Bombay High Court
Smt. Mamta W/O A. Vaidya vs Ashok M. Vaidya on 23 October, 1991
Equivalent citations: 1991(4)BOMCR585, 1992CRILJ2605
ORDER
1. This criminal revision application is directed against the judgment and order passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Chandrapur, dated 14-8-1991, in Criminal Revision Application No. 24/91 Ashok Vaidhya v. Mamta Vaidhya, setting aside the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chandrapur, on 8th February, 1991, on the application Exh. 2 for grant of interim maintenance, and directing the lower Court to decide the said application as per law after giving reasonable opportunity to the non-applicant to file his reply and both the parties to file affidavits in support of their contentions regarding the interim maintenance.
2. The facts giving rise to the present application are as follows :
Smt. Mamta, the original applicant wife of the non-applicant Ashok Vaidhya, instituted the proceedings under S. 125, Cr.P.C. in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First, Class, Chandrapur, for grant of maintenance. She filed the application u/S. 125, Cr.P.C. on 4-8-1990 along with the application for interim maintenance. The notice was issued to the original non-applicant Ashok, the husband of Smt. Mamta, vide order dated 4-8-1990. No order was passed to issue show cause notice to the non-applicant husband on the application for grant of interim maintenance. The case was adjourned to 5-9-1990 for return of notice issued to Ashok Vaidhya. As notice was not served on Ashok, the case was adjourned to 6-10-1990 with a direction to issue fresh notice to the non-applicant Ashok, on payment P.F.
3. On 6-10-1990, the non-applicant Ashok appeared in the court along with his advocate Shri Deshkar, who filed vakalatnama at Exh. 10. Shri Deshkar filed an application Exh. 6 for grant of time to file written statement and accordingly, he was granted time to file written statement till 25-10-1990.
4. On 25-10-1990, the non-applicant Ashok filed application at Exh. 7, contending that the respondent/original applicant was staying separately at the house of her parents without any sufficient cause and hence was not entitled for maintenance. He further claimed in the said application that he was and is still ready to keep the applicant at his house and, therefore, she be directed to stay at his house and thereby the application filed by Smt. Mamta, be rejected. The copy of the said application was supplied to the counsel for the applicant Smt. Mamta. For reply the case was posted to 9-11-1990. On 9-11-1990, the applicant Smt. Mamta filed her reply vide Exh. 8 and the case was adjourned for hearing on 12-12-1990. As there was no hearing on Exh. 7 on 12-12-1990, the case was adjourned to 19-12-1990 for hearing on Exh. 7.
5. Till 19-12-1990, the proceedings were in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandrapur. On 19-12-1990, C.J.M., Chandrapur, transferred the case to the file of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chandrapur, for disposal according to law. Thus the case was before Shri. K. P. Joshi, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chandrapur. The parties were directed to appear in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chandrapur on 4-1-1991.
6. On 4-1-1991, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chandrapur, heard the arguments and then the case was adjourned to 11-1-1991 for order on Exh. 7. However, on 11-1-1991 and on 24-1-1991, the order could not be passed and hence the case was adjourned to 8-2-1991. On 8-2-1991, the J.M.F.C., Chandrapur, passed the impugned order on application Exh. 2, granting interim maintenance @ Rs. 300/- p.m. to the applicant wife from the date of application i.e. 4-8-1990 and the non-applicant husband was directed to pay such maintenance till the disposal of the application i.e. Exh. 1.
7. According to the non-applicant/husband no show cause notice was served on him in respect of the application for grant of interim maintenance and thereby he was precluded from submitting his say. He was not even heard before passing the order on application for grant of interim maintenance. According to the non-applicant/husband, the applicant Smt. Mamta prayed for Rs. 250/- p.m. as interim maintenance, while the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chandrapur, granted Rs. 300/- per month as interim maintenance from the date of application, i.e. 4-8-1990. Being aggrieved by the order dated 8-2-1991, the non-applicant/husband preferred Criminal Revision No. 24/ 91 before the Sessions Judge, Chandrapur and the same was heard and decided by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Chandrapur. The learned lower revisional Court, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the application, roznama maintained by the lower court and various orders passed by the lower court on various applications, found that no show cause notice was issued in respect of the application Exh. 2 i.e. for interim maintenance, either by C.J.M. or J.M.F.C., Chandrapur. It is also found that neither the C.J.M. nor the J.M.F.C., Chandrapur directed the non-applicant/husband to file the reply in respect of the application Exh. 2. It is also apparent that no copy of the application for grant of interim maintenance was supplied to the non-applicant/husband. The roznama dated 4-1-1991 clearly indicates that the arguments were heard and the case was fixed for order on application Exh. 7, and the case was posted for 11-1-1991. The case was not heard and adjourned on that day for orders on 8-2-1991. However, surprisingly, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chandrapur, passed the order on Exh. 2 on 8-2-1991 granting interim maintenance to the applicant Smt. Mamta. Considering these aspects, the learned lower revisional court, 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Chandrapur, observed that, "Thus, prima facie it appears that neither a show cause notice on the application (Ex. 2) was issued to the petitioner/non-applicant, nor he was supplied with a copy of the said application, nor he was called upon to file reply on the said application, and even the arguments were not heard specifically on the said application and in spite of this, the learned lower court has passed the impugned order allowing the said application. Thus, the impugned order has been passed by the Lower Court without giving proper opportunity to opposite side to contest the same properly, and hence, in my opinion, the impugned order cannot be sustained and is laible to be set aside."
8. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the applicant Smt. Mamta, though no specific ground has been taken in the application, submitted that the grant of interim maintenance to the destitute wife, u/S. 125, Cr.P.C. being an interlocutory order, no revision lies u/S. 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as it is specifically barred. However, it is further submitted that if the order passed by the J.M.F.C., Chandrapur is bad, it can surely be quashed under the provisions of S. 482, Cr.P.C. However, this power not being vested in the Sessions Court, the impugned order be set aside and quashed.
9. On merits, as discussed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandrapur, apparently, the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chandrapur, is illegal and arbitrary.
10. The purpose of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to keep such orders outside the perview of the bar of the provisions so that enquiry or trial may proceed without delay. This is not likely to prejudice the aggrieved party if final order goes against it.
11. The scope of revision against the order u/S. 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. and the power u/S. 482, has been discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case of Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, . Their Lordships observed that at page 1893 (of Cri LJ) :
"A harmonious construction of Ss. 397 and 482 would lead to the irresistible conclusion that where a particular order is expressly barred under S. 397(2) and cannot be the subject of revision by the High Court, then to such a case the provisions of S. 482 would not apply. It is well settled that the inherent powers of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject-matter. Where there is an express provision, barring a particular remedy, the Court cannot resort to the exercise of inherent powers."
Their Lordships also interpreted the words 'interlocutory order' as under (at page 1895 of Cri LJ) :
"The term "interlocutory order" in S. 397(2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in S. 397. Thus; for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning case, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie u/S. 397(2). But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court."
12. In a case of Smt. Parmeshwari Devi v. The State, . Their Lordships discussed the scope of S. 397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, as under (at pages 248 & 249 of Cri LJ) :
"The purpose of S. 397 of the new Code is to keep such an order outside the purview of the power of revision so that the enquiry or trial may proceed without delay. This is not likely to prejudice the aggrieved party for it can always challenge it in due course, if the final order goes against it. But it does not follow that if the order is directed against a person who is not a party to the enquiry or trial and he will have no opportunity to challenge it after a final order is made affecting the parties concerned, he cannot apply for its revision even if it is directed against him and adversely affects his rights. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals. It may thus be conclusive with reference to the stage at which it is made, and it may also be conclusive as to a person, who is not a party to the enquiry or trial, against whom it is directed.
13. In a case of V. C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I., , the meaning of words "interlocutory order" has been discussed as follows (at page 694 (of Cri LJ)) :
"The word 'interlocutory order' used in S. 397(2) of the Code relates to various stages of the trial, namely, appeal, inquiry, trial or any other proceeding. The object seems to be to cut down the delays in stages through which a criminal case passes before it culminates in an acquittal, discharge or conviction. Having regard to the very large ambit and range of the Code, the expression 'interlocutory order' would have to be given a broad meaning so as to achieve the object of the Act without disturbing or interfering with the fairness of the trial. The term 'interlocutory order' used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial because the bar contained in S. 397(3) of the Code would apply to a variety of cases coming up before the courts not only being offences under the Penal Code but under numerous Acts. The revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi final. The same, however, could not be said of the Special Courts Act which was meant to cover only specified number of crimes and criminals and the objective attained was quickest despatch and speediest disposal.
The dominant purpose of the Act is to achieve not only speedy determination but a determination with the utmost despatch. Therefore, the provisions of the Act must be interpreted so as to eliminate all possible avenue of delay or means of adopting dilatory tactics by plugging every possible loophole in the Act through which the disposal of the case may be delayed."
