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[Cites 15, Cited by 1]

Gujarat High Court

Jagdishbhai Govindlal Patel vs Income- Tax Officer on 2 February, 2015

Author: Jayant Patel

Bench: Jayant Patel, S.H.Vora

         C/SCA/12763/2014                                   JUDGMENT




           IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

              SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12763 of 2014



FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:



HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JAYANT PATEL


and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.H.VORA

================================================================

1     Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see
      the judgment ?

2     To be referred to the Reporter or not ?

3     Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the
      judgment ?

4     Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as
      to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any
      order made thereunder ?

5     Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?

================================================================
               JAGDISHBHAI GOVINDLAL PATEL....Petitioner(s)
                               Versus
                  INCOME- TAX OFFICER....Respondent(s)
================================================================
Appearance:
MR SN DIVATIA, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR NITIN K MEHTA, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 1
================================================================

          CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JAYANT PATEL
                 and
                 HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.H.VORA



                                  Page 1 of 15
      C/SCA/12763/2014                                               JUDGMENT




                                Date : 02/02/2015


                               ORAL JUDGMENT

(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JAYANT PATEL)

1. Rule. Mr.Mehta, learned Counsel for the respondent, waives service of notice of Rule.

2. The learned Counsel appearing for both the sides are heard for final disposal.

3. The short facts are that on 27.7.2008, return of income was filed by the Assessee for the assessment year of 2008-09, declaring the total income of Rs.90,540/-. Notice under Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") was issued, commencing regular assessment proceedings on 18.8.2009.

Thereafter, as per the Assessee, all relevant details, including the date on which the property was acquired and the sale deed were submitted.

Ultimately, the assessment order was passed assessing the income of Rs.90,540/-. On 25.3.2014 Notice under Section 148 of the Act was issued for reopening of the assessment. On 9.4.2014, letter was addressed by the Assessee to the respondent demanding reasons. On 2.6.2014, Page 2 of 15 C/SCA/12763/2014 JUDGMENT reasons recorded were furnished to the Assessee.

On 10.6.214, the Assessee submitted objections against the reasons for resisting the reopening of the assessment. On 19.8.2014, order was passed by the respondent, rejecting the objections for reopening of the assessment.

Under these circumstances, the present petition before this Court.

4. We have heard Mr.Divatia, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr.Mehta, learned Counsel for the respondent.

5. As such, it is an admitted position that the period of four years from the end of the assessment year has expired on the date when the assessment was proposed to be reopened.

Therefore, in our view, the case may fall in the proviso (1) to Section 147 of the Act. As per proviso (1) to Section 147 of the Act, assessment can be reopened even after four years if it is found that there was failure on the part of the Assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year.

6. It appears that in the return of income, the Page 3 of 15 C/SCA/12763/2014 JUDGMENT Assessee had had mentioned the statement of long-

term capital gain, wherein the date for purchase of the property was shown as 1.4.1981 and thereafter income tax cost was considered and the capital gain was arrived at. In the assessment proceedings, when the reply was submitted for computation, Vide Item No.5, computation of capital gain and the copy of the sale deed was also enclosed. Thereafter, it appears that the final assessment order was passed on 6.9.2010.

At the first brush, one may say that the details pertaining to the transaction of sale of the property with the support of sale deed were produced. In the reasons recorded by the respondent, there is no clear opinion expressed or the reasons recorded that there was escapement of income in the assessment, but it appears that the re-computation of the capital gain on the basis of the 'Will' was considered as the basis and it was expressed that as per the provisions of Explanation 3 to Section 48 of the Act, the cost index of 2006-07 i.e. the year in which the property was acquired by 'Will' by the Assessee was to be considered as the basis and thereafter Page 4 of 15 C/SCA/12763/2014 JUDGMENT the long-term capital gain was to be computed.

7. We may record that for invoking the powers under Section 147 of the Act, it is necessary for the competent authority to record the reasons for arriving at the opinion that there was escapement of income for assessment. Such powers could be exercised within the outer limit of four years, but if the power is to be exercised beyond the period of four years, then as per the proviso (1) to Section 147, reasons are also required to be recorded that there was failure on the part of the Assessee to declare true and material facts for the assessment. No such reasons are specifically recorded by the respondent.

