Karnataka High Court
Geetha B. Rao vs The Secretary, Karnataka State ... on 23 June, 1994
Equivalent citations: ILR1994KAR2063, 1994(2)KARLJ703
ORDER Mohan Kumar, J.
1. When these matters came up for hearing before this Court, it was agreed that both the Writ Petitions can be disposed off finally.
2. The facts may be stated with reference to W.P No. 29902/92. The petitioner herein is a holder of a South Zone permit for the Tourist Taxi vehicle No. KA-06/666 covered by C/C/Stage carriage permit No. TVP.71/80. This vehicle has a seating capacity of six, i.e., 5+1. When the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was replaced by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it recognised granting permit for vehicle with capacity of 13, i.e., 12 + 1, which categories of vehicles were described as Maxi Cab [vide definition 2(22)]. The petitioner thereupon applied for variation of the condition by replacing the existing taxi with maxi cab, This request was rejected by order No. STA.1 REPL.12/89-90 dated 23-5-1992 by the Karnataka State Transport Authority. Aggrieved, the petitioner, submitted an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, which by order Annexure-A, allowed the appeal, permitting the variation by increasing the seating capacity, This order was passed on 27-8-1992.
3. Since the respondent - the Karnataka State Transport Authority, who was bound to give effect to Annexure-A order, failed to do so, the petitioner filed the Writ Petition seeking a Writ of Mandamus commanding the respondent to implement Annexure- A order.
4. The Writ Petition was filed on 7-10-1992. The copy of the Writ Petition was served on the respondent on 8-10-1992. It came up for Preliminary Hearing on 5-2-1993. On that day, the Government Advocate took notice and the matter was adjourned to 10-2-1993 and again to 18-2-1993. On 18-2-1993, it was adjourned to succeeding week. It was not posted thereafter till 24-8-1993.
5. On 23-2-1993, the Karnataka State Transport Authority, the primary authority who passed the order dated 23-5-1992, referred to above, who is the respondent in W.P.No. 29902/92, as also the State of Karnataka filed W.P.No. 5852/93 impugning Annexure-A order, referred to above. It came up for admission on 25-2-1993 and was adjourned to be heard along with W.P.No. 29902/92.
6. The short question for consideration is, whether the variation sought for can be granted. Before adjudicating the question, another ancillary aspect may be adverted to.
7. The order challenged in appeal by the petitioner in W.P.No. 29902/92 was passed by the Karnataka State Transport Authority. The said authority was exercising a quasi-judicial function. If so, it is not known as to how the order Annexure-A, which is a decision rendered in the statutory appeal against the order of the said authority can be impugned by the very same authority. The said authority is not "a person aggrieved" and it cannot be shown that it has suffered injustice which ought to be rectified. It can never be said that the said authority has any 'interest' to be safeguarded. If a Writ of Certiorari is a Writ ex debito justitiae which expression is ordinarily understood to mean that one who can show that he suffered injustice and who owed rectification, then the authority who decided a cause can never satisfy the definition of an aggrieved person. Hence, as the 1st petitioner in W.P.No. 5852/93, namely, the Karnataka State Transport Authority, is not an aggrieved person, he cannot impugn Annexure-A order.
8. That apart, as can be seen from the facts set out in the preceding paragraph, it may not be unreasonable to assume that the challenge to Annexure-A order made in W.P.No. 5852/93 is not bonafide. The order was passed on 27-8-1992. The petitioner in W.P.No. 29902/92 filed the Writ Petition on 7-10-1992. A copy thereof was served on the petitioners in W.P.No. 5852/93 on 8-10-1992, When W.P.No. 29902/92 came up for admission, time was sought on behalf of the respondent twice. It is thereafter W.P.No. 5852/93 was filed. These facts clearly betray want of bona fides in the respondents.
9. The legal contention urged is that the variation cannot be granted in view of Section 83 of the Act. The said Section reads thus:
"83. Replacement of vehicles. The holder of a permit may, with the permission of the authority by which the permit was granted, replace any vehicle covered by the permit by any other vehicle of the same nature."
The argument of the learned Government Pleader was that the expression "same nature" in the said Section should take to mean and include capacity as well. I am afraid, this construction cannot be placed to that expression. Firstly, on a plain understanding of the meaning of the Section can mean, vehicle of similar type, ie., a passenger vehicle. It only means that a Tourist vehicle cannot be replaced by a stage carriage or a goods-vehicle. In other words, the 'character' of vehicle cannot be changed. The meaning intended to be conveyed is that the characteristic of the vehicle should not be lost.
10. That apart, the question is not res integra. Earlier, in the corresponding section of 1939 Act, the expression employed was ".... same nature and capacity". By an amendment, the expression 'capacity' was deleted. When a similar question arose as to what is the effect of the said amendment, this Court in YESHODHARA KADAMBA v. KARNATAKA STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL , stated as follows:
"10. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the legislature deliberately omitted the word 'capacity' and retained the word 'nature'. To attribute the meaning of 'capacity' to the word 'nature' in such a circumstance cannot be accepted because that would be contrary to the Legislative intention. Any restriction on the rights of the applicant unless expressly provided by the statute cannot be impliedly imported. The word 'capacity' refers to the seating capacity and the word 'nature' does not mean and include capacity also and it is not permissible to read into the provisions of law a word which has been deliberately excluded by the Legislature itself. The Section has to be read as it exists, If the meaning of the words 'capacity' and 'nature' was one and the same, I do not think that the words 'nature and capacity' would have been discontinued by the amendment Act No. 56/1969. The reasonable probability would be that the object of the Legislature was to consider only the nature of the vehicle and not the seating capacity of the vehicle. In any event, it is not the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondents that the nature of the vehicle does not warrant the grant of permission under Section 59(2) of the Act,"
I arn in respectful agreement with what is stated above, This Court indicated that by deleting the word 'capacity', the Legislature intended to convey the meaning that what is important in the 'character' of the vehicle and not its capacity. The reasoning given therein will apply to the facts of this case as well. The language employed is the amended Section. Hence, I am of the view that the petitioner in W.P. No. 29902/92 is entitled for the relief sought for.
11. In the result, W.P.No. 29902/92 is disposed of in the following manner:
(i) There shall be a direction to the respondent in W.P.No. 29902/92 to comply with the direction in Annexure-A order within a period of thirty days from today;
(ii) There will be no order as to costs.
12. As regards W.P.No. 5852/93, I hold that the 1st petitioner therein has no locus standi to maintain the Writ Petition, The fact that the 1st petitioner joined the Writ Petition and moved the same long after W.P.No. 29902/92 was filed and came up for consideration before this Court, clearly betrays want of good faith in the conduct of the 1st petitioner. Hence, the said Writ Petition is dismissed with costs, Advocate's fee Rs.500/-. The incumbent of the Office of the 1st petitioner on the date of filing of W.P.No. 5852/93 shall pay this cost personally.