Madhya Pradesh High Court
Pramod Singh Kirar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 21 August, 2017
WP-18388-2014
(PRAMOD SINGH KIRAR Vs THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH)
21-08-2017
Mr. Manoj Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the
petitioner.
Mr. Pushpendra Yadav, learned counsel for the
respondent â State.
The petitioner before this Court has filed the present writ
petition being aggrieved by order dated 16/12/2014
passed by the respondents declaring the petitioner unfit
for grant of appointment on the post of Constable and a
posting order was also issued by the respondents.
However, the petitioner was not permitted to join and the
respondents have passed an order declaring the
petitioner to be unfit for the post of Constable. The sole
reason assigned in the impugned order is that the
petitioner was subjected to a trial for an offence u/S.
498A of the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, the
respondents have held him to be unfit for appointment.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance
upon the judgment delivered by this Court in W.P.No.
10343/ 2013 as well as W.P.No. 5641/2014 Dinesh Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh and his contention is that there
was no suppression on the part of the petitioner while
submitting police verification form and in those
circumstances, as there was no suppression and as he has
been honorably acquitted, the question of declining his
joining, as has been done, does not arise. Lastly reliance
has been placed upon the judgment delivered by this
Court in the case of Pramod Vs. Devi Ahilya University
W.P.No. 8809/2015, decided on 20/1/2017.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent
has placed heavy reliance upon the judgment delivered in
the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India reported in
(2016) 8 SCC 471 and his contention is that the matter
be remanded back to the Competent Authority.
This Court has carefully gone through the judgment
delivered in the case of Avtar Singh (supra). The present
case is not a case of suppression of facts. It was a
complaint lodged by the sister-in-law of the petitioner
against the petitioner in which the petitioner was
honorably acquitted. It is not a case where the wife of the
petitioner has lodged a complaint. However, the fact
remains that he has been honorably acquitted.
This Court is of the considered opinion that there appears
to be no justification in remanding the matter to the
appellate Authority.
A similar issue was involved in the case of Kailash
Chandra Sirvi Vs. State of M. P. & Ors. passed in Writ
Petition No.2778/2015 on 24/08/2016. This Court in the
aforesaid case in paragraphs No.12 to 23 has held as
under:
â12- Such type of controversy has already been considered by this Court in the
case of Manish Verma Vs. State of M.P. & and Others in Writ Petition No.3560/2014
decided on 16/10/2014. It is pertinent to note that Manish Verma was also involved in
an offence under Section 498-A of IPC. He was also denied appointment to the post of
Constable and this Court has allowed the writ petition preferred by the Manish
Verma.
13- This Court in the case of Manish Verma has passed the following order:
âA similar controversy regarding interpretation of acquittal came up before this
Court and this Court in the case of Rakesh Sharma Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & 5
Ors. (WP No.9913/2012) and in the aforesaid case this Court has held as under :
âThe petitioner before this Court has filed this present writ petition for issuance of
an appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondents to appoint the
petitioner on the post of Constable General Duty. Petitioner is also aggrieved by order
dt. 13/7/12 by which the Inspector General of Police has rejected the claim of the
petitioner.
In the present case, the petitioner has participated in the process of selection for the
post of Constable in the year 2012 and has also submitted a police verification form
stating categorically therein that he has been acquitted in S.T.No. 196/2007 on
14/2/2008. The petitioner by virtue of his merit was selected for the post of
Constable, however, the appointing Authority as well as the Inspector General of
Police have rejected the petitioner's claim for appointment even though he is more
meritorious and persons who are less meritorious have been appointed to the post of
Constable General Duty. The only reason assigned in the return is that the petitioner
as he has been acquitted by giving benefit of doubt in respect of Crime No. 126/2006,
cannot be appointed to the post of Constable General Duty.
Learned counsel for the respondents - State has drawn attention of this Court
towards paragraphs 53 of the M.P. Police Regulations and his contention is that a
person who is seeking appointment on the post of a Constable should bear a good
moral character and therefore, as the petitioner was prosecuted for an offence u/S.
302, 147, 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, he does not bear good moral
character, hence the order passed by the Inspector General of Police does not
warrant any interference.
