Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Mattparthy Veera Venkata ... vs Nalli Sarojini, E.G.Dist 9 Others on 3 January, 2025
*THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NYAPATHY VIJAY
+ C.R.P. No.3016 of 2015
% 03.01.2025
Between:
Mattparthy Veera Venkata Satyanarayana,
E.G.District.
...Petitioner
And
Nalli Sarojini E G Dist 9 Others and Others
...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Appellant: Sri K.S.Gopala Krishnan
Counsel for the Respondent(S): Sri Ms.Sindhoora VNL for
Ms. Gnanusha,
< Gist :
> Head Note:
? Cases Referred:
1
2005 SCC Online Chh 171
2 (2021) 2 SCC 718
3
(1999) 3 SCC 457
4
(1976) 3 SCC 749
5
(2001) 6 SCC 163
6
(2019) 20 SCC 633
7
(2006) 5 SCC 353
8
(1999) 3 SCC 573
9
1990 1 ALT 588
101995 (3) ALD 1000
112016 (3) ALD 235
12 (2022) 1 SCC 115
2
APHC010814372015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA
PRADESH
[3460]
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY ,THE THIRD DAY OF JANUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NYAPATHY VIJAY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 3016/2015
Between:
Mattparthy Veera Venkata Satyanarayana,
E.g.dist
...PETITIONER
AND
Nalli Sarojini E G Dist 9 Others and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. K S GOPALA KRISHNAN
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. VAKATI VENKATA GNANUSHA
2. SINDOORA VNL
The Court made the following:
3
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NYAPATHY VIJAY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 3016 of 2015
ORDER:-
The Civil Revision Petition is filed questioning the Judgment passed in A.T.A.No.2 of 2012, dated 10.03.2015 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Rajahmundry, in reversing the order and decree, dated 16.07.2010 passed in A.T.C.No.2 of 2005, on the file of the Special Officer-cum-Junior Civil Judge, Razole, East Godavari District.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are hereinafter referred to as they are arrayed in A.T.C.No.2 of 2005.
3. The scheduled of properties consists of two items of agricultural land of an extent of Ac.1-86 cents and Ac.1-54 cents. The Petitioner had filed A.T.C.No.2 of 2005, under Sections 10 and 15 read with Section 16 of A.P. (Andhra Area)Tenancy Act, 1956 (for short 'the Act') seeking declaration as statutory tenant and for preferential right to purchase the scheduled property.
4. The Respondent No.1 was the landlord. The original owner by name Uppaganti Suranna had orally leased out the scheduled 4 property to the father of the Petitioner. After the death of the original landlord, the father of the Petitioner continued the leasehold cultivation on same conditions. When the father of the Petitioner was in old age, the Petitioner and his brother by name Radha Krishna approached the Respondent No.1/landlord and asked him to lease the scheduled property and the same was accepted by the Respondent No.1. The father of the Petitioner died on 07.04.2002 and the brother of the Petitioner expressed his inability to do leasehold cultivation and thereby, the Petitioner became the sole cultivating tenant of the scheduled property.
5. It was pleaded that the Petitioner was regular in paying rents and there was no default. While so, for the year 2000-2001, the Petitioner tried to pay rentals through Demand Draft, but Respondent No.1 refused to receive the same and Respondent No.1 insisted for payment of rent in cash. Accordingly, the Petitioner paid the said amount for the following year also. On 10.07.2003, the Respondent No.1 got issued a legal notice making certain allegations against the Petitioner and a reply was issued thereto.
5
6. While so, on 09.04.2005, when the Petitioner was harvesting 2nd crop of the scheduled property with the help of his family members and coolies, all the Respondents accompanied by about 50 persons entered into the scheduled property with deadly weapons and shouted that they purchased the petition schedule property from the Respondent No.1 and that the Petitioner should give up his tenancy rights. Though the Petitioner informed the Revenue Divisional Officer, Amalapuram and Mandal Revenue Officer, Razole, over phone and also gave a complaint to the Police, no action was taken as mediation was proposed on 10.04.2005. The Petitioner had realised that a sale deed dated 08.04.2005 was brought into existence to defeat the right of pre-emption as provided under Section 15 of the Act. Hence, the Petitioner filed A.T.C. for the above mentioned reliefs.
