Central Administrative Tribunal - Allahabad
Abhishek Kumar Yadav vs Canteen Stores Department on 11 February, 2026
Reserved on 09.02.2026 CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, ALLAHABAD BENCH ALLAHABAD This is the 11th day of February, 2026.
Original Application No. 394 of 2024 HON'BLE MR JUSTICE OM PRAKASH -VII, MEMBER (J) HON'BLE MR. MOHAN PYARE, MEMBER (A) Abhishek Kumar Yadav a/a 40 years, Son of Shri Dayanand Yadav, resident of Village Prasiddha Ka Pura, Post Office Phaphamau, District Allahabad.
.Applicant By Adv : Shri Pankaj Kumar Gupta/Shri Joveen Singh VERSUS
1. Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi.
2. General Manager, Canteen Stores Department, Ministry of Defence Government of India ADELPHI, 119 Maharshi Karva Road, Mumbai.
3. Additional General Manager, (AGM) (Pers.) Canteen Stores Department, Ministry of Defence, Government of India ADELPHI, 119 Maharshi Karva Road, Mumbai.
4. Staff Selection Commission, Allahabad Region, Allahabad through its Secretary.
. . . Respondents By Adv: Shri M.P Mishra (O R D E R) BY JUSTICE OM PRAKASH -VII, MEMBER (J) The present O.A has been filed by the applicant under section MANISH 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 seeking following KUMAR SRIVASTA reliefs:-
VA
(i) That this Hon'ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to pass an appropriate order/direction commanding the respondents to consider/appointment of the applicant on the post of Lower Division Clerk (LDC) within a specific time period and set aside the order dated 24.11.2021 passed by respondent No. 3.2
(ii) That this Hon'ble Tribunal may further be pleased to pass such other and /or further order as is deem fit and proper in the present circumstances of the case".
2. The brief facts of the OA are as follows:-
The Staff Selection Commission, New Delhi issued an advertisement in 2017 for the Combined Higher Secondary Level (10+2) Examination for recruitment to the post of Lower Division Clerk (LDC) in various departments under the Government of India. The applicant, being eligible, applied and successfully cleared the written examination as well as the typing test. He was selected for appointment as Lower Division Clerk in the Canteen Stores Department, Ministry of Defence, Government of India and was issued an offer of appointment along with an attestation form. While submitting the attestation form on 03.03.2020, the applicant himself disclosed the pendency of a criminal case against him. The department sought clarification and relevant documents regarding the said case was duly submitted explaining that the FIR arose out of a family property dispute and he had been granted bail. Subsequently, the Trial Court declared that applicant was juvenile on the date of the alleged incident and transferred the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board. Despite this disclosure, the respondents cancelled the applicant's appointment on 26.04.2021 on the ground of alleged concealment of material facts. The applicant's representation was rejected. Feeling aggrieved, applicant approached the Hon'ble High Court. The High Court initially directed reconsideration of his case after affording an opportunity of MANISH hearing. However, the claim was again rejected on 24.11.2021 on KUMAR SRIVASTA the same ground of non-disclosure of the criminal case. Aggrieved, VA the applicant filed another writ petition, which was allowed by the Hon'ble High Court on 05.05.2022, setting aside the rejection order and issuing a mandamus to the respondents to issue the appointment letter in accordance with rules. Order passed in Writ 'A' No. 18833 of 2021 (hereinabove) was challenged in Special Appeal No. 846 of 3 2022. Hon'ble Division Bench allowed the Special Appeal, set aside order passed by Hon'ble Single Bench dated 05.05.2022 directing the applicant to approach before the Central Administrative Tribunal, thereafter present original application has been filed.
