Delhi District Court
Dr. Vikram Hingorani & Ors vs Sh. Mohan Hingorani A & Ors on 23 September, 2011
IN THE COURT OF SH. BRIJESH KUMAR GARG:
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE08, CENTRAL, DELHI.
SUIT NO. 217/2011
DR. VIKRAM HINGORANI & ORS. PLAINTIFFS
VS.
SH. MOHAN HINGORANI A & ORS. DEFENDANTS
23.09.2011
ORDER
This order shall dispose off the two petitions under the provisions of "Proviso" attached to order 23 Rule 3 CPC, and the third application of defendant no. 4 and 5 under Section 151 CPC, dated 29.4.2010 for treating the aforesaid two applications in the nature of a regular civil suit. One application under Order 23 Rule 3(Proviso) CPC, has been filed on behalf of the defendant no. 4 & 5 on 21.8.2008, whereas, the other similar application has been filed on behalf of defendant no. 6 on 5.12.2008.
2 It has been stated in both these applications that the suit property comprising basement, ground floor, mazenine and first floor at property bearing no. 13, Patel Road, West Patel Nagar, Delhi measuring 800 sq. yds. was given on perpetual lease to Sh. Ram Chand Tahilramani SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 1 of 20 in December, 1956 for a period of 99 years and the said plot was gifted by Sh. Ram Chand B. Tahalramani to his wife Smt. Sati Tahalramani vide Gift Deed dated 27.7.1959. It is also stated that a permission was also sought for the transfer of the said plot by way of aforesaid Gift Deed, from the competent authority and the permission was also granted vide letter dated 12.4.1958.
3 It is further stated that by virtue of Gift Deed dated 27.7.59, Smt. Sati Tahalramani had become the absolute and exclusive owner of the suit property and she raised construction in the said plot in the year 1980 and thereafter, entered into a 'Collaboration Agreement' with defendant no. 4 & 5 on 20.9.1988. Vide said 'Collaboration Agreement', the defendant no. 4 & 5 were supposed to demolish the entire built up structure on the plot to build a new multi storied building, as per the terms and conditions of the Collaboration Agreement. It is further stated that on 20.9.1998, Smt. Sati Tahalramani executed a registered GPA in favour of Sh. V.K. Soin(defendant no. 5), the Managing Director of defendant no. 4, in pursuance to the Collaboration Agreement dated 20.9.88 and by virtue of Collaboration Agreement and GPA, the defendant no. 5 demolished the entire property and constructed a multi storied building and sold various portions of the said multi storied building to various persons, after accepting deposits from them and since SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 2 of 20 then, various other persons are in possession of such portions. 4 It is further stated that the present suit was filed in August, 2004, wherein, it was alleged that the suit property originally belonged to Sh. Hardas Mal Hingorani and said Sh. Hardas Mal Hingorani executed a Will on 13.9.74, by virtue of which, the plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 & 3 became the owners of the suit property. It is further stated that the present suit is a collusive suit and the execution of the Will dated 13.9.74 has been challenged by the present applicants.
5 It is further stated that on 28.3.08, the plaintiff no. 1 to 6 and defendant no. 1 to 3 filed an application under Order 23 Rule 3 R/W Section 151 CPC for compromise. But, the present applicants were not made a party to the said compromise, and the Ld. predecessor of this court recorded the joint statement of plaintiff no. 1 to 6 and defendant no. 2 & 3 and passed a preliminary and final decree on 24.4.2008, which are subject matter of challenge, by way of the present applications/petitions. 6 In its application, the defendant no. 6 has also alleged the similar facts and has further disclosed that the defendant no. 6 has entered into a memorandum of understanding and agreement with defendant no. 4 & 5 on 23.3.95, by virtue of which, they have claimed ownership rights in respect of three flats in the suit property. One on the first floor and second on the second floor, with part of the basement in SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 3 of 20 the suit property. It is also stated that the said portions of the suit property already stand mutated in the name of defendant no. 6 and the entire sale consideration had already been paid to the defendant no. 4 & 5 on the date of execution of the agreement and memorandum of understanding dated 20.3.95. It is also stated that defendant no. 6 is a bonafide purchaser of the suit property and the compromise effected between the plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 & 3 was not legally sustainable.
