Himachal Pradesh High Court
Kanta Devi vs State Of H.P. And Another on 10 December, 2025
2025:HHC:42786
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr.MMO No.772 of 2024.
.
Reserved on: 14.11.2025
Date of Decision: 10.12.2025.
Cr. MMO No. 772 of 2024
Kanta Devi ...Petitioner
of
Versus
State of H.P. and another
rt ...Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr Bimal Gupta, Senior
Advocate, with Mr Trigun
Singh Negi, Advocate.
For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Jitender Sharma, Additional
Advocate General.
For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Rajat Kumar, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge:
The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 7 of 2024, dated 12.1.2024, registered at Police Station Jhakri, District Shimla, HP, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and consequential proceedings arising out of it.
1Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 22025:HHC:42786 (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) .
2. Brief facts, giving rise to the present petition, are that the informant made a complaint asserting that Government Primary School, Shiti, Tehsil Rampur, District Shimla, HP, invited applications for the post of Water Carrier in the year 1994. The of informant applied for the post, and nobody else had filed an application for the post; however, the petitioner/accused was rt appointed as a Water Carrier. The informant protested, but no action was taken. The petitioner belongs to the Rajput caste, but she submitted a false certificate of a scheduled caste and a forged school-leaving certificate. She mentioned herself as the wife of Babu Ram in the record. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter.
3. Being aggrieved from the registration of the FIR, the petitioner filed the present petition, asserting that the informant had filed a Civil Writ Petition No. 874 of 1995. The petitioner remained posted in various schools, and she retired after attaining the age of superannuation on 30.4.2024. The informant entered into a compromise with the petitioner on 2.2.2024, which ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 3 2025:HHC:42786 was duly attested by the Notary Public. The FIR was lodged with an ulterior motive to deprive the petitioner of retiral benefits by .
concealing the fact that the appointment of the petitioner was challenged earlier in a writ petition. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed.
4. The respondent No.1 filed a reply making a of preliminary submission regarding the lack of maintainability.
The contents of FIR were reproduced. It was asserted that the rt police conducted the investigation and found that the petitioner does not belong to the scheduled caste. She was married to Kalu Ram. She showed herself as the wife of Babu Ram in the joining letter. She had used a forged School Leaving Certificate. The investigation is continuing. The FIR discloses the offence against society. There is no provision for compromise. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
5. The informant/respondent No. 2 also filed a separate reply making a preliminary submission regarding the lack of maintainability. It was asserted that Civil Writ Petition No. 874 of 1995 pertained to the appointment by relaxation of the Rules. The authenticity of the documents produced by the petitioner was not ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 4 2025:HHC:42786 challenged, as the informant was not aware of the submission of forged documents. The compromise was effected by pressurising .
the informant, and this fact was communicated to SHO, Police Station Jhakri and Superintendent of Police, Shimla. The petitioner is trying to pressurise the informant with the help of her husband, son and other relatives to compromise the matter.
of The FIR discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
rt
6. I have heard Mr Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr Trigun Singh Negi, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State and Mr Rajat Kumar, learned counsel for respondent No.2/informant.
7. Mr Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the informant had challenged the appointment of the petitioner/accused in the Civil Writ Petition. This Court dismissed the Civil Writ Petition. The informant filed a false complaint against the petitioner/accused.
He had demanded money from the petitioner/accused for compromising the matter, which shows that the FIR was lodged ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 5 2025:HHC:42786 with an ulterior purpose. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed.
.
8. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the FIR prima facie shows the commission of a cognizable offence. The petitioner had forged the certificates and falsely claimed to be a of member of the scheduled caste. She had produced a forged school-leaving certificate. The matter is being investigated.
rt Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
9. Mr Rajat Kumar, learned counsel for the informant/respondent No.2, submitted that the earlier writ petition pertained to the process of appointment and the informant was not aware of the fact that the petitioner had submitted a forged certificate. He filed a complaint after coming to know of this fact. The contents of the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
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11. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC .
OnLine SC 7 as under: -
"7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, of 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:
rt "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 7 2025:HHC:42786 under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
of cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as rt contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge." (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 8 2025:HHC:42786 complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
of Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal rt proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed."
12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
"8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly.
The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 9 2025:HHC:42786 complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations;
.
and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)
13. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
of
14. The FIR specifically mentions that the petitioner belongs to the Rajput caste, but she had produced a forged caste rt certificate. She had also shown herself to be the wife of Babu Ram and produced a forged School Leaving Certificate. The reply filed by the State shows that it was found during the investigation that the petitioner described herself to be the wife of Babu Ram, whereas she is the wife of Kalu Ram. She belongs to the Rajput caste and forged the documents of a Scheduled Caste. She also forged a School Leaving Certificate. Therefore, the contents of the FIR prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence.
