Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
S.H. Javeri vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh Rep. By Its ... on 18 October, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1996(4)ALT802
Author: B. Sudershan Reddy
Bench: B. Sudershan Reddy
JUDGMENT B. Sudershan Reddy, J.
1. This Court's extraordinary jurisdiction is invoked by the petitioner in a matter which is basically and essentially a civil dispute between the petitioner and Respondents 3 and 5. The suit already filed by the petitioner in O.S. No. 37 of 1995 on the file of the learned V Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad is still pending and therefore, whatever observations that are made while disposing of this writ petition should be treated as meant for disposal of this writ petition alone and such observations, if any, shall have no bearing whatsoever upon the pending civil proceedings between the parties. It may not be really necessary to notice all the facts except such facts which are necessary for disposal of this writ petition.
2. Even according to the petitioner, the writ petition is filed challenging the arbitrary and illegal action on the part of respondents 3 and 4 and the conduct of Respondent No. 4 herein. It is alleged that the conduct of the respondent Hotel is in gross violation of judicial order and this affects and violates the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Though the Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by its Secretary, Home is made as a party to this writ petition, nothing is mentioned against the Government and the affidavit filed by the petitioner himself does not disclose any cause against the 1st respondent. It is rather difficult to appreciate as to why the 2nd respondent-Commissioner of Police is also impleaded as one of the respondents in the writ petition. All the allegations levelled and averments made and the contentions raised are against the respondents 3 to 5.
3. The writ petitioner filed O.S. No. 37 of 1995 on the file of the V Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for a declaration declaring that the 3rd respondent herein is not entitled to adjust the advance payment of Rs. 1 lakh made by the petitioner towards the dues payable by H.E.H. the Nizam's Private Estate, and to grant a decree of mandatory injunction permitting the plaintiff, his family members to use and have access to Room No. 102 in Gateway Hotel, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad (3rd respondent) till the advance amount of Rs. 1 lakh paid by the petitioner is adjusted till the date when the petitioner is given possession of Room No. 102 in the said Hotel and in the alternative to pass a decree for refund of advance payment of Rs. 1 lakh to the petitioner along with future interest at 24% p.a. from the date of the suit till realisation and permit the petitioner to remove the belongings lying in Room No. 102 in the said Hotel. Such a simple suit led to filing of many interlocutory applications between the parties.
4. In the said suit, the petitioner filed I.A. No. 750 of 1995 under Order 39 Rule 1 C.P.C. to allow him to have the access for use of Room No. 102 in the said Hotel which was allowed by the trial Court on 27-7-1995 and the 3rd respondent Hotel preferred an appeal C.M.A. No. 983 of 1995 in this Court. The 5th Respondent Nizam filed an application I.A. No. 824/95 under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC for appointment of Commissioner to take inventory of articles lying in Room No. 102 for the purpose of ascertaining the articles belonging to him. The said application was dismissed by the trial Court on the same day against which the 5th respondent preferred a C.R.P. 2575/1995. This Court by an order dated 10-10-1995 disposed of both the C.M.A. 983/95 and C.R.P. No. 2575/95. Civil Revision Petition and the C.M.A. were allowed by this Court directing the trial Court to appoint a Commissioner to take inventory of the goods in Room No. 102 of the said Hotel and keep them in the custody of the Hotel itself till the disposal of the suit However, the properties which are not liable for attachment under Section 60 of the C.P.C. were directed to be released and handed over to the petitioner. The petitioner herein, however, preferred L.P.A. No. 146 of 1995 against the Judgment in C.M.A. No. 983/95 dated 10-10-1995. In the L.P.A. a Division Bench of this Court by an order dated 23-11-1995 permitted the petitioner herein to remove his articles from Room No. 102 on furnishing security in the shape of Bank guarantee for a specified sum therein within 15 days and the Bank guarantee to be so furnished were to be renewed from time to time till the disposal of the suit. The Division Bench specifically directed the inventory as directed in the common order dated 10-10-1995 passed by the learned single Judge shall be made within a week. The L.P.A. was disposed of with such directions.
5. The learned V Addl. Judge by an order Dt.1-12-1995 appointed the 4th respondent herein as Advocate-Commissioner to take inventory of the articles lying in Room No. 102 with a further direction to return the goods which are not liable to be attached under Section 60 C.P.C. to the petitioner herein. The Commissioner completed the inventory of the articles lying in Room No. 102 in the presence of the parties. On 8-12-1995 the petitioner is stated to have submitted draft bank guarantee for the approval of the Court.
6. It however, appears that the 5th respondent Nizam filed an interlocutory application No. 1677/1995 seeking direction from the Court to permit one Md. Hameed of Nizam private estate to be present at the time of taking inventary but the same was dismissed and the Nizam preferred C.R.P. No. 4363/1995 and the same was allowed by this Court on 29-12-1995. But the C.R.P.No.4362/95 filed by Nizam against the order dated 14-2-1995 dismissing I.A. No. 1724/95 challenging the appointment of 4th respondent as Advocate-Commissioner was dismissed as "not pressed".