7 In reply to these applications, it has been stated that these applications are misconceived and are an abuse of the process of law. It is also stated that the defendants have deliberately concealed the fact that the Hon'ble High court of Delhi, vide order and decree dated 25.11.75, was pleased to decree that Sh. Hardas Mal Hingorani and Smt. Sati Tahalramani were the actual owners of the suit property in equal share. 8 It is further stated that Sh. Hardas Mal Hingorani, vide his Will dated 13.9.74, bequethed undivided half share in the suit property to his wife Mr. Rochi Hingorani and after her death, in three equal shares, to one of his son Mr. Bahar Hingorani(deceased father of plaintiff no. 1 to 3), his grand daughter Priya Hingorani and defendant no.1 Mohan Hingorani.
9 It is also stated that Smt. Sati Tahilramani was appointed as SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 4 of 20 sole executrix of the Will dated 13.9.1974 and Sh. Hardasmal Hingorani had died on 22.2.1981. It is further stated that Mrs. Rochi Hingorani died on 13.9.96 and after her death, 50 % undivided share of Mr. Hardasmal Hingorani became payable to the legatees under his Will. 10 It is further stated that Mrs.Sati Tahalramani inducted the defendant no. 4 & 5 in the suit property, as builder/contractor in the year 1988, for the specific performance of construction of a multistoried building under a 'Collaboration Agreement' dated 20.9.88 and vide said Collaboration Agreement, the defendant no. 4 & 5 were not given any title in the suit property. It is further stated that Mrs. Sati Tahalramani validly terminated the collaboration agreement vide legal notice dated 17.10.1992 and revoked the power of attorney, given thereunder, vide legal notice dated 23.3.1994. It is further stated that the defendant No.4 & 5 have no right to remain in possession of the suit property after termination of the contract and even if, the contract has been terminated wrongfully, they have the remedy to claim the damages. 11 It is further stated that the defendant no. 4 & 5, in blatant violation of the 'statusquo' order dated 6.4.1994, passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, in suit No. 740/1994, inducted defendant no. 6 as a licensee, in substantial portion of the suit property vide Licence Deed dated 23.3.1995 and since defendant no. 4 & 5 are the trespassers in the SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 5 of 20 suit property, the agreement between the defendant no. 4, 5 and 6, to induct the defendant no. 6 in the suit property as licensee is null and void.
12 It is further stated that Smt. Sati Tahalramani died on 21.1.2002 and defendant no. 2 & 3 are her surviving legal heirs and the present suit was filed by the plaintiffs in August, 2004, wherein, all these facts have been disclosed. It is further stated that during the pendency of the present suit, the plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 & 3 have arrived at an amicable family settlement on 18.3.2008 and terms of the family settlement were recorded in the application under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC(Ex. C1) and on the basis of the said family settlement, the suit property was partitioned by metes and bounds, among the family members and the plaintiffs compromised their suit with defendant no. 2 & 3 and are proceeding with the present suit against the other defendants. It is further stated that the present suit against the defendant no. 2 and 3 stands compromised, whereas, the present suit against the remaining defendants, including the present applicants, shall continue further. 13 It is further stated that the present applicants have no 'locus standi' to challenge the compromise/family settlement or the legality or validity of the Will exeucted by Late Sh. Hardas Banasingh Hingorani. 14 It is further stated that the remedy under the "Proviso" to SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 6 of 20 order 23 Rule 3 CPC, is available only to those parties of the suit, who are alleged to be the parties to such adjustment or satisfaction or compromise. The remedy under the "Proviso" to Order 23 Rule 3 CPC is not available to the present applicants, as they are not the family members of the plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 & 3 and are not a part of the family settlement. It has been denied by the plaintiff that Smt. Sati Tahalramani was ever an absolute or exclusive owner of the suit property. It is also stated that the 'Collaboration Agreement' dated 2.9.88 does not confer any title in the suit property, on defendant no. 4 & 5 and subsequently on defendant no. 6. It is further stated that applicants have failed to disclose any reason, as to how, the family settlement effected between the plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 & 3 was illegal. 15 The rejoinders were filed by the present applicants to the replies of the plaintiffs, wherein, they have denied the contents of the replies and have reiterated and reaffirmed the contents of their petitions/applications.
