Madhya Pradesh High Court
Monu Singh vs The State Of Mp on 22 April, 2022
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
ON THE 22nd OF APRIL, 2022
WRIT PETITION No. 15490 of 2019
Between:-
MONU SINGH S/O SHRI MURARI LAL , AGED 24
YEARS, OCCUPATION: UNEMPLOYED, R/O-
VILLAGE GITORE, TEHSIL MEHGAON,
DISTRICT BHIND M.P. (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI PRASHANT SINGH KAURAV - ADVOCATE)
AND
1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY MINISTRY OF HOME,
VALLABH BHAWAN BHOPAL (MADHYA
PRADESH)
2. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE POLICE
HEADQUARTERS BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
3. ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
(RECRUITMENT), POLICE HEADQUARTERS
BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
4. INTERNAL SCRUTINY COMMITTEE THROUGH
ITS CHAIRMAN, POLICE HEADQUARTERS,
BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY SHRI PAWAN SINGH RAGHUVANSHI - DEPUTY GOVT.
ADVOCATE )
This petition coming on for hearing this day, Hon'ble Shri Justice Milind
Ramesh Phadke, Judge passed the following:
ORDER
1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India had 2 been preferred by the petitioner challenging the order dated 10/04/2019, whereby he was denied appointment as a Police Constable on the ground that the Scrutiny Committee has found him unfit for the police services since at the time of his character verification criminal cases were found registered against him.
2. Facts in brief are that, a Police Recruitment Test was conducted in the year 2017, in which the petitioner appeared and in the final result the petitioner was declared successful. During the process of character verification it was found that two criminal cases had been registered against the petitioner, one as Crime No.292/204 under section 307, 323, 294/34 I.P.C. and another as Crime No.390/2015 under section 294, 336, 341, 427 and 506-B I.P.C and therefore he was denied the appointment.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously argued that the impugned order had been passed without taking into consideration the fact that in relation to Crime No.292/2014, the petitioner was acquitted by invoking the provisions of Section 232 Cr.P.C., which indicates that there was absolutely no case made out by the prosecution against the petitioner and it amounts to clean acquittal. It was further argued that so far as Crime No.390/2015 was concerned, since none of the prosecution witness had supported the prosecution case and there was no direct evidence against the petitioner, he was acquitted. It was contended by the learned counsel that only Crime No.292/2014 which was registered under section 307, 323, 294/34 I.P.C. involved the element of Moral Turpitude, but since his acquittal was by way of invoking the provisions of section 232 Cr.P.C., which engrafts in itself acquittal in case of no evidence, mere registration of offence u/s 307 IPC would not attract the element of moral turpitude and also since as per the circular dated 24/07/2018 issued by the Home 3 Department, none of the other offences involved moral turpitude, the denial of appointment to the petitioner was bad. To bolster his submissions reliance was placed on a decision of Division Bench of this Court in the matter of W.A.No.1954/2019 Devendra Singh Gurjar Vs. State of M.P. & other decided on 01/05/2020 quoting para 11 & 12, which are reproduced below.
11. In conspectus of above discussion what come out loud and clear and is vivid from the record that the trial Court while invoking Sec.232 of Cr.P.C.
did not find the offence adduced by the prosecution to be even sufficient to prima facie prove the charges. In other words, prosecution miserably failed to even prove the genuineness of a case projected by it thereby impelling the learned trial Judge to return a finding of acquittal u/S.232 which is an honourable and clean acquittal.
12. Consequently, it is obvious that while passing the impugned order dated 14.11.2018 (Annexure P/1), respondent No.3 while holding the petitioner to be ineligible for appointment and thereby cancelling the candidature, failed to properly apply his mind to the aspect of acquittal being honourable. Thereby rendering the impugned order dated 14.11.2018.
and thus, prayed for setting aside of the impugned order.