7. In the meanwhile the learned V Addl. Judge, disposed of LA. No. 824/95 filed by Nizam (5th respondent herein) and I.A. No. 71/96 filed by the petitioner to accept the Bank guarantee and I.A. No. 16/96 filed by the 3rd respondent Hotel for shifting the goods from Room No. 102 of the Hotel and draft Bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner herein was rejected. However, as directed earlier by this Court the goods which cannot be attached under Section 60 C.P.C. were ordered to be released to the petitioner and the rest of the articles were directed to be shifted into any other room from Room No. 102. It is required to be noticed that on Memo filed by the 3rd respondent Hotel, the learned trial Judge has directed the Advocate Commissioner (4th respondent herein) to execute the Order dated 6-3-1996 and shift the articles from Room No. 102 of the Hotel. In the meanwhile this Court by an order dated 12-3-1996 issued necessary directions to release the travel documents of the petitioner.
8. The petitioner once again filed C.R.P. 1042 and 1053/96 against the order passed by the trial Court on 6-3-1996 in I.A. Nos. 16 and 71 of 1996. Both the revisions were dismissed with costs by this Court quantifying the costs at Rs. 3,000/- and further directed that the process of shifting all the goods should be completed within one week from the date of the order by giving notice to the parties and the learned trial Judge was directed to fix a new date for the purpose of carrying out the directions.
9. The petitioner once again filed C.R.P. 1744/1996 against the order dated 4-4-1996 alleging that the order was passed in I.A. No. 750 of 1995 and not in I.A. No. 16 of 1995. This Court entertained the C.R.P. and granted stay of further proceedings in O.S. No. 735 of 1995 including shifting of articles from Room No. 102 pursuant to the order in I.A. No. 16 of 1996 dated 4-4-1996. However, this Court by an order dated 22-5-1996 on an application to vacate the stay order filed by the 3rd respondent Hotel passed the following Order:
"The order dated 4-4-96 was passed by the lower Court to execute the order dated 6-3-1996 which had no separate existence and I agree with the submission made by the learned counsel for R-1 that when once C.R.P. No. 1042/96 filed against the order dated 6-3-96 in I.A. No. 16-96 was dismissed on 24-4-96 by the High Court and confirmed on 10-5-96 by the Supreme Court in SLP No. 10494-94/96, the present CRP is not maintainable.
A serious note is required to be taken out of the fact inspite of the order passed by the Court directing the petitioner to vacate Room No. 102 of the respondent No. 1/Gateway Hotel, for one reason or another the petitioner has been indulging into defeating or atleast delaying the implementation of the aforesaid order passed by the Court which could indeed to be taken as causing serious prejudice to the respondent No. 1 on account of the fact that it is a room in a hotel which could be rented out on day to day basis to the customers to fetch a considerable amount of income, which according to the learned Counsel would not be less than Rs. 5,000/- per day. Having regard to the fact that the said room is directed to be vacated by the Court's order which has braved rough weather upto the Supreme Court without being impeached in any manner, it is necessary and high time that the same should be allowed to be operated and enforced.
In the above view of the matter therefore, the CMP No. 7522 of 1996 praying for stay of further proceedings in O.S. No. 735/95 on the file of the V Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in so far as it concerns the shifting of articles from Room No. 102 of the 1st respondent/Gateway Hotel pursuant to the orders dated 4-4-1996 passed in I.A. No. 16/96 in I.A. No. 824/95 in O.S. No. 735/95 is dismissed, with costs.
Advocate's fee is fixed at Rs. 2,500/-."
10. In I.A. No. 174/96 filed by the petitioner herein, the trial Court directed the Advocate-Commissioner to release the travel documents being Item Nos. 796, 797, 798, 955 and 956 of the Commissioner's list prepared after the inventory. It appears that on 30th June, 1996, the Commissioner received the objections raised by the petitioner for shifting of the articles stating that the Commissioner should seek the assistance of professional packers but refused to suggest the name and left the venue by filing a memo for adjournment. The Commissioner thereafter adjourned the proceedings after putting some articles into a trunk and sealed for the purpose of shifting. Thereafter the Commissioner appear to have issued another notice to the counsel appearing on behalf of the parties fixing the date as 6-10-1996 to execute the warrant and to comply with the directions issued by the trial Court as well as by this Court through various orders. On 3-10-1996 the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner addressed a letter to the Commissioner objecting to the services of Jet packers and permit the petitioner to bring his own packers. It is also stated in the notice that the Commissioner should deliver passport and other travel documents and the goods and other articles which cannot be attached under Section 60 of the C.P.C. and only thereafter shift the remaining articles.
11. It is complained that the 4th respondent herein by an endorsement dated 6-10-1996 stated that he will issue a reply to the objections raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, if he feels necessary. It is alleged that the Advocate Commissioner came only at 11-30 A.M. on 6-10-1996 to execute the warrant and thereafter the counsel for the 3rd respondent came to the venue and both of them had some discussion and thereafter proceeded to Room No. 102 ignoring the presence of the petitioner's counsel. It is stated that number of strangers were present when the Advocate-Commissioner opened the lock of Room No. 102. The petitioner's counsel once again raised objections with regard to the presence of Jet packers, but the Commissioner is stated to have said that he would use the services of Jet packers and he would go ahead with the execution of the Commission. It is alleged that the Commissioner was acting in a high handed manner. At this stage, this Court in a motion moved by the petitioner interdicted the further proceedings and the order was served upon the Advocate-Commissioner at 1-30 p.m. on 6-10-1996 and the proceedings were closed at 3-45 p.m.
12. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, it is specifically alleged that the Advocate Commissioner had opened the locks from inside the room and also the cup-boards without anybody's presence on behalf of the petitioner and on behalf of the 5th respondent and such opening of the lock was done by the petitioner in the presence of several people belonging to the 3rd respondent-Hotel and some police personnel. The conduct of the 4th respondent is alleged to be improper and unauthorised. It is also stated that no inventory or list prepared as to what articles were removed from Room No. 102 on 6-10-1996 and except the 4th respondent-Commissioner and the 3rd respondent-hotel no one else were present. This action of respondent-Commissioner is stated to be against the order dated 6-3-1996 directing the Advocate Commissioner to take steps for shifting of articles only after delivery of items to the petitioner which were ordered to be delivered and thereafter shift the remaining articles. The action of the Commissioner is stated to be against the directions of the Court.
13. It is stated that the items and goods involved are very valuable and the Commissioner ought to have appreciated the same and should have directed the petitioner to arrange for packing those articles and then removed them from Room No. 102 instead of engaging the services of Jet packers. It is also alleged that the Advocate Commissioner did not assertain the suitability of the room where the articles were proposed to be locked.
14. Thus it is clear that the entire subject matter of the writ petition and the dispute between the parties is undoubtedly civil in nature and the same is the subject matter of suit and various interlocutory proceedings on the file of the learned V Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. In the instant writ petition, the petitioner prays for the following reliefs:
(a) the action of respondents 3 and 4 in withholding several of the essential items in their Hotel room No. 102 (Taj Residency), Hyderabad, including the passports of the petitioner, his wife, his children and his servant maid inspite of Court orders in I.A. No. 71/96 in O.S. No. 735/95 as arbitrary, illegal, unauthorised and as in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioner under Constitution of India,
(b) declare the action of respondents 3 and 4 on 6th October, 1996 in meddling with valuable items which are in the room No. 102 of Taj Residency, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad, under the guise of executing warrants of commission entrusted to 4th respondent is arbitrary, illegal, unauthorised, and as in violation of orders passed by the V Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, on 6th March, 1996 in I.A. No. 824/95 and batch in O.S. 735/95 and as in violation of orders passed by this Court in C.M.A. 983/95.
(c) declare the action of subordinates of respondent No. 2 in being present at room No. 102 of the Taj Residency Hotel, Hyderabad on 6th October, 1996 as arbitrary, illegal and as unauthorised interference in a civil dispute among the parties,
(d) declare the action and conduct of the 4th respondent on 6th October, 1996 in discharge of his functions as Advocate Commissioner as arbitrary, illegal, unauthorised and as in violation of the Court orders and as ultra vires of his powers and also issue a consequential direction directing:
(i) for the appointment of an Officer of this Court as Commissioner to ensure that all the articles including the passports of petitioners and his people ordered to be given to the petitioner in I.A. No. 71/95 in O.S. 735/95 are duly handed over to the petitioner.
(ii) direct the officer of this Court to prepare an inventory of all the articles in Room No. 102 to ascertain as to whether all the articles as per the inventory list earlier prepared by the Advocate Commissioner are existing and if not which items are missing from Room No. 102, and
(iii) direct the respondent No. 4 to furnish to this Court list of all articles which have been removed from room No. 102 on 6th October, 1996 without the presence of any of the parties concerned including the petitioner and respondent No. 5 and restrain respondent No. 4 from in any way interfering or functioning as Commissioner with regard to subject matter of goods in room No. 102 and also order for payment of compensation of Rs. 10 lakhs by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 for the loss, suffering and damage they have caused to the goods of the petitioner high-handedly and arbitrarily, in the interest of justice.
15. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, so far as it relates to the Commissioner, it is further stated that the Advocate Commissioner has opened the lock from inside the room and also the cup-boards without anybody's presence on behalf of the petitioner. A very serious allegation was levelled against the 4th respondent herein attributing not only mala fides but mis-conduct. The petitioner has gone to the extent of alleging that the 4th respondent and the 3rd respondent must have meddled with valuable records. It is stated that no inventory list was prepared as to what articles were removed from the said room on 6-10-1996. The petitioner submits that the respondents 3 and 4 have acted in a manner amounting to contempt of the orders passed by the trial Court as well as by this Court. It is alleged that the 4th respondent-Commissioner is guilty of gross abuse of his power as Advocate- Commissioner. He did not conduct the proceedings in the manner in which the Advocate Commissioner has to conduct the proceedings. In nut shell the conduct of the Advocate-Commissioner with particular reference to the events on 6-10-1996 is under attack. It is stated that the 4th respondent-Advocate Commissioner is not authorised either under the warrant entrusted to him or under the common order dt.6-3-1996 to take the assistance of any third parties for removing the goods and the Advocate-Commissioner ought to have taken all necessary precautions and steps to shift the articles by himself, as the articles involved was very precious and valuable. It is alleged that the Advocate-Commissioner did not ascertain the suitability of the room where the proposed articles are to be kept.