16 Sh. Aman Hingorani Advocate for the plaintiffs, Sh. Ram Bihari Gupta, Advocate, with Sh. Amit Gaurav, Advocate, for defendant no. 4 & 5 and Sh. S.K. Garg, Advocate, for defendant no. 6 have addressed their arguments on the present applications. The Ld. counsel for the applicants have argued that the applicants have become the SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 7 of 20 owners of the portions of the suit property by virtue of various documents executed by Smt. Sati Tahalramani, and they are in possession of various portions of the suit property. It is further argued that the applicants were not a party to the compromise arrived at between the plaintiffs and the defendant no. 2 & 3 and since, the applicants are the defendants in the present suit, they were also a necessary party to the compromise effected between the plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 & 3 and therefore, the compromise effected between the plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 & 3 is illegal. It is also argued that no compromise has been effected by the plaintiffs with the defendant no. 4,5 & 6 i.e. the present applicants, and therefore, the compromise decree passed under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC cannot be sustained.
17 The Ld. counsel for the defendant no. 6 has also argued that the defendant no. 6 has purchased the suit property from defendant no. 4 & 5 by virtue of agreement and memorandum of understanding dated 23.3.1995 and is the bonafide purchaser and it is entitled to be made a party to the compromise, effected between the plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 & 3, being the parties to the present suit and therefore, the compromise effected between the parties is not legally sustainable. 18 On the other hand, the Ld. counsel for the plaintiffs has argued that the applicants/Defendant no. 4,5 & 6 cannot claim any SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 8 of 20 ownership rights on the basis of alleged documents and no title can be transferred in favour of the applicants by execution of General Power of Attorney, Agreement to Sell etc. and by execution of the Agreement of Collaboration dated 20.9.88. He has further argued that a family settlement has been validly arrived at between the plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 & 3, who are the family members and there was no requirement for them to make the applicants/defendant no. 4,5 & 6 a party to the family settlement. It is further stated that the provisions of "Proviso" to Order 23 Rule 3 CPC apply only to a party to the 'compromise' and not to the other parties. He has also argued that the present objections are also time barred and there is no compromise decree qua the defendant no. 4,5 & 6 and therefore, the present applicants cannot raise any objection to the compromise effected between the plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 & 3 and to the 'preliminary' and 'final decree' dated 24.4.2008.
19 I have carefully gone through the case file and I have given my considered thoughts to the arguments, addressed by the Ld. counsels for the parties. I have also carefully gone through the various judgments cited by the Ld. counsels for the parties.
20 The main contention of the Ld. Counsels for the defendants/applicants has remained that the applicants have become the SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 9 of 20 owners of a portion of the suit property as Smt. Sati Tahalramani was the exclusive and absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of 'Gift Deed' dated 27.7.1959 and she entered into an Agreement of Collaboration with defendant no. 4 & 5 on 20.9.88 , by virtue of which, the defendant no. 4 & 5 became the owners of a portion of the suit property. They have also argued that the defendant no. 4 & 5 have specifically sold a portion of the suit property to various other persons, including the defendant no. 6 and accordingly, all those persons and defendant no. 6 are in legal possession of different portions of the suit property and therefore, the compromise effected between the plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 & 3 is not binding upon them and no compromise decree can be passed on the basis of the said compromise.
21 Perusal of the case file shows that this contention of the Ld. Counsels for the defendants/applicants is misconceived. The Ld. counsels for the defendants/applicants have not rebutted the submissions of the Ld. counsel for the plaintiffs, regarding the orders passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi on 25.11.1975. The counsels for the defendants have not rebutted this fact that a decree was passed by the Hon'ble High Court on 25.11.1975, whereby, Sh. Hardasmal Hingorani and Smt. Sati Tahalramani were declared as coowners of the suit property in equal shares.
SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 10 of 20 22 However, the Ld. counsel for the applicants/defendants have argued that the execution of the Will dated 13.9.75 by Sh. Hardasmal Hingorani has been challenged by the applicants in their written statement in the present suit. But, I have failed to understand, as to how, the defendant no. 4, 5 & 6 can challenge the Will dated 13.9.1974, when the defendant no. 4,5 & 6 are not the family members of the plaintiffs and defendant no. 1 to 3. Furthermore, the defendant no. 4 & 5 were inducted in the suit property in the year 1988, whereas, the defendant no. 6 was inducted in a portion of the suit property in the year 1995 and therefore, there was no occasion for them to know any fact about the execution of Will on 13.9.1974 by Sh. Hardasmal Hingorani. I have failed to understand the basis of such objection by the applicants/defendant no. 4, 5 & 6.
