Vodafone Spacetel Ltd vs S Tel Pvt. Ltd on 28 March, 2012

[Cites 43, Cited by 2]

Bombay High Court

Vodafone Spacetel Ltd vs S Tel Pvt. Ltd on 28 March, 2012

2. The petitioner has invoked section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short "Arbitration Act") for interim measures and reliefs against the respondent in view of various breaches committed by the respondent under the Intra-Circle Roaming Framework Agreement dated 15th March, 2011 (ICRFA).

::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 :::

2 jud104.12

3. There exists an arbitration clause in the agreement. The basic clause is as under :

"24.3. A Dispute that remains unresolved for sixty (60) Business Days of the same arising, shall be finally resolved by arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the (Indian) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by a panel consisting of three (3) arbitrators.

Each of the Parties shall appoint one (1) arbitrator and the two (2) arbitrators so appointed shall appoint the third arbitrator.

24.9. Subject to the provisions of Clause 24.3, the courts of Mumbai, India shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to any Dispute."

4. The basic prayers of the petitioner is as under :

"(a) Direct the Respondent to provide appropriate security in the form of Bank Guarantee or asset to secure the payments towards the services provided by the Petitioner.

(b) In the interim pending disposal of this petition, the Respondent be directed to pay Post Dates Cheques as also charge on the bank account by way of attachment to the extent of the dues."

5. As per the agreement the respondent was under obligation to pay the minimum commitment charges (MCC). The respondent provided the MCC for the quarter May - June 2011 in terms of the ICRFA. The respondent failed to provide the MCC for the August -

October 2011. Therefore, the petitioner vide its email dated 20th July 2011 demanded for the MCC. The petitioner again demanded the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 ::: 3 jud104.12 respondent to provide Post Dated Cheques (PDC's) towards MCC.

However, the respondent vide its email dated 3rd August, 2011 refused to comply with its obligation to issue PDCs. The petitioner vide its email dated 19th August, 2011 notified the respondent regarding the delay in payment beyond the due date. The petitioner vide its emails dated 24th August, 2011 notified the respondent about the breaches of ICRFA. In response to the above email, the respondent did not dispute the above outstanding, but sought extension in payment vide email dated 29th August, 2011. The petitioner, previously known as Vodafone Essar Spacetel Ltd., has changed to Vodafone Spacetel Ltd. with effect from 13th October, 2011. In view of the above, the petitioner was constrained to issue Notice for Termination dated 28th October, 2011 ("Termination Letter") to the respondent. The respondent not responded to the Termination Letter till date. The petitioner has encashed the bank guarantees provided by the Respondent on account of above breaches. It is stated that ICRFA would stand terminated upon expiry of six (6) months from the date of receipt of Termination Letter, which will expire in May 2012. Therefore, the petitioner is under the obligation to provide services till the expiry of such notice period.

The petitioner submitted that the respondent is not in a position to clear outstanding and future invoices. Hence the present petition seeking for direction to provide the security by way of a Bank Guarantee and or asset to secure payments under the future invoices to be raise by Petitioner till the actual termination of the ICRFA.

::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 :::

4 jud104.12

6. The respondent resisted the same by filing reply dated 27th February, 2010. The preliminary objection was raised stating that as the respondent is situated outside jurisdiction of this court, therefore, this court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain the petition. The petitioner has already invoked four bank guarantees aggregating to Rs.11,93,89,388/-, on 22.12.2011; and more than 95% of its purported claim have already been satisfied; and no amounts are due and payable; and there was excess invocation of the bank guarantees, therefore, a reconciliation of the account needs to be followed. The same should be adjudicated by the duly constituted Arbitral Tribunal.

The averments are also made that the respondent is entitled to recover Rs. 2.3 crores from the petitioner in view of excess invocation of the bank guarantees. No details are provided by the petitioner how this amount of Rs.12.18 crores is recoverable.

7. The submission was also made that in view of clause 24.2 the petitioner failed to exhaust internal escalation mechanism before invoking the bank guarantee and/or filing of the present petition.

