Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Seema Devi vs Health And Family Welfare on 11 December, 2025
1
Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022
Court No. 4
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench,
New Delhi
O.A. No. 3402/2022
Reserved on:- 27.11.2025
Pronounced on:- 11.12.2025
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
Seema Devi, aged 34,
D/o Sh. Suresh Kumar,
R/o: B-47, Vijay Colony,
Bawana, Delhi - 110039.
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Mr. Nitesh Kumar Singh)
Versus
1. Govt. of India,
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,
Through its Secretary, Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi - 110011.
2. Deputy Director,
Directorate General of Health Services,
Govt. of India, New Delhi.
3. Medical Superintendent,
Lady Harding Medical College &
SMT S. K. Hospital,
Saheed Bhagat Singh Marg,
New Delhi - 110001.
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. Vijendra Singh)
2025.12.12
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Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022
Court No. 4
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J) In the present O.A. filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant has prayed for the following reliefs:-
"i). Pass an order of quashing the impugned order dated 06.09.2022 rejecting the candidature of the applicant and direct the respondent to consider the candidature of the applicant and offer of appointment be given to her;
ii). The applicant be appointed to the post of Medical Laboratory Technologist with all consequential benefits;
iii). Allow the O.A. with all consequential benefits;
iv). Pass such other order or directions as this Hon'ble Tribunal deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, including an order of this application in the interest of justice and equity."
2. Highlighting the facts of the case, learned counsel for the applicant submitted as under:
2.1. The applicant, a widow of an Air Force Corporal, had the requisite academic qualifications for the post of Medical Laboratory Technologist. She had completed her M.Sc. in Clinical Microbiology in 2014 and B.Sc. in Medical Laboratory Technology in 2011 from Punjab Technical University, and had also been working as a Laboratory Technician on contract basis in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital since 02.11.2010.
2.2. Learned counsel argued that the respondent, i.e., Lady Hardinge Medical College (LHMC) had issued an advertisement dated 23.07.2020 inviting applications for 2025.12.12 ANKIT 11:14:35 SAKLANI +05'30' 3 Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022 Court No. 4 Medical Laboratory Technologist posts, for which the essential qualification was a Bachelor's degree in Medical Laboratory Science and two years' experience, a criteria which the applicant undisputedly fulfilled. Learned counsel submitted that as per Para 8 of the advertisement, widows were entitled to relaxation of the upper-age limit up to 35 years. On the cut-
off date, i.e. 23.08.2020, the applicant was 31 years and 8 months old, and therefore well within the permissible age limit.
2.3. Learned counsel submitted that the applicant applied under the EWS category and enclosed all requisite documents, including her EWS certificate. Her application was accepted, admit card issued, and she appeared in the examination held on 23.07.2022, securing 72 out of 200 marks. Learned counsel submitted that the applicant's score was higher than the marks of the last selected candidate in the EWS category, who had secured only 60 marks. Despite this, her candidature was rejected vide order dated 06.09.2022 on the grounds that she was overage and that no EWS certificate was attached with the application form. Learned counsel argued that both grounds were factually incorrect.
2.4. Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant immediately represented her case on 10.09.2022, enclosing copies of her original and EWS certificate and clarifying the 2025.12.12 ANKIT 11:14:35 SAKLANI +05'30' 4 Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022 Court No. 4 age relaxation applicable to widows. Several reminders were also sent through email on 11.09.2022, 06.10.2022 and 28.10.2022, but the respondents failed to consider or decide the representations.
2.5. Learned counsel argued that the respondents proceeded to publish a select list on 12.11.2022, wherein candidates lower in merit than the applicant were appointed. Learned counsel highlighted that out of the 08 advertised vacancies under the EWS category, only 06 had been filled, and 02 vacancies still remained unfilled, despite the applicant being eligible, qualified, within age limit, and higher in merit. In these circumstances, learned counsel submitted that the action of the respondents is arbitrary, contrary to the advertisement, violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and legally unsustainable and therefore, having no other efficacious remedy, the applicant was constrained to approach this Tribunal.
