Gujarat High Court
Shinu Javed Mansuri vs Javed Hussain Mansuri on 16 October, 2014
Equivalent citations: AIR 2015 (NOC) 1249 (GUJ.), 2015 AIR CC 2376 (GUJ), (2016) 1 DMC 400, (2015) 1 GUJ LR 770, (2016) 2 CIVLJ 432, (2015) 1 GUJ LH 453, (2016) 1 HINDULR 709, (2016) 2 MARRILJ 376, (2015) 4 RECCIVR 1044, (2015) 151 ALLINDCAS 328 (GUJ), (2015) 3 CURCC 281
Author: Akil Kureshi
Bench: Akil Kureshi, Vipul M. Pancholi
C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
FIRST APPEAL NO. 2979 of 2013
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE VIPUL M. PANCHOLI
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see
the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the
judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as
to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any
order made thereunder ?
5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
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SHINU JAVED MANSURI....Appellant(s)
Versus
JAVED HUSSAIN MANSURI....Defendant(s)
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Appearance:
MS MEGHA JANI, ADVOCATE for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR MM TIRMIZI, ADVOCATE for the Defendant(s) No. 1
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE VIPUL M. PANCHOLI
Date : 16/10/2014
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI) Page 1 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT
1. Appeal is filed calling in question the legality of judgement and decree dated 21.08.2013 passed by the Additional Judge, Family Court, Vadodara in Family Suit No. 442 of 2012.
2.Brief facts are as under:
Appellant is Christian by birth. She converted to Islam and got married to respondent on 20.02.2003 as per Islamic rights. The marriage of the couple ran into trouble. The appellant claims that she was illtreated and harassed by her husband. She claims to have converted to her original faith of Christianity on 19.03.2012. On the premise that, upon her reconversion to her original religion, her marriage with the respondent would stand dissolved, she filed the above noted Family Suit No. 442 of 2012 before the Family Court, Baroda. In such family suit, she complained of illtreatment and harassment by the husband. She has also alleged that since 2008, the husband has neglected to look after the wife and a girl child was born out of the wedlock.Page 2 of 19
C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT She further stated that she had all along followed Christianity as her religion and reconverted to Islam only for the purpose of getting married. She eventually reconverted to her original faith on 19.03.2012. Primarily on such grounds, in the family suit she prayed that the Family Court may pass a decree under Section 7 of the Family Court Act, 1984 read with Section 4 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 ('Act of 1939' for short) declaring the marriage solemnized on 20.02.2003 as null and void. She also prayed for monthly maintenance towards the expenses of her daughter.
3. The respondenthusband appeared before the Family Court and opposed the petition. He filed application Exh 15 for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. In such application, he contended that the family suit of the wife is not maintainable under Section 4 of the Act of 1939. As per the husband, merely on reconversion, the wife could not seek declaration that the marriage stood dissolved. He also questioned the very Page 3 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT factum of the wife's reconversion to Christianity. On such grounds, he prayed before the Court that the suit itself be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code.
4.On such application, the Family Court passed impugned order dated 21.08.2013. The learned Judge recorded that in the family suit she has raised grounds of cruelty but has not prayed for dissolution of the marriage on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 2 of the Act of 1939. According to the learned Judge, Section 4 of the Act of 1939 would not apply to a person who had converted into Islam from some other faith and who reembraces her former faith. The learned Judge further held that the wife had prayed for declaration that the marriage was null and void and not for dissolution of marriage. On such grounds, he was pleased to reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code.
5. Learned counsel Ms. Jani for the appellant submitted that the Family Court committed Page 4 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT a serious error in rejection of the plaint. The appellant had filed the family suit for dissolution of marriage on the grounds mentioned in the said suit. It cannot be stated that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action or that from the statement in the plaint, the suit could be stated to be barred by any law. She contended that, on mere conversion to her original faith, the marriage between the appellant and the respondent would be automatically dissolved. The bar of Section 4 of the Act of 1939 would not apply in such a case. In this context, she relied on an unreported decision of the Delhi High Court in case of Munavarul Islam vs. Rishu Arora @ Rukhsar.