8. At this stage, we may record that this Court in the case of Sky Diamonds Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax in Special Civil Application No.18004 of 2014 decided on 21.1.2015 had observed thus:-

1. xxx
2.   The   only   question   which   may   arise   for  consideration   in   the   present   matter   is  "Whether   the   bar   of   four   years   provided   by  first   proviso   of   section   147   of   the   Income  Tax Act can be made applicable to the facts  of the present case or not?
Page 5 of 15
C/SCA/12763/2014 JUDGMENT
3.   The   relevant   facts   are   that   as   per   the  petitioner,   for   the   assessment   year  20082009,   the   scrutiny   was   made   under  section   143(3)   of   the   Income   Tax   Act  (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   "Act")   and  the  petitioner  submitted  detailed  letter  on  various points connected with the return of  income   tax   filed   under   section   139   of   the  Act.   On   18.11.2010,   during   the   course   of  regular   assessment,   in   reply   to   the   notice  under   section   142(1),   the   Chartered  Accountant   of   the   petitioner,   vide   letter,  had   submitted   various   documents   including  the   audit   report   and   the   details   about   the  salary   of   the   partners.   On   28.12.2010,   the  assessing   officer   passed   a   scrutiny  assessment order under section 143(3) of the  Act   and   while   passing   the   said   order,   the  survey made on 22.08.2008 and other relevant  aspects   were   considered   and   the   order   was  passed.
4.   On   17.01.2014,   the   assessing   officer  issued   notice   under   section   148   of   the   Act  informing the petitioner that the income has  escaped   assessment   for   the   assessment   year  2008­2009  and   vide  letter   dated  01.04.2014,  the respondent provided reasons recorded for  reopening  of  the  assessment.   On  17.06.2014,  the  petitioner  filed  objections   against  the  reasons and it was contended inter alia that  full   disclosure   was   made   including   the  points on the basis of which the assessment  is sought to be reopened and the period of  limitation   of   four   years   expired   was   also  contended by way of objection. On 10.10.2014  the respondent passed the order, whereby the  objections   filed   by   the   petitioner   were  disposed of and the notice for reopening of  the   assessment   was   maintained.   Under   the  circumstances,   the   present   petition   before  this Court.
5.   We   have   heard   Mr.J.P.   Shah,   learned  counsel   appearing   with   M.J.Shah   for   the  petitioner   and   Mr.   Sudhir   Mehta,   for   the  Page 6 of 15 C/SCA/12763/2014 JUDGMENT respondent Revenue.
6.   As   such,   apart   from   the   aspect   as   to  whether   income   escaped   assessment,   we   find  that one of the major point which may go to  the root of the matter is the bar operating  on   the   power   of   Revenue   to   reopen   the  assessment after the expiry of the period of  four   years   from   the   end   of   the   relevant  assessment year. Section 147 of the Act upto  first   proviso   which   is   relevant   for   the  purpose of this petition reads as under:
"147. Income escaping assessment. If the  Assessing Officer has reason to believe  that   any   income   chargeable   to   tax   has  escaped   assessment   for   any   assessment  year, he may, subject to the provisions  of   sections   148   to   153,   assess   or  reassess such income and also any other  income   chargeable   to   tax   which   has  escaped   assessment   and   which   comes   to  his notice subsequently in the course of  the   proceedings   under   this   section,   or  recompute   the   loss   or   the   depreciation  allowance or any other allowance, as the  case   may   be,   for   the   assessment   year  concerned (hereafter in this section and  in   sections   148   to   153   referred   to   as  the relevant assessment year):
Provided that where an assessment under  subsection   (3)   of   section   143   or   this  section  has  been  made for  the  relevant  assessment   year,   no   action   shall   be  taken   under   this   section   after   the  expiry of four years from the end of the  relevant   assessment   year,   unless   any  income   chargeable   to   tax   has   escaped  assessment   for   such   assessment   year   by  reason of the failure on the part of the  assessee to make a return under section  139   or   in   response   to   a   notice   issued  under  subsection  (1)  of  section  142  or  section   148   or   to   disclose   fully   and  truly   all   material   facts   necessary   for  Page 7 of 15 C/SCA/12763/2014 JUDGMENT his   assessment,   for   that   assessment  year" 

