Delhi District Court
Amarsons Commercial Private Limited vs Sentiss Pharma Private Limited on 31 January, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. PULASTYA PRAMACHALA
DISTRICT JUDGE, (COMMERCIAL COURT)-01,
PATIALA HOUSE COURT, NEW DELHI
INDEX
Sl. HEADINGS Page Nos.
No.
1. Memo of Parties 2
2. Description of case 2
3. Brief Facts of the case 2-4
4. Grounds of objection/challenge 4-6
5. Reply of respondent 6-7
6. Arguments of the Petitioner 7-8
7. Arguments of the Respondent 8-10
8. Appreciation of Arguments, Facts & Law 10-17
9. Decision 17
Digitally
signed by
PULASTYA
PULASTYA PRAMACHALA
PRAMACHALA Date:
2026.01.31
17:57:20
+0530
OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala)
District Judge (Commercial Court)-01,
Page No.1 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi
OMP (COMM) No.82/2022
In the matter of: -
Amarsons commercial Private Limited
Having its registered office at: 600, D.S.(G.F.),
New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi-110060
& Principal place of business at:
SCO No. 23, First Floor, Sector-11,
Panchkula-134112, Haryana.
...Petitioner
Versus
Sentiss Pharma Private Limited
Having its registered office at:
212, Ashirwad Commercial Complex, D-1, Green Park,
New Delhi-110016
& Corporate office at 3rd Floor, 261, Udyog Vihar,
Phase-IV, Gurugram- 122001, Haryana.
...Respondent
Date of Institution : 28.05.2022
Arguments heard on : 21.01.2026
Decided on : 31.01.2026
Decision : Petition is partly allowed.
JUDGMENT
DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE
1. Petitioner i.e. Amarsons Commercial Private Limited., has filed this petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') challenging the arbitral award dated 28.02.2022 as passed by the Sole Arbitrator.
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE
2. Briefly stated, petitioner is a company engaged in providing storage and distribution services across India and is registered under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act). The respondent is a company engaged OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala) District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Page No.2 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi in the manufacture, marketing, and distribution of pharmaceutical products in India. The respondent appointed the petitioner as its Carrying and Forwarding Agent (CFA) for storage and distribution of its products vide agreement dated 12.08.2011, which was renewed from time to time. The petitioner continued to provide services to the respondent for approximately nine years, i.e., till 2019. In terms of the agreement, the petitioner provided premises to the respondent for storage of products and for setting up its office. It is further averred that as per the agreements, the petitioner was required to mandatorily provide an experienced person to the respondent at an initial remuneration, and the monthly remuneration of the said person was reimbursable by the respondent as expenses, as specified in Annexure-II forming part of Clause 39 of the agreement. As per Clauses 3 and 55 of the agreement, any change or modification in territorial limits, remuneration, or any other term of the agreement was required to be made in writing and duly signed by both parties, and remuneration was to be reviewed and mutually agreed in writing. The petitioner alleges that the respondent unilaterally decided, from November 2017 onwards, to route billing of all distributors of Gurugram and Faridabad through its CFA at New Delhi, thereby reducing the territorial limits of the petitioner. It is contended that this decision was neither mutually discussed nor agreed upon, and was not reduced into writing, and the remuneration payable to the petitioner was neither reviewed nor renegotiated. As per Annexure-II of the agreement, payments were required to be made by pre-fixed due dates; however, the respondent allegedly OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala) District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Page No.3 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi failed to adhere to the said timelines and delayed monthly payments on several occasions.
3. Petitioner, being registered under the MSMED Act, claims entitlement to interest on delayed payments. It is further stated that the agreement contained a mandatory provision requiring advance written notice for termination. However, the respondent issued a termination notice dated 11.12.2019 during the subsistence of the agreement, allegedly without cause and without complying with Clause 42, which required at least 90 days' prior notice before 31.12.2019. The petitioner asserts that the said termination was illegal and unjustified. According to the petitioner, its accounts were not settled by the respondent and disputes persisted even after issuance of the termination notice. Thereafter, the respondent approached the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, pursuant to which learned Sole Arbitrator was appointed. Learned Arbitrator passed the impugned award dated 28.02.2022.