2.6. Learned counsel for the applicant contended that the rejection of the applicant's candidature was arbitrary and contrary to the terms of the advertisement as the respondents were bound by the advertisement, which expressly granted age relaxation up to 35 years for widows, and the applicant, being 31 years and 8 months old on the cut-off date, was well within the prescribed limit. Learned counsel further 2025.12.12 ANKIT 11:14:35 SAKLANI +05'30' 5 Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022 Court No. 4 contended that the applicant had duly enclosed her valid EWS certificate with the application form and had again furnished the renewed certificate along with her representation, yet the respondents erroneously held that the same was not attached. It was urged that the applicant fulfilled all eligibility conditions, had been working since 2010 as a Laboratory Technician in a Central Government Hospital, had been issued an admit card, and had secured 72 marks, far higher than the last selected EWS category candidate, who secured only 60 marks. Despite the applicant's higher merit and the fact that two EWS vacancies remain unfilled, her candidature was rejected without proper consideration, rendering the impugned action unreasonable, mechanical, and unsustainable in law.
3. Opposing the grant of relief, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the instant O.A. is devoid of merit and the applicant is not entitled to the reliefs sought. It was argued that the applicant had neither challenged the advertisement dated 23.07.2020 nor the corrigendum dated 16.09.2020, which clarified that age relaxation for widows is not applicable for Group B posts filled through open competitive examination.
3.1. Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant's candidature was rightly rejected on two grounds:
2025.12.12 ANKIT 11:14:35 SAKLANI +05'30' 6 Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022 Court No. 4
(i) she was overage as per the notified recruitment rules, and
(ii) she had not submitted the requisite EWS certificate with her application.
3.2. It was contended by the learned counsel that the application form was incomplete and her subsequent submission of documents, including the EWS certificate, did not form part of original application form and could not validate her claim. Reliance was placed on Hon'ble Supreme Court precedents, such as, Madan Lal v. State of J.K. (1995) 3 SCC 486; Ranjan Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 16 SCC 187; Anupal Singh v. State of U.P. (2020) 2 SCC 1731; Dr. G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow (1976) 3 SCC 585; Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar (2010) 12 SCC 576 wherein, according to the learned counsel, it was held that candidates participating in a selection process accept the terms of the advertisement and cannot challenge them after being unsuccessful. Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant's claim for age relaxation under EWS category was not legitimate as per the recruitment rules and relevant DoP&T instructions. Therefore, learned counsel for the respondents urged that the O.A. be dismissed in the interest of justice.
4. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the pleadings available on record. 2025.12.12 ANKIT 11:14:35 SAKLANI +05'30' 7 Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022 Court No. 4
5. ANALYSIS :
5.1. The upper age limit for recruitment to the Central Civil Services and civil posts, by the method of Direct Open Competitive Examination, as specified in the relevant service/recruitment rules, shall be increased by two years, as per Notification No. 15012/6/98-Estt.(D) dated 21.12.1998.
5.2. For widows, divorced women, and women judicially separated from their husbands who are not remarried, the Department of Personnel & Training provides that for appointments to Group C and D posts under the Central Government, filled through the Staff Selection Commission or Employment Exchange, the upper age limit shall be relaxed up to 35 years (and up to 40 years for members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes). This is subject to production of a certified copy of the relevant court judgment/decree to prove divorce or judicial separation, as applicable. However, there shall be no relaxation in educational qualifications or method of recruitment. This age relaxation is also extended to appointments to Group 'A' and 'B' posts, except where recruitment is made through open competitive examination.