7. Section 147 of the Act enables the AO to  reopen   the   assessment   subject   to   the  provisions   of   sections   148   to   153   of   the  Act,   but   the   first   proviso   to   the   very  section   147   of   the   Act   provides   that   no  action   shall   be   taken   under   this   section  (147) after the expiry of the period of four  years   from   the   end   of   the   relevant  assessment   year,   unless   any   income  chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for  such   assessment  year   by   the   reason   of  failure on the part of assessee to disclose  full and truly all material facts necessary  for assessment for the respective assessment  year.

8. The aforesaid shows that unless the case  falls   in   the   exceptional   category   of  "failure   to   disclose   fully   and   truly   all  material   facts   necessary   for   the  assessment", the action after the expiry of  four   years   for   reopening   of   the   assessment  is   not   permissible.   As   we   are   not   required  to   examine   other   contingencies   of   failure,  we do not deal with the same.

9.   As   per   the   learned   counsel   Mr.Shah   for  the petitioner, full and true disclosure of  all   material   facts   relevant   to   the   reasons  which   is   the   ground   for   reassessment   were  disclosed before the AO at the time when the  scrutiny of the assessment had taken place.  He   submitted   that   not   only   that   but   the  audit   report   was   also   produced   which  included   the   remuneration   to   the   partners  from  the  disclosed  item  of  Rs.74,90,834/and  during   the   course   of   the   assessment,   this  aspect is deemed to have been considered and  the   assessment   order   was   passed.   He  submitted  that  once  the  petitioner  succeeds  to   satisfy   that   full   and   true   disclosures  were   made   of   the   relevant   material   and  thereafter,   if   the   assessment   order   is  Page 8 of 15 C/SCA/12763/2014 JUDGMENT passed,   the   bar   of   four   years   would   apply.  Apart from the aforesaid contention, as per  Mr.Shah,   it   cannot   be   said   that   the   income  escaped the assessment and therefore section  147   of   the   Act   cannot   be   invoked   by   the  Department.

10.   Whereas,   Mr.   Mehta,   learned   counsel  appearing   for   respondent   is   not   in   a  position to dispute the factual aspect that  the true disclosure was made by the assessee  for   the   remuneration   paid   to   the   partners  and   computed   while   computing   the   business  income.   He   is   also   unable   to   dispute   that  the   audit   report   showing   the   aforesaid  details were produced.

11. In view of the above, we find no reason  to believe that true and full disclosure was  not   made   by   the   assessee   to   come   out   from  the bar of four years as provided by first  proviso to section 147 of the Act. Once the  bar   operates   upon   the   power   by   express  statutory provision, the action can be said  as   without   jurisdiction.     If   the   action   of  issuance  of  notice  is  without  jurisdiction,  it   would   be   a   case   for   interference   under  Article 226 of the Constitution.

12. In view of the above, we find that the  impugned action under section 147 of the Act  and   consequently   issuance   of   notice   under  section 148 of the Act (AnnexureE) including  disposal   of   the   objection   dated   10.10.2014  (AnnexureI) may not stand in the eye of law.  Hence, they are quashed and set aside.

13. The petition is allowed to the aforesaid  extent.   Rule   made   absolute   accordingly.  Considering  the  facts  and   circumstances,  no  order as to costs.

9. In our view, unless it is specifically found by the competent authority that there was failure on Page 9 of 15 C/SCA/12763/2014 JUDGMENT the part of the Assessee to declare true and full disclosure of the material facts for assessment, the assessment already made cannot be reopened after a period of four years.

10. Apart from the above, our attention is brought to the decision of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Rajesh Vithalbhai Patel in Tax Appeal No.13 of 2013 decided on 17.4.2013, wherein this Court by interpreting the deeming fiction of Section 49 of the Act has found that when the property is acquired through the modes specified under Section 49(2) of the Act by gift or 'will', cost of acquisition shall be the date on which the property was acquired or the cost of the previous owner of the property is to be considered. We may, for ready reference, refer to the observations made by this Court in the above referred decision at paragraphs 4 to 9 as under:-

4.   We   are   however,   of   the   opinion   that  CIT(Appeals)   as   well   as   Tribunal   committed  no error. We may recall that in the present  case,   since   the   assessee   had   acquired   the  property   through   gift,   in   normal  understanding of law, there would be no cost  of   acquisition   attached   to   such   property. 

