Telangana High Court
M/S. Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd vs The State Of Telangana on 24 September, 2025
Author: Juvvadi Sridevi
Bench: Juvvadi Sridevi
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
CRIMINAL PETITION No.3437 of 2022
O R D E R:
This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioner-accused No.4 and 3 to quash the criminal proceedings against them in C.C.No.18 of 2021 on the file of the learned I Metropolitan Magistrate (Municipal Court) at Chidibazar, Hyderabad (for short 'learned the trial Court'), registered for the offences under Sections 3(1)(zz)(iii), 21(i) and 26(2)(i) of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 and Food Safety and Stands (Food Products and Food Additive) Regulation, 2011.
02. Heard Sri Rajesh Batra, learned counsel, representing Sri Santhosh Alla, learned counsel for the petitioners and Smt.S.Madhavi, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State-respondents.
03. Brief facts of the case are that: On 20.06.2017 at about 01:00 P.M., the complainant along with his office subordinate, visited the premises of the accused No.2, namely M/s. Buddy Beverages Pvt. Ltd., situated at H.No.8-2-108/7, 2 Sy.No.57A/1, G.N.Reddy Godowns, Hastinapuram, Sagar Road, L.B. Nagar Circle, Hyderabad. The complainant secured the presence of a mediator for the purpose of conducting inspection of the said premises. During the course of inspection, the complainant introduced himself as Food Safety Officer, East Zone, L.B. Nagar Circle, Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad, to the accused No.1, who was found to be the Store In-charge of the said firm and engaged in its business operations. Upon inspection, the complainant found 4,224 bottles (353 cartons) of Aquafina Packaged Drinking Water kept for sale which is used for human consumption, along with other food articles, namely various soft drinks of Pepsico Company. Entertaining suspicion regarding the said packaged drinking water, the complainant collected samples and issued a Form-VA notice to the accused No.1, informing him that the sample of Aquafina Packaged Drinking Water would be forwarded to the State Food Laboratory, Hyderabad, for analysis. Upon analysis, the Public Analyst opined that the said sample was unsafe. Hence, the accused 3 are alleged to have committed the aforesaid offence and are liable for prosecution.
04. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the prosecution has failed to adhere to the mandatory procedure prescribed under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006. It is submitted that, in terms of Section 77 of the Act, the limitation period for launching prosecution is one year from the date of commission of the alleged offence. However, in the present case, there has been an inordinate and unexplained delay in filing the complaint. No reasons have been recorded by the Commissioner of Food Safety to justify the delay in initiating prosecution. It is further contended that the analysis was conducted in a non-accredited laboratory, and therefore, the report of the Food Analyst is legally invalid and cannot be relied upon.
05. With the above submissions, while praying for quashment of proceedings against the petitioners-accused Nos.4 and 3, he relied upon a decision in Dharampalsatyapal Limited through its Authorized representative, Shivakumar 4 V.R. v. State of Kerala represented by PP and another 1 wherein at Paragraph Nos.11 to 15 it was held that:
"11. Thus, the only reason mentioned to explain the delay is the procedural and administrational delay. There is a complete absence of any explanation of what is the procedural delay. No material has been referred to in the order of the Commissioner to explain the nature of the administrational delay or the factors responsible for such a delay.
12. The words 'procedural and administrational delay' are too vague and obscure terms to be regarded as an explanation or as reasons for delay. Those terms cannot signify a reason and are only broad terminologies used to denote a title for the delay and not anything of relevance or significance. When the statute expressly requires reasons to be stated in writing, it mandates a precise reference to the causes for the delay, which can be tested on the touchstone of relevancy or sufficiency by a court of law.
13. The terms procedural and administrative delay have been the subject of consideration by the courts under section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Amar Nath Yadav [(2014) 2 SCC 422], the Supreme Court had observed that it is time to inform all 1 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 938 5 the Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanations for the delay, and there was a bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tapism in the process. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duty with diligence and commitment. Similarly, in the decision Simplex Infrastructure Limited v. Union of India [(2019) 2 SCC 455] Supreme Court observed that administrative difficulties cannot be a valid reason to condone delay.
14. Section 77 of the Act, which stipulates that prosecutions must be launched within a period of one year, has significance. It entails the Food Inspectors to act swiftly and without delay. It is also a measure of fair and reasonable procedure prescribed under law before depriving the liberty of an individual. When the statute prescribes a period of limitation and carves out an exception from the main provision, the conditions required to fall within the exception must be strictly adhered to. The principle that penal statutes are to be interpreted strictly also has to be followed. Therefore, as a measure of depriving the liberty of an individual when the statute provides certain conditions to be satisfied, there cannot be any scope for a liberal interpretation. The requirement for giving reasons in writing enables 6 the court to review whether the stated reasons for extending the time for prosecution are legally and factually justifiable or not.
15. In the instant case, the letter from the Designated Officer was issued after a delay of 18 months. A further delay of five months from 21.03.2015 to 11.08.2015 at the office of the Commissioner has also not been explained. The aforenoted delay is substantial and beyond the period stipulated for taking cognizance. The reason for such a long delay has not been indicated at all. In the absence of any reason for such a long delay, the sanction becomes legally invalid. In the above circumstances, this Court is of the view that the Commissioner had failed to record any reason worth its name to extend the period stipulated under section 77 of the Act for sanctioning the prosecution."