The petitioner without invoking the arbitration clause filed the present petition. The various correspondences based upon the individual rights arising out of the agreement read with conduct of the parties need to be adjudicated by the arbitral tribunal. The submission is also made in view of the (2G) decision of the Supreme Court. The services of the petitioner have been suspended, therefore, ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 ::: 5 jud104.12 unless the respondent's rights are determined including the overall reflection of the Supreme Court judgment and the merits of matter/claim, there is no question of granting any relief in favour of the petitioner. It was also submitted that there is no balance of convenience and/or equity lies in favour of the petitioner as the petition is only to frustrate the rights under the contract.

8. The petitioner in rejoinder dated 13th March, 2012 resisted all the submissions and reiterated the case raised in the petition. It is further averred that in view of admitted position of suspension of 100% services under the agreement, the petition so filed based on total outstanding as on 31st January, 2012, after deducting the amounts received from encashing the bank guarantees. The averments are also made that the petitioner is in process of shutting down the business and, therefore, by email dated 23rd January, 2012 offered to resolve dispute through the mutual consultation and negotiation. There was no response and, therefore, the petition for interim reliefs.

9. The denial is also made to claim of Rs.2.3 crores as raised by the respondent in reply. The justification is given by the petitioner based upon clause 3.10 of the agreement which entitled them to invoke the bank guarantees without resorting to the internal mechanism as contended. The apprehension is also made that the respondent may dispose of its entire assets, therefore, prayed for ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 ::: 6 jud104.12 additional security also.

10. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner strongly relied on Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd. Vs. T. Thomas1 and Tata International Ltd. Vs. Trisuns Chemicals Industry Ltd.2 and thereby contended that inspite of above agreed clauses of venue and jurisdiction and that though the parties have agreed for exclusive jurisdiction of Court in Mumbai for want of leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent Act as not obtained by the petitioner, the petition be dismissed, therefore, there is no question of any ad-interim relief.

11. In Jindal Vijayanagar Steel (JSW Steel Ltd.) Vs. Jindal Praxair Oxygen Company Ltd.3 the Apex Court while dealing with Clause 12 of the Letters Patent Act read with section 20 and 120 of the Civil Procedure Code (for short "CPC") in petition under section 9 of the Arbitration Act, on facts and circumstances of the case held that the principles of section 20 (CPC) cannot be applicable to clause 12 of the Letters Patent Act since the CPC by section 120 specifically excludes its applicability to the Chartered High Courts. It is also observed that under clause 12 of the Letters Patent Act, the Bombay High Court would have jurisdiction to entertain and try the arbitration petition even if no cause of action arose within its 1 2003 (3) Arb.LR 268 (Bom) 2 2002 (2) Bom.C.R. 88 3 2006 Vol.108 (3) Bom.L.R. 2717 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 ::: 7 jud104.12 jurisdiction, provided the respondent has an office at Mumbai. As recorded above the parties in the present case have agreed for the Court of Mumbai jurisdiction, out of available courts, as part of cause of action arose in Mumbai also. In my view, therefore, the said judgment in no way is sufficient to accept the case that leave is necessary before filing section 9 petition. There was no such issue raised and/or decided by the Supreme Court. The same was the position in Food Corporation of India Vs. M/s. Evdomen Corporation 4. In Union of India Vs. Tolani Bulk Carriers Ltd.5 the same view was expressed by the Judge of this Court.

12. The judgments so cited by the respondent are of little assistance to support the case that this court has no jurisdiction and the leave is necessary.

13. In Tata International (supra) a single Judge of this Court dealt with section 2(e) and 47 explanation of the Arbitration Act referring to a Foreign Award and its enforcement in the High Court. It has been held that the leave need to be sought before filing the application under the Arbitration Act. It is ultimately held that in absence of subject matter of award being within jurisdiction, the High Court would have no jurisdiction to hear and decide such application.