[Ref: O.M. No. 15012/13/79-Estt.(D) dated 19.01.1980 and O.M. No. 15012/1/82-Estt.(D) dated 06.09.1983 and para 2 of O.M. No. 15012/1/87-Estt.(D) dated 05.10.1990 and para 2 of O.M. No. 41034/1/2014-Estt.(D) dated 30.01.2014]. 2025.12.12 ANKIT 11:14:35 SAKLANI +05'30' 8 Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022 Court No. 4 5.3 The "Direct Open Competitive Examination" for the purpose of these rules shall mean direct recruitment by Open Competitive Examination conducted by the Union Public Service Commission or the Staff Selection Commission, or any other authority under the Central Government, and it shall not include recruitment through Limited Departmental Examination or through shortlisting or by absorption or transfer or deputation.
5.4. In CIVIL APPEAL No. ___ of 2007 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 830 of 2006) - Union of India & Ors. vs. Shri Ramesh Singh Rajput, decided on 14.12.2007, the stand of the UOI/Appellants before the High Court was that the said rules applied only to recruitment through direct competitive examinations conducted by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) and the Staff Selection Commission (SSC). Recruitment in the Indian Air Force, being conducted by a Board constituted by the Commanding Officer of the Station/Units, was not through a central agency, and therefore, the rules did not apply.
5.5. In Civil Appeal No. 274 of 2016 titled Richa Mishra vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors., decided on 08.02.2016, it was observed as under:
" 26. In the first instance, it is to be borne in mind that Rules, 1997 are specific Rules, specially meant to give benefit of age relaxation to women in public service and post in connection 2025.12.12 ANKIT 11:14:35 SAKLANI +05'30' 9 Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022 Court No. 4 with the affairs of the State. These Rules are statutory in nature framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Such a special provision is made in favour of females in consonance with the Constitutional spirit contained in Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India which empowers the State to make any special provision for women and children. The salutary purpose and objective behind promulgating Rules, 1997 is manifest and can be clearly discerned. It is to encourage women, hitherto known as weaker section, to become working women, by taking up different vocations, including public employment. It would naturally lead to empowerment of women, which is the need of the hour. Women in this world, and particularly in India, face various kinds of gender disabilities and discriminations. It is notwithstanding the fact that under the Constitution of India, women enjoy a unique status of equality with men. In reality, however, they have yet to go a long way to achieve this Constitutional status. It is now realised that real empowerment would be achieved by women, which would lead to their well-being facilitating enjoyment of rights guaranteed to them, only if there is an economic empowerment of women as well. Till sometime back, the focus was to achieve better treatment for women and for this reason, the concentration was mainly on the well-being of women. Now the focus is shifted to economic empowerment. Such objectives have gradually evolved or broadened to include the active role of women when it comes to development as well. No longer the passive recipients of welfare-enhancing help, women are increasingly seen, by men as well as women as active agents of change: the dynamic promoters of social transformation that can alter the lives of both women and men. It is now realised that there is a bidirectional relationship between economic development and women's empowerment defined as improving the ability of women to access the constituents of development-in particular health, education, earning opportunities, rights, and political participation. This bidirectional relationship is explained by Prof. Amartya Sen by propounding a theory that in one direction, development alone can play a major role in driving down an equality between men and women; in another direction, continuing discrimination against women can hinder development. In this scenario, empowerment can accelerate development. From whichever direction the issue is looked into, it provides justification for giving economic empowerment to women. It is, for this purpose, there is much emphasis on women empowerment (as it leads to economic development) by United Nations World Bank and other such Bodies. Interestingly, the 2012 World Development Report (World Bank 2011) adopts a much more nuanced message. While it emphasizes the "business case" for women empowerment, it mainly takes it as given that the equality between women and men is a desirable goal in itself, and policies should aim to achieve that goal. Poverty and lack of opportunity breed inequality between men and women, so that when economic development reduces poverty, the condition of women improves on two counts: first, when poverty is reduced, the condition of everyone, including 2025.12.12 ANKIT 11:14:35 SAKLANI +05'30' 10 Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022 Court No. 4 women, improves, and second, gender inequality declines as poverty declines, so the condition of women improves more than that of men with development. Economic development, however, is not enough to bring about complete equality between men and women. Policy action is still necessary to achieve equality between genders. Such policy action would be unambiguously justified if empowerment of women also stimulates further development, starting a virtuous cycle. Empowerment of women, thus, is perceived as equipping them to be economically independent, self-reliant, with positive esteem to enable them to face any situation and they should be able to participate in the development activities.
