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[Cites 3, Cited by 598]

Supreme Court of India

Kashmira Singh vs The State Of Punjab on 2 September, 1977

Equivalent citations: 1977 AIR 2147, 1978 SCR (1) 385, AIR 1977 SUPREME COURT 2147, (1977) 4 SCC 291, (1977) 3 ALL LR 525, 1977 CRI APP R (SC) 312, 1977 ALLCRIR 412, 1977 SCC(CRI) 559, 1977 2 SCJ 413, 1977 4 MADLJ(CRI) 559, (1977) 79 PUN LR 679, 1977 4 CRI LT 390, 1977 ALL WC 675, 1977 UJ (SC) 593, 1977 SC CRI R 365, 1978 (1) SCR 385, ILR (1977) 2 KANT 1212

Author: P.N. Bhagwati

Bench: P.N. Bhagwati, A.C. Gupta

           PETITIONER:
KASHMIRA SINGH

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF PUNJAB

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/09/1977

BENCH:
BHAGWATI, P.N.
BENCH:
BHAGWATI, P.N.
GUPTA, A.C.

CITATION:
 1977 AIR 2147		  1978 SCR  (1) 385
 1977 SCC  (4) 291
 CITATOR INFO :
 F	    1978 SC 527	 (24)


ACT:
Practice and procedure in the matter of granting bail to  an
accused pending the hearing of an appeal-Order XLVII Rule  6
read with Order XXI Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules.



HEADNOTE:
The  appellant, though charged with offences u/ss.  323	 and
302  I.P.C.,  was convicted only u/s. 323 and  sentenced  to
suffer	 6  months'  rigorous  imprisonment.	The   appeal
preferred  by the State against acquittal u/s.	302,  I.P.C.
was  accepted  by  the	High Court  and	 the  appellant	 was
convicted   under   that  charge  and  sentenced   to	life
imprisonment.	As required under Rule 6, Order XXI  of	 the
Supreme	 Court Rules, the appellant surrendered	 before	 the
trial court and preferred special leave which was granted on
28-2-1974;   but   the	application  for   bail,   preferred
subsequently,  was rejected on 10-1-1975.  Since the  appeal
did  not come up for hearing for a long time, the  appellant
preferred  another  application	 for  bail.   Allowing	 the
application, the Court,
HELD  :	 No  practice  howsoever  sanctified  by  usage	 and
hallowed by time can be allowed to prevail if it operates to
cause injustice.  Every practice of the court must find	 its
ultimate  justification	 in the interest  of  justice.	 The
practice  not  to  release on bail a  person  who  has	been
sentenced to life imprisonment was evolved on the basis that
once  a person has been found guilty and sentenced  to	life
imprisonment,  he  should not be let loose so  long  as	 his
conviction   and  sentence  are	 not  set  aside;  but	 the
underlying postulate of this practice was that the appeal of
such  person  would  be	 disposed  of  within  a  measurable
distance  of  time so that if he is ultimately found  to  be
innocent, he would not have to remain in jail for an  unduly
long  period.	The rationale of this practice can  have  no
application where the court is not in a position to  dispose
of the appeal for five or six years.  It would, indeed, be a
travesty of justice to keep a person in jail for a period of
five  or six years for an offence which is ultimately  found
not to have been committed by him.  So long as this court is
not in a position to hear the appeal of an accused within  a
reasonable  period  of time, the  court	 should	 ordinarily,
unless	there  are  cogent  grounds  for  acting  otherwise,
release the accused on bail in cases where special leave has
been granted to the accused to appeal against his conviction
and sentence.
In  the	 instant  case, the very fact that  this  court	 has
granted to the appellant special leave to appeal against his
conviction shows that, in the opinion of this court, he has,
prima  facie,  a good case to consider and  in	the  circum-
stances,  namely,  that he has been in jail  and  the  total
period he has spent in jail so far is about 4-1/2 years,  it
would  be  highly unjust to detain him in  jail	 any  longer
during	the hearing of the appeal and he should be  released
on bail. [386 D-G, 387 A-D]



JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Misc. Petition No. 1907 of 1976. Application for Bail in Criminal Appeal No. 110 of 1974.