4 AIR 1999 SC 2352, 5 2002 (2) Bom.C.R. 256 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 ::: 8 jud104.12 The strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that leave is necessary for Part I and Part II of the Arbitration Act. Admittedly, in that case there was no part of cause of action arose in Mumbai and there was no agreed clause of jurisdiction as available in the present case. The learned Judge has distinguished Harishankar Singhania Vs. Dr.Gaur Hari Singhania6 by stating that it was the case under section 20 of the 1940 Act, whereby it was observed that in respect of an application under section 10 of the Arbitration Act of 1940, clause 12 would not apply.

The learned Single Judge in Tata International (supra) observed that the learned Judge in Harishankar Singhania (supra) not considered section 120 of CPC. He further observed that the power under clause 12 to grant leave should be available in the petition in Part I and/or Part II of the arbitration Act in absence of any expressed exclusion and thereby refused to refer the matter to the larger bench as there was no conflict in ratio decided. It is emphatically observed that the judgment which is ignoring relevant provisions of law has no binding precedent. The learned Judge, therefore, not granted leave under clause 12 as sought for.

14. It is to be noted that Single Judge of this Court while dealing with similar aspect of section 47 with regard to enforcement of foreign award in the Court at Mumbai, in view of specific agreed clause and further that part of cause of action arose in Mumbai 6 1996 (4) Bom. C.R. 67 equivalent to 1997 (1) Mh. L.J. 9 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 ::: 9 jud104.12 permitted to enforce such foreign award, therefore, facts and circumstances read with individual contracts are relevant while deciding issue of territorial jurisdiction under Arbitration Act and so also the issue with regard to the leave so contended. In such matter the leave is not necessary. This is also on the foundation that such arbitration petition cannot be treated equally with the concept of "suit" as contemplated under clause 12 of the Letters Patent Act.

Both are different for various purposes under various Acts." This Court in Standard Batteries Ltd. Vs. Casting (India) Pvt. Ltd 7 while dealing with clause 12 of the Letters Patent Act read with section 20(2) and 41 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 held that such application is not a suit within the meaning of clause 12. It is, therefore, observed that the leave is not necessary to file such application. The same was position in Standard Batteries Ltd. Vs. Casings (India) Pvt. Ltd.8. In the present case, again the facts are totally distinct and distinguishable.

15. In Kotak Mahindra (supra) referring to Section 2(e), 9 and section 20, 23 and 28 of the Contract Act on facts, held that the defendant was neither carrying on business in Mumbai nor residing in Mumbai, so no cause of action arose in Mumbai. Therefore, the clause conferring jurisdiction of Mumbai Court was of no consequence, and the petition under section 9 of the Arbitration Act 7 MANU/MH/0239/1978 equivalent to (1979) 81 Bom.L.R. 331 8 MANU/MH/0261/1978 equivalent to (1980) 82 Bom.L.R. 355 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 ::: 10 jud104.12 in Mumbai Court, not maintainable. In the present case as noted the part cause of action arose in Mumbai. The parties, therefore, as permissible, agreed for and chosen Mumbai Court, as the Court for jurisdiction to settle and/or decide their matters, the conflict with regard to leave of clause 12 as contended looses its importance.

Even otherwise this is a Court as contemplated under section 2(e) of the Arbitration Act, which parties have chosen to initiate and/or file their arbitration proceedings. Therefore, also there is no substance in the contention that, in the present facts and circumstances, the leave is necessary before ig filing section 9 petition, under the arbitration Act.

16. As the arbitration Act being Central Act the provisions and the judgments of other High Courts have persuasive value to decide the issue of leave. In Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. Vs. N.V.Chowdhury and Others9 though referring to Arbitration Act 1940, the Judge of Calcutta High Court observed that as part of cause of action arose within jurisdiction of the High Court an application is maintainable without leave under clause 12, as the Calcutta High Court was Civil Court having jurisdiction over the part of cause of action.