15. It was submitted that the informant had filed a Civil Writ Petition, which was dismissed by this Court, and the present proceedings are not maintainable. This submission is only stated to be rejected. Copy of the order passed by the Principal Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 874 of 1995 (Annexure R2-1) ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 10 2025:HHC:42786 shows that the appointment was challenged and the Court held that the petitioner was appointed on compassionate grounds .
after relaxing the Rules. The order does not say anything about the submission of forged documents. Therefore, the filing of the writ petition will not help the petitioner.
16. It was submitted that the informant had taken the of money from the petitioner to compromise the matter, which shows that the FIR was lodged with mala fide intention. This rt submission will not help the petitioner/accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed:
"30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated because of a political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, "If the use of power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal."::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 11
2025:HHC:42786 Xxxx
39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction under .
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, of after the closure of the earlier criminal case, cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In rt the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C."
17. Thus, the FIR cannot be quashed because of the subsequent events.
18. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false. This submission will not help the petitioner. The Court exercising the jurisdiction to quash the FIR does not go into the credibility of the witnesses or the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made by the parties. It has to accept the contents of the FIR as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon'ble ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 12 2025:HHC:42786 Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: -
.
"29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non-
of interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely rt according to its whims or caprice."
19. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: -
"13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 13
2025:HHC:42786
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:
.
"14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 of SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59:
(2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain rt the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) "16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge sheet, documents, etc. or not.
20. Since the contents of the FIR, prima facie, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed. Hence, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.
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21. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, .
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
Cr.MP(M) No. 2234 of 202422. The petitioner has filed the present petition for of cancellation of bail in FIR No. 7 of 2024, dated 12.1.2024, registered in Police Station Jhakri, District Shimla, HP, for the rt commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It has been asserted that respondent No.2/accused approached the Court and obtained bail.
The Court imposed a condition that she would not contact the informant, threaten or browbeat him/her or use any pressure tactics in any manner whatsoever. Respondent No.2/accused continuously threatened the petitioner to withdraw the complaint. She also filed a petition for quashing of the FIR based on a compromise, which was got executed by exercising influence upon the present petitioner. She is misusing the opportunity extended to her. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the bail be cancelled.
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23. The petition is opposed by filing a status report reproducing the contents of the FIR. It was asserted that the .
petitioner/informant approached the Investigating Officer and told him that the matter was compromised. The police advised the informant to produce the compromise before the Court.
Thereafter, the informant made a complaint regarding the threat of advanced to him. The police called him, but he did not make a statement to the police. The investigation is continuing. Hence, rt the status report.
24. A separate reply was filed by respondent No.2/accused, making preliminary submissions regarding the lack of maintainability and the informant having not come to the Court with clean hands. It was asserted that the FIR was lodged against the accused with an ulterior motive to extract money from her. It was specifically denied that the accused had tried to pressurize the informant to enter into any compromise. The informant purchased the stamp paper and got the compromise typed on his own. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
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25. A reply to the status report was also filed by the informant/petitioner, denying its contents.
.
26. During the pendency of the proceedings, it was submitted on behalf of respondent No.2/accused that the informant/petitioner had demanded ₹50.00 lacs for compromising the matter, and she had recorded a mobile of conversation to this effect. Since this was a serious matter, therefore, the police were directed to investigate the matter. The rt police submitted a report that an audio file containing the conversation between the informant and the accused was recovered from the mobile phones. The voice matched the voice of the informant.
27. I have heard Mr Rajat Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner/informant, Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State and Mr. Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr Trigun Singh Negi, learned counsel for respondent No.2/accused.
28. Mr Rajat Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner/informant, submitted that the accused had pressurised the informant to compromise the matter. She filed a petition for ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 17 2025:HHC:42786 quashing of the FIR based on a compromise. The Court had imposed a specific condition that she would not influence the .
witnesses. She has violated the conditions imposed by the Court.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the bail granted to respondent No.2/accused be cancelled.
29. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate of General, for respondent No.1/State, submitted that the informant complained to the police regarding the threat. The police asked rt the informant to join the investigation, but he did not do so.
There is no material to infer that the accused had threatened the informant. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
30. Mr Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.2/accused, submitted that the petitioner had called respondent No.2/accused and demanded ₹50.00 lacs from her. This call was recorded, and the mobile phone was sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory. The report of the laboratory shows that the informant's voice matched the voice in the call recording.