Section   49   of   the   Act,   however,   makes   a  deeming provision for computing the cost of  Page 10 of 15 C/SCA/12763/2014 JUDGMENT acquisition  in  such  cases.  Relevant  portion  of section 49 reads as under :

"49.   Cost   with   reference   to   certain  modes   of   acquisition:   (1)   Where   the  capital asset became the property of the  assessee­ xxx 
(ii) under a gift or will;

xxxx  the   cost   of   acquisition   of   the   asset  shall be deemed to be the total cost for  which the previous owner of the property  acquired it, as increased by the cost of  any   improvement   of   the   assets   incurred  or   borne   by   the   previous   owner   or   the  assessee as the case may be. 

Explanation   :   In   this   sub­section   the  expression   "previous   owner   of   the  property"   in   relation   to   any   capital  asset   owned   by   an   assessee   means   the  last previous owner of the capital asset  who acquired it by a mode of acquisition  other than that referred to in clause(i)  or   clause(ii)   or   clause(iii)   or  clause(iv) of this sub­section." 

5. In terms of sub­section(1) of section 49,  thus,   the   assessee   having   acquired   the  property   through   a   gift,   the   cost   of  acquisition on the asset by deeming fiction  would   be   the   cost   for   which   the   previous  owner   of   the   property   acquired   it,   as  increased by the cost of any improvement of  the asset incurred or borne by the previous  owner or the assessee as the case may be.

6.   For   the   purpose   of   computation   of   such  cost   of   acquisition   of   assets,   one   shall  have   to   fall   back   to   section   48,   relevant  portion of which reads as under :

Page 11 of 15

C/SCA/12763/2014 JUDGMENT "48.   Mode   of   computation   -   The   income  chargeable   under   the   head   "Capital   gains" 

shall   be   computed,   by   deducting   from   the  full value of the consideration received or  accruing as a result of the transfer of the  capital asset the following amounts, namely­
(i)   expenditure   incurred   wholly   and  exclusively   in   connection   with   such  transfer;
(ii)   the   cost   of   acquisition   of   the   asset  and the cost of any improvement thereto. Xxx Explanation   -   For   the   purpose   of   this  section : xxx
(iii) "indexed cost of acquisition" means an  amount   which   bears   to   the   cost   of  acquisition the same proportion as the Cost  Inflation   Index   for   the   year   in   which   the  asset   is   transferred   bears   to   the   Cost  Inflation Index for the first year in which  the   asset   was   held   by   the   assessee   or   for  the year beginning on the 1st day of April,  1981, whichever is later."