17. A Division Bench of Madras High Court in M/s.Dynasty 9 AIR 1986 Calcutta 338 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 ::: 11 jud104.12 Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Jumbo World Holdings Ltd10 after considering even the judgment of Harishankar Singhania (supra) and Standard Batteries Ltd (supra) white dealing with the provisions of the Arbitration Act and clause 12 of Letters Patent Act, has observed that the procedure for obtaining leave is applicable only to suit and not to such arbitration application. It is also observed that section 2 (1)(e) of Arbitration Act does not treat application as a suit. The provisions of clause 12 of Madras High Court are similar to clause 12 of Bombay High Court. The Division Bench of Madras High Court has in fact specifically dealt with Tata International (supra) the judgment of this court and observed that the earlier judgments of this court was not referred, while deciding the leave issue in Tata International (supra), the Division Bench by referring to the Supreme Court judgments Food Corporation of India (supra) and Jindal Vijayanagar Steel (supra) has observed in following words :

"19. .... .... .... It has been consistently held that the applications under the Arbitration Act cannot be equated with civil suit. (See Bhagwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1964 SC 444, Usmanali Khan v. Sagarmal, AIR 1965 Sc 1798, Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja (2004) 3 SCC 155 : (AIR 2004 SC 1433). The procedure for obtaining leave is applicable only to a suit and not to an application under the Arbitration Act. In our opinion, if a part of the cause of 10 AIR 2008 Madras 119 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 :::

12 jud104.12 action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court, the application under the Arbitration Act can be instituted in this Court and in that event leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is not necessary.

20. .... .... .... We, therefore, hold that obtaining of leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is not a condition precedent for filing an application under Section 9 of the Act."

18. It is also relevant to note a Division Bench Judgment of this court in Collins Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. United Spirits Ltd. Appeal (L) No.714 of 2010 in Arbitration Petition No.1072 of 2010 dated 20th October, 2010 (Mohit Shah, C.J. and Dr. D. Y.Chandrachud, J.). The Hon'ble Chief Justice, in a situation where a part cause of action arose in Mumbai and as there was similar clause whereby the parties have agreed for the arbitration to be conducted and subjected to the jurisdiction of Court at Mumbai, held as under :

"15. Apart from the principle enunciated by the Apex Court in the above decision, even on facts of present case, which are similar to the one decided in Hiralal Patni Vs. Sri Kali Nath (supra), once the appellant agreed in Arbitration Petition No.307 of 2006 to have the dispute referred to arbitration, the appellants deprived themselves of the right of the authority of the Court to refer the matter to arbitration or of the arbitrator to render the award. The appellants are estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of this Court ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 ::: 13 jud104.12 to entertain and try the Arbitration Petition No.307 of 2006 and to refer the matter to the learned Arbitrator.

Similarly, the appellants are estopped from challenging the authority of the learned Arbitrator to make the award which even otherwise was a consent award".

19. The Division Bench of this Court in Masood Mohmmed Husain V. Gulam R.Mohammedali 11 based upon Ashok Traders and Gurmukhdas Saluja 12 has observed that an application under section 9 is not a nature of suit. The apex court has reiterated the same in U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. Vs. Jain Construction Co. and Anr. (2004) 7 SCC 332. I have also followed the same line of action in Ravinder Singh Ahluwalia Vs. Kulvinder Singh Ahluwalia & Ors. 2009 (5) Mh.L.J. 170.

20. There is no dispute that part cause of action arose in Mumbai.

By the agreement both the parties agreed to resolve their dispute at Mumbai through arbitral tribunal. They specifically agreed for Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court, Mumbai, being Court as defined under section 2(e) of the Arbitration Act. I have already observed in National Commodity and Derivative Exchange Ltd. Vs. Indian Exchange of Metal Ltd. Arbitration Petition (L) No.280 of 2012 dated 9th March, 2012, based upon the similar agreed clause of arbitration, venue and the Court's 11 2007 (2) Bom.C.R.Report 291 equivalent to 2007(2) Mh.L.J.116 12 2004 (Supp.2) Bom.C.R. (S.C.) 705 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 ::: 14 jud104.12 jurisdiction, in the following words :

"6. Jurisdiction:

The Bye-laws/regulations' of NCDEX deal with and cover every aspect of commodities trading and clearing.