7. Though no relief was sought against Respondent Nos.5 to 10 in the A.T.C, they were added as formal parties as they were strong supporters of the landlord and were trying to infringe with the leasehold rights of the Petitioner.
8. The Respondent No.1/landlord filed counter denying the landlord and tenant relationship. The Respondent also pleaded 6 that the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and that the sale deed dated 08.04.2005 in favour of Respondent No.4 was true and valid and that the Respondent No.4 is in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the scheduled property.
9. The Respondent No.4/purchaser filed a separate counter contending that she has been cultivating the scheduled property with the assistance of the Respondent No.5 from the date of sale of the scheduled property.
10. In the course of enquiry, PWs.1 to 7 were examined on behalf of the Petitioner/tenant and Exs.A1 to A.44 were marked. On behalf of the Respondent/landlord, R.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.6 were marked.
11. The primary authority after taking into consideration the rival contentions, framed three issues which read as under:
(i) Whether there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and 1stRespondent?
(ii) Whether the petitioner has got preferential right for purchasing the petition scheduled property?
(iii) To what relief, if any, is the petitioner is entitled for ?
12. The primary authority after examining the evidence recorded the fact that after purchase of the scheduled property, 7 Respondent No.4 has been cultivating the scheduled property and is in possession pursuant to the sale deed dated 08.04.2005. Notwithstanding the same, the Petitioner was granted injunction and the possession of the Respondent No.4 was said to be not valid as the sale deed is a voidable transaction at the instance of the Petitioner/tenant and came to the conclusion that the Petitioner is a statutory tenant and that he has a preferential right to purchase the petition scheduled property and he is at liberty to invoke Section 15 of the Act.
13. Questioning the said order and decree, the landlord/Respondent Nos.4 and 5 filed an appeal in A.T.A.No.2 of 2012 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Rajahmundry. The District Appellate Court after taking into consideration the grounds of appeal, framed two points for consideration which read as follows:
(1) Whether there is tenancy between the petitioner and the 1stRespondent?
(2) Whether the petitioner is entitled to right of pre-emption?
14. The District Appellate Court while answering the Point No.1, did not disturb the finding that the Petitioner is a cultivating tenant but refused to grant injunction on the ground that relief of 8 permanent injunction is an equitable relief and failure to pay rent subsequent to the filing of A.T.C would have a bearing on the relief sought by the Petitioner.
15. With regard to Point No.2, the District Appellate Court after referring to Section 15(6) of the Act held that the sale deed executed by the landlord is only voidable at the action of the tenant and till the voidable transaction is avoided, the transaction is valid. As there were no express pleadings taken by the Petitioner to avoid sale, the sale in favour of Respondent No.4, cannot be invalidated and consequently, the Petitioner cannot seek relief and right of pre-emption. Aggrieved by this order, this civil revision petition is filed.
16. Learned counsel for the Respondents filed memos stating that Respondent No.1 by name Nalli Sarojini had died on 12.09.2018 and Respondent No.7-Mattaparthy Peda Venkata Satyanarayana died on 18.05.2021 and the death certificates were also filed. The Respondents Nos.11 to 15 were brought on record as legal representatives of Respondent No.1. As regards Respondent No.7, it was submitted that no legal representatives are necessary as he was added only as a formal party as a 9 supporter of landlord only and is not relevant for the primary reliefs sought in the A.T.C.
17. Heard Mr. K.S.Gopala Krishnan, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Ms.Sindhoora VNL on behalf of Ms. Gnanusha, learned counsel for the Respondent Nos. 2 and Respondent Nos.11 to 15.
18. Contentions: Learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that though there was no plea or evidence let in by Respondent No.1 with regard to the plea of default, the Appellate Court erred in holding that the Petitioner had committed default in payment of Makta. It was contended that the only plea in the counter of Respondent No.1 was that there was no jural relationship of landlord-tenant and the Appellate Court should not have refused relief of injunction on the ground that the Petitioner did not pay rents in the absence of any issue or dispute.
