Allahabad High Court
Chandraveer Singh vs M.B. Mathur on 4 July, 1989
Equivalent citations: 1990CRILJ124
JUDGMENT U.C. Srivastava, J.
1. In view of the decision of learned single Judge of this Court unless something more is done in respect of non-compliance of an interim order which may amount to contempt or not, a reference was made by one of us (U. C. Srivastava J.) to the Chief Justice for referring the matter to the larger Bench in order to decide whether there was recurring effect of interim order in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This matter came before us in view of the fact that one of the (U. C. Srivastava, J.) referred the matter for constituting a Division Bench for giving an authoritative pronouncement regarding the effect of interim order passed by this Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and its contempt in view of anomaly of certain decisions which are not in conformity with each other or could be said to be confined to the facts of that case only.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the contempt application are that in writ petition filed by the petitioner an interim order was passed by this Court against the termination order dated 4-6-1987. A Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 9-7-1987 stayed the operation of impugned order of termination. Notwithstanding the fact the effect of operation of termination order was stayed, the opposite party who was the Chief Personnel Manager, Indian Telephone Industries Ltd., Mankapur, district Gonda neither allowed the petitioner to discharge his duties nor paid his salary and no action whatsoever was taken. In the counter-affidavit the opposite party has contended that this Court did not pass any order that he may be put back on duty or that salary may be paid to him treating him to be an employee of the. opposite party and as such it cannot be said that there has been any disobedience or contempt of court in absence of specific direction to take work from him.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the applicant contended that the effect of interim order passed by this Court in the writ petition staying the operation of the termination order means that it ceased to be in existence during the subsistence of interim order and it became incumbent upon the opposite party to treat him in service as before and take work from him and in any case it was to pay him salary as was paid to him regularly earlier or was being paid to other employees. The opposite party (according to the applicant) has deliberately flouted the orders passed by this Court in not allowing him to do work or even to pay salary to him and his deliberateness is apparent from the counter-affidavit filed by the opposite party.
4. On behalf of the opposite party it was pleaded and contended that in the absence of a specific order by this Court that the petitioner may be put back on duty or that salary may be paid to him, there was no contempt as relationship of employer and employee is not doing either has already come to an end and the interim order passed after termination had come into effect did not revive the said relationship. In support of this plea reference to certain cases was made.
5. In Ratan Narain Mulla v. Chief Secy. Govt. of U. P., 1975 Cri LJ 1283 (All) the contempt application of a Government servant was filed as dismissal order was quashed by the Court even then salary was not paid to the employee. A single Judge of this Court held that the Court while quashing the dismissal order did not make any observation regarding the consequential relief prayed for in the writ petition in respect of arrears of salary. The learned single Judge held that it could not be said that the Court had impliedly issued a mandamus requiring the Government to pay to the petitioner arrears of salary. Hence the failure of the Government or its officers to pay the said amount did not amount to contempt. The learned Judge took the view that out of two reliefs claimed, the Court granted only the first relief and not the second relief which was a consequential relief which even otherwise could not have been granted as the petitioner had already attained the age of superannuation in the meantime and it cannot be said that the court had impliedly issued a writ of mandamus requiring the State Government to pay him arrears of salary. The State Government as a result of quashing of dismissal order granted the petitioner pension and salary but arrears of salary was refused on the ground that if the suit would have been filed, it would have been time barred. The learned single Judge did not enter into merits as to whether the suit was time barred or not. In that case reliance was further placed on a case under the old Contempt of Courts Act viz. Nanak Saran Srivastava v. S. S. Agarwala, Crl. Misc. Case No. 468 of 1971 (All) in which case it was held that where an order directing compulsory retirement of an employee is quashed and there is no direction for payment of salary, omission to pay it will not amount to contempt of Court. This case is quite distinguishable as it is in respect of an employee who despite success could not have been taken on service and relief of arrears of salary was not granted which could have been paid only if it was in time and that too in accordance with Fundamental Rules. A Division Bench of this Court in Duli Singh v. State of U. P., 1977 All LJ 268 held :-
"It is well settled that it is always open to an employer not to take work from his employee and the Court can only compel the employer to pay the salary or remuneration agreed upon under the contract of service. Here the teacher who had made an application for drawing up contempt proceedings succeeded in getting his salary despite the attitude of the appellant. Thus the interim order of this Court passed in his favour pending the writ petition was in fact complied with."