"In order to construe the term 'interlocutory', it has to be construed in contra-distinction to or in contrast with a final order. In other words, the words 'not a final order' must necessarily mean an interlocutory order or an intermediate order. Thus, the expression 'interlocutory order' is to be understood and taken to mean converse of the term 'final order'.
An interlocutory order merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. An order framing of the charge being an intermediate order falls squarely within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term 'interlocutory order' as used in S. 11(1) of the Act."
14. In a case of Hasmukh J. Jhaveri v. Shella Dadlani, 1981 Cri LJ 958, considering the earlier decisions of the Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, what is the scope of interlocutory order, in detail, has been discussed, which is reproduced as under :
"Bearing in mind the guidelines enunciated in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, , Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, , V. C. Shukla v. State, and Mohanlal v. State of Gujarat, , the scheme of the Code, the object for enacting or incorporating the said term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) and the basic concept of the term, the following propositions would logically follow :-
(1) That the term "interlocutory order" has been used in a restricted sense and not in a broad or realistic sense.
(2) That it merely denotes an order of purely interim or temporary nature. The emphasis in this category is on the word "purely", which would again highlight the concept that the nature of the order must be pure and simple temporary or interim in character and ostensibly deceptive appearance of a temporary character should not be confused with the real and outright temporary nature.
(3) Such orders pertaining to some matters in the proceeding which merely and purely assume the character of steps-in-aid of the proceeding can be embraced by the said terminology, which again affords a pointer about the nature and categories of the orders that are purely temporary or interim without actually affecting or even touching substantially any right or material aspect of the proceeding.
(4) Though a stamp of finality to the proceeding or termination of the proceeding may be quite a relevant and important consideration, yet it is not a sole criterion of the test in that behalf.
(5) The potential capacity to terminate proceeding or to give it a label of finality is also not the only and conclusive criterion, though it by itself is a relevant feature.
(6) The fact that the main proceeding is kept alive that does not ipso facto give a stamp to several such orders as "interlocutory order".
(7) It is not permissible to equate the expression "interlocutory order" as invariably being the converse of the term "final order".
(8) An order of moment would obviously be lifted out of the sweep of the said terminology.
(9) In respective of the order bearing stamp of finality, there may be an intervening stage which can be called as 'intermediate stage' at which an order may be passed which in turn may be called as "intermediate order", which neither gives the finality to the proceeding nor is purely interim or temporary and as such is not an interlocutory order, but would fall in between and in certain cases such order can be said to be not interlocutory.
(10) An order which - (a) decides; or (b) even touches the important rights or liabilities of the parties; cannot be said to be interlocutory.
(11) An order which - (a) substantially affects the rights of the parties or (b) decides certain rights of the parties; cannot be termed as 'interlocutory'.
(12) An order which - (a) adjudicates; or (b) even affects - (i) either the rights of the parties; (ii) even any particular aspect of the trial or the proceeding cannot be also termed as 'interlocutory order'.
Applying various tests laid down in the said guidelines, it would be manifest that an order under section 146 of the Code, directing attachment and sealing of the flat can never be embraced by the term "interlocutory order".
15. The learned counsel for the non-applicant submitted that the purpose of granting interim relief to the wife under section 125 of the Cr.P.C. would not be thwarted the merits on which the application is to be decided. Not only the proceedings under section 125, Cr.P.C. but also the grant of interim maintenance till the decision of the application on merits is a summary proceeding. Therefore, it would not amount to prejudging the issue on merit while granting the interim maintenance. Provisions of Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, has discussed in a case of Gangu Pundlik Vaghmare v. Pundlik Maroti Waghmare, . His Lordship observed that (at page 266 of AIR) :
"It is presumed that the proceeding which is initiated under the Act would be for divorce, judicial separation, or other matters based on certain allegations with regard to the misconduct or marital offences committed by the other spouse. Now if these allegations were to be gone into at the time of deciding as to whether the applicant, under Section 24 of the Act, is entitled to payment of maintenance or expenses, it would amount to prejudging the whole issue. It is needless to say that proceedings under section 24 of the Act are intended to be summary in nature and it would not be appropriate at that stage to decide if the spouse making the application under that section is or is not entitled to the said payment because of the misconduct or commission of marital offence by him or her. No doubt, it is entirely in the discretion of the Court to make or not to make an order under the said section. But that discretion has to be exercised by it on the requirements laid in that section itself and if that section does not prohibit the Court from directing payment of maintenance and expenses on the ground of misconduct, it would not be in keeping with the purpose of the section to refuse to do so merely in exercise of the discretion vested in the Court under that section."