19. As regards the finding that since there was no separate challenge to the sale deed executed in favour of Respondent No.4 on 08.04.2005 (Ex.B.1), it is the contention of the counsel for the Petitioner that there is no requirement of a separate challenge and the very filing of application is sufficient to indicate 10 the fact that the Petitioner is seeking to avoid the sale deed and as a matter of abundant caution, the Petitioner filed I.A.No.1 of 2023 seeking to amend the plea by including the relief of challenge to the sale deed. Learned counsel for the Petitioner relied on Qamaruddin v. Surjeet Kaur1, Iqbal Basith & others v. Subbalakshmi2 and Iswar Bhai C Patel @ Bachu Bhai Patel v. Harihar Behera and another3in support of his contentions.
20. Ms.Sindhoora VNL, argued on behalf of Ms. Gnanusha, the counsel for the contesting Respondent No.2 and Respondent Nos.11 to 15 i.e. legal representatives of Respondent No.1 primarily contended that the Appellate Court on appreciation of facts had arrived at certain findings and these findings should not be interfered by this Court in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel also contended that unless the sale deed is set-aside, no relief can be granted to the Petitioner. The following cases were cited in support of this contention:
1
2005 SCC Online Chh 171 2 (2021) 2 SCC 718 3 (1999) 3 SCC 457 11
1. Chomal Bhandari and others v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer II Division, Kurnool4
2. Vishwambhar and others v. Laxminarayana (dead) through Legal Representatives and another5
3.Murugan and others v. Kesava Gounder (dead) through Legal Representatives and others6
21. It was further contended that even if the sale deed is to be challenged now, the same is barred by time. The case law in Prem Singh and others v. Birbal and others7 is cited in support the said contention.
22. The counsel for Respondents further contended that only a Civil Court under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 has the power to cancel or vary the sale deed. It is her contention that Section 15 of the Act is only an enabling power to the Petitioner to seek for cancellation of the sale deed and the same cannot be interfered in proceedings under these Acts. 4 (1976) 3 SCC 749 5 (2001) 6 SCC 163 6 (2019) 20 SCC 633 7 (2006) 5 SCC 353 12
23. After hearing the respective counsel, following issues fall for consideration in this revision.
a. Whether the petitioner is entitled to be declared as statutory tenant?
b. Whether the finding of default in the absence of any issue by the Appellate Court is sustainable?
c. Whether the sale deed dated 08.04.2005 could be set-aside by the primary authority under the Act?
24. Reasoning: Issue (a): The fact that the Petitioner was in possession of the scheduled property prior to institution of A.T.C does not appear to be a matter of dispute as Respondent No.1 in the A.T.C (Respondent No.3 herein) i.e. the erstwhile landlord had filed counter affidavit admitting the possession of the Petitioner of the scheduled property. Paragraph 13 of the counter affidavit is extracted below:
"13. When the petitioner is playing games of obtaining DDs and cancelling and encashing them without paying anything, the first Respondent resolved the disputes with him and paid huge amounts and in consequence terms took possession of property and sold the same to 4thRespondent by means of registered sale deed dated 08.04.2005 and delivered possession of the property to R.4.13
25. The paragraph indicates that the erstwhile landlord, Respondent No.1 (Respondent No.3 herein), took possession of the property pursuant to resolution of disputes between them. The highlighted portion indicates this fact. However, the Respondent No.1 did not come into witness box and submit himself to cross-examination by the Petitioner to explain the so- called payment of monies. This aspect further gives credibility to the plea of tenancy as admitted in Ex.A.2 legal notice issued at the instance of Respondent No.1(Respondent No.3 herein) calling upon the Petitioner to pay rental dues and also deliver possession.
26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao,8 held that if a party to the suit does not appear in the witness-box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct. The paragraph 17 thereof is relevant and is extracted below;
"17. Where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness-box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is (1999) 3 SCC 573 8 14 not correct as has been held in a series of decisions passed by various High Courts and the Privy Council beginning from the decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh v. Gurdial Singh1. This was followed by the Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh2 and the Bombay High Court in Martand Pandharinath Chaudhari v.