The informant filed the petition to pressurize respondent ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 18 2025:HHC:42786 No.2/accused to pay him money. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
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31. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
32. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held in Ajwar v. Waseem of (2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974 that the bail, once granted, should not be cancelled mechanically; however, an rt unreasoned and perverse order is open to interference by the Superior Court. The bail can be cancelled if there are serious allegations against the accused. It was observed at page 783:
"27. It is equally well settled that bail, once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse bail order is always open to interference by the superior court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on society, resulting in such an order. In P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211 decided by a three-judge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1) CrPC in the following words : (SCC p. 224, para 24) "24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 19 2025:HHC:42786 consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by .
enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loath to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail, but if such an order is found to be illegal or of perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court."
Considerations for Setting Aside Bail Orders rt
28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined, and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused ought to be avoided. Suffice it to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused.
29. In Jagjeet Singh [Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560], a three-judge Bench of this Court has observed that the power to grant bail under Section 439CrPC is of wide amplitude and the High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, is bestowed with considerable discretion while deciding a bail application. But this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 20 2025:HHC:42786 reflect the due application of the judicial mind following well-established principles of law. In the ordinary course, courts would be slow to interfere with the order where bail has been granted by the courts below. But if it is found that .
such an order is illegal or perverse or based upon utterly irrelevant material, the appellate court would be well within its power to set aside and cancel the bail. (Also refer:
Puran v. Rambilas [Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124]; Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat [Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 13 SCC 584:
of (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 813].)
33. Similar is the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manik Madhukar versus Vitthal Damuji Meher rt and Ors. 2024: INSC:636 wherein it was observed as under: -
"19. Courts, while granting bail, are required to consider relevant factors such as the nature of the accusation, the role ascribed to the accused concerned, possibilities/chances of tampering with the evidence and/or witnesses, antecedents, flight risk, et al. Speaking through Hima Kohli, J., the present coram in Ajwar v.
Waseem, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, apropos relevant parameters for granting bail, observed:
"26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. (Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. (2004) ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 21 2025:HHC:42786 7 SCC 525; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav (supra) (2004) 7 SCC 528; Masroor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2009) 14 SCC 286; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496; Neeru Yadav v. State .
of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 16 SCC 508; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 12 SCC 129; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar @ Polia (supra) (2020) 2 SCC 118.
27. It is equally well settled that bail, once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to of interference by the Superior Court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be rt revoked by a Superior Court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on society, resulting in such an order. In P v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) (2022), 15 SCR 211 decided by a three-judge bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J)] has spelt out the considerations that must be weighed with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1) of the CrPC in the following words:
"24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loath to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail, but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 22 2025:HHC:42786 and interference by the appellate court." (emphasis supplied)
20. In State of Haryana v. Dharamraj, 2023 SCC OnLine SC .
1085, speaking through one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.), the Court, while setting aside an order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court granting (anticipatory) bail, discussed and reasoned:
"7. A foray, albeit brief, into relevant precedents is warranted. This Court considered the factors to guide the grant of bail in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh of (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2004) 7 SCC 528. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v.
Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496, the relevant principles rt were restated thus:
'9. ... It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 23
2025:HHC:42786
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by .
the grant of bail.'
8. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar alias Polia (2020) 2 SCC 118, this Court opined as under:
'16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an of assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of discretion in the grant of bail. The test is rt whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted. ...'
9. In Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Depak, 2023 INSC 761, this Court, in view of Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh, (1996) 4 SCC 693 and X v. State of Telangana, (2018) 16 SCC 511, held as follows:
'13. It is also required to be borne in mind that when a prayer is made for the cancellation of the grant of bail, cogent and overwhelming circumstances must be present, and bail, once granted, cannot be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it in conducing to allow a fair trial. This proposition draws support from the Judgment of this Court in Daulat Ram v. State of Haryana (1995) 1 SCC 349, Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh (1996) 4 SCC 693 and XXX v. State of Telangana (2018) 16 SCC 511.'
10. In XXX v. Union Territory of Andaman & Nicobar Islands, 2023 INSC 767, this Court noted that the principles ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 24 2025:HHC:42786 in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar (supra) stood reiterated in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra (2022) 9 SCC 321.
11. The contours of anticipatory bail have been .
elaborately dealt with by 5-Judge Benches in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 and Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 is worthy of mention in this context, despite its partial overruling in Sushila Aggarwal (supra). We are cognizant that liberty is not to be interfered with of easily. More so when an order of pre-arrest bail already stands granted by the High Court.