7. Under section 48 of the Act, thus capital  gain is computed by deducting from the full  value   of   the   consideration   received   or  accruing   as   a   result   of   the   transfer,   the  amounts   of   expenditure   incurred   wholly   and  exclusively   in   connection   with   such  transfer,   the   cost   of   acquisition   of   the  asset   and   the   cost   of   any   improvement  thereto.   Term   "cost   of   acquisition   of   the  asset" is explained in explanation (iii) to  section   48.   In   terms   of   such   explanation,  indexed   cost   of   acquisition   would   be   an  amount   which   bears   to   the   cost   of  acquisition the same proportion as the Cost  Inflation   Index   for   the   year   in   which   the  asset   is   transferred   bears   to   the   Cost  Inflation Index for the first year in which  the   asset   was   held   by   the   assessee   or   for  Page 12 of 15 C/SCA/12763/2014 JUDGMENT the year beginning on the 1st  day of April,  1981,   whichever   is   later.   In   simple   words,  therefore   for   an   asset   acquired   prior   to  1.4.1981   the   indexed   cost   of   acquisition  would be the cost of acquisition multiplied  by the ratio of the Cost Inflation Index in  the   year   in   which   assessee's   asset   is  transferred   to   the   Cost   of   Inflation   Index  for   the   year   beginning   on   1.4.1981.   It   was  therefore, that the Tribunal in our opinion  correctly   held   that   the   indexed   cost   of  acquisition shall have to be worked out with  reference   to   1.4.1981   since   in   the   present  case the asset was acquired by the previous  owner   of   the   property.   Learned   counsel   for  the   Revenue   however,   submitted   that   such  interpretation   would   fail   to   take   into  account the expression "Cost Inflation Index  for   the   first   year   in   which   the   asset   was  held   by   the   assessee".   In   his   opinion   the  "assessee" referred to under such expression  would   be   the   present   assessee   and   not   the  previous   owner.   In   our   opinion,   such  interpretation cannot be accepted. We say so  for   the   following   reasons.   Firstly,   by  virtue of a deeming fiction provided in sub­ section(1)   of   section   49,   cost   of  acquisition   in   hands   of   the   assessee   would  be the cost for which the previous owner of  the   property   acquired   it.   It   is   for   this  purpose   that   we   need   to   fall   back   on  computation provision of section 48. When we  do so, we work out the cost of acquisition  of the asset in the hands of previous owner.  While   doing   so,   we   cannot   transpose   the  assessee in explanation (iii) of section 48.  Doing   so,   would   amount   to   falling   short   of  giving   full   effect   to   the   deeming   fiction  contained   in   sub­section(1)   of   section   49.  To our opinion such deeming fiction must be  allowed to have its full play. As is often  stated,   a   deeming   fiction   must   be   allowed  its   full   application   and   should   not   be  allowed to boggle.

8.   Additionally,   we   notice   that   in   sub­ Page 13 of 15 C/SCA/12763/2014 JUDGMENT section(1)   of   section   49,   the   legislature  has provided that cost of acquisition of the  asset   shall   be   deemed   to   be   the   cost   for  which   the   previous   owner   of   the   property  acquired,   as   increased   by   any   cost   of  improvement of the assets incurred or borne  by the previous owner or the assessee as the  case   may   be.   If   the   interpretation   of   the  counsel   for   the   Revenue   was   correct,   this  later   reference   to   the   cost   of   improvement  borne   by   the   assessee   would   not   have   been  necessary since section 48 itself would take  care of any improvement on the capital asset  to be included for the cost of acquisition.  It   is   precisely   because   such   improvement  referred   to   in   section   48   would   have  reference only to that made by the previous  owner   that   the   additional   provision   had   to  be   made   in   the   deeming   fiction   provided   in  sub­clause(1)   of   section   49.   Further   the  interpretation   sought   to   be   given   by   the  Revenue  would   be  unacceptable  because  there  is   no   provision   under   which   the   cost   of  acquisition in the hands of the assessee in  cases   such   as   gift   on   the   date   of  acquisition of the property can be made and  found in the Act. A Serious road­block would  be   created   if   such   property   is   acquired  through   Will   and   would   therefore   have   no  reference to its actual cost on the date of  operation of the Will.

9.   There   is   nothing   on   record   to   show   on  what basis the Assessing Officer adopted the  cost of acquisition of the property at 15.63  lakhs   as   on   23.5.1995.   In   the   assessment  year   there   is   no   indication   whatsoever   on  what basis the Assessing Officer arrived at  such a figure. Counsel doing some guess work  submitted that the said figure may have been  indicated   in   the   sale   deed   itself   or   may  have   been   the   amount   on   which   necessary  stamp   duty   for   the   purpose   of   registration  of   the   gift   deed   might   have   been   computed.  In   absence   of   any   provision   in   the   Act  enabling   the   Assessing   Officer   to   adopt  Page 14 of 15 C/SCA/12763/2014 JUDGMENT either   of   the   said   figures   as   the   cost   of  acquisition   of   the   property   on   the   date   of  gift, simply cannot be accepted.

11. In view of the above, we find that even on merits also it could not be said that there was any escapement of the income for assessment.

Under these circumstances, the action for reopening of the assessment by the impugned Notice at Annexure-A can be said to be without jurisdiction and hence, deserves to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly, the same is quashed and set aside.

12. The petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule is made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs.

(JAYANT PATEL, J.) (S.H.VORA, J.) vinod Page 15 of 15