The main place of business transaction of the Petitioner is at Mumbai. The parties have specifically agreed and as referred above that the courts in Mumbai shall have an exclusive jurisdiction to resolve dispute arising out of the agreements. The parties are fully aware that the Respondent's warehouse is situated at Ghaziabad, has registered office at New Delhi and also the nature of online transactions. igThe Petitioner has made specific averments in the petition about the jurisdiction accordingly. The geographically located delivery centre for the commodities is not a important factor to decide the court's jurisdiction in such cases. It is known to the trading and clearing member and their constituent/participants/investor apart from the warehouse service provider that it is to facilitate delivery of commodities when demanded. In view of clear agreement between the parties to settle their dispute in the Court of Mumbai that itself is sufficient to hold that this Court has jurisdiction to deal with the subject matter and also in view of the nature of transactions and business of commodities trading online by the petitioner at Mumbai. The submission made by the Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner referring to Interglobe Aviation Ltd. Vs. N.Satchidanand (2011) 7 SCC 463 whereby the Supreme Court while dealing with case under the Consumer Protection Act based upon section 19 and 20 of the Civil Procedure Code (for short "CPC") observed that the contractual ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 :::

15 jud104.12 clause seeking to exclude the jurisdiction of courts is invalid. This judgment is of a little assistance as that was not the case under Arbitration Act. The facts are distinct and distinguishable. The concept of specified "court" changes the situation.

9. Leave under clause 12 of the Letters' Patent Act is not necessary :

The submission is also that the Petitioner has not sought a leave, under clause 12 of the Letters Patent Act before filing the petition, therefore, it should not be entertained. Theig reliance was placed on Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd. Vs. T.Thomas Educational Trust & Others 2003 (5) Bombay Cases Reporter 579. There was no such agreed jurisdiction clause in that matter. Atleast the part cause of action arose within jurisdiction of this Court. The parties have specifically agreed for this Court's jurisdiction, which is permissible. The agreed clause and considering scope and the purpose of the nature of transactions. I am not inclined to accept in the present facts and circumstances that the leave is necessary. The Arbitration Act, no where provides such pre-requisite condition before filing petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act. The arbitration petition is not a suit. [Rajasthan State Electricity Board V. Universal Petrol Chemicals Ltd. (2009) 3 S.C.C. 107 and Balaji Coke Industry (P) Ltd. V. Mass Bhagwati Coke (2009) 9 S.C.C. 403].

21. In Rajasthan State Electricity Board (supra) it is observed as under :

"24. A.B.C. Laminart case also referred to and relied ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 ::: 16 jud104.12 upon an earlier decision of this Court in Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. The said decision was rendered in the lights of facts of a similar contract where Clause 12 of the tender provided for arbitration whereas Clause 13 provided :

"... Notwithstanding the place where the work under this contract is to be executed, it is mutually understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto that this contract shall be deemed to have been entered into by the parties concerned in the city of Bombay and the court of law in the city of Bombay alone shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate thereon."

28. In the light of the aforesaid facts of the present case, the ratio of all the aforesaid decisions which are referred to hereinbefore would squarely govern and apply to the present case also. There is indeed an ouster clause used in the aforesaid stipulations stating that the courts at Jaipur alone would have jurisdiction to try and decide the said proceedings which could be initiated for adjudication and deciding the disputes arising between the parties with or in relation to the aforesaid agreements through the process of arbitration. In other words, even though otherwise the courts at Calcutta would have territorial jurisdiction to try and decide such disputes, but in view of the ouster clause it is only the courts at Jaipur which would have jurisdiction to entertain such proceeding."

Balaji Coke Industry (P) Ltd. (supra) which reads thus:

"30. In the instant case, the parties had knowingly and ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 ::: 17 jud104.12 voluntarily agreed that the contract arising out of the high-seas sale agreement would be subject to Kolkata jurisdiction and even if the courts in Gujarat also had the jurisdiction to entertain any action arising out of the agreement, it has to be held that the agreement to have the disputes decided in Kolkata by an arbitrator in Kolkata, West Bengal, was valid and the respondent Company had wrongly chosen to file its application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the Bhavnagar Court (Gujarat) in violation of such agreement. The decisions of this Court in A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. as also Hakam Singh are very clear on the point."