16. There is no authority vested in the Commissioner in keeping the articles after removing the same from the said room with the 3rd respondent.
17. The petitioner further complains that the 4th respondent has no such authority under the warrant entrusted to him to take any police help. It is not clear as to why and under what circumstances, the Advocate Commissioner took the help of the Police. The entire conduct of the Advocate-Commissioner and the proceedings conducted by him on 6-10-1996 is under challenge.
18. The writ petition was originally taken up on file by this Court on the basis of a letter written by the petitioner on 6-10-1996 stating that "the Advocate Commissioner opened the room No. 102 which was earlier sealed along with him four other unknown persons also were there. My counsel asked as to who are they, the Commissioner told that they are from jet packers and he instructed them to come. He said he will reply to my Advocate's letter if he feels it necessary. He further said that at any cost he will shift the articles. The counsel for the Hotel Management also has said the same thing. The said room was under my occupation for over 6 years. Very valuable items are there. As aforesaid, under the garb of shifting, they are meddling with them. The Advocate Commissioner is acting contrary to the orders under which he was directed to give the articles to me and to shift the remaining articles,"
"I am approaching this Hon'ble Chief Justice in the extraordinary circumstances straight from the Hotel premises. The Management of the Hotel and the Advocate Commissioner who has opened the said room is inside the room. They will meddle with my valuable goods. As there is no time even to file an affidavit duly typed, I pray that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to ensure the due implementation of the Court order with Police help. The articles with-hold by the Hotel Management including my passports, daily using material and my fundamental rights are affected".
19. The petitioner's wife addressed another letter to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice dated 5-10-1996 inter alia stating that "the urgency of this letter is now precipitated, since the Advocate Commissioner has fixed a date for the 6th October, to deliver our passports and items under Section 60 CPC and shift the remaining items which include all my personal items mentioned above. This being the 4th such date fixed. The previous experience shows the mala fide and bias attitude of the Commissioner in collusion with the Taj Group and the Nizam. I therefore apprehend that once again I may be made to suffer at the hands of the collusive conspiracy which will cause my children and me immense loss and hardship. Once action to shift my items is taken, I will be embroiled in my husband's litigation. I therefore humbly pray your honour, for suitable orders". This was also taken up along with the representation made by the petitioner and it is now numbered as a C.R.P. under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
20. Respondent No. 3 filed detailed counter-affidavit denying all the material averments in the petition made by the petitioner against the Hotel. It is stated inter alia that due to the conduct of the petitioner, the Hotel is being put to loss of revenue from Room No. 102 for over one year and four months. Rennovation and upgrading work of the Room is stalled. The rent previously was over Rs. 5,000/- per day and now it is over Rs,7,000/- per day. An objection about the maintainability of the writ petition is also taken. It is stated that the petitioner was responsible for the Commissioner in not executing the warrant on 30th June, 1996 and the Commissioner was forced to adjourn the commission, as the petitioner and his counsel Sri G. Arun have objected for shifting the articles. The allegation that there were some henchmen and supporters of the Hotel present at the site is denied.
21. It is further submitted that all the articles lying in Room No. 102 have already been identified and marked by the Advocate Commissioner from 8-12-1995 in the presence of the petitioner and from these articles, the articles covered by Section 60 CPC were ordered to be returned to the petitioner and remaining articles were directed to be shifted to some other room in the Hotel. This is exactly what the Commissioner proposed to do on 6-10-1996. M/s. Jet Packers were called by the Commissioner, as the petitioner and his Advocate Sri Arun have requested the Commissioner on 30th June, 1996 to seek the assistance of the professional packers. The Commissioner, in fact, requested the petitioner to suggest the name of professional packers, but he refused to do so. This aspect of the matter is recorded by the Commissioner in his proceedings dated 30th June, 1996. It is further stated that the Commissioner in execution of the warrant has identified the articles, items to be handed over to the petitioner and thereafter proceeded to the packing and shifting of the other articles. Thus the Commissioner has not committed any irregularity or misconducted himself.
22. The Advocate Commissioner also filed separate counter-affidavit denying all the material allegations made by the petitioner. It is stated that he has conducted the proceedings in accordance with law and has not committed any misconduct whatsoever, as alleged by the petitioner. The Advocate Commissioner in detail referred to the action taken by him pursuant to the warrant of appointment, and there is no need to refer to all of them in detail. It would be necessary to refer in particular as to what the Commissioner did from 12-9-1996 onwards. It is stated by him that a notice dated 24-9-1996 was issued by him to three counsel fixing the date of commission on 6-10-1996 at 11 A.M. and this was pursuant to the directions issued by the learned V Addl. Judge in I.A. No. 71/96. All the parties were also informed that the Commissioner would be taking assistance of M/s. Jet packers, Hyderabad for packing various delicate items. In reply to the said letter dated 24-9-1996 Sri S. Satyanarayana Prasad, Advocate, Hyderabad, addressed a letter dated 3-10-1996 to him requesting the Commissioner not to permit the presence of any third parties except the parties to the proceedings and their authorised representatives and his client is objecting for taking the assistance of M/s. Jet packers and that his client and his client's wife have to be permitted to bring their own packers. In the said letter, the learned counsel further requested the Commissioner to deliver his client's passport and other items as ordered in I.A. No. 71/96 and only thereafter the room would be inspected for shifting the remaining articles. This letter was served on the Commissioner on 5-10-1996. It is stated by the Commissioner that the petitioner was not at all justified in writing such letter and therefore, he thought that there was no need to issue any reply. It is also stated in categorical terms that on 4-10-1996 the Commissioner addressed a letter to the Station House Officer, Banjara Hills Police Station, Hyderabad requesting him to depute police personnel to Room No. 102, Hotel Banjara at 11 A.M. on 6-10-1996.
