Bombay High Court
Dilip Laxman Kokare vs S.M. Ambedkar And Anr. on 23 January, 1991
Equivalent citations: 1991(2)BOMCR85, (1991)93BOMLR852, 1991(1)MHLJ833
JUDGMENT M.F. Saldanha, J.
1. The petitioner, in this case, has challenged the order of externment dated 17-9-1990 as also an appellate order for the State Government dated 22-11-1990 confirming the earlier externment order.
2. The petitioner was served with a notice dated 15-3-1989 by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Zone-II, Bombay, asking him to show cause as to why action by way of an externment order should not be taken against him. It is unnecessary to set out the grounds on which the proposed action was contemplated because that the solitary ground urged before us by Mr. Nasik, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner is that there has been an abnormal delay in the passing of the externment order and that the delay of approximately 11/4 years vitiates the order passed against the petitioner.
3. As against this, Mr. Chopda, learned A.P.P. appearing for the respondents has drawn our attention to the affidavit of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone-II, filled in reply to the petition. The authorities contend that the delay of approximately 1 1/2 years was occasioned by the petitioner. Unfortunately, certain vague statements has been set out in the affidavit, cumulatively indicating that it was because of the delay on the part of the petitioner and his learned Advocate that the externment proceedings could not be completed. In our view, such an explanation cannot be availed of by the externing authorities for the reason that proceedings by way of an externment order are essentially preventive by nature and the very essence of such proceedings is that they must be expeditiously completed. If the object of externing a particular person is in order to remove him from the scene of his obnoxious activities which are having a detrimental affect in that area, the entire objective gets frustrated if the proceedings are allowed to drag on for an abnormally long period and it cannot then be said, that there exists a livelink between the charges that are levelled and the preventive action that is completed. The enquiry officer was not at all helpless if the petitioner and/or his learned Counsel kept delaying the matter, as alleged. The petitioner was only entitled to a reasonable opportunity of showing cause and if this facility was being misused by dilation of the proceedings, it was the duty of the concerned authority to have enforced due expediency instead of allowing matters to drift.
4. It needs to be reiterated in these cases that the law visualises a situation where an offender has become so persistently troublesome or dangerous to society around him that his physical presence in that area has to be done away with in the public interest. Delay in implementation, therefore, runs counter to and frustrates the objective behind these provisions. More importantly, a reviewing authority such as a Court, is unable is cases of gross delay, to ascertain as to whether the situation complained about is still in existence at the latter point of time when the order was passed. In the likely event of the wrongdoer at least in a few cases, having completely ceased indulgence in the offensive acts after service of the preliminary notice, and a prolonged period of good behaviour having followed the earlier activity that was complained of, the passing of an adverse order even if earlier justified may no longer be valid. Alternately, in the case of hardened and habitual offenders, with whom the police are most concerned, it is imperative that their activities are curbed at the earliest point of time. Dragging on enquiries for months and years will subject society to the torture from the offenders right through that long period and seriously undermine public confidence in the administration opening it to the inevitable charge of collusion. The casual and cavalier manner in which these proceedings were hitherto conducted, will have to be replaced by a sense of purpose and vigour. In serious matters of public security, such as these, speed is the watchwords, where the eye should be guided by the clock rather than the calendar, if at all there is honesty of approach.
5. The Bombay Police Act has been specially geared to deal with one more aspect, which is equally crucial, viz., the degree of confidence and security which normal day-to-day activity requires for the even tempo of social life is to be maintained. The fact that witnesses are unwilling to come forward and depose is a very significant circumstance and one of immense consequence for purposes of assessing the degree of terror that the offender has generated in persons around him. If a criminal is to be taken into custody or punished for criminal acts, under the existing procedural system in criminal courts of this country, at least some quantum of oral evidence becomes necessary and in the absence of such material, the law enforcement machinery becomes helpless in booking the offenders. The criminal, therefore, derives the psychological advantage of being able to indulge in criminal and anti-social activity with impunity and with the passage of time, that confidence grows. It is precisely under these circumstances that the provisions of the Bombay Police Act have to be applied and the criminal removed from his centre of activity and from the company of his associates who were accomplices. By such a procedure, not only is it possible to put the brakes on nefarious and criminal activities, but it is a measure that inspires confidence in the public mind that the threat to the security and well-being of the area has been removed. Particularly, in the present day context, where break-down of the law and order situation is being viewed with grave concern proceedings under the Bombay Police Act ought not to be lightly construed by the authorities. While it is true, that since the orders passed result in the deprivation of personal liberty and movement of the person concerned, the Courts are of necessity required to meticulously and scrupulously examine the correctness of the orders and of the procedure followed. In the light of this mandate of constitutional provisions which safeguard the rights and liberties of all citizens, the Courts, of law will of necessity be required to strike down orders that do not conform to the high standard prescribed and the authorities would, therefore, be well advised at all stages to conduct these proceedings with the sense of diligence that is necessary.
6. In view of the abnormal delay in the passing of the order as far as the present case is concerned, the externment order is liable to be quashed and set aside on this ground alone.
7. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The order of externment dated 17th September, 1990 as also the appellate order 22-11-1990 are quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute.
8. A copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department, who in turn shall bring it to the notice of all authorities invested with the powers of externment.