Himachal Pradesh High Court
Branch Manager Uco Bank vs Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd. And Ors. on 12 April, 2006
Equivalent citations: 2006(1)SHIMLC460
Author: Surjit Singh
Bench: Surjit Singh
JUDGMENT
Surjit Singh J.
1. Heard and gone through the record. Appellant defendant UCO Bank is aggrieved by the decree passed by the learned first appellate Court for recovery of certain amount of money on account of arrears of rent in favour of respondent Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd., after reversing the decree of dismissal of the suit passed by the trial Court.
2. Facts relevant for the disposal of the appeal may be noticed. A suit was filed by respondent Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd., hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, seeking recovery of certain amount of money on the ground that a shop had been let out by it to the appellant-defendant UCO Bank through its Branch Manager at Rampur, on monthly provisional rent of Rs. 1,920/~, subject to the fixation of final rent based on assessment of standard rent by the concerned authorities. Suit was contested by the appellants on the ground that though the premises of the plaintiff had been in their occupation for running a counter of the Bank, yet no rent was agreed to be paid and that in fact the understanding was that the bank would not charge any commission or fee etc. for clearing the cheques and drafts of the plaintiff and its officers and servants, in lieu of the provision of the premises for setting up extension counter. Certain preliminary objections, like competence of the man who filed the suit, limitation and estoppel etc. were also raised. The Trial Court framed various issues on the pleadings of the parties and after recording the evidence of the parties accepted the plea of the appellant-defendant that there was no agreement for payment of rent and that the premises were given to the appellants on the understanding that they would not be charging any commission or fee etc. for clearing the cheques and drafts of the plaintiff.
3. Plaintiff went in appeal to the Court of District Judge. The District Judge, has accepted the appeal with the finding that there are some documents on record which belie the defendants' plea and prove the claim of the plaintiff. The learned District Judge observed that the plaintiff was entitled to arrears of rent for a period of three years immediately preceding the date of the institution of the suit, because the claim beyond that period was barred by time. Consequently, a decree for a sum of Rs. 52,480 /-only with interest at the rate of 12% was passed, while the claim was for a sum of Rs. 1,53,272.
4. Defendant has come in appeal to this Court. It is aggrieved by the aforesaid finding of the first appellate Court. Besides assailing the aforesaid finding of the first appellate Court, learned Counsel representing the appellant has submitted that the Civil Court did not have the jurisdiction in the matter. It is also his plea that the suit had not been instituted by a duly authorized person and that the additional evidence on this point was admitted by the first appellate Court, without affording any opportunity to the appellant to oppose the prayer.
5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant. First I would take up the plea raised by the learned Counsel that the suit was not instituted by a person authorized by the plaintiff-corporation. His contention is that some documents were admitted as additional evidence by the first appellate Court and on the basis of those documents, a finding has been returned that the man who filed the suit was duly authorized. According to the learned Counsel by those documents the man who filed the suit had been authorized only after the institution of the suit. His further contention is that no opportunity was given to the appellant-defendants to oppose the prayer for additional evidence.
6. It is by now well settled that incompetence of a person to institute a suit on behalf of a body-corporate, on the ground that such person is not authorized by the Board of Directors of the Corporation is a defect which does not go to the root of the matter. Such a defect is curable and it can be cured at any stage by the Board of Directors by authorizing such a person to institute the suit. Therefore, the submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not of much significance. His plea that the appellant was not afforded any opportunity to oppose the prayer for additional evidence also does not hold much water because the allowing of the additional evidence with regard to a matter of procedure only, i.e. curing a procedural defect, cannot be said to have caused prejudice to the appellant-defendant.
7. Next contention is that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction, inasmuch as the plaintiff was supposed to have filed the petition for recovery of rent before the Collector under the H.P. Public Premises Eviction and Rent Recovery Act , 1971, in view of a Single Bench Judgement of this Court in New Bank of India v. Sukhbir Singh Sethi and Anr., Civil Revision No. 8 of 1997, decided on 4.11.1997. No doubt, in the said judgment a Single Bench of this Court has held that a private person, who rents out his premises to a Bank cannot seek ejectment of the Bank by filing a petition, under Section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, and that the remedy available to him is to file a petition before the Collector under the H.P. Public Premises Eviction and Rent Recovery Act, 1971, but in a subsequent judgment rendered in The Chamba District Co-operative Marketing & Supply federation v. State of H.P. and Ors. 1999 (1) Shim. L.C. 371, a different view has been taken.