23. The Commissioner in categorical terms states that he had reached Room No. 102 at 11 A.M. on 6-10-1996 as scheduled for executing the warrant of commission. The counsel for the petitioner requested him to postpone the commission on the ground that the petitioner has an objection for the assistance being taken by the Commissioner from M/s. Jet Packers Private Limited and insisted that the Commissioner should take the assistance of the persons named by the petitioner. The Commissioner refused to accept the suggestion and immediately the petitioner and his counsel left Room No. 102 stating that they were refusing to participate in the commission. The request to furnish the work memo was also rejected by the petitioner and his counsel. It is stated by him that he had identified the articles of the items to be handed over to the petitioner and thereafter proceeded with packing and shifting of the items, by taking all the necessary precautions for shifting of the items.
24. While the execution of the warrant was going on, he was served with an order at about 1-30 p.m. from the petitioner and his counsel came and served a notice stating that this Court granted stay of further proceedings and immediately the further proceedings were stopped. However, by the time some of the items were already shifted from the cellar room and the same was put under lock and seal. The Commissioner admits that the counsel for the petitioner demanded a list of articles shifted from room No. 102 to the cellar room and the Commissioner requested the learned counsel for the petitioner to accompany him to the cellar room for furnishing a list, but he refused to do so. It is stated that the items shifted to the cellar room were kept in 6 carton boxes and 3 tin boxes and 2 wooden almirahs duly sealing the same. The cellar room is stated to be near the Security Office of the Hotel and the Commissioner is stated to have requested the Hotel to post guards round the clock to guard the room where the articles were shifted and kept.
25. In nutshell; the Commissioner states that he has not acted in any partisan manner showing any undue interest in the matter but acted strictly in accordance with the directions issued by the Court from time to time.
26. The 5th respondent in the counter-affidavit however submits that the counsel for the parties were served notices for the proceedings to be conducted on 30-6-1996. The counsel for the 5th respondent was not served with a notice and he could not be present by which the interest of the 5th respondent sufferred. However, it is admitted that the Advocate Commissioner got served a notice upon the learned counsel for the 5th respondent for the meeting to be held on 6-10-1996, as it happened to be the birth day of the 5th respondent, nobody could be present on that day on behalf of the 5th respondent. The averments made in the counter-affidavit filed by the 5th respondent would show that even the 5th respondent had some grievance against the Commissioner and the manner in which the Commissioner is stated to have conducted the proceedings in executing the warrant of commission. The other averments made in the counter-affidavit need not be referred to.
27. All these facts referred to hereinabove and the pleadings in the case filed by the parties would show that it is undoubtedly and essentially a dispute between the parties which is civil in nature. The affidavit filed in support of the writ petition more or less is in the nature of a charge-sheet against the Advocate Commissioner. Even the relief that is sought in the writ petition is against the Advocate Commissioner. The dispute mostly centres around the manner in which the Advocate Commissioner is alleged to have conducted himself in the process of executing the warrant of appointment. Not only the petitioner but the 5th respondent also has some complaint against the Advocate Commissioner. Even the wife of the petitioner made a complaint against him to this Court through the letter dated 5-10-1996 (this letter is also treated as C.R.P. under Article 227 of the Constitution of India). But it is rather surprising to note that some allegations are levelled by the wife of the petitioner even on 5-10-1996 stating that "the previous experience shows the mala fide and bias attitude of the Commissioner in collusion with the Taj Group and the Nizam". The petitioner's wife also apprehends that "once again she may be made to suffer at the hands of the collusive conspiracy which will cause her children and herself immense loss and hardship". It is rather difficult to presume that the petitioner never had the knowledge of the contents of the letter addressed by the petitioner's wife.
28. Be that as it may what is that arises for consideration by this Court in this writ petition? Can it be said that appropriate directions could not have been granted by the Civil Court where the suit between the parties is pending. The very fact that one after the other interlocutory applications were being filed by the parties would show that the matter was being very closely monitored by the learned trial Judge. Almost all the interlocutory orders passed by the learned trial Judge became the subject matter of serious debate and controversy in this Court in various Civil Revision Petitions and Civil Miscellaneous Appeals. In such view of the matter, it would be rather difficult to appreciate as to why the petitioner has chosen to file the instant writ petition for the relief which he could have as well obtained from the Civil Court, if the facts stated by the petitioner are true and correct.
29. Sri Satyanarayana Prasad, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, however, submits that this Court in appropriate cases can always interfere in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction to meet the ends of justice even in a matter which may be essentially civil in nature. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that mere pendency of the suit in the trial Court would not affect the power or jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel submits that there is nothing unusual or extraordinary in petitioner invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Infact, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, there was no other remedy that could have saved the situation. There will not be any difficulty whatsoever in agreeing with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, so far as it relates to power and jurisdiction of the Court is concerned. The question is the exercise of power.