16. During the proceedings under section 125, Cr.P.C., the Magistrate dealing with such application, has power to make an interim order directing payment of reasonable sum by way of maintenance till the disposal of the application under section 125, Cr.P.C., and the purpose behind granting such interim relief, has been discussed by their Lordships in a case of Savitri Govind Singh Rawat v. Govind Singh Rawat, 1985 Mah LJ 976 : (1986 Cri LJ 41) (SC) (at page 43 of Cri LJ) :
In order to enjoy the fruits of the proceedings under section 125, the applicant should be alive till the date of the final order and that the applicant can do in a large number of cases only if an order for payment of interim maintenance is passed by the Court. Every Court must be deemed to possess by necessary intendment all such powers as are "ubi aliquid conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non-potest" (where anything is conceded there is conceded also anything without which the thing itself cannot exist). (Vide Earl Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, 1959 Edn., p. 1797). Whenever anything is required to be done by law and it is found impossible to do that thing unless something not authorised in express terms be also done then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Such a construction though it may not always be admissible in the present case, however, would advance the object of the legislation under consideration. A contrary view is likely to result in grave hardship to the applicant, who may have no means to subsist until the final order is passed. There is no room for the apprehension that the recognition of such implied power would lead to the passing of interim orders in a large number of cases where the liability to pay maintenance may not exist. It is quite possible that such contingency may arise in a few cases but the prejudice caused thereby to the person against whom it is made is minimal as it can be set right quickly after hearing both the parties. The Magistrate may, however, insist upon an affidavit being filed by or on behalf of the applicant concerned stating the grounds in support of the claim for interim maintenance to satisfy himself that there is a prima facie case for making such an order. Such an order may also be made in an appropriate case ex parte pending service of notice of the application subject to any modification or even an order of cancellation that may be passed after the respondent is heard" (para 6).
"Having regard to the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by a Magistrate under section 125 of the Code, we feel that the said provision should be interpreted as conferring power by necessary implication on the Magistrate to pass an order directing a person against whom an application is made under it to pay a reasonable sum by way of interim maintenance subject to the other conditions referred to therein pending final disposal of the application. In taking this view we have also taken note of the provisions of Section 7(2)(a) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (Act 66 of 1984) passed recently by Parliament proposing to transfer the jurisdiction exercisable by Magistrate under section 125 of the Code to the Family Courts constituted under the said Act."
Their Lordships empowered the Magistrate to pass not only interim but even ex parte order upon filing an affidavit, granting maintenance allowance in the proceedings under section 125, Cr.P.C. Similarly, the Magistrate is empowered to modify or even cancel his order after hearing the other side. Thereby, it means that instead of approaching superior Court, matter can be settled after hearing both the sides after granting interim maintenance allowance.
17. The Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure contains summary and quick remedy for securing some reasonable sum by way of maintenance, thereby to protect the destitute wife against starvation. Chapter IX of the Code does not in reality create any serious new obligation unknown to Indian social life. This chapter provides "a mode of preventing vagrancy, or at least of preventing its consequences". These provisions are intended to fulfil a social purpose. Their object is to compel a man to perform the moral obligation which he owes to society in respect of his wife and children. By providing a simple speedy but limited relief, they seek to ensure that the neglected wife and children are not left beggared and destituted on the scrap-heap of society and thereby driven to a life of vagrancy, immorality and crime for their sub-sistence. Thus, Section 125 is not intended to provide for a full and final determination of the status and personal rights of the parties. The jurisdiction conferred by the section on the Magistrate is more in the nature of a preventive, rather than a remedial jurisdiction; it is certainly not punitive. In view of the spirit of the provisions, the Magistrate is empowered either to modify or even to cancel the order passed by him earlier. Considering this fact, granting interim maintenance, pending proceedings under section 125, Cr.P.C. is an "interlocutory order" and thereby no revision is maintainable under section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus, 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Chandrapur, committed error while entertaining and deciding the criminal revision No. 9/91 and, therefore, the order passed by him is set aside.
18. However, considering the illegalities committed by the learned Magistrate while granting the interim order, I am of the opinion that it deserves to be quashed and, therefore, I take suo motu cognizance under the inherent powers and quash and set aside the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First class, Chandrapur, dated 8-2-1991. Thus, the instant application is allowed.
19. Application allowed.