8. As a matter of fact, an overall reading of the provisions of the H.P. Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971, leaves little doubt that the Act is meant for eviction of unauthorized persons by following summary procedure prescribed therein, from the public premises. 'Public premises' have been defined to mean any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the State Government and includes any premises belonging to or taken on lease inter alia by or on behalf of any Corporation, established by or under a Central Act as defined in Clause (vii) of Section 3 of General Clauses Act, 1897, per Section 2(e) of the H.P. Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971. Appellant-defendant is admittedly a Corporation established by or under a Central Act. The definition of the Public Premises as referred to hereinabove clearly indicates that the property should belong to or should have been taken on lease by a Corporation. Now if the property is taken on lease by the Corporation, the lease should be valid, lawful and operative on the date, when the provisions of the H.P. Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971 are sought to be pressed into service. If the very lease in favour of the Corporation is alleged to have come to an end and the corporation itself is alleged to be in unauthorized occupation, the property would cease to be Public Premises and hence the Act would not be applicable, The definition of 'Public Premises' in a case where the facts are similar to the ones alleged in the present case, pre-supposes that the lease in favour of the corporation is intact. This in my considered view is the correct meaning of the 'Public Premises'. And when this is the correct meaning of the term 'Public Premises' as used in H.P. Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971, there should not be any doubt that the mechanism provided in the Act for eviction can be resorted to only at the instance of the authorities, to whom according to the definition of 'Public Premises', the premises belong or are leased out and not for eviction of those authorities by the persons to whom the premises belong and who have let out the same to such authorities.
9. Section 6 of the Act, which provides for the disposal of the property left on the Public Premises by unauthorized occupants strengthens the aforesaid view. The provision says that property left on the premises by the unauthorized occupant can be sold by public auction and the sale proceeds utilized for payment of amount, if any, due to the State Government, a corporate authority or a local body, referred to in Sub-section (i) of Clause (e) of Section 2, on account of arrears of rent or damages or costs etc. The mention in the provision that the sale proceeds are to be utilized for clearing the arrears of rent due to the State Government etc. and the Commission, in the provision regarding appropriation of such proceeds for paying the arrears due to any other person clearly indicate that the mechanism provided in the Act is meant for eviction of those persons, who are in unauthorized occupation of the premises belonging to or taken on rent by the Government or other authorities referred to in Section 2(e) of the Act and not for the eviction of the Government or other authorities who might have taken such premises on rent, at the instance of their landlord.
10. In any case, no such plea was raised by the appellant-defendant in the Trial Court or first appellate Court and therefore, it is too late in the day for the appellant-defendant to say that the Civil Court did not have the jurisdiction.
11. As regards the finding recorded by the first appellate Court on merits, the main contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the first appellate Court has heavily relied upon two documents, that is, Ex. A-l and Ex. A-2, to come to the conclusion that there was an agreement for payment of rent and that as a matter of fact those documents are not relevant nor do they amount to acknowledgement within the meaning of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, and that observation made by the first appellate Court to this effect is unfounded.
12. Ex. A-1, is a letter written by the appellants-defendants to the plaintiff in response to a letter demanding rent for the months of June and July, 1997. This letter is dated July 19, 1997. In the said letter, the appellants-defendants have conveyed to the plaintiff that its request for payment of rent has been forwarded to the higher authorities for approval. The letter nowhere says that there was an understanding that no rent was to be paid and that in lieu of rent plaintiffs cheques and drafts were to be cleared without charging any commission or fee etc. This communication, in my considered view, amounts to an admission on the part of the appellants-defendants, under Section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act.
13. The second communication Ex. A-2, has been written by defendant No. 3, that is, Manager, UCO Bank, Rampur to defendant No. 2 Regional Manager, UCO Bank, Shimla, informing him about the area of the premises and the amount of standard rent as assessed by the concerned authorities. Further this letter bears a mention that as per communication received from the plaintiff regarding demand of rent indicates that only one shop has been rented out. Clarification is sought by the respondent No. 3 from respondent No. 2 through this communication if the plaintiff should be requested to rent out one more shop. This communication also amounts to an admission on the part of the defendants- appellants, which is relevant under Section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act. These admissions not only disprove the case of the appellants but also give a complete lie to the plea that was set up in the pleadings, viz. no rent was agreed to be paid and that in lieu of rent, cheques and drafts of the plaintiff were to be cleared free of charges.
In view of the above stated position, I do not find any merit in the appeal. Also no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, arises.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
CMP No. 236 of 2006.
Dismissed, in view of the dismissal of the main appeal.