6.On the other hand, learned counsel Mr. Tirmizi for the respondent opposed the appeal contending that:
(i) The factum of the appellant's reconversion to Christianity is not established;
(ii) If she has reconverted to Page 5 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT Christianity, as contended by her, she cannot file petition for dissolution of marriage under Section 4 of the Act of 1939.
(iii) She had not prayed for dissolution of marriage on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 2 of the Act of 1939 and therefore, the Family Court correctly rejected the plaint.
7.Counsel relied on the following decisions of the other High Courts:
(I) Decision in case of K C Moyin vs. Nafeesa reported in AIR 1973 Kerela 176;
(II) Decision of Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in case of Sarwar Yar Khan vs. Jawahar Devi reported in 1964 (1) Andh.WR 60
1. The short question needed to be decided in this appeal is, whether the learned Judge of the Family Court was justified in rejecting the plaint at the very threshold in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the CPC. Under the said Page 6 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT provision, a plaint would be rejected in case where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint barred by any law.
The question is, therefore, when read as a whole, can the family suit filed by the wife be stated to be one which is barred by any law. We may recall, the short case of the wife was that she was not born Muslim lady but converted into Islam and got married to the respondent. She subsequently reconverted to the original faith of Christianity. According to her, this act of reconversion would automatically bring about the dissolution of her marriage with the respondent. As the respondent has questioned the very factum of the reconversion of the appellant into Christianity, we do not go into this factual aspect. However, when we are considering the legality of the judgement of the Family Court rejecting the plaint in exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11, we would have to proceed on the basis of factual averments made by the appellant in her suit. We, therefore, proceeded on the basis of her averments in the family suit namely that she got Page 7 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT reconverted to her original faith of Christianity. We may therefore, examine the effect of Section 4 of the Act of 1939 in such a situation.
2.The Act of 1939 was enacted to consolidate and clarify the provisions of Muslim law relating to suits for dissolution of marriage by woman married under Muslim law and to remove doubts as to the effect of renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman on her marriage ties. The relevant portion of the statement of objects and reasons for enactment of the said Act of 1939 reads as under:
"One more point remains in connection with the dissolution of marriages. It is this. The Courts in British India have held in a number of cases that the apostasy of a married Muslim woman ispo facto dissolves her marriage. This view has been repeatedly challenged at the bar but the Courts continue to stick to precedents created by rulings based on an erroneous view of the Muslim law. The Ulemas have issued Fatwas supporting nondissolution of marriage by reason of wife's apostasy. The Muslim community has, again and again, given expression to its supreme dissatisfaction with the view held by the Courts. A number of articles have been appearing in the press demanding Page 8 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT legislation to rectify the mistake committed by the Courts; hence clause 5 is proposed to be incorporated in this Bill.
Thus, by this Bill the whole law relating to dissolution of marriages is brought at one place and consolidated in the hope that it would supply a very long felt want of the Muslim community in India."
3. With these aims and objects, the Act of 1939 was enacted. Section 2 of the said Act pertains to grounds for decree for dissolution of marriage and provides that a woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on anyone or more of the grounds mentioned in clauses
(i) to (ix) of the said section. These include grounds such as whereabouts of the husband have not been known for a period of four years; that the husband has neglected or has failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years, etc. Clause (ix) of Section 2, in particular, provides that the marriage may be dissolved on any other ground which is recognized as valid for the dissolution of the marriages under the Muslim law. Section 4 of the Act of 1939 which is of Page 9 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT considerable importance for us reads as under:
"4. Effect of conversion to another faith: The renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman or her conversion to a faith other than Islam shall not by itself operate to dissolve her marriage:
Provided that after such renunciation, or conversion, the woman shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any of the grounds mentioned in section 2:
Provided further that the provisions of this section shall not apply to a woman converted to Islam some other faith who reembraces her former faith."