30. A close scrutiny of the pleadings and the material available on record would not reveal that the proceedings of the Commissioner on 6-10-1996 would have led to any irretrievable and irreversible situation and the same could not have been rectified by the Civil Court. It is evident that the Civil Court was issuing necessary directions from time to time in the matter of execution of warrant by the Commissioner. The Code of Civil Procedure is a comprehensive piece of Legislation regulating the proceedings in the Civil Court and it takes care of every conceivable situation. The Code, infact, declares that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. It is well settled that such power can always be invoked by a person if the relief could not be granted to such person with reference to any specific provision of the Code of Civil Procedure. In fact, the manner in which the matter was being dealt with by the trial Court would itself show that necessary directions were being issued from time to time. The order dated 11th June, 1996 in I A. No. 174/1996 the Court observed:
"Now coming to the shifting of the articles from room No. 102 to some other portion in the premises of the defendant No. 1 hotel. It is to be seen that no doubt this Court has directed by an order dated 6-3-1996 in I.A. 16/96 the articles covered by Section 60 of CPC as identified by this Court should be released and handover first to the plaintiff and thereafter the remaining articles should be shifted thereform. But the intention and idea beyond passing the said order was ultimately to shift all the articles from room No. 102. The subsequent legal proceedings were neither accepted nor contemplated while passed the said order. The ultimate and sole aim was to vacate the room by removing all the articles therefrom so as to avoid any further monetary loss to the defendant No. 1 hotel. Therefore, now sticking to the very same earlier wordings in the order dated 6-3-1996 passed in I.A. No. 16/96 will ultimately to defeat the very aim and purpose of passing the order. In implementing the order of shifting of all the articles by taking narrow view of the said wordings will be too technical and will defeat the ends of justice and equity. In this regard the observation made by the Hon'ble High Court while disposing off C.R.P. Nos. 1042/96 and 1053/96 referred above, so also in C.M.P. No. 7522/96 in C.R.P. No. 1744/96 have to be taken into consideration."
The parties after invoking the jurisdiction of the Civil Court are bound to proceed and adopt the remedies that are available under the Code of Civil Procedure, but not to resort to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The right to judicial remedies provided by the Constitution of India and conferment of power upon this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has its own history, growth and philosophy. This Court is empowered to issue writs in the nature of Mandamus, Certiorari, quo-warranto, Habeas Corpus in appropriate cases to meet the ends of justice. Essentially the remedy available under Article 226 of Constitution of India is Public Law remedy. This extraordinary jurisdiction normally, cannot be allowed to be invoked to settle, resolve or adjudicate the disputes arising out of private law. Questions of title relating to immovable property, claims and counter-claims in respect of moveable property, rights arising under the Contract are normally to be adjudicated in Civil proceedings.
31. It is not as if Article 226 of the Constitution of India enables any person to obtain whatever relief without any limitation. The Court's jurisdiction and power to issue writ to any "person" or "authority" for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred either by Part III and for any "other purpose" is to be exercised, according to well established principles. The literal construction of expression "any person" for "any purpose" would lead to choatic situation and may adversely affect the judicial system and administration of justice itself.
32. The higher Courts in India have repeatedly held that exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary in nature and the Court would decline to interfere (i) if there is an alternative remedy; (ii) if the conduct of the party disentitles him for the relief; (iii) if the petition involves disputed questions of fact. It is no doubt true that these limitations are imposed upon the Courts by themselves and for good reasons. Pragmatic considerations weighed with Courts in imposing fetters upon itself. Great Judges endowed with wisdom and foresight laid down the law as to in what manner the discretion should be used in exercising the great Constitutional power of issuing writs. In Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of. Gujarat, , the Apex Court, though in a different context observed:
"If this Court takes upon itself to do everything which even the High Courts can do this Court will not be able to do what this Court alone can do under Article 136 of the Constitution and other provisions conferring exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. There is no reason to assume that the concerned High Court will not do justice. Or that this Court alone can do justice. If this Court entertains Writ Petitions at the instance of parties who approach this Court directly instead of approaching the concerned High Court in the first instance, tens of thousands of Writ Petitions would in course of time be instituted in this Court directly. The inevitable result will be that the arrears pertaining to matters in respect of which this Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution will assume more alarming proportions. As it is, more than ten years old Civil Appeals and Criminal Appeals are sobbing for attention. It will occasion great misery and immense hardship to tens of thousands of litigants if the seriousness of this aspect is not sufficiently realized. And this is no imaginary phobia. A dismissed Government servant has to wait for nearly ten years for redress in this Court. (Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India . A litigant whose appeal has been dismissed by wrongly refusing to condone delay has to wait for 14 years before his wrong is righted by this Court. O. Shankarrao v. Chandrasenkunwar, (Civil Appeal No. 1335 (N) of 1973 decided on January 29,1987). The time for imposing self-discipline has already come, even if it involves shedding of some amount of institutionalego, or raising of some eyebrows. Again, it is as important to do justice at this level, as to inspire confidence in the litigants that justice will be meted out to them at the High Court level. and other levels, (emphasis applied) Faith must be inspired in the hierarchy of Courts and the institution as a whole. Not only in this Court alone. And this objective can be achieved only by this Court showing trust in the High Court by directing the litigants to approach the High Court in the first instance. Besides, as a matter of fact, if matters like the present one are instituted in the High Court, there is likelihood of the same being disposed of much more quickly, and equally effectively, on account of the decentralisation of the process of administering justice. We are of the opinion that the petitioner should be directed to adopt this course and approach the High Court."
