Himachal Pradesh High Court
Sheetal Rana vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Others on 5 January, 2019
Author: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA .
Cr. MMO No. 595 of 2018.
Date of decision: 05.01.2019.
Sheetal Rana .....Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh and others ..... Respondents.
Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr. Arun Sehgal, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Mr.Vinod Thakur and Mr. Sudhir Bhatnagar, Additional Advocate Generals with Mr. Bhupinder Thakur, Deputy Advocate General and Mr. Ram Lal Thakur, Assistant Advocate General, for respondents No.1 and 2.
Mr. Dinesh Bhatia, Advocate, for respondent No.3.
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge (Oral).
By medium of this petition, the petitioner has sought quashing of FIR No.82 of 2014, registered at Police Station, Dharamshala, District Kangra, on 15.05.2014, under Section 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?Yes ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 2 498-A IPC as well as proceedings in Case No.75-II/2014, titled 'State versus Ashish and others' pending before learned Chief .
Judicial Magistrate, Kangra at Dharamshala, on the ground that even though she is complainant, but having compromised all other issues with the respondents, she is not interested in pursuing the FIR or the proceedings in the aforesaid case. In support of such contention, the petitioner has annexed a copy of the compromise deed Annexure P-2 as also the affidavit Annexure P-3 to this effect.
2. Respondent No.3 is husband and is present before this Court and identified as such by his Counsel and in fact can have no objection to the FIR and the proceedings in Case No.75- II/2014, titled 'State versus Ashish and others' being quashed as he happens to be the accused therein.
3. I have talked to both the parties and it appears that they have serious compatibility issue and do not want to reside together and have already moved an application for mutual divorce and the same is stated to be pending in the Courts, Kangra at Dharamshala.
4. Therefore, taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and further taking into consideration the fact that the pendency of the FIR and the case ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 3 before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra at Dharamshala, would further hamper and destroy the relations whatsoever so .
little left between the parties,
5. However, the moot question is whether the Court in such like cases can quash the proceedings. The law on this subject has been summed up in a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. V. State of Punjab & Anr. JT 2014 (4) SC 573, wherein it was held as under:
"(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code.
No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves.
However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
(II) When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. (III)Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 4 impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention .
of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
(IV)On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. (V)While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
(VI)Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 5 basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of .
conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.
(VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 6 those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage .
before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."
6. It would be seen that prior to Narinder Singh's case (supra), a three Hon'ble Judges Bench had considered the relevant scope of Sections 482 and 320 Cr.P.C. in Gian Singh versus State of Punjab and another (2012) 10 SCC 303 wherein it was held that power of the High Court in quashing of the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power is distinct and different from the power of a Criminal Court for compounding offences under Section 320 Cr.P.C. While exercising inherent power of quashment under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime and its social impact. It warned the High Courts for quashing proceedings in heinous and serious offences of mental depravity, murder, rape, dacoity etc. which principles have been reported and reaffirmed in Narinder Singh's case (supra).
::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 77. Now the further question remains whether this Court can quash the proceedings where respondents No.3 to 8 .
have been charged under Section 498-A IPC.
8. This question need not detain this Court any longer in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dimpey Gujral, W/o Vivek Gujral and others versus Union Territory through Administrator, UT, Chandigarh and others (2013) 11 SCC 497 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with a case regarding quashing of FIR and its consequential proceedings involving Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 452, 506 IPC and after relying upon the judgment of Gian Singh's case (supra) held as follows:-
"7. In certain decisions of this court in view of the settlement arrived at by the parties, this court quashed the FIRs though some of the offences were non- compoundable. A two Judges' Bench of this court doubted the correctness of those decisions. Learned Judges felt that in those decisions, this court had permitted compounding of non-compoundable offences. The said issue was, therefore, referred to a larger bench.
The larger Bench in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 considered the relevant provisions of the Code and the judgments of this court and concluded as under: (SCC pp.342-43, para 61) ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 8 "61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of .
the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 9 quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership .
or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."