12. Yet, much like bail, the grant of anticipatory bail is to be rt exercised with judicial discretion. The factors illustrated by this Court through its pronouncements are illustrative and not exhaustive. Undoubtedly, the fate of each case turns on its own facts and merits." (emphasis supplied)
21. In Ajwar (supra), this Court also examined the considerations for setting aside bail orders in terms below:
"28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate Court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined, and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused ought to be avoided. Suffice it to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused.::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 25
2025:HHC:42786
29. In Jagjeet Singh (supra) (2022) 9 SCC 321, a three-judge bench of this Court has observed that the power to grant bail under Section 439 Cr. P.C. is of .
wide amplitude and the High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, is bestowed with considerable discretion while deciding an application for bail. But this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must reflect the due application of the judicial mind following well-established principles of law. In the ordinary course, courts would be slow to interfere with of the order where bail has been granted by the courts below. But if it is found that such an order is illegal or perverse or based upon utterly irrelevant material, the rt appellate Court would be well within its power to set aside and cancel the bail. (Also refer: Puran v. Ram Bilas (2001) 6 SCC 338; Narendra K. Amin (Dr.) v. State of Gujarat (2008) 13 SCC 584)" (emphasis supplied)
34. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702, wherein it was observed:
(B) Cancellation of bail 18.10. As per Halsbury's Laws of England, the grant of bail does not set the accused at liberty in the absolute sense but merely shifts custody from the State to the sureties. Conse-
quently, cancellation of bail entails an assessment of whether the accused has abused the liberty so conferred. 18.11. In Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana (1995) 1 SCC 349, this Court delineated broad, though not exhaustive, grounds justifying cancellation of bail, including:
• Interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of justice;
• Evasion of justice;
• Abuse of the concession of bail;
• Likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice.::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 26
2025:HHC:42786 18.12. In Abdul Basit v. Abdul Kadir Choudhary (2014) 10 SCC 754, this Court elaborated the circumstances in which bail granted under Section 439(2) Cr. P.C.may be cancelled, in-
cluding where the accused:
.
• engages in similar criminal activity post-bail; • interferes with or obstructs the investigation; • tampers with evidence or influences witnesses;
• intimidates or threatens witnesses; • attempts to abscond or evade judicial process;
of • becomes unavailable or goes underground; • violates the conditions imposed or evades the control of sureties.
rt 18.13. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar (2020) 2 SCC 118, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud explained:
"An appellate court is empowered to set aside a bail order if it is found to be based on a misapplication of legal princi- ples or where relevant considerations have been ignored. On the other hand, cancellation of bail typically arises from post-bail conduct or supervening circumstances."
18.14. Finally, in Deepak Yadav v. State of U.P. Criminal Ap- peal No. 861 of 2022 (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 9655 of 2021) dated 20.05.2022, this Court reaffirmed that bail already granted should not be cancelled in a routine or mechanical manner.
Only cogent and overwhelming circumstances, which threaten the fairness of the trial or the interest of justice, would warrant such interference.
18.15. Thus, it is clear that while cancellation of bail is a se- rious matter involving deprivation of personal liberty, the law does permit annulment of a bail order that is unjusti- fied, legally untenable, or passed without due regard to material considerations. The distinction between annul- ment of bail orders due to perversity and cancellation for post-bail misconduct must be clearly understood and ap- plied, ensuring a careful, calibrated, and constitutionally sound approach to the administration of criminal justice.
::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 272025:HHC:42786
35. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
.
36. The status report specifically mentions that the informant complained to the police about the threats advanced to him, but he did not join the investigation when he was called to do so. Therefore, the status report does not confirm the allegations of made in the petition regarding the informant's intimidation. The petitioner has sought the cancellation of the bail only on the rt ground that the accused is intimidating him. Since this fact has not been established, therefore, the bail cannot be cancelled.
37. However, the matter cannot be left here. The allegations made by respondent No.2/accused regarding the demand of ₹50.00 lacs for compromising the matter with the petitioner are serious. Prima facie, they have been confirmed by the report of the FSL. Demand of ₹50.00 lacs by the informant from the accused to compromise the matter amounts to interference with the Administration of Justice as well as the commission of offences punishable under BNS, and the action is required to be taken in the matter. The transcript of the conversation is not on record. Hence, the State is directed to file ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS 28 2025:HHC:42786 the transcript of the conversation on record, and the petitioner will show cause as to why the proceedings for Contempt of Court .
for interfering with the Administration of Justice and for committing the offence punishable under BNS should not be initiated against him within two weeks.
(Rakesh Kainthla) of Judge 10th December, 2025 (Chander) rt ::: Downloaded on - 10/12/2025 20:38:08 :::CIS