4. Per contra learned counsel for the respondent/State submitted that circular dated 24/07/2018 issued by the Home Department contains that when a person had been tried for an offence involving moral turpitude, though he has been acquitted, but still the question of his character verification and his entitlement/disentitlement for induction in the Government services will have to be decided on the basis of the nature of the offence of that particular case, thus, in view of the circular dated 24/07/2018 since the petitioner had faced trial 4 involving moral turpitude, it takes away the right of the petitioner to be inducted in the Police Department. It was further argued that though there is an acquittal of the petitioner on the basis of deficient evidence or compromise, it does not amount to declaring the person to be of a good character and it does not automatically entitle a person to get inducted in the government services. It was also argued that in absence of any malice against the authorities, mere acquittal of a serious charge would not confer any right on the petitioner, thus, supported the impugned order and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. In support of his arguments he placed reliance on a decision rendered in the matter of Ajay Yadav Vs. State of M.P. & others passed in W.P. No.5342/2019 on 18/03/2019.
5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length and perused the record.
6. The question which arises and is required to be addressed in the present matter is whether rejection of candidature of the petitioner, when there is no allegation of malice against the authorities and petitioner been acquitted of serious charges, inter alia, of attempt to murder i.e. section 307 IPC which involves moral turpitude, as the prosecution witnesses had turned hostile, ought to be and is required to be interfered with?
7. While addressing the question, the meaning of expression acquittal is required to be looked into. The expressions "honourable acquittal", "acquittal of blame" and "fully acquittal" are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or Penal Code. It had been developed by judicial pronouncements by time and the proposition which in the present emerges is that, if the acquittal is directed by the court on consideration of facts and material evidence on record with the finding of false implication or the finding that the guilt had not been proved, accepting the explanation of the accused as just, it be treated as honourable 5 acquittal. In other words if the prosecution could not prove the guilt for other reasons and not honourably acquitted by the court, it be treated as other than honourable and proceedings may follow. In a very recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the matter of Union of India Vs, Methu Meda reported in (2022) 1 SCC 1, after discussing the entire case laws prevailing in the field, it had been concluded in para 13, 14 and 21 as under:
13. The expression honourable acquittal has been considered in S.Samuthiram, after considering the judgments in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal and R.P. Kapur, Raghava Rajgopalachari, this Court observed that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing guilt of the accused is on the prosecution, until proved beyond reasonable doubt. In case, the prosecution failed to take steps to examine crucial witnesses or the witnesses turned hostile such acquittal would fall within the purview of giving benefit of doubt and the accused cannot be treated as honourably acquitted by the criminal court. While, in a case of departmental proceedings, the guilt may be proved on the basis of preponderance of probabilities, it is thus observed that acquittal giving benefit of doubt would not automatically lead to reinstatement of candidate unless the rules provide so.
14. Recently, this Court in State (UT of Chandigarh) V. Pradeep Kumar, relying upon the judgment of S. Samuthiram said that acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive of the suitability of the candidates on the post concerned. It is observed, acquittal or discharge of a person cannot always be inferred that he was falsely involved or he had no criminal antecedent. The said issue has further been considered in Mehar Singh holding 6 non-examination of key witnesses leading to acquittal is not honourable acquittal, infact, it is by giving benefit of doubt. The Court said that nature of acquittal is necessary for core consideration. If acquittal is not honourable, the candidates are not suitable for government service and are to be avoided. The relevant factors and the nature of offence, extent of his involvement, propensity of such person to indulge in similar activities in future, are the relevant aspects for consideration by the Screening Committee, which is competent to decide all these issues.
21. As discussed hereinabove, the law is well-settled. If a person is acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt, from the charge of an offence involving moral turpitude or because the witnesses turned hostile, it would not automatically entitle him for the employment, that too in disciplined force. The employer is having a right to consider his candidature in terms of the circulars issued by the Screening Committee. The mere disclosure of the offences alleged and the result of the trial is not sufficient. In the said situation, the employer cannot be compelled to give appointment to the candidate. Both the Single Bench and the Division Bench of the High Court have not considered the said legal position, as discussed above in the orders impugned. Therefore, the impugned orders passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Methu Meda v. Union of India, Writ Petition No.3897 of 2013, order dated 27.9.2013 and the Division Bench in Union of India v. Methu Meda, 2013 SCC OnLine MP 1070 are not sustainable in law, as discussed hereinabove.
