Madhya Pradesh High Court
Surendra Singh Chauhan vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 6 November, 2025
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ASHISH SHROTI
WRIT PETITION No.199 OF 2021
SURENDRA SINGH CHAUHAN
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Utkarsh Bajpai- learned counsel for the petitioner.
Shri Sohit Mishra - learned Government Advocate for the
respondents/State.
Reserved on : 30/10/2025
Delivered on : 06/11/2025
ORDER
1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging order dated 28/11/2019 (Annexure-P/1) passed by respondent no.4, whereby the punishment of bringing him down to the basic of the pay scale of the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector for a period of one year with cumulative effect has been imposed upon him.
2. The facts necessary for decision of this case are that the petitioner at the relevant time was working on the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector at Police Station-Gwalior. He was served with a charge- sheet vide memo dated 08/08/2004 (Annexure-P/4), whereby following two charges were levelled against him:
2आररप
1. थन ग ल यर कअप०क० 393/07 धर 376, 34 तह ० कआररप बजश लत र कर कयम क ततक बद हदनक8-6-07 कर थन पर य जन तथ 2-3 हदन तकथन पर बठय रखकर बबन धलनकए ब लध त% कय& हकय छरड कर कतव& य कपलत सहदगध आचरणकर पदलशत & करन ।
2. उपररक पकरण क पच& क० 1 हदनक 8-6-07 म0 आररप कर छरडन स प2 & नगर पल4 स अधकक ग ल यर स चच& करन बतकर ग त जनकर कश डयर म0 ख कर अपन पद क दरपय ग कर घरर अनश 4 सन नत पदलशत & करन।"
3. One Mr. Amit Saxena, City Superintendent of Police, Gwalior was appointed as Enquiry Officer. He conducted the departmental enquiry and ultimately submitted his report to respondent no.4 wherein he found charge no.1 as partly proved while charge no.2 was found proved. The respondent no.4 thereafter issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner on 26/11/2007 (Annexure-P/5), whereby the copy of the enquiry report was forwarded to the petitioner and he was asked to submit his explanation to the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. The respondent no.4 also proposed punishment of removal from service in the said show-cause notice. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 08/12/2007 (Annexure- P/6).
4. The respondent no.4 thereafter passed order dated 09/01/2008 (Annexure-P/7) thereby inflicting the punishment of bringing the petitioner down to the basic of the pay scale of the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector with cumulative effect for a period of two years. The appeal filed by the petitioner challenging the punishment order before respondent no.3 as also the mercy appeal filed by him before respondent no.2 were dismissed vide order dated 12/05/2008 and 5/09/2008 respectively.
5. The petitioner being aggrieved challenged the aforesaid the punishment orders before this Court by filing W.P. No.183/2009(S).
3The petition was allowed vide order dated 09/03/2017 (Annexure- P/2). Pertinently this Court found that the petitioner has been held guilty of having failed to promptly register the offence bearing Crime No.393/2007 which was not the charge levelled against the petitioner. It was held that the petitioner could not have been held guilty of said allegation while imposing punishment. This Court, therefore, set-aside the orders of punishment and remitted the case to respondent no.4 for passing a fresh and appropriate order in terms of the enquiry report. It was further directed that the petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits except the difference of salary for the period from 09/01/2008 till passing of fresh order by the disciplinary authority. The appreciation of the facts and the directions issued by this Court in the aforesaid order are having important bearing on the outcome of this case and, therefore, the same are reproduced as under:-
"4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly conceded that the enquiry procedure adopted by the respondents does not suffer from any legal infirmity.
4.1 However it is pointed out that while passing the penalty order the disciplinary authority while concurring with the findings of the enquiry officer has also criticized the petitioner's inaction of not promptly registering the offence which was of grave nature. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the allegation of petitioner failing to promptly register the offence was never alleged in the charge sheet.
5. A bare perusal of the charge-sheet indicates that charge no.1 is divided into two parts; the first alleges that after registration of the offence punishable u/Ss. 376, 34 of IPC bearing crime no. 393/2007 the petitioner brought the accused Brijesh Tiwari on 8.6. 2007 to the Police Station and made him sit at the Police Station for 2-3 days. While 4 the second part of this charge is that without conducting any lawful proceeding against the said accused was allowed to go scot-free.
