Madras High Court
The Chairman And Managing Director, ... vs S. Ganapathy, The State Of Tamil Nadu ... on 25 September, 2006
Author: D. Murugesan
Bench: D. Murugesan, V. Ramasubramanian
JUDGMENT D. Murugesan, J.
Page 2617
1. The appellant company is a Government of India undertaking functioning under the administrative control of Department of Atomic Energy and is in the process of separating strategic minerals like Zircon, Monazite, Ilmenite, Page 2618 Rutile, Garnet etc., For expansion of its mining activities in Manavalakurichi area, the appellant company required a large extent of land and accordingly, lands admeasuring about 40.072 HA were acquired by the Government of Tamil Nadu and possession of the land was also handed over to the appellant company during the year 1990-1991. The land owners were paid adequate compensation. The land owners/displaced persons approached this Court by way of writ petitions seeking for a direction to the appellant company to fulfil the promises by providing suitable employment to one member of each family as they were dispossessed of their lands by the acquisition proceedings. The writ petitions were laid only on the ground that in the award enquiry, the Manager of the appellant Company had promised before the Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, that one member from each family of the individuals, whose lands were acquired, would be given employment in the appellant company. In view of such promise, the appellant Company is estopped from denying such benefit.
2. By a common order dated 09.12.2002, the writ petitions were allowed with a direction to provide appointment to one member of each of the displaced families. It was also directed that till such time, such appointments are made, the appellant company should not make any appointment to class 3 and 4 posts or other lower class or menial posts. Based upon the above direction, other consequential directions were also issued.
3. Mr. Sanjay Mohan, learned Counsel for the appellants would contend that the appellant company, being a public sector undertaking directly controlled by the Department of Atomic Energy, cannot make any appointments contrary to the rules. No scheme was framed for employment of the family members, whose lands were acquired. He would submit that the land owners have been paid the compensation for the lands and in such event, they cannot compel the appellant company to provide employment. He would also submit that the decision to provide employment shall be taken at the level of Board, and the promise given by Manager of the Company during the award enquiry, is not binding on the Company. Consequently, estoppel could be pleaded against the Company.
4. On the other hand, Mr. Parthasarathy, learned Counsel for the contesting respondents/writ petitioners would contend that inasmuch as the Government of Tamil Nadu issued G.O.Ms. No. 324 Revenue Department dated 18.03.1986 directing all public sector undertakings to recruit without reference to the employment exchange at least one member of each family, who were displaced on account of acquisition of lands for any project and in view of the said G.O., the writ petitioners are entitled to succeed. He would also submit that having assured employment to the members of the displaced families at the time of the award enquiry, the appellant company is estopped from going back on the promise.
5. Insofar as the first contention as to the G.O. is concerned, it is to be seen that the said G.O. is only an administrative instruction and it cannot be held to be mandatory compelling the appellant to provide employment at least to one member of each family, whose lands were acquired. The appellant company is admittedly a public sector undertaking, directly coming under the administrative control of the Department of Atomic Energy and the Page 2619 recruitment shall be made only in accordance with the rules. Our attention was not drawn by the land owners that as per the rules, the displaced persons/erstwhile land owners are entitled to seek for employment. Of course, the provision for such employment can be made by the undertaking itself by framing schemes and in such event, the displaced persons/land owners could claim employment on the basis of the scheme. In the absence of any such scheme, a direction to the appellant company to provide employment to the displaced persons/erstwhile land owners would amount to a direction contrary to the very regulations or rules governing the appointments.
6. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents had contended that under similar circumstances, the Apex Court in the judgment reported in Calcutta Port Trust v. Deba Prosad Bag 1994 Supp.(2) SCC 102 has relied similar Government Order and had directed the employment. In that case, a similar Government Order directing employment of displaced persons was considered by the Port Trust for whose benefit the lands were acquired and it was resolved to offer employment considering the fact that those persons are uprooted and were never paid any compensation. Such resolution was passed as a rehabilitation measure. On the basis of the resolution, certain eligible candidates were also considered and there was a dispute as to the appointment. In that context, the Apex Court had held that the uprooted persons are entitled to employment. However, on the facts of this case, as already stated, the land owners/displaced persons were paid compensation and the Board has not resolved to provide employment to the familymembers of the land owners/displaced persons. Hence, on facts then judgment of the Apex Court is distinguishable.
7. In (2003) 3 MLJ 726 (The Chairman, TNEB v. Arulnathan and Ors.), a Division Bench of this Court held that the displaced persons or the land owners do not have any fundamental right to be provided with employment solely on the ground that their lands have been acquired. This judgment was followed by a subsequent Division Bench in W.A. Nos. 2113 to 2180 of 2001 etc., dated 19.08.2006.