23 Perusal of the record further shows that defenadant no. 4 & 5 have placed on record a photocopy of the Lease Deed dated 6.9.56 in favour of Sh. Ramchand B. Tahalramani and a gift deed dated executed by Sh. Ramchand B. Tahalramani in favour of his wife Smt. Sati Tahalramani on 27.7.59. They have also filed a letter dated 22.4.58 issued from the office of the housing and rent officer cum Additional Settlement Commissioner, for grant of permission to transfer the suit property by Sh. Ramchand B. Tahalramani in favour of Smt. Sati SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 11 of 20 Tahalramani. A copy of 'Collaboration Agreement' dated 20.9.88, executed by Smt. Sati Ramchand B. Tahalramani with M/s Pushpa Builders is also on record. A copy of the General Power of Attorney executed by Smt. Sati Tahalramani dated 20.9.88, in favour of M/s Pushpa Builders Ltd.,(defendant no. 4, herein) is also on record. A copy of the affidavit executed by Smt. Sati Tahalramani dated 20.9.88 is also placed on record. Perusal of all these documents indicates that Sh. Ramchand B. Tahalramani was having the lease hold rights in the suit property and even if the contentions of the Ld. counsel for the defendants/applicants are accepted, at this stage, it can be safely held that only the lease hold rights could be transferred by Sh. Ramchand B. Tahalramani, in favour of Smt. Sati B. Tahalramani vide gift deed dated 27.7.59. The execution of agreement of collaboration dated 20.9.88 and the General Power of Attorney, the affidavit and other relied documents, in the considered opinion of this court, does not transfer any title or ownership rights in favour of defendant no. 4 & 5. 24 It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "Suraj Lamp & Industries Private Limited Vs. State of Haryana and another", reported as, (2009) 7 Supreme Court Cases 363, as under:
12. The "power of attorney sales", as noticed SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 12 of 20 above, was adopted to overcome the restrictions/prohibitions in terms of allotment and the rules of allotment of DDA governing the allotment of flats. Such transactions were obviously irregular and illegal being contrary to the rules and terms of allotment. Further, in the absence of a registered deed of conveyance, no right, title or interest in an immovable property could be transferred to the purchaser.
13. However, the Delhi High Court in a few cases accepted such "power of attorney sales" as creating an "interest" in the DDA flat which was so issuing injunctions or decrees preventing the vendor from further dealing with the property. This led to a general impression that the "power of attorney sales" were valid recognised modes of transfer and the very purpose of DDA prohibiting transfers and requiring permission on payment of certain difference in price was defeated by this process.
(Emphasis supplied) 25 In view of the above pronouncement and the facts and circumstances of the present case, this objection of the Ld. counsels for the applicants cannot be sustained.
25 The second contention of the Ld. counsels for the applicants has remained that the compromise was not arrived at between the plaintiffs and the present applicants and therefore, no decree can be passed on the basis of the said family settlement against the present SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 13 of 20 applicants. In the considered opinion of this court, it was not necessary for the plaintiffs or the defendant no. 1 to 3 to join the other defendants of the applicants, as a party to the compromise or the family settlement. The plaintiffs or the defendant no. 1 to 3 were under no obligation to join the applicants or the other defendants as a party to their family settlement. Even otherwise, the present applicants are not their family members and therefore, they cannot be made a party to the family settlement. Furthermore, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case titled as H.C. Shastri Vs. Dolphin Canpack (P) Ltd. & Ors. reported as 67(1997) Delhi Law Times 652 , as under:
18. As regards the submission of the applicant/intervenor that the compromise entered into is void and unlawful, the same is falacious and has no basis. Explanation to Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no doubt provides that an agreement of compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the Rule. This is not a case where any of the parties to the compromise is challenging the same as vitiated by a fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence or coercion. It is the applicant/intervenor who is alleging the compromise to be void and unlawful on the ground that it was collusive and entered into SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 14 of 20 without his presence.
27 It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as Bai Chancal and others, Vs. Syed Jalaluddin & Ors. reported as AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1081, as under:
8. ....... On the other hand, Rule 3 of Order XXIII, CPC, clearly envisages a decree being passed in respect of part of the subject matter of the suit on a compromise, and Rule 6 of Order XII, CPC, permits the passing of a judgment at any stage without waiting for determination of other questions. Thus, it is clear that, in the same suit, there can be more than one decree passed at different stages. In the present case, the first decree of 8th July, 1946 was based on a compromise between the plaintiffs and some of the defendants, while the second decree dated 28th January, 1949 decided the rights of the remaining defendants. The two decrees were separate and independent and neither of them could be treated as a nullity.