Radhabai Krishnarao Deshmukh3. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulla Kharagjit Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat4 also followed the Privy Council decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh case1. The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virendra Nath5 held that if a party abstains from entering the witness- box, it would give rise to an adverse inference against him. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand6 drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872 against a party who did not enter the witness-box."
27. A similar view was taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ishwar Bhai C. Patel's case (3 supra) as cited by the learned counsel for the Petitioner.
28. Apart from not entering the witness box and submitting himself to cross-examination, the Respondent No.1 (Respondent No.3 herein) accepted the judgement of the Primary Authority declaring the jural relationship of landlord and tenant and did not challenge the same.
15
29. The well reasoned finding of Primary Authority as well as the District Appellate Court is concurrent on the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the Petitioner and Respondent No.1 (Respondent No.3 herein). The paragraph 27 of the order of the District Appellate Court is extracted below:
"27. With the above evidence, since proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, the petitioner could establish that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the father of 1stRespondent and his father and later between the 1stRespondent and himself."
30. In view of the concurrent findings of fact regarding jural relationship of tenancy, this Court does find any reason to disturb the said finding.
31. As the tenancy is established, the next question would be whether the resumption of possession by the landlord as pleaded in the counter could be sustained. There is a mechanism provided under the Act for taking possession of properties from the tenant. Any plea with regard to the possession cannot be taken into consideration as an element of free will of the tenant has to be established as provided under Section 14 of the Act. As per Section 14, the tenant intending to surrender his tenancy has to give a three months notice and the surrender shall take 16 effect only when the Special Officer comes to a conclusion that the surrender is voluntary and genuine. Section 14(1) of the Act is extracted below:
14. Surrender of holding by cultivating a tenant:.
(1) A cultivating tenant may terminate his tenancy and surrender his holding at the end of any agricultural year after giving to the landlord and the Special Officer at least three months' notice expiring with the end of such agricultural year; and the surrender of such holding shall take effect only after it is accepted by the Special Officer on being satisfied, after making such inquiry as he thinks fit, that such surrender is voluntary and genuine:
32. The emphasised portion of the above provision indicates that the tenancy continues by fiction until the Special Officer accepts the same as genuine and voluntary. In M.Venkateswara Rao v. P.Venkata Raju9, the surrender of tenancy dehors Section 14 of the Act was considered and held at paragraphs 8 and 10 as under;
" (8) IT is clear that the procedure as contemplated under Section 14 of the Act has not been followed in this case. As pointed out by the learned judge in the 1990 1 ALT 588 9 17 above case the termination of tenancy can be at any time. The right that has been given to the tenant is that the Special Official has to be given at least three months notice. This requirement of giving notice of three months is stipulated with a view to safeguard the interests of the tenant. So long as the surrender as contemplated under Section 14 of the act has not been completed and final order has not been passed in pursuance of an oral or written agreement if any entered into between the landlord and the tenant, it cannot be said to be a final one. Unless and until final order has been passed with regard to the surrender by the Special Officer under section 14 of the Act, the relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be said to have been extinguished. So long as the relationship of landlord and tenant subsists, the tenant must be deemed to have been treated as a cultivating tenant as defined under Section 2 (c) of the Act."
"(10) The intendment of the Legislature to give the power to record the surrender to the Special Officer after giving at least three months notice is to safeguard the interests of the tenants. The very object of the Legislature in giving this valuable right has been taken away by the landlord by forcibly entering into the land on the plea that there is voluntary surrender of the land by the tenant...."18
33. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Pulikandam Subba Reddy v. Gorantal Veeraswamy 10 at paragraph 12.
34. Section 17 of the Act is also relevant here as it states that the provisions of the Act override even contracts between the parties. Section 17 is extracted below;
"17. Act to override contracts and other laws: - The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any pre-existing law, custom, usage, agreement or decree or order of a Court."
35. In the light of the above, the landlord and tenant do not even have an option to contract out of the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the plea of voluntary surrender pursuant to negotiations as pleaded by the landlord is legally impermissible.