8. For the above said reasons and particularly in the absence of any scheme and except the G.O. which is in the nature of administrative instruction, this Court would not be justified in issuing directions compelling the appellant company to provide employment to one member of each family, displaced by acquisition.
9. Coming to the issue relating to estoppel, the doctrine of "promissory estoppel" has developed as a principle of reasonableness and fairness and is used against statutory bodies and Government authorities on whose representations or promises, parties or citizens act and some detrimental consequences ensure because of refusal of authorities to fulfil their promises or honour their commitments. In Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana the Apex Court has held as follows:
On a consideration of the decisions of this Court, it is clear that there can be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power Page 2620 of the State. So also the doctrine cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. The Government would not be bound by the act of its officers and agents who act beyond the scope of their authority and a person dealing with the agent of the Government must be held to have notice of the limitations of his authority. The Court can enforce compliance by a public authority of the obligation laid on him if he arbitrarily or on his mere whim ignores the promises made by him on behalf of the Government. It would be open to the authority to plead and prove that there were special considerations which necessitated his not being able to comply with his obligations in public interest.
10. In Hira Tikkoo v. Union Territory Chandigargh the Apex Court has held in para 25 as follows:
Surely, the doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied against public authorities when their mistaken advice or representation is found to be in breach of a statute and therefore, against general public interest. The question, however, is whether the parties or individuals, who had suffered because of the mistake and negligence on the part of the statutory public authorities, would have any remedy of redressal for the loss they have suffered. The "rules of fairness" by which every public authority is bound, require them to compensate loss occasioned to private parties or citizens who were misled in acting on such mistaken or negligent advice of the public authority. There are no allegations and material in these cases to come to a conclusion that the action of the authorities was mala fide. It may be held to be careless or negligent. In some of the English cases, the view taken is that the public authorities cannot be absolved of their liability to provide adequate monetary compensation to the parties who are adversely affected by their erroneous decisions and actions. But in these cases, any directions to the public authorities to pay monetary compensation or damages would also indirectly harm general public interest. The public authorities are entrusted with public fund raised from public money. The funds are in trust with them for utilisation in public interest and strictly for the purposes of the statute under which they are created with specific statutory duties imposed on them. In such a situation when a party or citizen has relied, to his detriment, on an erroneous representation made by public authorities and suffered loss and where the doctrine of "estoppel" will not be invoked to his aid, directing administrative redressal would be more appropriate remedy than payment of monetary compensation for the loss caused by non-delivery of the possession of the plots and consequent delay caused in setting up industries by the allottees.
11. Recently in the judgment reported in Kuldeep Singh v. Government of NCT Delhi 2006 AIR SCW 3627 the Apex Court has once again reiterated the same law.
Page 2621
12. From the above law declared by the Apex Court, it is seen that doctrine of "promissory estoppel" cannot override the public interest in the event the act of the Government or the appellant in this case that the action was fair and reasonable. In this case, as the appellant cannot bye-pass the procedure of selection, more particularly in the absence of any scheme, a mere promise made by the General Manager of the Company, cannot be considered to be a promissory estoppel.
13. The contention of the respondents is that as the Manager has promised for offering employment to one member of each family of displaced person during the award enquiry, the appellant Company cannot go back and deny such employment. First of all, it is not the case of the displaced persons that they offered the land voluntarily without there being any objection solely on the ground that they will be provided employment opportunity. The lands were acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act and the land owners participated in the 5-A enquiry, made their objections. Equally they also participated in the award enquiry and accepted the compensation amount. Though there is a promise made by the Manager of the appellant Company, the displaced persons did not part with the land only on such promise. That apart, the appellant being a public sector undertaking is controlled by the Department of Atomic Energy and in the absence of such decision, the mere promise by the Manager was not bind the appellant Company and consequently, such promise given by the Manager of the Company, cannot be considered to be one of estoppel that could be pleaded against the appellant Company. Hence, the said contention is also rejected.
14. That apart, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed for one more reason viz., the land acquisition proceedings were completed by passing Award during September, 1990 and compensation was paid to all the land owners. The land owners have approached this Court in the year 2000, after the period of ten years. Hence the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of latches.
15. For all the above reasons, we are not inclined to accept the relief sought for in the writ petitions in seeking for a direction to the appellant company for providing employment to one member of each family, who were displaced by the acquisition proceedings. Accordingly, the writ Appeals are allowed and the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, W.A.M.P. Nos. 414 to 420 of 2003 are closed.