Patna High Court
Abdul Gafoor vs The Additional Member, Board Of Revenue ... on 9 March, 1984
Equivalent citations: AIR1984PAT268, AIR 1984 PATNA 268, 1984 BBCJ 424 (1984) PAT LJR 771, (1984) PAT LJR 771
ORDER A. Ali Ahmad, J.
1. Respondent No. 4 Khusilal Mahto (since dead) and respondent No. 5 Jagdish Mahto purchased Plots Nos. 436 and 425 in full and Plots Nos. 259 and 424 in part from Sheikh Sultan Ahmad and Sheikh Anwar Ahmad by a registered sale deed dated 11th November, 1966. The petitioner filed an application under Section 16 (3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961, before the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Begu-sarai, on the ground that he held land adjacent to the land sold in favour of the aforesaid two respondents. The application was contested by the purchasers but the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Begusarai, by his order dated 18th January, 1968, allowed the prayer for pre-emption. The matter then went in appeal. The appellate Court set aside the order and remanded the case back to the Deputy collector, Land Reforms, for fresh decision in accordance with law. The Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, again by his order dated 27th December, 1971, upheld the claim of pre-emption made by the petitioner. The appeal failed before the Collector. Thereafter the vendees went in revision before the Member, Board of Revenue. The learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, by his order dated 21st November 1974 (annexure '4') allowed the application and held that the claim for pre-emption could not be allowed on two counts; namely, (i) the application under Section 16 (3) had to be in form LC 13 but the petitioner did not furnish informations required under that form, and (ii) the pre-emptor, though held land adjacent to plots Nos. 425, 289 and 424 but he did not hold any land adjacent to plot No. 436. The revision application, therefore, was allowed and the claim of the petitioner under Section 16 (3) of the Act was disallowed. Thereafter this application has been filed in this Court with a prayer to quash the order passed by the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, dt/- 21st Nov. 1974, as contained in An-nexure '4'.
2. Undisputedly, plots No. 436 and 425 which have been sold in full and plots Nos. 289 and 424 which have been sold in part are contiguous and they form one block. The petitioner is raiyat of adjacent plots, namely, plots Nos. 435 and 426 which are contiguous to plots Ncs. 426, 289 and 424. Therefore notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner does not hold any land adjacent to plot No. 436, the application for pre-emption cannot be dismissed on that ground because the land has been sold in one block and the petitioner holds land adjacent to the block. This view is supported by the decision in Sheikh Mohammad Umar v. Baidyanath Giri (1969 BLJR 542).
3. Mr. Tara Kant Jha next urged that the application under Section 16 (3) could not be thrown merely on the ground that the informations required by Form LC 13 were not fully furnished. The infirmity is with regard to Schedule I of the form. Schedule I is as follows:--
"SCHEDULE I (Description of the land transferred) Name of the district Description of the land whether held for agriculture; horticulture or homestead, Sub-division Police Station Village Plot Number of the land Area of each plot Classification of each plot (I, II, III,IV,V)."
The petitioner did not supply the information regarding the description of the land as to whether it was agricultural, horticultural or homestead. Then again, he did not mention the district or the sub-division where the land in question was located. He also did not mention the classification of each plot. Mr. Indu Shekhar Prasad Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, drew my attention to the case of Ganesh Prasad v. Jugeshwar Tewari, (1969 Pat LJR 284). In that case a Bench of Ihis Court had. the occasion to consider the effect of non-mention of the "description of the land whether held for agriculture, horticulture or homestead'', as provided in Schedule I of Form L. C. 13. The Bench was of the view that this was fatal to the maintainability of the application. It, therefore, allowed the writ application and dismissed the claim of pre-emption. Mr. Tara Kant Jha, on the other hand, referred to the decision in Hiralal Agrawal v. Rampadarath Singh, (1968 Pat LJR 68A) : (AIR 1969 SC 244). In this case Rule 19 of the Act which prescribes the manner in which the application under Section 16 (3) has to be filed was being considered. In that connection Form L. C. 13 also came for consideration Under Rule 19 a copy of the sale deed has to be filed along with fhe application under Section 16 (3). That was not done and on that ground it was said that since the mandatory requirement as provided under Rule 19 and Form L. C. 13 was not complied with, the application under Section 16 (3) should fail. The learned Judges rejected this argument and observed that the object of Rule 19 in prescribing that the application under Section 16 (3) must be accompanied by a copy of the registered deed is clearly to enable the Collector before he exercises his power thereunder to ascertain the purchase price, the terms and conditions of the sale, the readiness of the applicant to have the land in question re-conveyed to him on the same terms and conditions as mentioned in the sale deed. They further observed that to dismiss the application for pre-emption on the technical ground of non-compliance of Rule 19 will nullify the object of the Statute and as such it cannot be the intention of the framers of Rule 19 and Form L. C. 13.
Thereafter their Lordships observed:
"Surely these are directory instructions and if there is sufficient compliance thereof the application can be validity entertained by the Collector."
4. It appears that the attention of the learned Judges deciding the case of Ganesh Prasad (supra) was not draw" to the decision in the case of Hirala] Agrawal (supra). According to the ratio in the decision in Ganesh Prasad's case, non-
compliance with Rule 19 and non-mention of the information required under L. C. 13 were fatal. This decision is by a Division Bench of this Court and ordinarily it would have been binding on me but in view of the Supreme Court decision in Hiralal Agrawal's case, I have no option but to follow the view taken by the Supreme Court.
5. Now what has to be seen is as to whether substantial information has been furnished by the petitioner in Schedule I. Firstly, description of land as to whether it was, agricultural, horticultural or homestead was to be given. This is not there but the map attached to the application under Section 16 (3) clearly shows that the land is agricultural in character. Thereafter the petitioner did not mention the name of the district or sub-division but he has mentioned the number of the police station and the name of the village. On the basis of these two informations there can be absolutely no difficulty in finding as to in which district and in which sub-division the land is located. Likewise I do not find any prejudice to have been caused to the purchasers by non-mention of classification of the plots in question. They do not seem to have raised the point that the land is of Class I and the petitioner is debarred from pre-empting the same on account of the fact that he has got land more than the ceiling prescribed under the Act. For these reasons, in my view, substantial information was furnished in Schedule I and on that ground the application could not be said to be not maintainable.
6. Mr. Indu Shekhar Prasad Sinha lastly urged that the right of a pre-emptor is a weak right and his application should not be allowed after about eighteen years of the sale. The contention is no doubt attractive but it has to be borne in mind that the final disposal of the pre-emption application has taken quite a long time and for this delay the petitioner cannot be said to be responsible in any manner. I, therefore, see no merit in this submission.
7. The application is, therefore, allowed and the order of the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, dated 21st November, 1974, as contained in An-nexure '4' is hereby quashed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.