This Court is of the considered opinion that once the petitioner has been acquitted,
the entire crime registered against him stands wiped out. An acquittal is an acquittal
whether it is a "clean acquittal", whether it is "honourable acquittal" or "acquittal
based on giving benefit of doubt". The "clean acquittal", the "honourable acquittal" or
"acquittal based on giving benefit of doubt" has not been distinguished in the Code of
Criminal Procedure. This court in the case of Smt Panna Mehta Vs. State of M.P.
reported in 2002(4) M.P.H.T. 226 in paragraph 11 and 12 held as under :
"11. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, Indian Penal Code, Evidence Act or any other
enactment, the word, "acquittal" has not been defined. As per the Law Lexicon, the
Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary (Edn. 1992) "Acquittal" defined, Act X of 1882, Section
403, "the word acquittal is verbum equivocum , and may in ordinary language be
used to express either the verdict of a jury, or the formal judgment of the Court, that
the prisoner is not guilty". (Per Tindal, C.J., Burgess Vs. Boetefeur, 13 LJMC 126 : 135
ER 193). It is generally said that a party is acquitted by the jury, but in fact, the
acquittal is by the judgment of the court (ibid). According to the Oxford Dictionary,
"acquittal" means that a person is not guilty oif a crime, with which he has been
charged. So in a criminal jurisprudence there is no difference between "clean
acquittal", "honourable acquittal" or "acquittal based on giving benefit of doubt".
When the accused is acquitted by giving benefit of doubt means the prosecution was
not able to prove its case beyond doubt.
12. As ruled by the Supreme court in case of Manni Lal Vs. Parmai Lal (AIR 1971 SC
330) and Dilip Kumar Sharma and others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1976 SC
133), order of acquittal means a person concerned, has not committed the offence for
which he was charged and tried. Criminal Courts are recording acquittal when the
prosecution fails to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt and benefit of doubt
given to the accused does not mean that the accused was involved in the case but the
same could not be proved by the prosecution. In Criminal Law, words "beyond
reasonable doubt" cannot be termed as stigma or proof of any criminal charge
against acquitted accused. Therefore, petition for expunging the same is not
maintainable under Section 482, Cr.PC and the same is misconceived."
In light of the aforesaid order as the petitioner was acquitted on 09-12-2013 and the
character verification took place on 30-012014, the question of denying appointment
to the petitioner does not arise.
The writ petition stands allowed. Respondents are directed to consider the case of the
petitioner and if his name finds place in the merit list, the respondents shall issue a
consequential appointment order. The petitioner shall be entitled for all
consequential benefits including the seniority, grant of increments, notional fixation
of salary as well as promotion etc. However, will not be entitled for backwages. The
respondents will not deny the appointment to the petitioner only because he was
involved in a criminal case as he has been acquitted, vide judgment of acquittal dated
09-12-2013.â
14- The judgment passed by this Court was subjected to judicial scrutiny as the State
Government being dissatisfied by the verdict of this Court preferred a writ appeal.
The Division Bench of this Court while dismissing the writ appeal i.e. Writ Appeal
No.73/2015 has passed the following order on 28/07/2015:
âBy this writ appeal under Section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchha Nyayalaya
(Khand Nyapith Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 the appellants are aggrieved by the
judgment dated 16.10.2014 passed in W.P. No.3560/14(S) whereby the petition has
been allowed.
02. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the respondent Manish Verma had
applied for the post of Police Constable and participated in the Police Constable
Recruitment Test of 2012 conducted by respondent M.P. Professional Examination
Board and he had stated on affidavit that there was a matter for offence under
Section 498-A of IPC pending before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ujjain. He
qualified for the second round and passed the medical test. In the meantime he was
acquitted from the case pending against him and hence he filed another affidavit to
the concerned authority that he had been acquitted but the respondent Professional
Board depending on Government Circular No.F.1774/2002/C-a dated 5th June, 2003
rejected his appointment since he was involved in an offence of moral turpitude.
Being aggrieved by the non-selection respondent Shri Verma filed a WP bearing
No.3560/14(S) whereby it was vehemently urged that a character verification was
given by the committee constituted as per guidelines prescribed in the Supreme
Court judgment in the matter of Civil Appeal no.4842/13 SLP No.38886/12
Commissioner of Delhi Vs. Meharsingh which had held that if the acquittal in a
criminal case was not honourable only then the eligibility would be affected and that
the candidate would not be eligible for the police service in which high level of
morality is essential.