3. Per contra, the respondents have filed a counter affidavit stating that the applicant qualified the CHSL Examination, 2017 and his appointment was provisional subject to verification of character, antecedents and police verification. After receipt of the attestation form (CSF-4) and related documents on 02.03.2020, the applicant disclosed that an FIR had been lodged against him under Sections 323, 504 and 506 IPC and the criminal case was pending. Accordingly, he was directed to submit a copy of the FIR. The respondents have stated that the alleged incident pertained to the year 2010, when the applicant was a juvenile aged about 17 years and 9 months. It is further asserted that the applicant was acquitted only on 22.07.2021 on the basis of benefit of doubt. However, according to the respondents, the applicant concealed the pendency of the criminal case and other material facts at the stage of verification and had filed a false declaration before the Staff Selection Commission. At the relevant time of verification, the applicant was aged about 27 years, 2 months and 14 days. It is contended that obtaining appointment by suppression of material facts and furnishing a false declaration amounts to a serious misconduct. On this ground, the applicant's appointment was cancelled. Aggrieved by the order of the Hon'ble High Court dated 05.05.2022 directing issuance of appointment, the Union of India MANISH preferred Special Appeal No. 846 of 2022, which was ultimately KUMAR SRIVASTA disposed of by the Hon'ble High Court by order dated 01.02.2024. VA Thus, order passed by Hon'ble Single Bench dated 05.05.2022 in Writ 'A' No. 18833 of 2021 is not in existence as on date.
4. In reply to the counter affidavit, applicant has filed rejoinder affidavit opposing the contentions as made in the counter affidavit 4 while reiterating the averments as already advanced in the OA. Nothing new has been averred in the rejoinder affidavit.
5 We have heard Shri P.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the applicants and Shri M.P Mishra, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the record.
6. Submission of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the applicant has not concealed any material fact. While submitting the attestation form on 03.03.2020, the applicant himself disclosed the pendency of the criminal case. He also furnished all relevant documents as sought by the department. Therefore, the allegation of suppression or false declaration is factually incorrect and unsustainable. Learned counsel for the applicant further argued that the alleged incident relates to the year 2010, when the applicant was a juvenile. The competent Trial Court declared the applicant a juvenile on the date of the incident and transferred the case to the Juvenile Justice Board. As per the Juvenile Justice Act, a case relating to juvenile cannot be treated at par with a criminal case of an adult and cannot be used to deny public employment. Learned counsel for the applicant also argued that the FIR was registered under Sections 323, 504 and 506 IPC, which are minor offences. The dispute arose out of a family property matter and does not involve any moral turpitude or serious criminal conduct. Such allegations cannot be treated as a valid ground to deny appointment to a Group 'C' post. It is further contended that the applicant was granted bail during the pendency of the case and was ultimately MANISH acquitted on 22.07.2021. Even otherwise, the case ended in acquittal KUMAR and no stigma survives against the applicant. The respondents have SRIVASTA VA failed to consider this material fact. He further argued that despite full and voluntary disclosure made by the applicant in the attestation form, the respondents cancelled his appointment on the incorrect ground of concealment. Once the applicant had disclosed the case, the question of suppression does not arise. The appointment was 5 cancelled without proper appreciation of facts and without considering the explanation submitted by the applicant. The order passed is mechanical, non-speaking and shows non-application of mind. It is well settled that mere involvement in a criminal case, particularly of a trivial nature and relating to juvenile age, cannot be a ground to deny appointment when there is no concealment and the candidate has made a truthful disclosure. The respondents have acted contrary to settled law. Thus, learned counsel for the applicant further argued that the impugned action of cancelling the appointment is harsh, arbitrary and disproportionate, especially when the applicant has cleared all stages of selection, disclosed the criminal case voluntarily and the case pertained to his juvenile age. Thus, learned counsel for the applicant argued that Original Application may be allowed and the respondents be directed to issue the appointment letter to the applicant as Lower Division Clerk with all consequential benefits. Learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court, Allahabad in the case of Navodaya Vidhyalaya Samiti and two others Vs. Pundariaksh Dev Pathak and another decided in Writ A No. 9462/2025 and 6670/2025 on 16.10.2025.
7. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that the applicant's selection was provisional and subject to verification of character, antecedents and police verification, as clearly mentioned in the offer of appointment. The applicant did not acquire any vested or indefeasible right to appointment merely on selection. Learned counsel for the respondents further argued that although the MANISH applicant disclosed the existence of an FIR, he did not make a full, KUMAR SRIVASTA clear and truthful disclosure regarding the nature, pendency and VA seriousness of the criminal proceedings at the relevant stage before the Staff Selection Commission. The declaration made by the applicant was not in accordance with the requirement of complete disclosure, and therefore amounted to suppression of material facts. Learned counsel for the respondents next argued that furnishing a 6 false or incomplete declaration at the stage of verification strikes at the root of integrity and trust required in government service. Obtaining appointment by suppression of material facts constitutes serious misconduct, which justifies cancellation of candidature. Learned counsel for the respondents again submitted that at the time of verification, the criminal case against the applicant was admittedly pending. The applicant was acquitted only on 22.07.2021, much after the cancellation of appointment. Therefore, the respondents were justified in taking a decision based on the facts existing at the relevant time. He further argued that merely because the applicant was a juvenile at the time of the alleged incident does not automatically entitle him to appointment in government service. The applicant was acquitted on the basis of benefit of doubt. Such an acquittal does not amount to a clean or honourable acquittal. Therefore, the respondents were justified in forming an adverse opinion regarding the suitability of the applicant. Learned counsel for the respondents next argued that after the order of the Hon'ble High Court dated 05.05.2022, the respondents have pursued their legal remedies in accordance with law by filing a Special Appeal. The matter now stands before this Tribunal for decision on merits, and no wilful disobedience of court orders can be attributed to the respondents. The applicant was given opportunity to submit explanations and documents. His case was reconsidered pursuant to directions of the Hon'ble High Court. Therefore, the principles of natural justice have been duly followed. Thus, learned counsel for the respondents contend that the decision to cancel the applicant's MANISH appointment was lawful, justified and taken after due consideration KUMAR of all relevant facts. The Original Application is devoid of merit and SRIVASTA VA is liable to be dismissed.
8. We have considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the entire records.
79. Before discussing the submissions raised across the bar, it will be useful to quote the relevant paragraphs of the case of Pundariaksh Dev Pathak (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant:-
"18. In the matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the concerned incumbent had been acquitted from the charges in 2011 and the Hon'ble Supreme Court also examined even the situation where the allegations levelled against a juvenile would have been found to be true and he was convicted, the same would stand obliterated and no stigma would remain existent in his getting job. When a plea was raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that though the concerned juvenile was acquitted but no disclosure was made by him as regards the criminal case pending against him which would be fatal to his service, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
"28. In the facts of the present case, it is admitted position that the petitioner was juvenile as declared by the Board at the time when the F.I.R. was lodged against him, therefore, his case was to be dealt, taking into consideration the provisions of Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Even if it is presume that the petitioner had not disclosed about the pendency of the criminal case, the requirement of disclosed details of criminal prosecution faced as a juvenile is violative of right to privacy and right to reputation of child, guaranteed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It also denudes the child of protection sought by the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, hence, it was not expected from the petitioner to disclose details of criminal prosecution faced as a juvenile.
29. Admittedly, the petitioner has been acquitted in the present case and the case so lodged against him was trivial in nature and should not be viewed as disqualification for entry in Government service."
(emphasis by Court) MANISH KUMAR
19. We are conscious of the fact that J.J. Act, 2000 has since been replaced SRIVASTA VA by Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (in short 'J.J. Act, 2015') and by virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 111 of the J.J. Act, 2015, the Act of 2000 has been repealed, however, as per sub-section (2) of Section 111, anything done or any action taken under the Act of 2000 shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of Act of 2015.
820. Therefore, while examining the effect of juvenility of the present petitioner on his services, we find that since the FIR in question was lodged against him in the year 2011 and the relevant date of the alleged commission of offence by him, i.e. 18.04.2011, is prior to coming into force of Act of 2015, no provision of the new Act would come in his way. We are making these observations in the light of Section 24 of the Act of 2015, which is identical to Section 19 of the Act of 2000 providing that even conviction of a juvenile shall not suffer disqualification qua his services, however, there is an addition in the new Act in terms of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 24 wherein a child who has completed or is above the age of 16 years and is found to be 'in conflict with law' by the Children's Court under Section 19(1)(i) of the new Act, the protection granted under sub-section (1) of Section 24 would not be available to him. 10
21. Above aspect has been noticed for the reason that since the petitioner has been declared juvenile in the year 2024 and has been found to be 'child in conflict with law' by the J.J. Board vide its order dated 04.06.2024 and the Act of 2000 is not in force, proviso attached to sub-section (1) of Section 24 of J.J. Act, 2015 may be read against him, but the proviso would not be applicable in the present case, inasmuch as, relevant date for consideration of the criminal case lodged against the petitioner would be the date when the said offence was alleged to have been committed by him, i.e. 18.04.2011 and not any subsequent date. At that time, the old Act of 2000 was in force wherein no such proviso was there as it finds place in the Act of 2015.
22. ..............