5.1. The enquiry officer and also the disciplinary authority found the first part of the charge no. 1 to be not proved. While the second part of charge no. 1 was found to be proved. Incidentally charge no. 2 was found to be fully proved.
5.2. A bare reading of both the charges does not indicate that the intention of the disciplinary authority issuing the chargesheet was to allege any charge of failing to promptly register the offence bearing crime no. 393/2007. 5.3. Therefore it is obvious that the charge-sheet and the consequential enquiry do not pertain to any allegation that the offence was not registered promptly by the petitioner. 5.4. It is pertinent to notice that the charge no. 1 itself alleges the instance of restraining the accused at the Police Station and thereafter allowing him to go scot-free occurreds subsequent to the registration of the offence. The factum of registration of offence was never subject matter of any allegation in the charge-sheet. However, the disciplinary authority while issuing the impugned order found the petitioner to be guilty of failing to promptly register grave offence of rape.
5.5. It is settled principle of law in service jurisprudence that any allegation which is not alleged in the charge-sheet and in regard to which no enquiry is held can become a cause for punishment.
5.6. The disciplinary authority in the penalty order P-1 inter-alia holds the petitioner guilty of the misconduct of failing to promptly register the offences in question (vide para 2 of findings clause at page 2 of penalty order P-1).
6. To the extent indicated above the impugned order of penalty is vitiated in law. Accordingly, present petition is allowed in the following terms:-
1. The impugned order of penalty, dated 9.1.2008 (Annexure P/1), the appellate order dated 5 12.5.2008 (Annexure P/2) and the order dated 5.9.
2008 (Annexure P/3) rejecting the mercy appeal are set-aside only to the extent it finds the petitioner guilty of failing to promptly register the offence in question;
2. Matter is remanded to the disciplinary authority to pass a fresh and appropriate order in terms of the enquiry report for which there would be no necessity of giving fresh opportunity to the petitioner.
3. The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits except difference of salary for the period from 9.1. 2008 till passing of fresh order by the disciplinary authority in terms of this order.
4. No cost."
6. In compliance of the Court order, the disciplinary authority again passed the order on 22/04/2017 (Annexure-P/8) thereby maintaining the punishment imposed upon the petitioner earlier. The petitioner again approached this Court by filing W.P. No.5745/2017. This Court again set-aside the punishment order vide order dated 05/08/2019 (Annexure- P/3) thereby holding that the disciplinary authority has completely failed in assigning reasons for imposing the punishment and the same was found to be in violation of law laid down by this Court in the case of Kranti Associates Private Limited & another Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan & others reported in (2010)9 SCC 496. After setting-aside the punishment order, the matter was once again remitted to respondent no.4 for passing a fresh and speaking order. The impugned order has, accordingly, been passed by respondent no.4 in compliance of the Court order.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the impugned 6 order of punishment on the ground that enquiry officer as well as the disciplinary authority has failed to consider the reply filed by the petitioner. It is his submission that the authorities have also failed to to properly understand the directions issued by this Court in W.P. No.183/2009. It is his submission that this Court has specifically recorded a finding that the enquiry officer as also the disciplinary authority has not found first part of charge no.1 as proved and still respondent no.4 has passed the impugned order taking into the account the said part of the charge. He also submitted that the disciplinary authority has again exceeded the scope of the charges levelled against the petitioner and has passed the impugned order contrary to the directions issued by this Court in W.P. No.183/2009.
8. The learned counsel further submitted that the disciplinary authority has recorded findings on presumptions and assumptions for which there is no foundation on the basis of material collected during the course of the enquiry. There was no malafide intention alleged against the petitioner in the enquiry and, therefore, even if there is some lacuna on the part of the petitioner that could not have been termed as misconduct and the punishment could not have been imposed upon the petitioner. He further submitted that the steps taken by the petitioner in not arresting the accused persons in the criminal case stood justified in view of the fact that the accused is ultimately acquitted by the Court in its judgment dated 28/03/2008. The learned counsel also submitted that the petitioner stood retire from service w.e.f. 31/08/2017 and right from inception of the petitioner in service till his retirement there was no charge sheet issued to him except the present one. It is his submission that the disciplinary authority ought to 7 have considered the previous record of the petitioner also while imposing the punishment.