03. Counsel for the appellant/State has contended that despite having considered the
said case, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and directed the
Professional Board to issue the consequential appointment order if he was otherwise
eligible according to the merit list and the respondent Board could not deny
appointment to the petitioner only because he was involved in the criminal case as he
has been acquitted vide judgment of acquittal dated 09.12.2013. Counsel submitted
that such a finding was contrary to the facts of the case and Counsel placed reliance
on Commissioner of Delhi (supra) as well as the another judgment by the Apex Court
in the matter of State of MP and others Vs. Parvez Khan [Civil Appeal No.10613 of
2014] to bolster his submissions. Counsel vehemently urged the fact that the
respondent was charged with offence under Section 498-A of the IPC and the
acquittal was not honourable and the police service is a unit force which requires a
high degree of morality and integrity and hence the petitioner cannot be considered
for appointment.
04. Moreover Counsel submitted that the case of the respondent has been considered
by a duly constituted screening committee and a full opportunity of hearing was given
to the petitioner and it was the ground of moral turpitude that he is not eligible for
the police service. Counsel placed reliance on a Circular of the Govt. dated
05.06.2003 whereby there is a bar for consideration of such person and offence under
Section 498-A of IPC has been included in the scheduled offences of moral turpitude
at Sl. No.11 and the Circular has been filed as Annexure A/2 along with the present
appeal and Counsel prayed that the learned Single Judge had erred in coming to the
conclusion that the acquittal was honourable and that the petitioner was entitled to
the appointment. The findings of the Screening Committee were final in this regard
and placing reliance on Meher Singh (supra) Counsel submitted that there was no
malafides in the proceedings of the Screening Committee and it cannot be assailed in
the light of Meher Singh. The Apex Court had also held that the High Court was not
justified in interfering while the order of rejecting of the respondent of recruitment of
the police service and in this light also Counsel prayed that the judgment of the
learned Single Judge be set aside.
05. Per Contra Counsel for the respondent Manish Verma has vehemently urged the
fact that in the matter of Rakesh Sharma Vs. State of MP in WP No.9913/2012
considered by the learned Single Judge and other cases it was considered that
nothing has been suppressed by the respondent Shri Verma and in the police
verification form also quite categorically stated that the case was pending against
him and subsequently it has resulted in an acquittal. The acquittal is a clean acquittal
and hence no interference is called for in the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
Moreover Counsel submitted that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case
the wife had also stated that she had no objection if the applicant was considered for
the appointment primarily since the matrimonial dispute had been compromised and
they were now living together as man and wife, Counsel prayed that the appeal was
without merit and the same be dismissed.
06. On considering the above submissions, we find that the proceedings of the
Screening Committee are not barred from judicial scrutiny. The learned Single Judge
has come to the conclusion that the proceedings were arbitrary and the acquittal has
been honourable. Then under these circumstances we do not find any good ground to
interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Moreover even if the
testimony of the wife is considered she has categorically stated in trial Court during
the trial that at the time of marriage no dowry was demanded and she has also
admitted in impugned para â 12 & 13 of her deposition that the applicant was
without a job and she wanted to reside separately with him and the compromise had
been arrived at during the period of trial itself. Moreover she has stated so before
this Court also. Then under these circumstances, we find that only question that
remains to be considered is whether offence under Section 498-A of the IPC would be
one of moral turpitude and the acquittal of the accused has been honourable ?
07. On considering the above submissions and the record we find that the Counsel for
the appellants has very vehemently urged the fact that the findings of the Screening
Committee could not have been assailed in the writ petition since it was specially
constituted body and had considered the case in accordance with the provisions of
law. And he relied on the cases of Pervez Khan and Mehar Singh (supra), however we
find that even in the said case, the Court had held in impugned para-29 that the
Screening committee's proceedings have been assailed as being arbitrary, unguided
and unfettered. The Apex Court had also considered the fact that the acquittal of
Mehar Singh was based on the compromise, however, disclosure was not made in the
said case regarding the enmity and other important facts i.e. Mehar Singh had other
criminal cases also recorded against him and in this regard the Apex Court had come
to the conclusion that the acquittal was not honourable. Whereas in the peculiar facts
and circumstances of the present case, it would be difficult to hold that the acquittal
of the respondent Shri Verma was otherwise. On scrutinising the evidence available
on record, we find that in the judgment of acquittal, the learned Judge of the trial
Court has categorically stated that the demand was not for dowry but a loan had been
availed by the respondent and hence the prosecution case had not been established
and the accused had been acquitted since the ingredients of offence under Section
498-A of the IPC were not fulfilled; then under these circumstances it would be
difficult to hold that the acquittal was not honourable.