******* Keeping in view all the aforesaid and other relevant considerations, when such affirmative actions are taken by lawmaker, in the form of subordinate legislation, they need to be enforced appropriately so that the purpose that is intended is suitably achieved. Seen in this context, Rule 4 of Rules, 1997 is to be interpreted to have universal application when it comes to women candidates seeking appointment in public service and post in connection with the affairs of the State of Chhattisgarh. After all, that is the primary purpose behind enacting the aforesaid Rule having statutory character. In order to gather the intention of the lawmaker, the principle of 'purposive interpretation' is now widely applied. This has been explained in the case of Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla2015 (11) SCALE 684in the following words:
"9. The aforesaid two reasons given by me, in addition to the reasons already indicated in the judgment of my learned Brother, would clearly demonstrate that provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act require purposive interpretation so that the aforesaid objective/purpose of such a provision is achieved thereby. The principle of 'purposive interpretation' or 'purposive construction' is based on the understanding that the Court is supposed to attach that meaning to the provisions which serve the 'purpose' behind such a provision. The basic approach is to ascertain what is it designed to accomplish? To put it otherwise, by interpretative process the Court is supposed to realise the goal that the legal text is designed to realise. As Aharan Barak puts it:
"Purposive interpretation is based on three components: language, purpose, and discretion. Language shapes the range of semantic possibilities within which the interpreter acts as a linguist. Once the interpreter defines the range, he or she chooses the legal meaning of the text from among the (express or implied) semantic possibilities. The semantic component thus sets the limits of interpretation by restricting the interpreter to a legal meaning that the text can bear in its (public or private) language."
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10. Of the aforesaid three components, namely, language, purpose and discretion 'of the Court', insofar as the purposive component is concerned, this is the ratio juris, the purpose at the core of the text. This purpose is the values, goals, interests, policies and aims that the text is designed to actualize. It is the function that the text is designed to fulfil.
11. We may also emphasize that the statutory interpretation of a provision is never static but is always dynamic. Though literal rule of interpretation, till some time ago, was treated as the 'golden rule', it is now the doctrine of purposive interpretation which is predominant, particularly in those cases where literal interpretation may not serve the purpose or may lead to absurdity. If it brings about an end which is at variance with the purpose of statute, that cannot be countenanced. Not only legal process thinkers such as Hart and Sacks rejected intentionalism as a grand strategy for statutory interpretation, and in its place they offered purposivism, this principle is now widely applied by the Courts not only in this country but in many other legal systems as well."
Therefore, the intention of the rule making authorities had always been to give benefit of relaxation in age to women candidates. After all, we are called upon to interpret subordinate legislation salutary aim whereof is to achieve social purpose and consequently social justice. What should be the approach in interpreting such laws is explained in Badshah v. Sou. Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr.(2014) 1 SCC 188in the following words:
"13.3. Thirdly, in such cases, purposive interpretation needs to be given to the provisions of Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure While dealing with the application of destitute wife or hapless children or parents under this provision, the Court is dealing with the marginalized sections of the society. The purpose is to achieve "social justice" which is the Constitutional vision, enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India. Preamble to the Constitution of India clearly signals that we have chosen the democratic path under rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights achieving their social justice. Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty of the Courts to advance the cause of the social justice. While giving interpretation to a particular provision, the Court is supposed to bridge the gap between the law and society.