9. On the other hand, learned Government Advocate for the respondents/State supported the action of the respondents and submitted that the detailed reasons have been assigned by respondent no.4 while inflicting the impugned punishment. It is his submission that since the impugned order has been passed by respondent no.4 upon appreciation of evidence collected during the course of enquiry, the same does not warrant any interference by this Court in the present writ petition. The learned counsel also submitted that the petitioner acted negligently while releasing the accused person after registration of the case even though there was serious allegation made against him by the prosecutrix. The offence, since was of serious nature, the petitioner ought to have arrested the accused. He also submitted that the charge no.2 was also found duly proved against the petitioner inasmuch as he noted incorrect information in the case-diary. He, thus, submitted that the impugned order is justified in the facts and circumstances of the case and does not warrant any interference by this Court.
10. Considered the arguments and perused the record.
11. In the order passed by this Court on 09/03/2017 in W.P. No.183/2009, the facts have been already been crystallized. The procedure adopted by the respondents while conducting departmental enquiry is no more in dispute in view of observation made in para 4 of the aforesaid order. Thus, this Court is now required to see as to whether the punishment imposed upon the petitioner by the impugned order is justified in the facts of circumstances of the case or not?
812. The Charge no.1 levelled against the petitioner is in two parts- first part alleges that after registration of the offence punishable under Sections 376 & 34 of IPC bearing Crime No.393/2007, the petitioner brought the accused- Brajesh Tiwari to the Police Station- Gwalior on 08/06/2007 and made him to sit at the police station for 2-3 days. The second part of this charge is that without conducting any lawful proceeding against the accused, he was allowed to go scot-free. The first part of the aforesaid charge has not been found established by the enquiry officer as also by the disciplinary authority. Thus, there remains second part of this charge which is held proved against the petitioner.
13. The petitioner has submitted in reply to the show-cause notice that he found allegations made against the accused suspicious inasmuch as the accused and the husband of the prosecutrix both were brothers and there was dispute going on between both of them regarding their agricultural property. In view of the aforesaid, the petitioner exercised his discretion not to arrest the accused person. The petitioner was the Investigating Officer of the case and, therefore, he had that discretion either to arrest accused or not. Thus, even if the discretion exercised by the petitioner while acting as Investigating Officer, is not of the choice of the disciplinary authority, the same cannot be termed as misconduct.
14. Second charge against the petitioner was that he furnished incorrect information in the case diary to the effect that he did not arrest the accused person on the instructions of the then Superintendent of Police. There was no evidence available to this effect also except the statement given by the then C.S.P. The petitioner 9 has specifically made an assertion in his reply to the show-cause notice that the then C.S.P. was unhappy with him and therefore, he has denied the fact that the petitioner informed him about the case.
15. It is profitable to note here that the petitioner has been in service since 1976 and is having sufficient experience of working in the Police department. There is no allegation made against the petitioner that he left the accused person with some oblique motive. Thus, in absence of any such allegation made against the petitioner, the disciplinary authority could have appreciated the previous record of the petitioner and also the fact that by mentioning wrong fact in the case diary, the petitioner could not have gathered any benefit. It should have been considered that, in relation to charge no.2, there is statement of the then CSP on one hand and the statement of petitioner at the other. In absence of any allegation of any oblique motive attributed to the petitioner and the fact that the petitioner could not have drawn any benefit by making false statement in case diary, on principles of probability, the statement of petitioner deserve to be accepted. The finding in respect of charge no.2 is thus found to be perverse.
16. Pertinently, respondent no.4 in para 3 of the impugned order has observed that there is no allegation of corruption levellved against the petitioner in the charge-sheet. Still in the concluding part of this paragraph he has recorded a finding that the act of the petitioner amounts to dishonesty. This finding is, thus, contrary to the charge levelled against the petitioner as also to the observation made by him in the first part of this paragraph. The Apex Court has considered the meaning of termed as 'misconduct' in the case of Union of India v. J. Ahmed reported in (1979)2 SCC 286, and observed as under:
10"10. It would be appropriate at this stage to ascertain what generally constitutes misconduct, especially in the context of disciplinary proceedings entailing penalty.