08. Consequently we find that the findings of the Screening Committee are open to
scrutiny and the learned Single Judge has very correctly considered the evidence on
record and to do substantial justice between the parties arrived at the conclusion that
the acquittal was not tainted. Moreover the respondent's wife Smt. Verma has also
appeared before this Court as well as the trial Court and stated that she was now
amicably residing with the respondent Shri Verma and the criminal cases had been
compromised and withdrawn. Considering the fact that the compromise was also
before the Screening Committee, it ought to have properly interpreted the principles
laid down by the Apex Court. Undoubtedly the Screening Committee had to carry out
the object of the comprehensive policy of the State and the scheme referred to above
and since admittedly the police services demand a high standard of morality; but in
the present case to our mind it would be improper to hold that the acquittal was not
honourable since there is categoric finding by the trial Court that the respondent Shri
Verma was not guilty of the offence of demand of dowry. In these circumstances, we
do not find any good ground to interfere in the judgment of the learned Single Judge
since in the present case the husband and wife have reconciled each other after being
estranged over matrimonial disputes and it was also in the interest of general public
that the matrimonial disputes are required to be settled amicably and the judgment of
the learned Single Judge directing the appointment if the respondent Shri Verma is
otherwise eligible would go a far way in cementing the matrimonial chords and
strengthening the institution of marriage. In this light also no fault can e foud with
the judgment impugned and it does not call for any interference. The appeal is
without merit and the same is dismissed as such.â
15- Thereafter, the matter has travelled to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court has again dismissed the Special Leave Petition i.e. SLP(C)
No.592/2015 (State of Madhya Pradesh And ors. Vs. Manish Verma and Anr.) on
18/01/2016. Meaning thereby, the view taken by this Court in the case of Manish
Verma has been upheld by the Division and has not been set aside by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. The State Government has appointed Manish Verma by order dated
23/06/2016.
16- The petitioner in the present case stands on better footing than Manish Verma
who was a candidate from open market, whereas the petitioner in the present case is
already serving the police department and as also stated earlier if the petitioner can
serve the police department on the post of Constable, he can very well serve the
police department on the post of Sub Inspector of Police in light of the judgment
delivered by this Court.
17- Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment delivered
by this Court in the case of Pushpendra Mishra Vs. State of M. P. in Writ Petition
No.5795/2015 decided on 19/08/2015. The learned Single Judge in the aforesaid
judgment has held as under:
âThe authority has rejected the claim of the petitioner for appointment to the post
of Constable on the ground that a criminal case was registered against the petitioner.
However, authority did not consider the merit of the criminal case. The authority has
also not taken into consideration the fact that a counter case was also registered
against the complainant party. The petitioner and complainant party are neighbour.
The offences are minor in nature. The trial Court already observed that the story put-
forth by the prosecution is suspicious. It is a fact that a person who has criminal
antecedents cannot be appointed in the police department. However, it has also to be
taken into consideration that whether a person was falsely implicated in the case or
not. In certain circumstances, there is a possibility that a person may have been
falsely implicated in the case.
The judgment relied on by the learned PL State of M.P. and others Vs. Parvez Khan
(supra) is distinguishable on facts because in the aforesaid judgment the person was
tried in two criminal cases. In one case he was prosecuted for commission of offences
under Sections 323, 324, 325, 294, 506-B/34 of IPC and other case under Section
452, 394, 395 of IPC. Certainly commission of offences under Section 394, 395 of IPC
is serious offnece. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of West Bengal and
others Vs. S. K. Nazrul Islam reported (2011) 10 SCC 184 has observed in regard to
cancellation of appointment of a Constable on the ground that he had submitted false
information to the effect that criminal case was registered against him or not as
under:
"Surely, the authorities entrusted with the responsibility of appointing constables
were under duty to verify the antecedents of a candidate to find out whether he is
suitable for the post of constable and so long as the candidate has not been acquitted
in the criminal case of the charges under Sections 148/323/380/427/596 IPC, he
cannot possibly be held to be suitable for appointment to the post of constable." The
Supreme Court further observed in the matter of Commissioner of Police and Ors Vs.