14. Of late, in this very direction, it is emphasized that the Courts have to adopt different approaches in "social justice adjudication", which is also known as "social context adjudication" as mere "adversarial approach" may not be very appropriate. There are number of social justice legislations giving special protection and benefits to vulnerable groups in the society. Prof. Madhava Menon describes it eloquently:
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that "social context judging" is essentially the application of equality 2025.12.12 ANKIT 11:14:35 SAKLANI +05'30' 12 Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022 Court No. 4 jurisprudence as evolved by Parliament and the Supreme Court in myriad situations presented before courts where unequal parties are pitted in adversarial proceedings and where courts are called upon to dispense equal justice. Apart from the social-economic inequalities accentuating the disabilities of the poor in an unequal fight, the adversarial process itself operates to the disadvantage of the weaker party. In such a situation, the judge has to be not only sensitive to the inequalities of parties involved but also positively inclined to the weaker party if the imbalance were not to result in miscarriage of justice. This result is achieved by what we call social context judging or social justice adjudication.
15. The provision of maintenance would definitely fall in this category which aims at empowering the destitute and achieving social justice or equality and dignity of the individual. While dealing with cases under this provision, drift in the approach from "adversarial" litigation to social context adjudication is the need of the hour.
16. The law regulates relationships between people. It prescribes patterns of behavior. It reflects the values of society. The role of the Court is to understand the purpose of law in society and to help the law achieve its purpose. But the law of a society is a living organism. It is based on a given factual and social reality that is constantly changing.
Sometimes change in law precedes societal change and is even intended to stimulate it. In most cases, however, a change in law is the result of a change in social reality. Indeed, when social reality changes, the law must change too. Just as change in social reality is the law of life, responsiveness to change in social reality is the life of the law. It can be said that the history of law is the history of adapting the law to society's changing needs. In both Constitutional and statutory interpretation, the Court is supposed to exercise direction in determining the proper relationship between the subjective and objective purpose of the law.
17. Cardozo acknowledges in his classic ...no system of jus scriptum has been able to escape the need of it", and he elaborates: "It is true that Codes and Statutes do not render the Judge superfluous, nor his work perfunctory and mechanical. There are gaps to be filled. There are hardships and wrongs to be mitigated if not avoided. Interpretation is often spoken of as if it were nothing but the search and the discovery of a meaning which, however, obscure and latent, had none the less a real and ascertainable pre-existence in the legislator's mind. The process is, indeed, that at times, but it is often something more. The ascertainment of intention may be the least of a judge's troubles in ascribing meaning to a stature. Says Gray in his lecture The fact is that the difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the legislature has had no meaning at all; when the 2025.12.12 ANKIT 11:14:35 SAKLANI +05'30' 13 Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022 Court No. 4 question which is raised on the statute never occurred to it; when what the judges have to do is, not to determine that the legislature did mean on a point which was present to its mind, but to guess what is would have intended on a point not present to its mind, if the point had been present.
18. The Court as the interpreter of law is supposed to supply omissions, correct uncertainties, and harmonize results with justice through a method of free decision-"libre recherche sceintifique" i.e. "free Scientific research". We are of the opinion that there is a non-rebuttable presumption that the Legislature while making a provision like Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure, to fulfill its Constitutional duty in good faith, had always intended to give relief to the woman becoming "wife" under such circumstances. This approach is particularly needed while deciding the issues relating to gender justice. We already have examples of exemplary efforts in this regard. Journey from Shah Bano, AIR 1985 SC 945 to Shabana Bano, AIR 2010 SC 305 guaranteeing maintenance rights to Muslim women is a classical example.
19. In Rameshchandra Daga v. Rameshwari Daga, AIR 2005 SC 422, the right of another woman in a similar situation was upheld. Here the Court had accepted that Hindu marriages have continued to be bigamous despite the enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act in 1955. The Court had commented that though such marriages are illegal as per the provisions of the Act, they are not 'immoral' and hence a financially dependent woman cannot be denied maintenance on this ground.