36. Even on the facts of the case, the Respondent No.1 landlord (Respondent No.3) herein did not come into witness box nor did any of the witnesses speak of the surrender of tenancy and in this scenario, there is no option but to disbelieve the plea of voluntary surrender by the petitioner. In view of Section 14 of the Act, the tenancy continues by fiction.
101995 (3) ALD 1000 19
37. Issue (b): Now, coming to the issue whether the Petitioner committed any default as held by the Appellate Court. In the counter filed before the Primary Authority, there was no specific plea of default. The Primary Authority nor the Appellate Court did not frame any issue regarding default as the same was not in issue as per the pleadings.
38. In spite of the same, the Appellate Court suo motu examines the evidence regarding payment of rent and holds that the petitioner committed default in payment of rent subsequent to the institution of rent i.e for the period 2006 to 2010 and for the period 2010-2014 on the basis of a memo. No affidavit was filed by the contesting Respondents stating about the default. The District Appellate Court failed to see that it is impermissible to pass an order regarding substantive rights on the basis of a memo as held by this Court in Syed Yousuf Ali v. Mohd. Yousuf & Others11. The District Appellate Court had failed to see that the plea of the contesting Respondents i.e subsequent purchasers in the pleadings as well as in depositions is that they are in possession of the scheduled property from the date of sale. It is not their case that there is any landlord and tenant relationship. 11 2016 (3) ALD 235 20
39. Even assuming that there is default in payment of rent, the same per se cannot be a ground to deny the relief to the Petitioner considering the very purpose of the Act. Under the scheme of the Act, once a person is declared to be statutory tenant, the tenancy continues till the same is terminated as per the provisions of the Act. The relief of injunction to a statutory tenant cannot be denied on equitable principles as applicable to the civil suits under the Specific Relief Act considering the nature of special enactment.
40. The District Appellate Court failed to understand the purport of the Act, which was to protect socially and financially vulnerable tenants and if the reasoning of the District Appellate Court is to be accepted, the same would enable the landlords to forcefully evict the tenants and the relief can be denied to the tenants for non- payment of rents for the subsequent periods.
41. Issue No.(C): Coming to the third issue regarding right of pre-emption, Section 14 of the Act provides for a right to the tenant to seek priority for purchase of the scheduled property. In case, the landlord is intending to sell the property, a notice should be given to the cultivating tenant of his intention to sell the 21 property and requiring him to exercise his option to purchase the land.
42. In the event the cultivating tenant exercised his option to purchase the land, the price payable to the landlord will be determined by the Special Officer, if the cultivating tenant and the landlord do not come to an agreement regarding the price payable. The Special Officer on inquiry will determine the price to be payable and this amount can be paid in 10 equal installments by the tenant and this sale shall be deemed to be effective on payment of first installment and the land shall be deemed to be the security for payment of balance installments.
43. In this case, it is not the contention of Respondent No.1 that there was an offer of sale to the Petitioner at any point of time. Section 14(6) of the Act provides that any sale of the land by the landlord in contravention with the provisions prescribed shall be voidable at the option of the cultivating tenant. The voidability of the sale deed at the option of tenant need not be by way of a specific challenge to the sale deed and a filing of A.T.C as done by the Petitioner asserting his claim for right of pre- emption would suffice.