In Ghan Shyam Das Gupta and Anr. v. Anat Kumar Sinha and others, the Apex Court held:
"The principle as to when the High Court should exercise its special jurisdiction under Article 226 and when to refuse to do so on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy has been settled by a long line of cases. The remedy provided under Article 226 is not intended to supersede the modes of obtaining relief before a Civil Court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions. As was observed in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Ventaka Rao, the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is supervisory in nature and is not meant for correcting errors like an appellate Court. In Thansingh Nathmal v. A. Mazid, a case dealing with liability to pay Sales Tax, the appellants without following the statutory remedy under the Sales Tax Act, moved the High Court under Article 226 on the ground that the Act was ultra vires. The challenge was rejected. Another contention, namely, that the finding of the Commissioner that the goods were actually within the State at the time of the contract was based on no evidence and was purely speculative, was also raised. This ground also failed before the High Court and the writ petition was dismissed. Approving the decision, this Court observed that if the appellants had pursued the statutory remedy under the Act and the question had been referred to the High Court, the Court could have appropriately advised the Commissioner, but not having done so, the High Court could not be asked to assume the role of an appellate Court over the decision of the Commissioner either on a question of fact or even of law. Again when a learned single Judge of the High Court and on appeal a Division Bench proceeded to examine the correctness of an order in relation to grant of a permit to ply a vehicle under the Motor Vehicles Act, it was observed by this Court in M. Naina Mohammed v. K.A. Natarajan, , that the power under Article 226 is supervisory in nature and the Judges at both the tiers had unwittingly slipped into the subtle but, fatal, error of exercising a kind of appellate review. So far the question of executability of a decree is concerned, the Civil Procedure Code contains elaborate and exhaustive provisions for dealing with it in all its aspects. The numerous rules of Or .XXI of the Code take care of different situations, providing effective remedies not only to judgment-debtors and decree- holders but also to claimant objectors as the case may be. In an exceptional case, where provisions are rendered incapable of giving relief to an aggrieved party in adequate measure and appropriate time, the answer is a regular suit in the Civil Court. The remedy under the Civil Procedure Code is of superior judicial quality than what is generally available under other statutes, and the Judge being entrusted exclusively with administration of justice, is expected to do better. It will be, therefore, difficult to find a case where interference in writ jurisdiction for granting (relief) to a judgment-debtor or a claimant-objector can be justified. The Rr.97 to 106 of Or. XXI envisage questions as in the present appeal to be determined on the basis of evidence to be led by the parties and after the 1976 Amendment, the decision has been made appealable like a decree. The High Court, in the present case, therefore, ought not to have embarked upon a decision of the writ petition on merits, and should have refused to exercise its special jurisdiction on the ground of alternative remedy before the Civil Court."
In Swetambar Sthanakwasi Jain Samiti and Anr. v. The Alleged Committee of Management Sri R.J.I. College, Agra and others, 1996 (2) Supreme 137, the Apex Court observed:
"We are of the view that the High Court not only fell into patent error but also exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Though the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not confined to issuing the prerogative writs, there is a consensus of opinion that the High Court will not permit this extraordinary jurisdiction to be converted into a Civil Court under the ordinary law. When a suit is pending between the two parties the interim and miscellaneous orders passed by the trial Court - against which the remedy of appeal or revision is available-cannot be challenged by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Where the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to try a suit, the High Court cannot convert itself into an appellate or revisional Court and interfere with the interim/miscellaneous orders of the Civil Court. The writ jurisdiction is meant for doing justice between the parties where it cannot be done in any other forum."
33. The writ petition is based upon total misconception of law and facts. No litigant has right to choose his own forum to get his affairs resolved in accordance with his wishes. It is true that the doors of the temple of justice are not closed and are always open to be invoked by any aggrieved person and nobody can be heard in saying that the proceedings are to be entertained by this Court only in a particular manner. The Post Constitutional Courts in India have taken a liberal view with regard to the procedural requirement and made access to justice very easy but easy access to justice is not a licence granted to misuse or abuse the judicial process. There is no dearth of unscrupulous litigants who will be ever ready to misuse the liberal attitude of the Constitutional Courts. The Court has a duty to protect itself from such litigants.
34. The proceedings in the instant case which were the subject matter of debate in various interlocutory applications and which were subsequently confirmed/modified by this Court in Civil Revision Petitions and Civil Miscellaneous Appeals. Any order at this stage by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to some extent may amount to judicially reviewing the earlier orders passed by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure. Such a course is not permissible. The Apex Court in Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat, , had an occasion to deal with similar situation and held that "if there are two modes of invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court and one of those modes has been chosen and exhausted it would not be a proper and sound exercise of discretion to grant relief in the other set of proceedings in respect of the same order of the Subordinate Court. The refusal to grant relief in such circumstances would be in consonance with the anxiety of the Court to prevent abuse of process as also to respect and accord finality to its own decisions".
