may at any time require a written statement or additional written statement from any of the parties and fix a time of not more than thirty days for presenting the same."
11.The learned counsel submitted that because of this, the court has got power to provide for filing additional written statement at any time and they were forced to raise jurisdictional issue only because under Section 21 of CPC, such jurisdictional issue will have to be raised at the court of first instance.
12.In this context, he referred to the judgment of this court in Thirupathi Vs. Kothai Aachi reported in 2003 (1) CTC 553 and referred to paragraph 8 which is as follows:
"8.Order 8, Rule 9 CPC enables the Court to accept a written statement filed at a later stage, even after settlement of issues upon such terms as it may think fit and proper, however, the Rule contemplates the leave of the Court before any party can present a further pleading after the written statement has been filed. This Rule invest the Court with widest possible discretion and enables it to accept additional written statement."
13.The learned counsel also referred to the judgment of this Court in S.Suresh Vs. Sivabalakannan and others reported in 2007 (3) CTC 554, wherein similar view was reiterated by this court.
14.Per contra, Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, learned counsel for second respondent submitted that the suit was laid before the proper court by his client. In respect of the very same appellant, this court in Revathi CP Equipments Ltd. And another Vs. Patel Roadways Pvt. Ltd., Coimbatore and 2 others reported in 1987 TLNJ 328 upheld the maintainability of such suit. In pages 330 and 331, it was observed as follows:
"Therefore, when a suit is laid by electing the remedy under the Carriers Act and not as a claim for damages for breach of the contract viz., of terms and conditions of the consignment note; none of the other decisions like AIR 1986 Rajasthan 89, 1959 I M.L.J. 106 and AIR 1979 Madras 21, require to be considered, as they deal with the point as to whether a party to the contract could be bound to sue only in the Court agreed to between the parties and in which a part of the cause of action has arisen and in no other. The Court below has relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court touching upon this aspect. All these decisions would have relevance, if the suit had been filed claiming damages for breach of contract of the terms and conditions of the consignment note. Plaintiff in claiming a particular relief, may have more than one basis which could be adopted by him, and if he elects to file a suit on any one of the basis available to him in law; then he would be bound by the same and any objection putforth to such a claim would have to be with reference to what he had elected and not others."
Thus, the learned counsel for second respondent contended that the suit was maintainable.
15.On the question of jurisdiction issue, the learned counsel referred to the judgment of this court in M/s.Kalpaka Transport Co. Ltd. Vs. The Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. Represented by its Principal Officer and Senior Divisional Manager T.R.Suryanarayanan, Madras and another reported in 2001 (1) MLJ 714 and referred to the following passages found in paragraphs 20 and 21, which is as follows:
"20.In the last judgment cited above reported in Ravichandran Transports, Mettur Dam, Salem Dist. V. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2000) 2 M.L.J. 318 : (2000) I C.T.C. 748, it is held by the learned single Judge of this Court that herein the suit is based on letter of subrogation executed by the insurer in favour of the insurance company, such a letter executed in Madras and notarised by notary public, the Court in madras has jurisdiction to entertain the suit as part of cause of actin arises at Madras.
21.In the light of the decisions rendered at different points of time by this Court, no mention need be necessary that in the case on hand, the trial Court has undoubtedly jurisdiction to try the suit since the letter of subrogation and special power of attorney issued in favour of the first plaintiff by the second plaintiff under the Ex.A.11 dated 22.6.1982 and hence the trial court which tried the suit undoubtedly has jurisdiction to try the same and the only point raised on the part of the appellant, that is the jurisdiction of the lower court being decided in the above manner, nothing remains to be seen."
16.The learned counsel also referred to the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Economic Transport Organization Vs. Charan Spinning Mills (P) Ltd. And another reported in 2010 (2) CTC 295 in which the very same appellant is also a party and referred to the following passage found in paragraphs 28 and 29, which is as follows:
"28.The contention of appellant that the presumption under Section 9 of the Carriers Act is available only in Suits filed before Civil Courts and not in other Civil proceedings under other Acts, is not tenable. This Court in Patel Roadways Ltd. V. Birla Yamaha Ltd., 2000 (3) CTC 59 (SC) : 2000 (4) SCC 91 has observed:
"The principle regarding the liability of a carrier contained in Section 9 of Carriers Act namely, that the liability of a carrier is that of an Insurer and that in a case of loss or damage to goods entrusted to the carrier the plaintiff need not prove negligence, are applicable in a proceeding before the Consumer Forum. The term "Suit" has not been defined in Carriers Act nor it is provided in the said Act that the term "Suit" will have the same meaning as in Civil PC. Therefore, the term 'Suit' has to be understood in its ordinary dictionary meaning. In that sense, term 'Suit' is a generic term taking within its sweep all proceedings initiated by a party for valuation of a right vested in him under law. It is true that a proceeding before Consumer Forum is ordinarily a summary proceeding and in an appropriate case where the Commission feels that the issues raised are too contentious to be decided in summary proceedings it may refer parties to Civil Court. That, however, does not mean that proceedings before the Consumer Forum is to be decided by ignoring the express statutory provision of Carriers Act in a proceeding in which a claim is made against a common carrier. A proceeding before the Consumer Forum comes within the sweep of term "Suit".