4. As is apparent from the above quoted portion of statements of objects and reasons and it can also be traced from the contemporaneous literature, prior to the enactment of said Act of 1939, conversion of a Muslim woman from a faith of Islam to another religion was considered as one of the grounds for automatic dissolution of her marriage. When seen in that light, main body of Section 4 provides that renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim Page 10 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT woman or her conversion to a faith other than Islam shall not by itself operate to dissolve her marriage. In other words, this was a statutory provision making a departure from any school of thought or principle that mere renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman or her conversion to a faith other than Islam by itself would operate to dissolve her marriage. The first proviso to Section 4 provides that after such renunciation or conversion, the woman shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 2.
5. The combined effect of the main body of Section 4 read with first proviso therefore, would be that, whatever the situation prior to the enactment of the Act of 1939, the renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman or her conversion to a faith other than Islam would not itself operate to dissolve her marriage but, such a woman would still be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any of the grounds Page 11 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT mentioned in Section 2. In other words, even after renunciation of her religion or conversion to other faith, the marriage of a Muslim woman would remain intact and there would be no automatic dissolution.
Her right, however, to seek dissolution of the marriage on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 2 would also not be, in any manner, jeopardized. Such a woman even though no longer professing Islam can still seek dissolution of the marriage from her husband, if she could establish any of the grounds mentioned in Section 2.
6. The further proviso to Section 4, however, carves out an exception in favour of a woman who converted to Islam from some other faith and who reembraces her former faith. In such a situation, the provisions of Section 4 shall not apply to her. The legislative intention is, thus, very clear. Under Section 4 dissolution of marriage upon a mere renunciation of Islam by a married woman or her conversion to a faith other than Islam would not be recognized. By virtue of the first proviso such a woman's right to seek dissolution Page 12 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT of the marriage on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 2 of the Act even after conversion is, however, not taken away. However, by virtue of further proviso, Section 4 itself would not apply in a situation where a woman has converted into Islam from some other faith and re embraces her former faith.
7. In our opinion therefore, Section 4 makes a clear distinction. In case of a woman, who renounces Islam or converts to some other faith, Section 4 along with its first proviso would apply. However, in case of a woman, who has converted into Islam from some other faith and thereafter, reembraces her original faith, Section 4 itself would not apply. Therefore, in such a situation, if the law recognized by the courts is such that the marriage stands dissolved merely by the act of the woman of reconversion to her original faith, the Section 4 of the Act of 1939 would not prevent such consequences. To this limited extent, we are at slight variant with the view of the Delhi High Court in case of Munavarul Page 13 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT Islam vs. Rishu (supra). It is Arora @ Rukhsar also a case where the wife had converted into Islam and thereafter, reconverted to her original faith of Hinduisam. The Court observed as under:
"18. While doubtless the jurists are divided on whether the factum of apostasy dissolves the marriage or renders it invalid or void or null, there is certainly unanimity amongst both the jurists as well as the judgements of the Courts, that apostasy of either party to a marriage contracted under Muslim personal law shall put an end to the marriage. Thus the question arises as to whether the Act, more specifically, section 4 thereof, alters this state of law."
Thereafter, the Court proceeded to examine whether this situation would be altered by virtue of Section 4 of the Act of 1939. Putting considerable stress on the words used "by itself" in Section 4 the Court held as under:
"36. Thus, it is evident that section 4 was enacted in its form to prevent a fraud from being played upon the courts law by women married under Muslim personal law apostatizing solely to escape marital ties. However, on a consideration of the words of the provision, the other provisions in the Act, the long title of Page 14 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT the Act, as well as the legislative history and given the mischief sought to be rectified by the provision, this Court is of the view that section 4 only operates to modify the preexisting rule to the extent of specifying that apostasy does not ipso facto dissolve a marriage contracted under Muslim personal law. It cannot be saidcertainly not without doing some violence to the words of the statute that the plain and simple meaning of the words employed in the provision admits of the construction that apostasy does not per se dissolve a marriage contracted under Muslim personal law.