06. On the other hand, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State-respondents contended that the Public Analyst report is very clear that the sample is unsafe and that it is not a fit case to quash the proceedings against the petitioners at this juncture and the matter has to be decided after conducting trial by the concerned Court and that in view of the serious allegations levelled against the petitioners, the 7 petitioners are liable to be prosecuted for the alleged offences and prayed this Court to dismiss the petition.
07. In view of above submissions, it is relevant to extract Section 77 of the Food Safety And Standards Act, which reads as under:
"77. Time limit for prosecutions:- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act after the expiry of the period of one year from the date of commission of an offence:Provided that the Commissioner of Food Safety may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, approve prosecution within an extended period of up to three years."
08. Section 77 of the Act, which stipulates that the prosecutions must be launched within a period of one year, has significance. It entails the Food Inspectors to act swiftly and without delay. It is also a measure of fair and reasonable procedure prescribed under law before depriving the liberty of an individual. When the statute prescribes a period of limitation and carves out an exception from the main provision, the conditions required to fall within the exception must be strictly adhered to. The principle that penal statutes are to be 8 interpreted strictly also has to be followed. Therefore, as a measure of depriving the liberty of an individual when the statute provides certain conditions to be satisfied, there cannot be any scope for a liberal interpretation. The requirement for giving reasons in writing enables the court to review whether the stated reasons for extending the time for prosecution are legally and factually justifiable or not.
09. In the present case, the sample was collected on 20.06.2017 and the report of the Food Analyst was issued on 04.07.2017. Accordingly, the limitation for launching prosecution expired on 04.07.2018. Though Section 77 of the Food Safety and Standards Act empowers the Commissioner of Food Safety, for reasons to be recorded in writing, to approve prosecution within an extended period of up to three years, the complaint in the present case was filed only on 17.02.2021. The Government Order dated 28.12.2020 merely states that the reason for approving prosecution beyond one year was "administrative," which cannot be considered a legally valid justification.
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10. As seen from the cognizance order of the learned Magistrate, it was mentioned that "In view of the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in W.P. Civil No.3 of 2020 dated 23.03.2020 extending period of limitation for filing complaint. This complaint is filed period of limitation.". It is to be noted that in Sagufa Ahmed and others v. Upper Assam Polywood Products Private Limited and others 2 the Hon'ble Supreme Court at Paragraph Nos.16 & 17 held that:
"16. To get over their failure to file an appeal on or before 18.03.2020, the appellants rely upon the order of this Court dated 23.03.2020 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020. It reads as follows:
"1. This Court has taken Suo Motu cognizance of the situation arising out of the challenge faced by the country on account of Covid19 Virus and resultant difficulties that may be faced by litigants across the country in filing their petitions / applications / suits / appeals/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under Special Laws (both Central and/or State).
2. To obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunals across the country including this Court, it is hereby ordered that 2 (2021) 2 Supreme Court Cases 317 10 a period of limitation in all such proceedings, irrespective of the limitation prescribed under the general law or Special Laws whether condonable or not shall stand extended w.e.f. 15th March 2020 till further order/s to be passed by this Court in present proceedings.
3. We are exercising this power under Article 142 read with Article 141 of the Constitution of India and declare that this order is a binding order within the meaning of Article 141 on all Courts/Tribunals and authorities.
4. This order may be brought to the notice of all High Courts for being communicated to all subordinate Courts/Tribunals within their respective jurisdiction.
5. Issue notice to all the Registrars General of the High Courts, returnable in four weeks."
17. But we do not think that the appellants can take refuge under the above order. What was extended by the above order of this Court was only "the period of limitation" and not the period upto which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. The above order passed by this Court was intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were prevented due to the pandemic and the lockdown, from initiating proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed by general or special law. It is needless to point out that the law of limitation finds its root in two latin maxims, one of which is Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt which means that the law will assist only those who are 11 vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over them."
11. In light of the above authoritative pronouncement, it is clear that the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in W.P. (Civil) No.3 of 2020 extended only the "period of limitation" in respect of proceedings which were required to be initiated on or after 15.03.2020, but it did not enlarge the time for condonation of delay where the limitation period had already expired prior to the said date. In the present case, the period of limitation for launching prosecution expired much before 15.03.2020, and hence, the complainant cannot derive any benefit from the Covid-19 extension order. Consequently, the reliance placed by the learned Magistrate on the said order to hold that the complaint was filed within limitation is legally untenable.
12. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Amar Nath Yadav 3, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed that it is time to inform all the Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanations for the delay, and there was a 3 (2014) 2 SCC 422 12 bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tapism in the process. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duty with diligence and commitment. Similarly, in the decision Simplex Infrastructure Limited v. Union of India 4 the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that administrative difficulties cannot be a valid reason to condone delay. In the instant case, the delay in filing the complaint is clearly beyond the statutory period prescribed for taking cognizance, and no legally sustainable reasons for such prolonged delay have been recorded by the Commissioner, as mandated under Section 77 of the Act. In the absence of such reasons, the sanction accorded becomes legally invalid. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that the Commissioner has failed to comply with the statutory requirement of recording reasons for extending the limitation. In that view of the matter, the prosecution launched against the 4 (2019) 2 SCC 455 13 petitioners-accused Nos.4 and 3 amounts to abuse of process of law and the same is liable to be quashed.
13. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is allowed and the proceedings against the petitioners-accused Nos.4 and 3 in C.C.No.18 of 2021 on the file of the learned I Metropolitan Magistrate (Municipal Court) at Chidibazar, Hyderabad, are hereby quashed.
As a sequel, Interlocutory Applications, if any pending, shall also stand closed.
_____________________ JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J Dated: 24-SEP-2025 KHRM