23. We may mention here that in the review application filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal, specific reference was made to the order passed by the J.J. Board as regards his status as juvenile and review was sought taking aid of various provisions of J.J. Act, 2000 as well as Division Bench judgment in the case of Shivam Maurya (supra). Further, prayers were made in the review application to maintain that part of the order dated 03.01.2025 whereby termination order was set aside and to direct respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to reinstate the petitioner as P.G. Teacher in the institution in MANISH KUMAR question with all consequential benefits. However, the Tribunal, without SRIVASTA taking into consideration the legal pleas raised, rejected the review VA application by order dated 25.02.2025 (also impugned before us) by observing that review was not rehearing of the original matter and that the review application was misconceived.
24. In view of above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that once the Tribunal itself recorded a finding regarding juvenility of the petitioner, it 9 rightly set aside the termination order but remand made to the departmental authority was an unwarranted exercise on its part. We are, therefore, inclined to set aside the part of order of Tribunal whereby matter has been remanded to the authorities for fresh consideration. Further, considering the grounds raised and prayers made in the review application, we also deem it appropriate to direct reinstatement of the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits.
25. Accordingly, Writ-A No. 6670 of 2025 is allowed.
26. The order dated 03.01.2025 passed by the Tribunal is set aside to the extent the Tribunal has remanded the matter to the authorities for fresh consideration and both the orders impugned in this petition are modified with a direction to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service and grant him all consequential financial and service benefits within a period of one month from the date an authentic copy of this order is produced before them".
10. The core issue for consideration in the present OA is whether the respondents were justified in cancelling the applicant's appointment on the ground of alleged concealment of a criminal case, despite the applicant having disclosed the same and the criminal case relating to his juvenile age.
11. From the record, it is an admitted position that while submitting the attestation form on 03.03.2020, the applicant himself disclosed the pendency of the criminal case. Upon being asked by the department, the applicant furnished all relevant details and documents, explaining that the FIR arose out of a family property dispute and he had been granted bail. Therefore, the allegation of concealment or suppression of material facts is factually incorrect. MANISH Once disclosure is made, the question of suppression does not arise. KUMAR SRIVASTA 12. It is also undisputed that the alleged incident pertains to the VA year 2010, when the applicant was a juvenile. The competent Trial Court declared the applicant a juvenile on the date of the alleged incident and transferred the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board. The legal effect of juvenility is well settled. Under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, even a conviction of a 10 juvenile does not entail any disqualification in public employment. In the present case, the applicant stands on a much stronger footing, as he was ultimately acquitted.
13. The Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad, in. Pundarikaksh Dev Pathak (supra), after relying upon judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, has categorically held that criminal proceedings relating to juvenile cannot be used to deny public employment, even conviction of a juvenile does not carry any stigma, and requiring disclosure of criminal prosecution faced as a juvenile violates the right to privacy and reputation. Applying the said law to the present case, we find that the respondents were not justified in treating the juvenile case of the applicant as a disqualification.
14. The FIR against the applicant was registered under Sections 323, 504 and 506 IPC, which are minor offences. The dispute admittedly arose out of a family property matter and does not involve moral turpitude or serious criminal conduct. Further, the applicant was acquitted on 22.07.2021. Merely because the acquittal was on the ground of benefit of doubt cannot, by itself, be a ground to deny appointment, particularly when the case relates to juvenile and is of trivial nature.
15. The Hon'ble High Court, vide judgment dated 05.05.2022, had already set aside the rejection order dated 24.11.2021 and issued a mandamus to the respondents to issue the appointment letter in accordance with rules. The matter was remitted to this Tribunal for decision on merits. In view of the settled law laid down by the MANISH KUMAR Hon'ble High Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the action of SRIVASTA the respondents in cancelling the appointment cannot be sustained. VA
16. We find that the impugned order dated 24.11.2021 has been passed without proper application of mind, by mischaracterizing disclosure as concealment, and by ignoring the statutory protection 11 available to a juvenile. The decision of the respondents is arbitrary, disproportionate and contrary to settled law.
17. In view of the foregoing discussion, the Original Application deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The order dated 24.11.2021 passed by respondent no. 3 is hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to issue the appointment letter to the applicant for the post of Lower Division Clerk (LDC) in accordance with rules, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. No order as to costs. All associated MAs stand disposed.
(Mohan Pyare) (Justice Om Prakash VII)
Member (A) Member (J)
Manish/-
MANISH
KUMAR
SRIVASTA
VA