Sandeep Kumar passed in Civil Appeal No.1430/2007, as under:
"When the incident happened the respondent must have been about 20 years of age.
At that age young people often commit indiscretions, and such indiscretions can often
been condoned. After all, youth will be youth. They are not expected to behave in as
mature a manner as older people. Hence, our approach should be to condone minor
indiscretions made by young people rather than to brand them as criminals for the
rest of their lives."
Although the matter has been referred by the Supreme court to larger Bench but in
my opinion, the observations made in the aforesaid case by the Court are relevant to
decide the controversy involved in this case.
The Supreme Court in the matter of Pawan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and another
reported in 1996 SCC (4) 17 has observed as under:
"Before concluding this judgment we hereby draw attention of the Parliament to step
in and perceive the large many cases which per law and public policy are tried
summarily, involving thousands and thousands of people through out the country
appearing before summary courts and paying small amounts of fine, more often than
not, as a measure of pleabargaining. Foremost along them being traffic, municipal
and other petty offences under the India; Penal Code, mostly committed by the young
and/or the inexperienced. The cruel result of a conviction of that kind and a fine of
payment of a paltry sum on plea-bargaining is the end of the career, future or
present, as the case may be, of that young and/or in experienced person, putting a
blast to his life and his dreams. Life is too precious to be staked over a petty incident
like this. Immediate remedial measures are therefore necessary in raising the
toleration limits with regard to petty offences especially when tried summarily.
Provision need be made that punishment of fine upto a certain limit, say upto
Rs.2000/- or so, on a summary/ordinary conviction shall not be treated as conviction
at all for any purpose and all the more for entry into and retention in government
service. This can brook no delay, whatsoever."
From the observation made by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, it is clear
that life of the young person to get the job could not be jeopardise merely on the
ground that a criminal case was registered against him.
In the present case the petitioner has been acquitted from the offence after trial. The
trial Court specifically observed that false implication of the petitioner in the case
cannot be not ruled out. As per facts of the criminal case, in which the petitioner was
prosecuted there was a quarrel between the parties and thereafter FIR was lodged. A
counter case was also lodged against the complainant party. Regulation 64 of Madhya
Pradesh Police reads as under:
64. General Condition of Service- Every candidate for an appointment in the police
should be made acquainted, prior to appointment, with the general conditions of
police service, which are as follows:
(1) Each police officer shall devote his whole time to the police service alone. He shall
not take part in any trade or calling whatever, unless expressly permitted to do so.
(2) He shall faithfully and honestly use his best abilities to fulfill all his duties as a
police officer.
(3) He shall confirm himself simplicity to all rules, which shall, from time to time, be
made for the regulation and good order of the service. And shall cultivate a proper
regard for its honour and respectability.
(4) He shall submit to discipline, observe subordination and promptly obey All lawful
orders.
(5) He shall serve and reside wherever he may be directed to serve and reside.
(6) He shall wear, when on duty, such dress and accoutrements as shall, from time to
time, be prescribed for each rank of the service and shall be always neat and clean in
his appearance. At no time shall any police officer appears partly in uniform and
partly in mufti.
(7) He shall allow such deductions to be made, from his pay and allowances as may be
required for kit, quarters and the like, under the rules of the service.
(8) He shall promptly discharge such debts as the Superintendent may direct and
shall not without the Superintendent's permission, have money transactions with any
other police officer, or borrow money from a resident of the district in which he is
employed.
(9) He shall not withdraw from the service without distinct permission in writing, or
(in the absence of such permission) without giving two months' previous warning of
his intention to do so.
(10) He shall not on any occasion or under any pretext, directly or indirectly take or
receive any present, gratuity or fee from any person what so ever, without the
sanction of the Superintendent.
(11) He shall act with respect and deference towards all officers of Government and
with forbearance, kindness and civility towards private persons of all ranks. In private
life he shall set an example of peaceful behaviors and shall avoid all partisanship.