Apart from the agreed clause of venue of arbitration and/or of Court's jurisdiction, for filing a subsequent arbitration petition, in view and as contemplated under section 2(e), 9, 11, 42 and 44 to 48 and/or even for the enforcement and/or execution of the award including foreign award, is an additional factor, to permit such arbitration petition at agreed and permissible jurisdiction/court. The concept of such leave is not provided under the arbitration Act. The requirement, even if any is only for the respective High Courts, and not for such other principal Court in the District.

22. The petitioner has made specific averments for the purpose of interim measures/protection including the demand of amount, as the respondent inspite of repeated communication and demand was unable to make due payment. The petitioner, therefore, in view of ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 ::: 18 jud104.12 agreement invoked the bank guarantees. The only defence which was raised by the respondent that they have deposited/paid 95% of the due amount. Their counter claim and/or counter demand against the respondent for which various correspondences have already been exchanged is not decided, therefore, the dispute and differences unless settled there is no question of any security. This itself means that there is no dispute with regard to the amount so raised by the petitioner. There is clear material on record, which is not in dispute, that for whatever reason including the order passed by the Supreme Court, all services/transactions/agreements and the related transaction at this stage, are disturbed. The pendency of review even, if any, is in no way sufficient to overlook the averments made by the petitioner in petition that in view of collapse of business the respondent is likely to transfer and/or create third party rights in assets and/or properties. This apprehension is no where specifically denied by the respondent. The preliminary objection so raised, once decided, against the respondent and unless the difference and/or dispute so raised by the respondent is settled and/or adjudicated, the liability so recorded and averred in the petition, as not denied, needs to be protected, till final adjudication of dispute by the arbitrator and/or settlement between the parties. The petitioner, in my view, therefore, has made out prima facie case as amount is due and payable, unless protected and/or secured, the whole arbitration proceedings will get frustrated. The balance of convenience and equity lies in favour of the petitioner. However, considering the facts ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 ::: 19 jud104.12 and circumstances and the reason which compelled the business to collapse, I am of the view that it will be not sufficient to secure the balance amount instead of granting prayers made by the petitioner.

23. The respondent's case, even if any, that the amount of Rs.2.3 crores is recoverable from the petitioner, though averred, but not provided with the details, therefore, the fact remains that the respondent is not in position to make the payment and/or deliberately not making payment only to settle the said counter claim but this itself in my view is additional factor to show that the petitioner has made out the case atleast to secure the balance amount.

24. It will be difficult for the petitioner to recover and/or this amount if the respondent close and/or shut down business in view of the situation that they have admittedly, unable to provide the services. This being commercial contract, the petitioner is entitled to protection for security and as case is made out I am inclined to grant the same. Resultantly, the petition is allowed in following terms:

(a) The leave as contemplated under clause 12 of the Letters Patent Act to file petition under section 9 of the Arbitration Act in the Original Side of High Court of Judicature at Bombay is not necessary/mandatory. The arbitration petition cannot be dismissed solely on the ground that the leave was not obtained prior to filing of the said application.

::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:57 :::

20 jud104.12

(b) The Bombay High Court, has jurisdiction to entertain such arbitration petition in view of specific/agreed jurisdictional clause, out of the two or more available. The part cause of action, as arose in Mumbai, such agreement of Court's jurisdiction/choice of court, is permissible.

(c) The respondent is hereby directed to furnish the security to the satisfaction of the Prothonotary and Senior Master for an amount of Rs.2 crores within six weeks.

(d) All points are kept open for the parties to be agitated before the arbitral tribunal. It is made clear that if the arbitral tribunal is constituted this order to continue for a period of four weeks from the date of first hearing before the tribunal. Both parties are at liberty to take out an appropriate application before the arbitral tribunal.

(e) The petition is accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

(ANOOP V.MOHTA J.) ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 18:21:58 :::

Unlock Advanced Research with PRISMAI

Bombay High Court