11. Code of conduct as set out in the Conduct Rules clearly indicates the conduct expected of a member of the service. It would follow that conduct which is blameworthy for the government servant in the context of Conduct Rules would be misconduct. If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with due and faithful discharge of his duty in service, it is misconduct (see Pierce v. Foster [17 QB 536, 542]). A disregard of an essential condition of the contract of service may constitute misconduct [see Laws v. London Chronicle (Indicator Newspapers [(1959) 1 WLR 698])]. This view was adopted in Shardaprasad Onkarprasad Tiwari v. Divisional Superintendent, Central Railway, Nagpur Division, Nagpur [61 Bom LR 1596], and Satubha K. Vaghela v. Moosa Raza [10 Guj LR 23]. The High Court has noted the definition of misconduct in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary which runs as under:
"Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive; acts of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not constitute such misconduct."
In industrial jurisprudence amongst others, habitual or gross negligence constitute misconduct but in Utkal Machinery Ltd. v. Workmen, Miss Shanti Patnaik [AIR 1966 SC 1051 : (1966) 2 SCR 434 : (1966) 1 LLJ 398 : 28 FJR 131] in the absence of standing orders governing the employee's undertaking, unsatisfactory work was treated as misconduct in the context of discharge being assailed as punitive. In S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India [(1967) 2 SCR 566 : AIR 1967 SC 1274 : (1967) 2 LLJ 249] the manner in which a member of the service discharged his quasi judicial function disclosing abuse of power was treated as constituting misconduct for initiating disciplinary proceedings. A single act of omission or error of judgment would ordinarily not constitute misconduct though if such error or omission results in serious or atrocious consequences the same may amount to misconduct as was held by this Court in P.H. Kalyani v. Air France, Calcutta [AIR 11 1963 SC 1756 : (1964) 2 SCR 104 : (1963) 1 LLJ 679 : 24 FJR 464] wherein it was found that the two mistakes committed by the employee while checking the load-sheets and balance charts would involve possible accident to the aircraft and possible loss of human life and, therefore, the negligence in work in the context of serious consequences was treated as misconduct. It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency or attainment of highest standards in discharge of duty attached to public office would ipso facto constitute misconduct. There may be negligence in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be such as to be irreparable or the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high. An error can be indicative of negligence and the degree of culpability may indicate the grossness of the negligence. Carelessness can often be productive of more harm than deliberate wickedness or malevolence. Leaving aside the classic example of the sentry who sleeps at his post and allows the enemy to slip through, there are other more familiar instances of which a railway cabinman signals in a train on the same track where there is a stationery train causing head-on collision; a nurse giving intravenous injection which ought to be given intramuscular causing instantaneous death; a pilot overlooking an instrument showing snag in engine and the aircraft crashes causing heavy loss of life. Misplaced sympathy can be a great evil (see Navinchandra Shakerchand Shah v. Manager, Ahmedabad Coop. Department Stores Ltd. [(1978) 19 Guj LR 108, 120]). But in any case, failure to attain the highest standard of efficiency in performance of duty permitting an inference of negligence would not constitute misconduct nor for the purpose of Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules as would indicate lack of devotion to duty."
17. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner had earlier also punished for the similar acts. There is no oblique motive attributed to the petitioner. Thus, in view of judgment of Apex Court 12 in the case of P.H. Kalyani Vs. Air France, Calcutta reported in AIR 1963 SC 1756, which relied upon by Apex Court in the case of J. Ahmed (supra), the allegation found proved by authorities could not have been termed as misconduct.
18. The petitioner has already retired from service on 31/08/2017. He has already suffered enough by litigating this matter right from 2007 till date.
19. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that the finding recorded by respondent no.4 is not borne out from the record of the departmental enquiry which is produced by the learned Government Advocate during the course of the hearing.
20. Consequently, the order dated 28/11/2019 is set-aside and respondents are directed to confer consequential benefits on the petitioner as if the punishment is never inflicted on him.
21. With the aforesaid observations, this writ petition is allowed and disposed off.
(ASHISH SHROTI) JUDGE rahul RAHUL SINGH Digitally signed by RAHUL SINGH PARIHAR DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH AT GWALIOR, 2.5.4.20=eac942476567cd1b39b3da46068403462fdf82ab676d0cde4dee473fe77953f5, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH AT GWALIOR,CID - 7063520, PARIHAR postalCode=474001, st=Madhya Pradesh, serialNumber=0275c4f803f94c47998be5c534e21bded910fd4ab9d159b55575e814d05b2eed, cn=RAHUL SINGH PARIHAR Date: 2025.11.07 17:51:59 +05'30'