29.Again in Economic Transport Organisation V. Dharward District Khadi Gramodyog Sangh, 2000 (3) CTC 73 (SC) : 2000 (5) SCC 78, this Court reiterated the principle stated in Patel Roadways and added the following:
"Even assuming that Section 9 of the Carriers Act, 1865 does not apply to the cases before the Consumer for a under Consumer Protection Act, the principle of common law abovementioned gets attracted to all these cases coming up before the Consumer for a. Section 14(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act has to be understood in that light and the burden of proof gets shifted to the carriers by the Application of the legal presumption under the common law. Section 14(1)(d) has to be understood in that manner. The complainant can discharge the initial onus, even if it is laid on him under Section 14(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act by relying on Section 9 of the Carriers Act. It will, therefore, be for the carrier to prove absence of negligence."
We reiterate the said settled position and reject the contention of the appellant that the presumption under Section 9 of Carriers Act is not available in a proceeding under the Consumer Protection Act and that therefore, in the absence of proof of negligence, it is not liable to compensate the respondents for the loss."
17.Therefore, he contended that the appellant being defendant when raised a jurisdictional issue but did not file any additional written statement before the trial commenced he takes his own risk. Reliance placed upon Order 8 Rule 9 has no application.
18.It must be noted that burden to inform the defendant about his right to file an additional written statement is not on the court. Before commencing the trial, he should have taken an application seeking leave to file an additional written statement, but it was not done. The legal position before amendment made in CPC had undergone sea change. After amendment Order 14 Rule 2 reads as follows:
"2.Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.-(1)Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule(2), pronounce judgment on all issues.
(2)Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to--
(a)the jurisdiction of the Court, or
(b)a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue."
19.The contention raised by the learned counsel for appellant that the matter of filing additional written statement should be liberally granted cannot accepted any more. In fact, after amendment to CPC made by the Amendment Act, 1999 a time limit has been prescribed even for filing written statements and it was done to advance the cause of justice.
20.The Supreme Court while interpreting the amendment under Order 8 Rule 1, vide its judgment in Salem Advocate Bar Assn. v. Union of India reported in (2005) 6 SCC 344 held in paragraphs 20 and 21 as follows:
"20. The use of the word shall in Order 8 Rule 1 by itself is not conclusive to determine whether the provision is mandatory or directory. We have to ascertain the object which is required to be served by this provision and its design and context in which it is enacted. The use of the word shall is ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the provision but having regard to the context in which it is used or having regard to the intention of the legislation, the same can be construed as directory. The rule in question has to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. The rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. The rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice and not its mistress. In the present context, the strict interpretation would defeat justice.
21. In construing this provision, support can also be had from Order 8 Rule 10 which provides that where any party from whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 or Rule 9, fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the court, the court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such other order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. On failure to file written statement under this provision, the court has been given the discretion either to pronounce judgment against the defendant or make such other order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. In the context of the provision, despite use of the word shall, the court has been given the discretion to pronounce or not to pronounce the judgment against the defendant even if the written statement is not filed and instead pass such order as it may think fit in relation to the suit. In construing the provision of Order 8 Rule 1 and Rule 10, the doctrine of harmonious construction is required to be applied. The effect would be that under Rule 10 Order 8, the court in its discretion would have the power to allow the defendant to file written statement even after expiry of the period of 90 days provided in Order 8 Rule 1. There is no restriction in Order 8 Rule 10 that after expiry of ninety days, further time cannot be granted. The court has wide power to make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. Clearly, therefore, the provision of Order 8 Rule 1 providing for the upper limit of 90 days to file written statement is directory. Having said so, we wish to make it clear that the order extending time to file written statement cannot be made in routine. The time can be extended only in exceptionally hard cases. While extending time, it has to be borne in mind that the legislature has fixed the upper time-limit of 90 days. The discretion of the court to extend the time shall not be so frequently and routinely exercised so as to nullify the period fixed by Order 8 Rule 1.'' (Emphasis added)
21.Likewise, for filing preliminary written statement, the appellant (being the defendant in the suit) took a calculated risk. After the amendment was made to Order 14 Rule 2, it has been made specifically clear that the it is undesirable only to decide the suit on a preliminary issue. But it was also made clear that all issues should be decided while disposing of the suit. Therefore, atleast before the trial, an attempt should have been made to file an additional written statement, which was not done in this case.
22.The Supreme Court while considering Order 14 Rule 2 in Lufthansa German Airlines v. Vij Sales Corpn., reported in (1998) 8 SCC 623, held in paragraph 4 as follows:
4. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent took an objection that the learned Judge should not have decided the question of limitation as a preliminary issue, especially when that question did not arise, merely on the basis of allegations made in the plaint. This Court has pointed out the undesirability of deciding a suit on a preliminary issue. This Court has also insisted that normally all issues should be decided while disposing of the suit. The amendment introduced in Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Amendment Act of 1976, also provides that notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 2, pronounce the judgment on all issues. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order XIV is an exception where a suit can be disposed of on the question of law only.
23.Though the counsel for the appellant insisted for a remand by permitting to file an additional written statement, this court is not inclined to consider the request as the appellant had miserably failed to file any such written statement in time. Having not controverted the plaint averments, they will have to suffer the decree as ordered by the court below.
24.In the light of the above, the Appeal Suit will stand dismissed with costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed.
vvk To The Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.IV, Chennai