22
44. The judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Murugan's case (6 supra) and Chomal Bhandari (4 supra) are cases where the relief was refused as the voidable sale deeds were not specifically challenged in those cases. As mentioned above, the Petitioner sought for a specific prayer regarding his right of pre- emption and this relief encompasses the relief to set-aside the sale deed. Even otherwise, in paragraph X of the petition, it was specifically pleaded that the sale deed dated 08.04.2005 was brought into existence only to defeat the right of pre-emption and that the same is non-est and void. The Paragraph X of the petition is extracted below:
"X. On the other hand as the Petitioner being a statutory tenant in respect of the Petition scheduled property and as the 1" respondent intended to sell away the same to 4th respondent by way of a Regd, Sale deed dt.8-4-2005 behind back of Petitioner and without offering the property to him he is asking to exercise the option of right of preferential purchase in respect of the Petition scheduled property. The Petitioner strongly believes that the sale deed dt.8-4-2005 was brought in to existence with ulterior motive, with a view to defeat the just rights of the Petitioner in respect of Petition scheduled property and still Petition scheduled property is in the hands of Petitioner and no delivery took place by 1" respondent either to 4th respondent or 5th respondent who is looking after the affairs of 4th respondent and recitals in the said sale deed as 23 to delivery of possession etc.. are false and in view of the state of affairs the Petitioner strongly believes that the said sale deed must be brought in to existence with ulterior motive and to achieve the illegal aim as stated above but not otherwise. As such the said sale deed dt.8-4-2005 is non-est in the eye of Law. Unless the respondents are restrained by way of permanent Injunction there is likelihood of dispossession of Petitioner from the Petition scheduled property at any moment high-handedly and unlawfully by respondents and their followers etc.."
45. The parties hereto were thoroughly aware of the scope of the case and this objection of the counsel for the Respondents cannot be sustained. As there is sufficient pleading, relief need not be denied to the Petitioner. It would be useful to refer to the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V. Prabhakara v. Basavaraj K.12 which held at para 21 as under :
21. A relief can only be on the basis of the pleadings alone.
Evidence is also to be based on such pleadings. The only exception would be when the parties know each other's case very well and such a pleading is implicit in an issue. Additionally, a court can take judicial note of a fact when it is so apparent on the face of the record. A useful reference can be made to the following passage in Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal [Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, (2008) 17 SCC 491 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 927] : (SCC pp. 497 & 500, paras 15 & 23) 12 (2022) 1 SCC 115 24 "15. The relevant principle relating to circumstances in which the deficiency in, or absence of, pleadings could be ignored, was stated by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul [Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735] : (AIR p. 738, para 10) '10. ... If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely, in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is : did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial, and did they lead evidence about it? If it appears that the parties did not know that the matter was in issue at the trial and one of them has had no opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedly would be a different matter. To allow one party to rely upon a matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence and has had no opportunity to lead evidence, would introduce considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice to one party, the court cannot do injustice to another.'
46. The cases cited by the counsel for the Respondents regarding limitation to challenge the sale deed need not be specifically referred in view of the above reasoning.
47. As regards the contention of the counsel for the Respondents that the sale deed could be challenged only by way 25 of suit in a civil Court under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act and that Section 15 of the Act is only an enabling provision, this Court is of the opinion that it would be odd for a vulnerable tenant to run to a civil Court seeking for avoidance of this sale deed and then come back to the Primary Authority under this Act seeking for enforcement of his right. Further, the answer to this argument is apparent on a reading of Section 16 of the Act, which provides that any dispute between the landlord and the cultivating tenant be decided by the Special Officer. Section 16 of the Act is extracted below:
"16. Adjudication of disputes and appeal:. - (1) Any dispute arising under this Act, between a landlord and a cultivating tenant in relation to a matter not otherwise decided by the Special Officer under the provisions of this Act, shall, on application by the landlord or the cultivating tenant, as the case may be, be decided by the Special Officer after making an enquiry in the manner prescribed"
48. The phrase "any dispute arising under this Act, between a landlord and a cultivating tenant" under the Act includes sale in violation of procedure prescribed under Section 15 of the Act. The dispute under the Act cannot be conferred to a civil Court for cancellation of the sale deed under Section 31 of the Specific 26 Relief Act considering the language employed in Section 16 of the Act.
49. In view of the above, Judgement and decree in A.T.A.No.2 of 2012, dated 10.03.2015 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Rajahmundry is set aside and the order of the Primary Authority dated 16.07.2010 passed in A.T.C.No.2 of 2005, passed by the Special Officer-cum-Junior Civil Judge, Razole is restored.
50. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed. No order as to costs. As a sequel, pending applications, if any, shall stand closed.
__________________ NYAPATHY VIJAY, J Date: 03.01.2025 Note: L.R. copy be marked KLP