20. Thus, while interpreting a statute the court may not only take into consideration the purpose for which the statute was enacted, but also the mischief it seeks to suppress. It is this mischief rule, first propounded in Heydon's Case (1854) 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b which became the historical source of purposive interpretation. The court would also invoke the legal maxim construction ut res magis valeat guam pereat, in such cases i.e. where alternative constructions are possible the Court must give effect to that which will be responsible for the smooth working of the system for which the statute has been enacted rather than one which will put a road block in its way. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation should be avoided. We should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. If this interpretation is not accepted, it would amount to giving a premium to the husband for defrauding the wife. Therefore, at least for the purpose of claiming maintenance under Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, such a woman is to be treated as the legally wedded wife.
21. The principles of Hindu Personal Law have developed in an evolutionary way out of concern for all those subject to it so as to make fair provision against destitution. The manifest purpose is to achieve the social objectives for making bare 2025.12.12 ANKIT 11:14:35 SAKLANI +05'30' 14 Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022 Court No. 4 minimum provision to sustain the members of relatively smaller social groups. Its foundation spring is humanistic. In its operation field all though, it lays down the permissible categories under its benefaction, which are so entitled either because of the tenets supported by clear public policy or because of the need to subserve the social and individual morality measured for maintenance.
22. In taking the aforesaid view, we are also encouraged by the following observations of this Court in Capt. Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal (1978) 4 SCC 70:
The brooding presence of the Constitutional empathy for the weaker sections like women and children must inform interpretation if it has to have social relevance. So viewed, it is possible to be selective in picking out that interpretation out of two alternatives which advances the cause - the cause of the derelicts."
5.6. The posts exempt from the purview of UPSC are those where recruitment is carried out by the organizations themselves. Such organizations do not fall within the category of any Central Government authority akin to UPSC or SSC, which conduct open competitive examinations on behalf of the Central Government. From another perspective, there is no bar to granting age relaxation for Group B services under the relevant OMs or Recruitment Rules. The bar exists only when recruitment is conducted through open competitive examinations by an agency as defined under the 1998 Rules.
The applicant's case does not fall within the ambit or definition contemplated under the 1998 Rules. 5.7. The respondents have the power to relax the rules under the relevant Recruitment Rules; Rule 6 specifically provides for such power and the same reads as under:
"6.Power to relax.- Where the Central Government is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do, it may, by 2025.12.12 ANKIT 11:14:35 SAKLANI +05'30' 15 Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022 Court No. 4 order, and in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission and reasons to be recorded in writing, relax any of the provisions of these rules with respect to any class or category of persons."
5.8. Alternatively, age concession of 5 years is allowed to departmental candidates (Central Government employees) in case of recruitment to Group A and Group B posts, whether filled through UPSC (other than those filled via competitive examination) or posts exempted from UPSC (where recruitment is made by the organizations themselves). This concession is admissible to government servants working in posts in the same line or allied cadres, where a relationship can be established showing that prior service will aid in efficient discharge of duties. [Ref: O.M. No. 15012/8/87- Estt.(D) dated 15.10.1987 and O.M. No. 35014/4/79-Estt.(D) dated 24.10.1985; OM dated 27.03.2012] 5.9. In Civil Appeal No. 8558 of 2018 - Dharam Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Anr., decided on 19.08.2025, the Apex Court observed as under:
"13. As we have observed in both Jaggo (Supra) and Shripal (Supra), outsourcing cannot become a convenient shield to perpetuate precariousness and to sidestep fair engagement practices where the work is inherently perennial. The Commission's further contention that the appellants are not "full-time" employees but continue only by virtue of interim orders also does not advance their case. That interim protection was granted precisely because of the long history of engagement and the pendency of the challenge to the State's refusals. It neither creates rights that did not exist nor erases entitlements that may arise upon a proper adjudication of the legality of those refusals.
14. The learned Single Judge of the High Court also declined relief on the footing that the petitioners had not specifically 2025.12.12 ANKIT 11:14:35 SAKLANI +05'30' 16 Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022 Court No. 4 assailed the subsequent decision dated 25.11.2003.