(12) On ceasing to belong to the force, he will immediately deliver up all kit and
accoutrements, and vacate any quarters that have been supplied to him at the public
cost. From the facts of the case, conclusion cannot be drawn that the petitioner was
not suitable candidate to be appointed in police service.
In my opinion, the authority did not consider the case of the petitioner in proper
perspective and rejected the candidature of the petitioner only on the ground that the
petitioner was tried for commission of offence. This approach of the authority is not
proper.
Consequently, the petition filed by the petitioner is allowed. The impugned order
dated 24.3.2015, (Ann. P-5) is hereby quashed. It is ordered that the petitioner be
given appointment on the post of Subedar, Sub-Inspector cadre and Platoon
Commander in pursuance to his selection within a period of four weeks from the date
of receipt or copy of this order. The petitioner shall not be eligible to receive arrears
of salary but he shall be entitled to get benefit of seniority and other benefits from the
date of his initial appointment on which date other persons were appointed in
pursuance to same selection to the post of Subedar, Sub-Inspector cadre and Platoon
Commander. No order as to costs.â
18- In light of the judgment delivered in the case of Pushpendra Mishra, this Court is
of the considered opinion that the petitioner is certainly entitled for appointment on
the post of Sub Inspector and the factum of registration of criminal case and his
consequential acquittal, by no stretch of imagination will come in the way of his
appointment.
19- The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Joginder Singh Vs. Union Territory of
Chandigarh and Others reported in (2015) 2 SCC 377 from paragraphs No.15 to 27
has held as under:
â15. To answer the point No. 1, we must first consider whether the acquittal of the
Appellant from the criminal case was an honourable acquittal. It is the contention of
the Respondent that even though the Appellant was acquitted in the criminal case,
the appointment of the Appellant by the appointing authority to the post of Constable
in Chandigarh Police, which is a disciplined force was not desirable. The High Court
has held that what would be relevant is the conduct and character of the candidate to
be appointed in the service of state police and not the actual result thereof in the
criminal case as claimed by the Appellant. Further, the relevant consideration to the
case is the antecedents of the candidate for appointing him to the post of Constable.
16. However, adverting to the criminal proceeding initiated against the Appellant, we
would first like to point out that the complainant did not support the case of the
prosecution as he failed to identify the assailants and further admitted that the
contents of the Section 161 of Code of Criminal Procedure statement were not
disclosed to him and his signatures were obtained on a blank sheet of paper by the
Investigation Officer. Further, Sajjan Singh, who was an eye-witness of the case, who
was also injured, had failed to identify the assailants. Both the witnesses were
declared hostile on the request of the prosecution.
17. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhiwani held that the prosecution case
has not been able to prove in any way the allegations against the Appellant. Thus, the
learned Judge held that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges
leveled against the Appellant in the criminal proceedings. Therefore, we are in
agreement with the findings and judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge
and are of the opinion that the acquittal of the accused from the criminal case was an
honourable acquittal.
18. Learned Counsel has rightly placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in
Deputy Inspector General of Police and Anr. v. S. Samuthiram of which relevant para
is extracted as under: (SCC p. 609, para 24) "
24. The meaning of the expression "honourable acquittal" came up for consideration
before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal. In that case, this Court has
considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a
criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that
the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the
acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions "honourable acquittal",
"acquitted of blame", "fully exonerated" are unknown to the Code of Criminal
Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is
difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression "honourably acquitted".
When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and
that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the
accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Further, an acquittal of the Appellant is an "honourable" acquittal in every sense
and purpose. Therefore, the Appellant should not be deprived from being appointed
to the post, in the public employment, by declaring him as unsuitable to the post even
though he was honourably acquitted in the criminal case registered against him.
20. Further, undisputedly, there has been no allegation of concealment of the fact
that a criminal case was registered against him by the Appellant. Thus, the Appellant
has honestly disclosed in his verification application submitted to the selection
authority that there was a criminal case registered against him and that it ended in
an acquittal on account of compromise between the parties involved in the criminal
case, he cannot be denied an opportunity to qualify for any post including the post of
a Constable.
21. Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Secretary, Deptt. of
Home Secy., A.P. v. B. Chinnam Naidu which states herein: (SCC p. 750, para 9)
â9. A bare perusal of the extracted portions shows that the candidate is required to
indicate as to whether he has ever been convicted by a Court of law or detained
under any State/Central preventive detention laws for any offences whether such
conviction is sustained or set aside by the appellate Court, if appealed against. The
candidate is not required to indicate as to whether he had been arrested in any case
or as to whether any case was pending. Conviction by a Court or detention under any
State/Central preventive detention laws is different from arrest in any case or
pendency of a case. By answering that the Respondent had not been convicted or
detained under preventive detention laws it cannot be said that he had suppressed
any material fact or had furnished any false information or suppressed any
information in the attestation form to incur disqualification. The State Government
and the Tribunal appeared to have proceeded on the basis that the Respondent ought
to have indicated the fact of arrest or pendency of the case, though column 12 of the
attestation form did not require such information being furnished. The learned
Counsel for the Appellants submitted that such a requirement has to be read into an
attestation form. We find no reason to accept such contention. There was no specific
requirement to mention as to whether any case is pending or whether the applicant
had been arrested. In view of the specific language so far as column 12 is concerned
the Respondent cannot be found guilty of any suppression.â (Emphasis laid by this
Court)
22. Further, reliance has been placed by this Court in Commr. of Police, Delhi and
Anr. v. Dhaval Singh wherein it is stated as under: (SCC pp. 248-49, para 6)
â6. Learned Counsel for the Appellants has drawn our attention to a judgment
rendered by a Bench of this Court on 4-101996 in Delhi Admn. v. Sushil Kumar. On
the first blush, that judgment seems to support the case of the Appellants but there is
a material difference between the two cases. Whereas in the instant case, the
Respondent has conveyed to the Appellant that an inadvertent mistake had been
committed in not giving the information against the relevant column in the Form
much before the cancellation of his candidature, in Sushil Kumar case no such
correction was made at any stage by the Respondent. That judgment is, therefore,
clearly distinguishable on facts.â
23. Further, a bare perusal of Rules 12.12, 12.14 and 12.18 of the Rules, which would
indicate that the recruit should be of a good character and suitability. The said Rules
are extracted hereunder:
âRule 12.12: Supervision of recruitments. The standard of performance and the
reputation of the whole police force depend above all upon the quality of its
Constables. Standards for recruits are laid down in the rules which follow, but, over
and above these, constant attention and effort to raise the general standard of
recruitment are essential. Gazetted officers shall at all times devote special attention
to discovering and encouraging men of a thoroughly good stamp to enroll themselves.
Efforts shall be made to enroll a proportion of men belonging to communities or
classes, whose representation in the force is desirable, but who appear reluctant to
offer themselves. The examination and measuring of candidates for enrolment shall
invariably be carried out by a gazetted officer, who shall concern himself specially to
prevent the victimization of, or the taking of illegal gratification from, candidates by
subordinate Government servants concerned in the conduct of their examination.
Superintendents shall personally satisfy themselves that the arrangements for the
reception of new recruits in the Lines, and for providing them with bedding and warm
clothing, whether as a sanctioned Government issue or under a system whereby the
cost is recovered later in instalments from pay, are adequate, and that recruitment is
not discouraged by initial and avoidable hardships. Deputy Inspectors General, in
addition to exercising a careful control over recruitment generally, and preventing
the enrolment of undesirable types, shall, at their inspections, formal and informal,
pay special attention to the observance of this rule.
***
Rule 12.14 Recruits-Status of.- (1) Recruits shall be of good character and great care shall be taken in selection men of a type suitable for police service from candidates presenting themselves for enrolment.
*** 12.18 Recruits verification of character of. (1) The character and suitability for enrolment of every recruit shall be ascertained by a reference to the lambardar of the village or ward member of the town of which the recruit is a resident. A search slip shall also be sent to the Finger Print Bureau in order to establish his freedom or otherwise from conviction. Such lambardar or ward member shall, if the recruit is of good character, furnish a certificate to that effect which shall be verified and attested by the sub-inspector in charge of the local police station. The Sub-Inspector shall be complete the information required by form 12.18 (I).â It is the submission made on behalf of the Respondents that the above referred rules lay down the criteria that clean antecedents and good moral character is indispensable for a candidate to even fall within the zone of consideration.