8. In the present case, the charges were framed against the petitioner for the offences punishable under sections 307, 324, 323, 294/34 I.P.C. He was acquitted after trial vide judgment dated 20/06/2015 by the Sessions Judge, 7 Bhind, as the prosecution witnesses did not support the case of the prosecution.
In para 4 of its judgment, it had been observed by the Sessions Court that in view of the compromise entered in to between the accused persons and the complainant Raju and injured Madhuka and Ragini, without recording the accused statement the Court proceeded under section 232 Cr.P.C. to pass the judgment of acquittal.
9. From perusal of the judgment it is evident that the prosecution witnesses Raju (PW.1), Ramswaroop (PW.9), Ramlakhan (PW.10), Harvilas (PW.11), Rekha (PW.5), Subhash (PW.2), Smt. Sunita (PW.6), Machula (PW.7), Karansingh (PW.8), all the witnesses though had turned hostile, had in one voice admitted about the injuries caused to them were in the scuffle with the accused persons.
10. The Law with regard to the effect and consequence of the acquittal has been settled in Avatar Singh Vs. Union of India reported in (2016) 8 SCC 471, wherein it was decided as thus:
38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of aforesaid discussion, we summarize our conclusion thus:
38.1 Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information.
38.2 While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information.
38.3 The employer shall take into consideration the 8 Government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the decision. 38.4 In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourse appropriate to the case may be adopted:
38.4.1 In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse. 38.4.2 Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of the employee. 38.4.3 If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.
38.5 In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.
38.6 In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion may appoint the candidate subject to 9 decision of such case.
38.7 In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper.
38.8 If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime.
38.9 In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding Departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information in verification form. 38.10 For determining suppression or false information attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such information which was required to be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was not even asked for.
38.11 Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him.
11. In view of the above judgment as laid down in para 38.3, 38.4.3 and 38.5 of the above case and in the facts of the present case, it is clear that the employer is having right to consider the suitability of the candidate as per government orders/instructions/rules at the time of taking the decision for 10 induction of the candidate in employment. Thus, the employer reserves a right to consider all the relevant facts available as to the antecedents, in cases of acquittal on technical grounds in respect of offences of heinous/serious nature, which is not a clean acquittal or an acquittal recorded u/s 232 Cr.P.C.
12. Further recourse could be taken from the judgment in the case of Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and another vs. Mehar Singh, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 685, from para 23, which reads as under:
23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that the Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police force even if they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal or discharge is on technical grounds or not honourable. The Screening Committee will be within its rights to cancel the candidature of a candidate if it finds that the acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the conduct of the prosecution case or is the result of material witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced officers of the Screening Committee who will be able to judge whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if appointed, to the post in a police force. The Screening Committee will have to consider the nature and extent of such person involvement in the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause for worsening the law and order situation rather than maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the Delhi Police does not merit any interference from this Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only persons with impeccable character enter the police force.
13. From the above discussion, the picture which emerges is that the petitioner who wants to join the police force must be a person of utmost 11 integrity and should have unsullied character. A person having a criminal antecedents would not be fit for employment and the employer is having a right to consider the nature of acquittal because a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. Thus, the final call taken by the committee would be final unless mala fide.
14. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the matter of W.A.No.1954/2019 Devendra Singh Gurjar Vs. State of M.P. decided on 01/05/2020, is misplaced in the light of judgment rendered in the case of Union of India Vs. Methu Meda (supra), wherein the Supreme Court in the concluding para had held that even if a person is acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt, from the charge of an offence involving moral turpitude or because of witnesses turned hostile, it would not automatically entitle him for the employment that too in a disciplined force.
15. Therefore, the order dated 10/04/2019 passed by the authority need not be interfered with and consequently the Writ Petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE) JUDGE Pawar ASHISH PAWAR 2022.05.23 18:27:39 +05'30'