However, that view overlooks that the writ petition squarely challenged the 11.11.1999 refusal as the High Court itself directed a fresh decision during pendency, and the later rejection was placed on record by the respondents. In such circumstances, we believe that the High Court was obliged to examine the legality of the State's stance in refusing sanction, whether in 1999 or upon reconsideration in 2003, rather than dispose of the matter on a mere technicality. The Division Bench of the High Court compounded the error by affirming the dismissal without engaging with the principal challenge or the intervening material. The approach of both the Courts, in reducing the dispute to a mechanical enquiry about "rules" and "vacancy" while ignoring the core question of arbitrariness in the State's refusal to sanction posts despite perennial need and long service, cannot be sustained. Therefore, in view of the foregoing observations, the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained. The State's refusals dated 11.11.1999 and 25.11.2003, in so far as they concern the Commission's proposals for sanction/creation of Class-III/Class-IV posts to address perennial ministerial/attendant work, are held unsustainable and stand quashed. The appeal must, accordingly, be allowed. Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that "ad-hocism"
thrives where administration is opaque. The State Departments must keep and produce accurate establishment registers, muster rolls and outsourcing arrangements, and they must explain, with evidence, why they prefer precarious engagement over sanctioned posts where the work is perennial. If "constraint" is invoked, the record should show what alternatives were considered, why similarly placed workers were treated differently, and how the chosen course aligns with Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Sensitivity to the human consequences of prolonged insecurity is not sentimentality. It is a constitutional discipline that should inform every decision affecting those who keep public offices running."
5.10 We must also appreciate the following aspect:
(i) The applicant has been working as a Lab Assistant at RML Hospital on a long-term contractual basis since 02.11.2010, thereby possessing extensive and continuous experience.
(ii) The applicant had applied for the EWS certificate through Saral ID HREWS/2019/82139 dated 30.05.2019, well before the closing date of the examination, and the original certificate was verified during the hearing. Its genuineness cannot be 2025.12.12 ANKIT 11:14:35 SAKLANI +05'30' 17 Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022 Court No. 4 questioned merely due to a different address, which can be independently verified.
(iii) The FAQ cited by the respondents pertains to UPSC open competitive examinations. There is no bar under OM dated 27.03.2012 to grant age relaxation. The relaxation is correlated not only with age but also with the experience of a departmental candidate, which must be considered independently.
(iv) The application form does not contain a separate column for government employees or departmental candidates. Therefore, under OM dated 27.03.2012, the applicant's case ought to have been considered under this category for determining age and experience.
(v) No error is found in filling out the application form.
(vi) The argument that the advertisement or corrigendum was not challenged is immaterial, as the applicant seeks the application of relevant OMs to Group B posts.
6. CONCLUSION :
6.1. In view of the foregoing discussions and in the peculiar facts of the present case, considering the power to relax and in light of the judicial precedents cited, the applicant, having rendered continuous long-term service and in view of the 2025.12.12 ANKIT 11:14:35 SAKLANI +05'30' 18 Item No. 1 O.A. No. 3402/2022 Court No. 4 provision for relaxation under Rule 6 of the Recruitment Rules, the impugned office order dated 06.09.2022, rejecting the applicant's candidature on the grounds of over-age and non-
submission of the EWS certificate, is hereby quashed and set aside.
6.2. The competent authority among the respondents shall consider granting the requisite relaxation. Upon such consideration, the offer of appointment shall be issued to the applicant, provided all other conditions of eligibility are fulfilled.
6.3. The above exercise shall be completed within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order.
6.4. The Original Application is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending M.A.s, if any, shall stand disposed of. No costs. 6.5. The original file produced by learned counsel for the respondents shall be returned to him by the Court Officer after obtaining proper acknowledgment.
(Rajinder Kashyap) (Manish Garg)
Member (A) Member (J)
/as/
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