U. P. Singh for the Appellant.

O. P. Sharma for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI. J.,-This is an application for bail pending the hearing of an appeal by special leave. The appellant was convicted by 386 the Sessions Court for an offence under section 323 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer six months' rigorous imprisonment. There was also a charge against the appellant for an offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code but he was acquitted of that offence by, the Sessions Court and hence the State preferred an appeal against the order of acquittal to the High Court. This appeal was allowed and the High Court set aside the order of acquittal and convicted the appellant of the offence under section 302 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life. The appellant, thereupon, preferred a petition for special leave to appeal to this Court and special leave was granted to, him on 28th February, 1974. The, appellant filed an application for bail pending the hearing of the appeal, but the application was dismissed on 10th January, 1975. Since the appeal did not reach hearing for a long time, the appellant preferred another application for bail and that is the application which is now being disposed 'of by this judgment.

The appellant contends in this application that pending the hearing of the appeal he should be released on bail. Now, the practice in this Court as also in many of the High Courts has been not to release on bail a person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment for an offence under section 302 of the Indian penal Code. The question is whether this practice should be departed from and if so, in what cir- cumstances. It is obvious that no practice howsoever sanctified by usage and hallowed by time can be allowed to prevail if it operates to cause injustice. Every practice of the Court must find its ultimate justification in the interest of justice,. bail a person whohas been sentenced to life imprisonment was evolved in the High Courts and in this Court on the basis that once a person has been found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, he should not be let loose, so long as his conviction and sentence are not set aside, but the underlying postulate of this practice was that the appeal of such person would be disposed of within a measurable distance of time, so that if he is ultimately found to be innocent, be would not have to remain in jail for an unduly long period. The rationale of this practice can have no application where the Court is not in a position to dispose of the appeal for five or six years. It would indeed be a travesty of justice to keep a person in jail for a period of five or six years for an offence which is ultimates found not to have been committed by him. Can the Court ever compensate him for his incarceration which is found to unjustified ? Would it be just at all for the Court to tell a person : "We have admitted your appeal because we think you have a prima facie case, but unfortunately we have no time to hear your appeal for quite a few years and, therefore, ,until we hear your appeal, you must remain in jail, even though you may be innocent ?" What confidence would such administration of justice inspire in the mind of the public ? It may quite conceivably happen, and it has in fact happened in a few cases in this Court, that a person may serve out his full term of imprisonment before his appeal is taken up for hearing. Would a judge not be overwhelmed with a feeling of contrition while acquitting such a person after hearing the appeal ? Would it not be an affront to his sense of justice ? Of what avail would the acquittal be to such a person who has already served out his term of impri-

387

sonment or at any rate a major part of it ? It is, therefore, absolutely essential that the practice which this Court has been following in the past must be reconsidered and so long as this Court is not in a position to hear the appeal of an accused within a reasonable period of time, the Court should ordinarily, unless there are cogent grounds for acting otherwise, release the accused on bail in cases where special leave has been granted to the accused to appeal against his conviction and- sentence. Here in the present case, the appellant, after serving out the sentence 'of six months' rigorous imprisonment for the offence under section 323 imposed upon him by the Sessions Court, was on bail throughout the duration of the appeal before the, High Court and since the appeal was allowed and he was convicted for the offence under section 302 and sentenced to life imprisonment, he surrendered before presenting his petition for special leave to appeal to this Court. Since then, the appellant has been in jail and the total period he has spent in jail so far is about four and a half years. The appeal is of 1974 ;and it is not likely to come up for hearing for at least another two years since. this Court is at present hearing appeals preferred in the year 1972.The very fact that this Court has granted to the appellant specialleave to appeal against his conviction shows that, in the opinion of thisCourt, he has prima facie a good, case to consider and in the circumstances it would be highly unjust to detain him in jail any longer during the bearing of the appeal. We, therefore, direct that the appellant be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patiala. The appellant will report at the nearest police station once in a fortnight.

S.R. Appeal allowed.

388