(emphasis supplied)
8. In the light of the above observations of this court in Gian Singh, we feel that this is a case where the continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law because the alleged offences are not heinous offences showing extreme depravity nor are ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 10 they against the society. They are offences of a personal nature and burying them would bring about peace and .
amity between the two sides. In the circumstances of the case, FIR No.163 dated 26/10/2006 registered under Section 147, 148,149, 323, 307, 452 and 506 of the IPC at Police Station Sector 3,Chandigarh and all consequential proceedings arising there from including the final report presented under Section 173 of the Code and charges framed by the trial court are hereby quashed."
9. Similar, issue came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in J.Ramesh Kamath and others versus Mohana Kurup and others AIR 2016 SC 2452, wherein it was held as under:-
"11. The first contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants was, that the respondents-accused have been charged of offences under Sections 406, 408, 409, 477A and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. It was the pointed contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, that most of the provisions under which the accused- respondents had been charged, were non-compoundable under Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code. And as such, the matter could not have been compounded.
12. Whilst it is not disputed at the hands of the learned counsel for respondent nos.1 and 2, that most of the offences under which the accused were charged are non- compoundable, yet it was asserted, that the jurisdiction invoked by the High Court in quashing the criminal proceedings against respondent nos.1 to 3, was not under ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 11 Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but was under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as .
interpreted by this Court.
13. Insofar as the decisions of this Court are concerned, reference, in the first instance, was made to Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582: (AIR 2008 SC 1969), wherefrom, our attention was invited to the following observations:
"5. It is on the basis of this compromise that the application was filed in the High Court for quashing of proceedings which has been dismissed by the impugned order. We notice from a reading of the FIR and the other documents on record that the r dispute was purely a personal one between two contesting parties and that it arose out of extensive business dealings between them and that there was absolutely no public policy involved in the nature of the allegations made against the accused. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served in continuing with the proceedings in the light of the compromise and also in the light of the fact that the complainant has on 11-1-2004, passed away and the possibility of a conviction being recorded has thus to be ruled out.
6. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law."
(Emphasis is ours) A perusal of the conclusions extracted above, with a reading of the FIR and the supporting documents ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 12 in the above case reveal, that the dispute was purely of a personal nature, between two contesting parties. Further that, the dispute arose .
out of private business dealings between two private parties. And furthermore, there was absolutely no public involvement, in the allegations made against the accused. Based on the aforesaid considerations, this Court had held, that in disputes where the question involved was of a purely personal nature, it was appropriate for Courts to accept the terms of compromise, even in criminal proceedings. It was sought to be explained, that in such matters, keeping the matters alive would not result, in favour of the prosecution. We are of the view, that the reliance on the above judgment would have been justified, if the inferences drawn by the High Court were correct, namely, that admittedly there was no misappropriation of the funds of the Association, and secondly, the r offences alleged were purely personal in nature. We shall examine that, at a later stage.
14. Having placed reliance on the judgment in the Madan Mohan Abbot case (supra), which was determined by a two-Judge Division Bench of this Court, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 3 went on to place reliance on Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303: (AIR 2012 SC (Supp) 838, para 55, 56, 57), which was decided by a three-Judge Division Bench. Insofar as the instant judgment is concerned, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 3, in the first instance, invited this Court's attention to paragraph 37 thereof, wherein the earlier decision rendered by this Court in the Madan Mohan Abbot case, was duly noticed. Thereupon, the Bench recorded its conclusion as under:
"59. B.S. Joshi (2003) 4 SCC 675 : (AIR 2003 SC 1386) Nikhil Merchant (2008) 9 SCC 677 : (AIR 2009 SC 428), Manoj Sharma (2008) 16 SCC 1: (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1171) and Shiji (2011) 10 SCC 705:
(AIR 2012 SC 409) do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 13 does not limit or affect the powers of the High court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B. S. Joshi, Nikhil .
Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji this Court has compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist the distinction between compounding of an offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by the High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different although the ultimate consequence may be the same viz. acquittal of the accused or dismissal of indictment.
60. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law and the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia (1990) 2 SCC 437: (AIR 1990 SC 1605) Dharampal (1993) 1 SCC 435 : (AIR 1993 SC 1361), Arun Shankar Shukla (1999) 6 SCC 146: (AIR 1999 SC 2554), Ishwar Singh (2008) 15 SCC 667: (AIR 2009 SC 675), Rumi Dhar (2009) 6 SCC 364 : (AIR 2009 SC 2195) and Ashok Sadarangani (2012) 11 SCC 321 : (AIR 2012 SC 1563) The principle propounded in Simrikhia that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override express bar provided in law is by now well settled. In Dharampal the Court observed the same thing that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Similar statement of law is made in Arun Shankar Shukla. In Ishwaqr Singh the accused was alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC and with reference to Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC was not compoundable offence and there was express bar in Section 320 that no offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code. In Rumi Dhar although the accused had paid the entire due amount as per the settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded with for the commission of the offences under Sections 120- B/420/467/468/471 IPC along with the bank officers who were being prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with 13 (1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding that the Court would not quash a case involving a crime against the society when a prima facie case has been made out against the accused for framing ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 14 the charge. Ashok Sadarangani was again a case where the accused persons were charged of having committed the offences under Sections 120-B, 465, .
467, 468 and 471, IPC and the allegations were that the accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged property documents as collaterals and utilised such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening letters of credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank to negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court was alive to the reference made in one of the present matters and also the decisions in B.S.Joshi, Nikhil Merchant and Manoj Sharma and it was held that B.S.Joshi, and Nikhil Merchant dealt with different factual situation as the dispute involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the case under consideration in Ashok Sadarangani was more on the criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in Ashok Sadarangani supports the view that the criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different footing.
61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 15 in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while .
working in that capacity, etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak r and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."
(Emphasis is ours)
15. A perusal of the above determination, leaves no room for any doubt, that this Court crystalised the position in respect of the powers vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to quash criminal proceedings. It has now been decisively held, that the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is not limited to quashing proceedings within the ambit and scope of ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 16 Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The three- Judge Division Bench in the above case, clearly .
expounded, that quashing of criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, could also be based on settlements between private parties, and could also on a compromise between the offender and the victim. Only that, the above power did not extend to crimes against the society. It is also relevant to mention, that the jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, for quashing criminal proceedings, was held to be exercisable in criminal cases having an overwhelming and predominatingly civil flavour, particularly offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership, or such like transactions. Or even offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry etc. Or family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal. In all such cases, the parties should have resolved their entire dispute by themselves, mutually.
16. The question which emerges for our consideration is, whether the allegations levelled in the complaint against respondent Nos.1 to 3, would fall within the purview of the High Court, so as to enable it to quash the same, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code?"
10. Similar issue recently came up before three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court in Parbatbhai Aahir alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Kumar and others versus State of Gujarat and another, (2017) 9 SCC 641 wherein after taking into consideration the majority of the judgments as ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 17 have been cited above, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down certain broad guiding principles which the High Court should .
consider in determining whether to carry out quashment of FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings, which can be summarized as under:-
"(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 18 the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
.
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 19(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the .
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."
11. In view of the aforesaid exposition of law, there can be no gainsaying that the jurisdiction vested with this Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing criminal proceedings is exercisable relating to offences arising out of some misunderstanding and matrimonial dispute like dowry etc. This Court, therefore, is of the opinion that this is a case where the continuation of the criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law because the alleged offence is not heinous offence showing extreme depravity nor the same is strictly against the society. This is an offence of ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 20 personal nature and quashing the proceedings would bring about peace and amity between two sides.
.
12. Keeping in view the aforesaid guidelines, it is not disputed that the parties have reached a settlement and on that basis have preferred the present proceedings seeking quashment of the FIR. Once petitioner does not want to hold the accused/respondents No.3 to 8 responsible, the quashing of such FIR would definitely be to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of the Court.
13. The facts of this case otherwise do not in any manner fall within the exceptions laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court where compromise cannot be entered into or the proceedings cannot be quashed.
14. Thus, taking holistic view of the matter and looking into all attending facts and circumstances, I find this to be a fit case to exercise powers under Section 482 of the Code and accordingly FIR No.82 of 2014, registered at Police Station, Dharamshala, District Kangra, on 15.05.2014, under Section 498-A IPC and proceedings in Case No.75-II/2014, titled 'State versus Ashish and others' pending before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra at Dharamshala, are quashed.
::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP 2115. The petition stands allowed in the aforesaid terms.
Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.
.
5th January, 2019. (Tarlok Singh Chauhan) (krt) Judge r to ::: Downloaded on - 08/01/2019 23:02:17 :::HCHP