4. The petitioner submits that it did not receive a signed copy of the award from the learned Arbitrator and approached this Court on the basis of a downloaded copy. It is asserted that the present petition has been filed within three months from the date of passing of the award. Accordingly, the present petition has been preferred.
GROUNDS OF CHALLENGE
5. Aggrieved by the arbitral award dated 28.02.2022, petitioner has preferred present objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on, inter alia, the following grounds: -
OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala) District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Page No.4 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi i. Because Ld. Sole Arbitrator failed to appreciate the documentary evidence on record and has returned findings beyond the terms of the contract, rendering the award contrary to public policy of India and vitiated by patent illegality.
ii. Because the impugned award travels beyond the scope of the agreement between the parties. Ld. Arbitrator was required to remain within the four corners of the contract, which has not been done.
iii. Because the award is perverse and unsustainable in law as material evidence produced by the petitioner has been ignored, thereby rendering the award a nullity.
iv. Because Ld. Arbitrator erroneously held that the powers of attorney dated 10.08.2020 and 17.03.2021 were validly executed and that Mr. Deepak Bahri was authorised to further delegate powers to Mr. Kapil Ahuja and Mr. Sachin Jaiswal, despite the same being expressly prohibited under Clause 6 of the Board Resolution dated 09.01.2008.
v. Because Ld. Arbitrator failed to consider the binding terms and conditions of the agreement while passing the impugned award, thereby making the award opposed to public policy. vi. Because the termination notice dated 11.12.2019 was issued during the subsistence of the agreement without assigning any reasons and without adhering to the mandatory 90 days' advance notice stipulated under Clause 42 of the agreement, rendering the termination illegal and the award based thereon is unsustainable. vii. Because the respondent's claim of Rs.21,90,104/- towards alleged non-returned stock has been wrongly allowed. Ld. Arbitrator, while relying upon Clauses 47 and 49, incorrectly OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala) District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Page No.5 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi concluded that the agreement stood terminated by efflux of time and that the petitioner breached the agreement by not returning the goods, ignoring the fact that termination itself was under
challenge.
viii. Because the finding that the agreement stood terminated by efflux of time and that the notice dated 11.12.2019 was merely a "closure notice" is erroneous, misconceived and unsupported by the contractual framework.
ix. Because the petitioner's legitimate claim of Rs.9,54,625/-
towards carrying cost of respondent's goods has been wrongly rejected on the premise that non-return of goods was attributable to the petitioner, whereas the termination of the agreement was itself disputed and sub judice, and therefore the petitioner was under no obligation to return the goods during pendency of the dispute.
x. Because Ld. Arbitrator misinterpreted Clause 3 of the agreement and incorrectly held that the respondent acted in accordance with the agreement and that the parties had mutually agreed not to review Annexure-II, which finding is unsupported by any evidence and renders the award legally illegal. xi. Because Clauses 40 and 41 of the agreement have been misread in isolation and not in conjunction with Clauses 3 and 55. A conjoint reading of these provisions clearly establishes that any modification in territory or contractual terms required mutual written consent of both parties, which was admittedly absent.
REPLY OF RESPONDENT
6. The respondent filed its reply denying all averments made in the petition. It was contended that the CFA Agreement dated OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala) District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Page No.6 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi 10.01.2017 was valid only till 31.12.2019 and that the requirement of 90 days' notice applied solely in cases of premature termination. It was further averred that Clause 42 permitted renewal only with mutual consent, making renewal non-mandatory. The respondent alleged that the petitioner failed to return the stock in violation of Clauses 6, 7, 47, 48 and 49 of the agreement and sought to unjustly enrich itself.
ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONER
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Clause 42 of the agreement clearly stipulates that upon expiry of the agreement by efflux of time on 31.12.2019, the parties had the option to renew the agreement by mutual consent. It was argued that the said clause does not contemplate issuance of any closure or termination notice where the agreement is to naturally expire, and renewal is left to mutual understanding. It was contended that by issuing the termination notice dated 11.12.2019, the respondent illegally curtailed the petitioner's contractual right to seek renewal, and learned Arbitrator has decided the issue beyond the terms of the contract, thereby rendering the impugned award contrary to public policy. It was further submitted that although the respondent claimed Rs.21,90,104/- towards the alleged value of stock lying with the petitioner, and the said claim has been allowed by learned Arbitrator, learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate that once the respondent itself had breached the terms and conditions of the agreement, it could not seek enforcement thereof against the petitioner. Learned counsel further contended that ld. Sole Arbitrator wrongly rejected the petitioner's claim towards expenses on the ground that the same OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala) District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Page No.7 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi was not provided for under the agreement, while completely overlooking Annexure-I, which expressly entitles the petitioner to reimbursement of expenses incurred on behalf of the respondent. It was also argued that learned Arbitrator directed the petitioner to pay the awarded amount within 30 days from publication of the award, failing which interest @18% per annum would be payable from the date of the award. It was submitted that Section 34 of the Act itself provides a statutory period of 90 days for challenging the award and, therefore, interest could not have been imposed prior to expiry of the said period. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the following judgments: -
i. Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority [(2015) 3 SCC 49] ii. Reliance infrastructure Ltd. v. State of Goa [(2024) 1 SCC 479] iii. Oil and Natural Gas corporation ltd. v. Saw Pipes ltd [(2003) 5 SCC 705] iv. State bank of Travancore v. M/s Kingston Computers (I) Pvt. Ltd. [(2011) 11 SCC 524] v. State of Orissa & Ors. v. Larson and Turbo Ltd. [(2005) SCC Online ORI 42] ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the scope of interference with an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act is extremely limited, particularly on the ground of conflict with public policy. It was argued that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate as to how the impugned award falls within any of the permissible grounds under Section 34. It was OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala) District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Page No.8 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi contended that interference on the ground of conflict with justice or morality is warranted only in such cases, where the arbitral award shocks the conscience of the Court. Further, in respect of domestic awards, the ground of "patent illegality appearing on the face of the award" has been introduced by sub-section (2A) of Section 34; however, such illegality must go to the root of the matter and cannot encompass mere erroneous application of law or re-appreciation of evidence. Learned counsel submitted that it is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is impermissible while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34. It was further argued that the respondent did not terminate the agreement, as the contract came to an end by efflux of time, and that Clause 47 of the agreement squarely obligated the petitioner to return the goods upon expiry of the contract. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance upon the following judgments: -
i. State of Haryana & Ors. v. S.L. Arora & company [(2010 3 SCC 690] ii. Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s Nova Soft Technologies [2025 INSC 605] iii. Project Director, National Highways No. 45E and 220 National Highways Authroity of India v. M. Hakeem & Anr [(2021) 9 SCC 1] iv. McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd & Ors [(2006) 11 SCC 181] v. United bank of India v. Naresh Kumar & Ors. [(1996) 6 SCC 660] vi. Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority [(2015) 3 SCC 49] OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala) District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Page No.9 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi vii. Ssangyong Engineering and Construction company limited v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) [(2019) 15 SCC 131] viii.A.G. Enviro infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. J.S. Enviro Services Pvt.
Ltd.[MANU/DE/3998/2023.
APPRECIATION OF ARGUMENTS, FACTS & LAW
8. The scope of enquiry under section 34 is restricted to consideration whether any one of the grounds mentioned in section 34 exists for setting-aside the award. Section 34 of the Act reads as under: -
"34. Application for setting aside arbitral award- (1) Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub- section (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the court only if-
(a) the party making the application furnishes proof That-i) a party was under some incapacity, or
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or
(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration;
Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only That part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala) District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Page No.10 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or
(b) the court finds That-
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or
(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India.
Explanation 1 - For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified That an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if,-- (i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81; or (ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or (iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice.
Explanation 2.- For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.
(2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds That the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award:
Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by re- appreciation of evidence."
9. The general principles are that Arbitrator is a Judge of the choice of the parties and his decision, unless there is an error apparent on the face of the award which makes it unsustainable, is not to be set aside even by the Court, even if the Court of law could come to a different conclusion on the same facts. The Court cannot reappraise the evidence and it is not open to the Court to sit in appeal over the conclusion of the Arbitrator. It is not open OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala) District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Page No.11 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi to the Court to set aside a finding of fact arrived at by the Arbitrator and only grounds on which the award can be set aside are mentioned in the Arbitration Act. Where the Arbitrator assigns cogent grounds and sufficient reasons and no error of law or misconduct is cited, the award will not call for interference by the Court in exercise of the power vested in it. Where the Arbitrator is a qualified technical person and expert, who is competent to make assessment by taking into consideration the technical aspects of the matter, the Court would generally not interfere with the award passed by the Arbitrator.
10. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Associate Builders vs. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49 held that the interference with an arbitral award is permissible only when the findings of the arbitrator are arbitrary, capricious or perverse or when conscience of the Court is shocked or when illegality is not trivial but goes to the root of the matter. It was held that once it is found that the arbitrator's approach is neither arbitrary nor capricious, no interference is called for on facts. The arbitrator is ultimately a master of the quantity and quality of evidence while drawing the arbitral award. Patent illegality must go to the root of the matter and cannot be of trivial nature.
11. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. vs. National Highways Authority of India, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 677 held that under Section 34 (2A) of the Act, a decision which is perverse while no longer being a ground for challenge under "public policy of India", would certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award.
OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala) District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Page No.12 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi A finding based on the documents taken behind the back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a decision based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not based on evidence led by the parties and therefore, would also have to be characterized as perverse. It was held that a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality.
12. I shall first deal with the main objection, which goes to the root of the matter, namely, whether the notice dated 11.12.2019 was examined by the learned Arbitrator within the framework of the agreement. It is not in dispute that the parties last entered into a CFA agreement in the year 2017, which was valid till 31.12.2019 and could expire by efflux of time. At this stage, it becomes necessary to refer to Clause 42 of the agreement, which governs termination and renewal and reads as under: -
"Clause 42: This agreement, notwithstanding the date of execution by these presents, shall be effective from 10.01.2017 (effective date) and shall remain in force till 31.12.2019. This agreement is terminable by either of the party within the currency of this agreement by giving 90 (ninety) days advance notice, in writing, without assigning any cause for such termination. The agreement may be renewed on expiry for such further time on the same conditions or with such modified conditions, as may be mutually agreed by and between the parties."
13. From Clause 42 of the agreement, it is evident that the intention of the parties was to have a definite tenure of the CFA arrangement, which was to remain operative till 31.12.2019. The agreement was not perpetual in nature. The said clause further OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala) District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Page No.13 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi provides two distinct contingencies, namely: (i) expiry of the agreement by efflux of time on 31.12.2019, with an option of renewal by mutual consent; and (ii) premature termination during the currency of the agreement by either party upon giving 90 days' advance notice in writing.
14. Learned Arbitrator has held that the notice dated 11.12.2019 was merely a closure notice, intimating the petitioner that the agreement would come to an end on 31.12.2019 by efflux of time and that the respondent did not intend to renew the same. I find no infirmity in the said interpretation. The view taken by ld. Arbitrator that the contract stood concluded by efflux of time and that the notice dated 11.12.2019 was merely an intimation of non-renewal, is a plausible and reasonable interpretation of Clause 42.
15. Now coming to the objection relating to grant of Rs.21,90,104/- towards the value of stock admittedly lying with the petitioner, it is not in dispute that the respondent's products continued to remain in the possession of the petitioner even after expiry of the agreement. Learned Arbitrator, while allowing the said claim, placed reliance upon Clauses 47 and 49 of the agreement, which read as under: -
"47. Upon termination of the agreement, sentiss shall have the right to take over the control and possession of all the products and documents belonging to Sentiss and CFA shall not cause any obstruction or hindrance in the above process and CFA further waives all its right to cause any legal impediment in the event of such take over by Sentiss.
49. On the expiry or earlier termination of this agreement, CFA shall immediately hand over the stock of the said products and OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala) District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Page No.14 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi other property or documents belonging to Sentiss which may be in possession of CFA within 7 days from such expiry or termination and will furnish to Sentiss a statement completed in all respects regarding the stocks held at the aforesaid premises immediately prior to the termination".
16. Once it has already been held that the agreement came to an end by efflux of time on 31.12.2019, the obligation cast upon the petitioner under Clauses 47 and 49 to hand over the stock within the stipulated period, automatically became applicable. Thus, learned Arbitrator has adopted a reasonable interpretation of the agreement and appreciation of evidence, which does not call for interference under Section 34 of the Act.
17. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of PSA SICAL Terminals Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Board of Trustees of V.O Chidambranar Port Trust Tuticorin reported as 2021 SCC OnLine SC 508, reiterated its view as taken in MMTC Limited Vs. Vedanta Limited reported as (2019) 4 SCC 163, and held as follows: -
"11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well- settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) i.e., if the award is against the public policy of India. As per the legal position clarified through decisions of this Court prior to the amendments to the 1996 Act in 2015, a violation of Indian public policy, in turn, includes a violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award. Additionally, the concept of the "fundamental policy of Indian Law" would cover compliance with statutes and judicial precedents, adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural justice, and reasonableness. Furthermore, "patent illegality" itself has been held to mean contravention of the substantive law of India, OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala) District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Page No.15 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi contravention of the 1996 Act, and contravention of the terms of the contract.
12. It is only if one of these conditions is met that the Court may interfere with an arbitral award in terms of Section 34(2)
(b)(ii), but such interference does not entail a review of the merits of the dispute, and is limited to situations where the findings of the arbitrator are arbitrary, capricious or perverse, or when the conscience of the Court is shocked, or when the illegality is not trivial but goes to the root of the matter. An arbitral award may not be interfered with if the view taken by the arbitrator is a possible view based on facts."
18. In so far as the remaining objections of the petitioner relating to denial of remuneration and the period of interest are concerned, the same essentially seek re-appreciation of evidence and refer to such issue which do not go into roots of the matter. Such an exercise is impermissible within the limited scope of Section 34 of the Act. I find that the conclusions arrived at by learned Arbitrator on these aspects are based on appreciation of contractual terms and evidence on record and do not suffer from patent illegality or perversity, except to the last part, which relates to direction to pay the awarded amount within 30 days and provided for interest from 31st day from the date of award. Awarded amount and interest could be payable only after lapse of the statutory period provided to challenge the award.
19. In the case of Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., (2025) 7 SCC 1, a Constitution Bench of Supreme Court dealt with the question of power of court to modify award u/s 34 of the Act, by holding as follows: -
"Conclusions
87. Accordingly, the questions of law referred to by Gayatri Balasamy [Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala) District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Page No.16 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1681] are answered by stating that the Court has a limited power under Sections 34 and 37 of the 1996 Act to modify the arbitral award. This limited power may be exercised under the following circumstances:
87.1. When the award is severable, by severing the "invalid"
portion from the "valid" portion of the award, as held in Part II of our Analysis;
87.2. By correcting any clerical, computational or typographical errors which appear erroneous on the face of the record, as held in Parts IV and V of our Analysis;
87.3. Post-award interest may be modified in some circumstances as held in Part IX of our Analysis; and/or"
20. In the present case, the said part of award is severable and it can be modified also without affecting the soul of award.
DECISION
21. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find no infirmity, illegality, or violation of public policy in the impugned arbitral award dated 28.02.2022, except for last portion relating to grant of interest (para-114(g) of the Award). Accordingly, award is modified to the extent that interest on the awarded amount shall be payable w.e.f. 29.05.2022. Rest part of the award cannot be interfered u/s 34 of the Act. This petition is thus, partly allowed.
22. File be consigned to Record Room after due compliance.
Digitally signed by PULASTYA PULASTYA PRAMACHALA PRAMACHALA Date: 2026.01.31 17:57:25 +0530 Pronounced in the (PULASTYA PRAMACHALA) Open Court on this District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, st 31 day of January, 2026 Patiala House Court, New Delhi OMP (COMM.) No. 82/2022 (Pulastya Pramachala) District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Page No.17 of 17 Patiala House Court, New Delhi