37. That being the construction of section 4, it necessarily follows that a woman married under Muslim personal laws, upon apostatizing, will be entitled to sue under section 2(ix) seeking dissolution of the marriage and this Court holds so. All that is required is that she proves before the appropriate Court that she intended to and has indeed apostatized from Islam and accordingly seeks a declaration that the marriage has come to an end."
8. In our understanding, however, as noted earlier, Section 4 of the Act of 1939 materially changes the consequences of a situation where a Muslim woman renounces Islam or convert to some other faith. This act of her itself would not dissolve the marriage. What the first proviso of Page 15 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT Section 4 saves is not her right to approach a Court for declaration or dissolution on this ground under Section 2 of the Act, but her right to seek dissolution of marriage if she can establish any of the grounds available under Section 2 of the Act of 1939. However, this would not apply in case of a woman, who was not born into Islam but was converted into Islam and thereafter, reconverted herself to her original faith. In such a situation, the position of law as prevailing prior to the Act of 1939 would continue to operate. If, therefore, the effect of her reconversion to her original faith is dissolution of marriage, the situation would not be altered by virtue of Section 4 of the Act of 1939. She would, therefore, not have to seek dissolution of marriage under any of the grounds mentioned in Section 2 of the Act of 1939 including Clause (ix) thereof. She may, however, seek a declaration to that effect by establishing necessary facts and law on the subject. This is precisely what she desired to do for which purpose she filed the family suit. Such suit could not Page 16 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT have been rejected in any of the clauses of Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC.
9. The decision of Kerela High Court in case of K.C.Moyin vs. Nafeesa (supra) was rendered in a different background. It was a case where a Muslim lady claimed conversion to some other religion and thereafter, remarried on the pretext that by such conversion her earlier marriage stood dissolved. Faced with the prosecution for bigamy under Section 494 of the IPC, she pressed her conversion from Islam and consequent dissolution of marriage as a defense. It was in this background that the Court held that she could seek divorce only on the grounds mentioned in Section 2 of the Act of 1939 and no other ground. This case was founded on different facts since it was not a case of reconversion by a woman to her original faith having at one point converted into Islam.
10. Likewise, the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in case of Sarwar Yar Khan vs. Jawahar Devi (supra) does not lay down any Page 17 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT ratio which can be applied in the present case. In fact, in such decision the Court came to the conclusion that by virtue of res judicata the question of dissolution of marriage had achieved finality. The Court went on to held that till such dissolution, the Act of 1939 did not apply to the State of Hydrabad since the territories in question were not part of the Indian Union till such date. For apparent reasons, this judgement would be of no assistance to the respondent.
11. To refer her family suit one for dissolution of marriage under Section 4 of the Act of 1939, at best may be a misdiscription. The suit was undoubtedly not barred by any law. At any rate the petitioner in the family suit had to establish necessary facts by leading evidence. If she succeeded in establishing that she was the Christian woman who converted into Islam and later on reconverted to Christianity, she would, thereafter, have to present before the Court the legal fall out of such established facts. Her suit could not have Page 18 of 19 C/FA/2979/2013 JUDGMENT been dismissed at the threshold. The Trial Court committed a serious error in non suiting the appellant without full fledged trial. An error was committed in coming to the conclusion that, she not having claimed dissolution of marriage under Section 2 of the Act of 1939 her plaint was barred by law.
12. In the result, the impugned judgement of the Family Court dated 21.08.2013 is set aside. Proceedings are remanded back before the Family Court for considering the same after permitting both sides to lead relevant evidence on record. First appeal is allowed and disposed of accordingly.
(AKIL KURESHI, J.) (VIPUL M. PANCHOLI, J.) Jyoti Page 19 of 19