The said case is distinguishable inasmuch as though work was not taken from the person concerned, but in view of interim order ultimately salary was paid to him. Reference was also made to State of U. P. v. M. V. Siddiqui, AIR 1980 SC 2052. In the said case the respondent filed a suit for permanent injunction and obtained an interim injunction restraining the appellants from giving effect to the order of reversion and directing that the respondent should be kept on the teaching side presumably in the U. P. Education Service. But on one date counsel for both the parties were absent and after rejecting the application for adjournment of the case, the suit was dismissed. Thereafter the respondent moved an application for restoration of his suit without delay but still no order were passed on it and the authority concerned again passed a reversion order and the opposite party was relieved of his charge on 16-10-1968. On 17-10-1968 he moved an application before the Court for setting aside the order dated 15-10-1968 on which the Court merely passed an order directing to maintain the status quo. The respondent showed the Court's order and desired to take him back but he was told that the order of the Court only required maintenance of status quo and since the order of Director of Education had been served on him and he had already been relieved of the post, he could not be allowed to take over charge of his post. In these circumstances the High Court took the view that contempt has been committed but after making certain observations the Court felt that no action be taken against the appellants. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that no contempt could be held to have been committed as no injunction order was passed or subsisting when reversion order was passed and the respondent was relieved on 16-10-1978. The order for maintaining the status quo could not be taken to mean that the respondent who had been relieved was to be reinstated or that the interim order which had lapsed because of dismissal of suit for non-prosecution automatically stood revived without there being any order to this effect by the Court.
6. In the case of a Government servant. the Government servant is entitled to the salary for which provision has been made in Fundamental Rule 17 and Rule 54. But the applicant is an employee of a corporation which is an instrumentality of the State and its employees are governed by various industrial laws. Section 3 of Payment of Wages Act provides that every employer shall be responsible for the payment to persons employed by him of all wages required to be paid under this Act. While Section 4 provides for fixation of wage periods which shall not exceed one month and Section 5 provides for time of payment of wages and provides that the wages of every person employed upon or in any railway, factory, or industrial or other establishment upon or in which less than one thousand persons are employed, shall be paid before the expiry of the seventh day. Section 15 provides that the claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and penalty for malicious or vexatious claims are cognizable by the prescribed authority which can pass order for compensation also except in cases of delayed wages if the authority is satisfied that the delay was due to a bona fide error or bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person or the occurrence of an emergency, or the existence of exceptional circumstances, such that the person responsible for the payment of wages was unable though exercising reasonable diligence, to make prompt payment or the failure of the employed person to apply for or accept payment. These provisions made it amply clear that in any such establishment, it is incumbent upon the employer to pay salary to the employee by the date fixed every month. In case operation of termination order was stayed, it would be taken to mean that he continues to be a regular employee as the operation of termination order has been suspended and he is entitled to get salary like others even if work is not taken from him by the employer though there is no refusal by the employee to perform his duty or work.
7. The interim order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India staying operation of termination order without any consequential order or direction will not be a superfluous, meaningless or redundant order in the absence of consequential order which necessarily is not required in every case. Its effect will be to restore back the relationship of employer and employee may it be temporarily as it was prior to the passing of termination order. Despite the interim order if work is not taken or even salary is not paid discriminating such person from the other employees who are paid salary, the negative act would be in derogating of the orders passed by the Court which not being treated with respect or having binding effect. The inaption and even non-payment of salary in the absence of any plausible explanation of delay will amount to flouting the interim orders passed by the Court.
8. The cases relied upon by the opposite party are distinguishable on facts and in none of the cases the question which arises in the case was directly concerned. In the instant case it appears that under certain legal advise, the opposite party did not pay salary to the petitioner despite interim order passed by this Court. The opposite party is only an official of the Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. Mankapur, district Gonda and it was his duty to comply with the Court's orders. In view of the wrong legal advice it cannot be said that there was any intention on his part as such to flout the orders passed by the Court. As such only a warning is issued to the opposite party that he should be careful in future. It is expected that he will now carry out the orders passed by the Court without delay and shall see that salary is paid to the applicant without delay.
9. With these observations, the contempt application is consigned and the notices are discharged.