24. However, in the present case, we have observed that the Appellant was involved in a family feud and the FIR came to be lodged against him on 14.04.1998, after he had applied for the post of Constable. Further, he had been acquitted on 04.10.1999, i.e. much before he was called for the interview/medical examination/written test. Further, as per Rule 12.18, emphasis has been laid on the freedom and otherwise from conviction. An interpretation of the Rules referred to supra clearly indicate that an acquittal in a criminal case will qualify him for appointment to the post of Police Constable, as the Appellant had successfully qualified the other requisites required for his selection. Thus, as rightly pointed out by the Trial Court that as the prosecution has failed to prove the charges against the Appellant by adducing cogent evidence, therefore, the Police authorities cannot be allowed to sit in judgment over the findings recorded by the Sessions Court in its judgment, wherein the Appellant has been honourably acquitted. Denying him the appointment to the post of a Constable is like a vicarious punishment, which is not permissible in law, therefore, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is vitiated in law and liable to be set aside.
25. Further, apart from a small dent in the name of this criminal case in which he has been honourably acquitted, there is no other material on record to indicate that the antecedents or the conduct of the Appellant was not up to the mark to appoint him to the post. The Appellant was also among the list of the 40 selected successful candidates, who had fulfilled all the other requirements of the post. Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Jagtar Singh v. CBI, which states as under: (SCC pp. 50-51, paara 4) â4...It is not necessary for us to go into the question as to whether the claim of privilege by the Respondents is justified or not. We also do not wish to go into the details of the investigations made regarding the antecedents and character of the Appellant. We have carefully examined the material on the basis of which the Respondents have come to the conclusion that the Appellant is not suitable for appointment to the post of Senior Public Prosecutor in the Central Bureau of Investigation and we are of the view that the Respondents are not justified in reaching a conclusion adverse to the Appellant. No reasonable person, on the basis of the material placed before us, can come to the conclusion that the Appellant's antecedents and character are such that he is unfit to be appointed to the post of Senior Public Prosecutor. There has been total lack of application of mind on the part of the Respondents. Only on the basis of surmises and conjectures arising out of a single incident which happened in the year 1983 it has been concluded that the Appellant is not a desirable person to be appointed to the Government service. We are of the view that the Appellant has been unjustifiably denied his right to be appointed to the post to which he was selected and recommended by the Union Public Service Commission.â
26. Thus, we are of the opinion that the alleged past conduct of the Appellant in relation to the criminal case will not debar or disqualify him for the post of the Constable for which he was successfully selected after qualifying the written test, medical test and the interview conducted by the selection authority. Further, as stated by us earlier, there has been no concealment of any relevant fact from the Respondents by the Appellant. The Respondents were thus not justified in denying the said post to the Appellant. The conclusion arrived at by them is not cogent and lacks proper application of mind.
27. We therefore, hold that the High Court has committed a grave error both on facts and in law and it has failed to follow the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra and uphold the decision of the CAT. For the foregoing reasons both the appeals succeed and are allowed.â 20- In light of the aforesaid judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the registration of FIR and acquittal in a criminal case for an offence under Section 498-A of IPC will certainly not at all debar the petitioner to hold the post of Sub Inspector of Police for which he has been successfully selected after qualifying written test, medical test and the interview conducted by the authorities.
21- Resultantly, as the petitioner's name finds place in the merit list, the respondents are directed to issue an appointment order in favour of the petitioner within 90 days. The petitioner shall be entitled for all consequential benefits including seniority, grant of increments, notional pay fixation of salary as well as promotion, however, he will not be entitled for back wages. The respondent will not deny appointment to the petitioner only because he was involved in a criminal case and has been acquitted vide judgment dated 08/06/2012.
22- The exercise of passing necessary orders and taking all consequential action be completed within a period of 30 days from today. It is made clear that in case, the order passed by this Court is not complied with within a period of 90 days, the petitioner shall be entitled for full back wages from the date other identically placed persons have been appointed on the basis of selection which took place on the basis of selection of the year 2013.
23- With the aforesaid, writ petition stands allowed with a cost of Rs.10,000/-.â Resultantly, writ petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the respondent is accordingly quashed.
The petitioner shall be entitled for all consequential benefits including 50% back wages. He shall be entitled for the same benefits from the same date which other batchmates have been appointed for the post of constable.
Certified Copy as per rules (S.C.SHARMA) JUDGE bina