28 It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as Pushpa Devi Bhagat(D) Th. LR. Smt. Sadhna Rai Vs. Rajinder Singh & Ors. reported as 2006 AIR (SC) 2628, as under:
11. Section 96 provides for appeals from SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 15 of 20 original decrees, Subsection(3) of Section 96, however, provided that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the court with the consent of the parties. We may notice here that Order 43 Rule 1(m) of CPC had earlier provided for an appeal against the order under Rule 3 Order 23 recording or refusing to record an agreement, compromise or satisfaction. But, clause (m) of Rule I Order 43 was omitted by Act 104 of 1976 with effect from 1.2.1977. Simultaneously, a proviso was added to Rule 3 Order 23 with effect from 1.2.1977. We extract below the relevant portion of the said proviso:
"Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the court shall decide the question...."
Rule 3A was also added in Order 23 with effect from 1.2.1977, barring any suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.
12. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23, can be summed up thus:
(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC.
(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause
(m) Rule 1 Order 43.SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 16 of 20
(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3A.
(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23.
Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree, is nothing but contract between the parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made. The second defendant, who challenged the consent compromise decree was fully aware of this position as she filed an application for setting aside the consent decree on 21.8.2001 by alleging that there was no valid compromise in accordance with law. Significantly, none of the other defendants challenged the consent decree. For reasons best known to herself, the second defendant within a few days thereafter (that is on 27.8.2001), filed an appeal and chose not to pursue the application filed SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 17 of 20 before the court which passed the consent decree. Such an appeal by second defendant was not maintainable, having regard to the express bar contained in Section 96(3) of the Code.
13. Order XXIII deals with withdrawal and adjustment of suits, Rule 3 relates to compromise of suits, relevant portion of which is extracted below:
"3. Compromise of suit. Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subjectmatter of the suit."
The said Rule consists of two parts. The first part provides that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the court shall order such agreement or compromise to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith. The second part provides that where a defendant satisfies the plaintiff in SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 18 of 20 respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the court shall order such satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith. The Rule also makes it clear that the compromise or agreement may relate to issues or disputes which are not the subjectmatter of the suit and that such compromise of agreement may be entered not only among the parties to the suit, but others also, but the decree to be passed shall be confined to the parties to the suit whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject matter of the suit. We are not, however, concerned with this aspect of the Rule in this appeal. 29 From the above pronouncements, it is clear that a few of the parties to a litigation can enter into a mutual settlement and it is not necessary for them to join the other parties to the suit in their compromise. The plaintiffs are at liberty to compromise their dispute with any of the defendants and after the settlement with a few of the defendants, the suit of the plaintiff can be disposed off as settled qua those defendants, with whom, the plaintiff has voluntarily settled his dispute. The suit of the plaintiff can continue qua the remaining defendants.
30 Even in the present case, the plaintiffs have arrived at a family settlement with defendant no. 1 to 3, and in the considered SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 19 of 20 opinion of this court, in the light of various pronouncements, as discussed above, they were not required to join the other defendants, to their family settlement. Even otherwise, the defendant no. 4, 5 & 6 cannot be joined as a party to the family settlement because they were not the members of the family of the plaintiffs or the defendant no. 1 to 3. In these circumstances, this objection of the applicants/defendant no. 4, 5 & 6 is also misconceived.
30 In view of the above circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that both these applications are misconceived and are a gross misuse and abuse of the process of law and therefore, all three applications are, hereby, dismissed, subject to imposition of cost of Rs.10,000/ on defendant no. 4 & 5 and a separate cost of Rs.10,000/ on defendant no. 6. It is ordered accordingly.
Announced in the open court on this 23rd day of September, 2011.
BRIJESH KUMAR GARG ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE08 CENTRAL, DELHI.
SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 20 of 20
SUIT NO. 217/2011
23.9.2011
Present: None for the parties.
Separate order on the application of defendant no. 4,5 dated 21.8.2008 & and the application of defendant no. 6 dated 7.12.2008, filed on 5.12.2008, both under Order 23 Rule 3 (Proviso) R/w Section 151 CPC and another application of defendant no. 4 & 5 under Section 151 CPC dated 29.04.2010, has been passed, whereby, all the three applications have been dismissed, subject to imposition of cost of Rs. 10,000/ on defendant no. 4 & 5 and a separate cost of Rs. 10,000/ on defendant no. 6.
Adjourned for further proceedings on 29.10.2011.
BRIJESH KUMAR GARG ADJ08, CENTRAL, DELHI/23.09.2011 SUIT NO. 217/2011 Page 21 of 20