Madhya Pradesh High Court
Daryav Singh vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 1 July, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003(3)MPHT281
ORDER S. Samvatsar, J.
1. This petition is filed under Section 482, Cr.PC challenging order dated 23-4-99 passed by First Additional Sessions Judge, Ganjabasauda in Criminal Revision No. 91/98 whereby the Revisional Court has confirmed the order passed by the Trial Court rejecting the prayer of the applicant accused to try the case against him in accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act.
2. Facts of the case are that a criminal case was registered against the applicant for committing offences under Sections 302, IPC. The date of incidence is 16-12-97. According to the applicant his date of birth is 8-6-84 and, therefore, according to him he was below 16 years of age at the time of commission of the offence and, therefore, he is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act.
3. Both the Courts below rejected his prayer by holding that the age of the applicant was above 16 years. The said finding is arrived at by the two Courts below on the basis of medical opinion based on X-ray report which shows that the age of the applicant was above 16 years and below 18 years,
4. This order is under challenge in the present petition firstly on the ground that the Courts below have erred in holding that the age of the applicant was above 16 years. The said finding is arrived at on the basis of medical report which is merely an opinion. Courts below have not relied on the direct evidence, i.e., the mark-sheet of the Primary Board Examination. As per the said mark-sheet which is issued by Deputy Director, Public Instructions, date of birth of the applicant is 8-6-84. Applicant has also annexed a copy of horoscope which supports the fact that the date of birth of the applicant is 8-6-84. The certificate issued by the Primary Board is a public document and in presence of the said document the evidential value of the medical opinion looses its significance.
5. After perusing the said certificate and the impugned order, I find that the Court below has erred in discarding the mark-sheet issued by the Primary Examination Board without assigning any valid reasons. In fact the Revisional Court has not assigned any reasons for not relying on the said mark-sheet and, thus, the findings arrived at by the two Courts below that the applicant was above 16 years of age is liable to be set aside.
6. This prayer is opposed by the learned Counsel for the State on the ground that on the date of institution of the proceedings, the applicant has already ceased to be a Juvenile and, therefore, the benefit of the said Act cannot be extended to the applicant. Counsel for respondent relied on Section 3 of the said Act of 1986 which provides for continuing the inquiry in respect of juvenile who has ceased to be a juvenile. The said section reads as under:--
"3. Continuation of inquiry in respect of juvenile who has ceased to be a juvenile.-- Where an inquiry has been initiated against a juvenile and during the course of such inquiry the juvenile ceases to be such, then, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, the inquiry maybe continued and orders may be made in respect of such person as if such person had continued to be a juvenile."
According to Counsel for respondent, as no inquiry is yet initiated there is no question of continuing the said inquiry under the provisions of the Said Act.
7. After going through the said section it is clear that in terms of the section, the provisions of Section 3 applies in a case where an inquiry has been initiated against the juvenile. However, the said section is interpreted by various Courts particularly, the Apex Court in the case of Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, 1982 Cr.LJ 994, and the Apex Court after considering the provisions of the Children's Act which are corresponding to Section 3 of the present Act and held that the commission of the offence is decisive for giving benefit of provisions of the Juvenile Act to the offender. In view of the said judgment the present applicant who was 13 years of age at the time of commission of the offence is entitled to protection of the Juvenile Act. Hence, both the Courts below have erred in not giving the benefit of the said Act to the present applicant.
8. In the result the impugned orders are set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Trial Court with a direction to afford the benefits of Juvenile Act to the applicant. Applicant is thus entitle for an inquiry in accordance with the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act.
9. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed.