Punjab-Haryana High Court
Balwant Singh vs Labour Court And Ors. on 23 May, 1995
Equivalent citations: (1997)IIILLJ635P&H, (1995)111PLR298
JUDGMENT Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.
1. The petitioner is aggrieved by the award dated April 7, 1993 given by the Labour Court. The petitioner's claim has been rejected on the ground that he had challenged the order dated July 5, 1985 terminating his services after a period of about five years when he issued the notice of demand on July 3, 1990. On this basis, the learned Labour Court has found that the workman is not entitled to any relief.
2. It is in this situation that the petitioner has filed the present petition.
3. Mr. Vikas Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 prescribed no period of limitation within which a workman has to challenge the order of termination. As such, the action of the Labour Court in declining the relief to the petitioner on the ground of delay, cannot be sustained. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jai Bhagwan v. Management of the Ambala Central Cooperative Bank Ltd., (1984-I-LLJ-52) and the decisions of this Court in Management of Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Miss Neelam Kwnari, 1993 2 104 P.L.R. 552 and The Patiala Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 1990(5) S.L.R. 509. The claim made on behalf of the petitioner has been controverted by the learned counsel for the respondents.
4. The short question that arises for consideration is - Has the Labour Court erred in declining relief to the petitioner-workman on the ground of delay.
5. It is true that the Act does not prescribe a period of limitation within which an aggrieved workman has to raise a demand and seek a reference of the dispute. However, it is equally settled that the Courts help the vigilant. A person who remains 'aloof', indifferent or recalcitrant' is deemed to have acquiesced. He cannot be allowed to say that he is aggrieved. He may be deemed to have waived his right to the remedy and relief by his conduct and neglect. Lapse of time and delay may put the party in a situation where it may become totally inequitable, unjust and unfair to grant him any relief.
6. The Constitution under Article 22 guarantees "the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of fundamental rights as provided for in Part III. It also empowers the High Courts to issue certain writs. No period of limitation has been prescribed in respect of either of the remedies. Still, it has been held that "in cases of delayed and stale claims, not only the Court would, but it 'should' take note of the evidence of neglect of a party's right for a long time". In fact, in State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Bhailal Bhai A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1006 , the Court held that the "maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil Court must be brought, may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured." If delay can defeat even a constitutional remedy for the enforcement of a fundamental or any other right, it does not appear to be reasonable to say that a Labour Court is bound to interfere even in a case where a workman has been clearly negligent in seeking his remedy and offers no explanation whatsoever for the delay. If the analogy of the Statute of limitation can be invoked in proceedings under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, there appears to be no rationale for the view that the workman shall be entitled to the grant of relief irrespective of the delay and that the Labour Court shall have no jurisdiction to decline the relief merely because the Government has made a reference under Section 10 of the Act. It can lead to inequitable results. It can jeopardise Industrial peace. It can have an "unsettling effect" on the "employer's financial arrangement".
7. Mr. Vikas Singh contends that once a reference is made, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of delay or to decline the relief on that account. In view of the provisions of Section 10, the appropriate Government has only to form an opinion about the existence or apprehension of an Industrial dispute. Once this test is satisfied, the Government acquires the jurisdiction to refer the dispute for adjudication. The words 'at any time' imply that the jurisdiction of the Government is not barred by any limitation of time. However, it is equally settled that the Government does not go into the merits of the dispute. It only refers the case for adjudication. The burden of deciding the dispute is on the Court. The mere fact that a reference has been made, does not mean that the Court is precluded from examining whether in fact, an industrial dispute existed or there was some basis for forming an opinion in that behalf. The discretion of the Government is not unfettered or arbitrary. Equally it is open to the adjudicating Court to consider whether the claim is stale and the explanation, if any for the delay is satisfactory. If the Government allows itself "to be stampeded into making reference of old or stale disputes" the Court cannot be a silent spectator. To illustrate, if the Government under the pressure of the Union refers a dispute for adjudication after a lapse of say 20 years, it cannot be said that the Court has to determine and decide the dispute on merits and ignore the delay totally.
8. The decisions referred to by Mr. Vikas Singh may be briefly noticed. In Jai Bhagwan's case (supra), the Labour Court had rejected the claim of the workman on merits and not on the ground of delay. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while reversing the award of the Labour Court held that the workman was not entitled to full back-wages as he had raised the dispute "after considerable delay without anything in the meanwhile to question the termination of his services..." Since the Labour Court had not declined the relief on the ground of delay, the issue that arose for consideration of their Lordships was not similar to that which arises in the present case. In Neelam Kumari's case (supra), one of the issues was "Whether there is any limitation prescribed for raising an industrial dispute" ? It was answered in the negative. However, their Lordships were pleased to observe as under : -
"We may hasten to add that inordinate delay in raising dispute would result in producing unjust result and it may prove counter-productive to industrial peace. The inactivity of a worker in raising dispute may disentitle him from the relief and no premium can be permitted for the inactivity of the claimant or the applicant. One cannot be permitted to take benefit of one's own wrong..."
The above observations clearly support the action of the Labour Court in the present case. The petitioner admittedly approached the appropriate authority by way of a demand notice after a lapse of almost five years. He gave no explanation for this long delay. Even in the writ petition, no explanation whatsoever has been offered. If any relief is granted to him, it would be permitting the petitioner to take advantage of his own wrong.
9. Lastly, Mr. Vikas Singh has referred to the decision in the case of Patiala Central Cooperative Bank (supra). It was held as under: -
"The only argument raised by the counsel for the petitioner is that the services of workman were terminated in 1973; workman sought the reference in August 1980, and the appropriate Government made the reference to the Labour Court in October 1980. The reference being belated the Labour Court should not have entertained it and that the Labour Court has erred in ordering reinstatement of the workman. I do not find any force in this contention. No doubt, it is desirable that there should not be undue, delay in making a reference by the appropriate Government, but delay and, laches cannot be made a ground for striking down a reference. The making of reference is an administrative action and the Government is the final authority for that. The Labour Court would not enter that arena and refuse to entertain the reference on account of delay. It is duty bound to decide the reference on merits".
10. We are unable to subscribe to the view taken by the learned Judge that Labour Court would not enter that arena and refuse to entertain the reference on account of delay". In our view, it is open to the Labour Court to decline the relief in a case where the workman has been negligent and has offered no satisfactory explanation for the delay in approaching the appropriate authority. We also find that in Shalimar Works Ltd. v. its Workmen, (1959 - II -LLJ - 26) it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the relief of reinstatement should not have been given to the discharged workman as the reference had been made after four years of the dispute having arisen.
11. In our view, the Labour Court had the jurisdiction to decline the relief on the ground of delay. Its action in doing so was neither illegal nor unjust. It suffers from no error. We find no ground to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution with the discretion exercised by the Court Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed in limine.