35. A writ of Mandamus is basically a public law remedy and can always be invoked by an aggrieved person to obtain any relief in the Public law field. In any other matter, the aggrieved person has to adopt the ordinary civil remedy. Invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of rights under private law would amount to abuse of the process of the Court, In a converse case the House of Lords in O'Reilly v. Mackman and others, 1982 (3) All E.R. 1124, observed that "Now that those disadvantages to applicants have been removed and all remedies for infringements of rights protected by public law can be obtained on an application for judicial review, as can also remedies for infringements of rights under private law if such infringements should also be involved, it would in my view as a general rule be contrary to public policy, and as such an abuse of the process of the Court, to permit a person seeking to establish that a decision of a public authority infringed rights to which he was entitled to protection under public law to proceed by way of an ordinary action........"
36. The proceedings in the trial Court would show that necessary directions were being issued from time to time even to the Commissioner as to in what manner the warrant has to be executed. It is not as if the trial Court could not have granted further direction, if necessary and nothing prevented the petitioner from obtaining such directions.
37. The learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Satyanarayana Prasad, however, submits that this Court's jurisdiction is neither barred nor ousted to interfere even in matters which are the subject matters of debate in the Civil Court. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can always issue appropriate directions and call for the records from the Court which is subordinate to it and pass orders in the interest of justice. True the Court's jurisdiction is not ousted and the Court may have the power, but the question is exercise of power. The learned Counsel placed reliance upon a division Bench decision of this Court in Rakesh Gupta v. Hyderabad Stock Exchange, . In the said decision the case law on the subject is reviewed and the Court speaking through the Hon'ble the Chief justice summarised the law thus:
"We have seen thus that even in respect of prerogative like Mandamus the Courts have found situations in which writs have been issued to private individuals like an arbitrator under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act or interfered with the award which is in the nature of a document of settlement between the parties, found a school administered by a private trust amenable to writ jurisdiction in the case of its not obeying the commands of law to make payment of salary to the teachers in the school and carefully carved out the self-imposed restrictions upon the jurisdiction to point out the one who is obliged to act under the command of statute and has not acted as commanded by law is amenable to writ jurisdiction, whether he is a private individual or a juristic person, but not a State under Article 12 of the Constitution. The above can be summarised, in our view, in these words:
(1) The High Court's power under Article 226 of the Constitution is as wide as the amplitude of the language used indicates and so can affect any person even a private individual and be available for any other purpose, even one for which another remedy may exist, (2) Strictly speaking the inhibitions recognised by the Courts in England upon the powers of the Courts to issue prerogative writs do not operate in India except as self-imposed restrictions by the Courts themselves (3) Wise and clear restraints on the use of extraordinary remedy have been indicated in various pronouncements of the Supreme Court and High Courts, and the High Courts will not go beyond those wholesome inhibitions. However, where the situations warrant or exceptional circumstances cry for timely judicial interdict or mandate, the Court shall have the power to issue any writ, order or direction. In the words of the Supreme Court-" the mentor of law is justice and a potent drug should be judiciously administered. Speaking in critical retrospect and protentous prospect, the writ power has, by and large, been the people's sentinel on the qui vive and to cut back on or liquidate that power may cast a peril to human rights."
(4) Mandamus, certiorari and prohibition are recognised as public law remedies. They are not available to enforce private law rights.
(5) The word 'authority' in Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not restricted to the same meaning as the words 'other authorities' should receive in the definition of the 'State' in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The former must receive a liberal meaning. The latter is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights. The High Court's power under Article 226 of the Constitution however, unlike the power of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is more pervasive in the sense that it can issue writ:, for enforcement of fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words 'any person or authority' used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on that body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party, no matter by what means the duty is imposed; and (6) The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water-tight compartments. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of various circumstances.".
I fail to appreciate as to how and in what manner the said decision supports the plea advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the very same judgment, the Division Bench held that "Mandamus, cetirorari and prohibition are recognised as public law remedies. They are not available to enforce private law rights."
38: It is not possible to agree with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there are no limitations whatsoever upon this Court in the matter of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is no doubt true that the power of judicial review conferred upon this Court is an extraordinary power and its writ can reach any person, if the interest of justice requires. But it has its own limitation in the matter and manner in which it has to be exercised. The Constitutional scheme itself envisages some limitations which are well recognised by the Courts. It would be appropriate to recall the classic statement on the subject by Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire County Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment and another appeal, 1986 (2) All E.R. 199, that "Judicial review is a great weapon in the hands of the judges; but the judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our parliamentary system on their exercise of this beneficient power."
39. For all the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed and the respondents 3 and 4 shall have their costs quantified at Rs. 10,000/-.
40. The learned Counsel for the petitioner at the end of the Judgment requested to extend the order earlier passed by this Court on 6-10-1996. For the reasons recorded in the Judgment, I do not consider it appropriate to keep the Judgment under suspension or extend the interim order earlier granted by this Court on 6-10-1996.