Jharkhand High Court
Their Workmen Being Represented By The ... vs Employers In Relation To The Management ... on 21 January, 2020
Author: Ravi Ranjan
Bench: Chief Justice, Sujit Narayan Prasad
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.513 of 2018
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Their Workmen being represented by the President, Hind Mazdoor Kisan Panchayat, Ram Jatan Ram .... .... Appellant Versus
1. Employers in relation to the Management of Rajhara Colliery of M/s CCL Palamau through the Project Officer, Rajhara Colliery of M/s CCL, Palamau
2. Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Labour .... .... Respondents With L.P.A. No.636 of 2018 With I.A.No.9889 of 2019 Their Workmen represented through the President of Hind Mazdoor Kishan Panchayat, Sri Pramod Soni .... .... Appellant Versus
1. Employers in relation to the Management of Rajhara Colliery of M/s C.C.L. having its Office at P.O. & P.S.- Rajhara, District- Palamu
2. Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi .... .... Respondents
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CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
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For the Appellant : Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, Senior Advocate For the Respondent-C.C.L. : Mr. Anoop Kr. Mehta, Advocate
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Oral Judgment 05/Dated: 21.01.2020 Both the intra-court appeals have been directed to be listed together for analogous hearing vide order dated 18.09.2019 passed in 2 L.P.A. No.513 of 2018.
I.A.No.9889 of 2019
It appears from the record of L.P.A.No.513 of 2018 that the appeal has been filed within time but the appeal being L.P.A.No.636 of 2018 has been filed after delay of 123 days and as such, application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed for condoning the aforesaid delay in filing the appeal being L.P.A.No.636 of 2018 stating therein that the delay has been caused in filing the appeal due to delay in taking decision by the Union and once the Union has taken decision, thereafter as per the instruction of the Union, the certified copy has been obtained and then the memo of appeal has been drafted and thereafter it has been filed, which caused the delay of 123 days.
Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel for the appellant has submitted that if the delay would not be condoned, the appellant would suffer irreparable loss and injury.
Mr. Anoop Kr. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent- Management has fairly submitted that the appeal being L.P.A.No.513 of 2018 is being decided on merit, therefore, it would be just and proper to decide the L.P.A.No.636 of 2018 also on its merit.
This Court after considering the aforesaid submission on behalf of the parties, deem it fit and proper to condone the delay in filing the appeal.
Accordingly, the delay in filing the L.P.A.No.636 of 2018, is hereby condoned.
I.A.No.9889 of 2019 is allowed.
L.P.A.No.513 of 2018 & L.P.A.No.636 of 2018 Both the intra-court appeals have been filed against the order dated 11.05.2018 passed in W.P.(L) No.2266 of 2007, whereby and whereunder 3 the learned Single Judge of this Court has quashed and set aside the award dated 16.03.2006 passed in Reference Case No.114/1989 by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad.
2. It requires to refer herein that L.P.A.No.636 of 2018 has been filed by one Sri Pramod Soni Intervener to the writ petition representing their Workmen through the President of Hind Mazdoor Kishan Panchayat.
3. The brief facts which require to be enumerated herein for proper adjudication of the lis reads hereunder as:-
The case of the Sponsoring Union before the Tribunal is that Banwari Ram and 102 persons whose names find place in the schedule to the term of reference dated 15.09.1989 were working in permanent nature of job of shale picking and wagon picking from the year 1982 at the railway siding of Rajhara Colliery of M/s Central Coalfield Limited, but their payment of wages was being shown through some intermediaries in order to deprive them the benefit of wages as per National Coal Wage Agreement in short "NCWA".
According to them, their work was being supervised by the loading clerk of the management of Rajhara Colliery and further their attendance in each calendar year was for more than 240 days. Since they are continuously working in the job of shale picking, as such, they have approached the Management to regularise them as permanent employee of M/s Central Coalfield Limited and payment of wages as per recommendation of NCWA, but the Management did not pay any heed, so the dispute was raised by making reference to the effect:-
"Whether the action of the management of Rajhara Colliery of M/s. Central Coalfields Ltd. in denying regularisation to Shri Banbari Ram and 102 others shown in the Annexure employed through a contractor on shale picking and wagon picking jobs is justified? If not, to what relief are the workmen concerned entitled to?"4
"By Ministry's corrigendum dated 30.05.90 the names shown in the appendix to this reference be added below as Sl. No.103 of the annexure."
The case of the Management, on the other hand, is that reference is not maintainable because the Sponsoring Union, namely Hind Mazdoor Kisan Panchayat, is not recognized Union.
Further according to them, Shale Picking job is not prohibited category of job, therefore, the Management used to engage contractor for very brief period for Shale Picking as well as for execution of civil nature of job. According to the Management, none of the concerned persons was the employee of the management of Rajhara Colliery.
Thereafter, the Tribunal has proceeded to examine the matter by allowing the parties to lead evidence in support of their defence and finally the following award was passed:-
"The action of the management of Rajhara colliery of M/S. C.C. Ltd. in denying regularisation of Banwari Ram and 102 others shown in annexure to the reference order dated 15.09.89 is not justified and they are entitled for regularisation and payment of wages as per NCWA and they are entitled for wages of category-I Mazdoor as prescribed in N.C.W.A. The management is directed to re-instate them in employment and thereafter regularize them in Category-I Mazdoor within 30 days from the date of publication of the award, failing which they shall be entitled for wages as prescribed in N.C.W.A. However, they will not be paid any back wages."
The Management has challenged the award before this Court by invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being W.P.(L) No.2266 of 2007 in which one Sri Pramod Soni representing the Management in the capacity of President of Hind Mazdoor Kisan Panchayat, has intervened whose intervention application has been allowed and after hearing him, the order has been passed by quashing and setting aside the award, which is the subject matter of the present intra-court appeals.
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4. Learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner appearing in W.P.(L) No.2266 of 2007 as also Mr. Rajiv Nandan Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the Intervener has impleaded the respondent by virtue of allowing the I.A. No.5803 of 2016 by the writ Court, they have put their appearance and have jointly submitted before entering into the legality and propriety of the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge that on or after 11.08.1985, the workmen represented by their Union have been terminated from service by stopping them in discharging their duties.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant with all fairness has submitted that however the workmen have been terminated from service w.e.f. 11.08.1985 but the dispute has not been made by questioning the termination of the workmen rather the dispute has been raised against the decision of the Management in denying the regularisation to Sri Banwari Ram and 102 other concerned workmen which has been referred by the appropriate Government for its adjudication vide order dated 15.09.1989 and the Industrial Tribunal has proceeded for answering the reference with respect to question of regularisation.
Learned counsel for the appellant, however, has questioned the order passed by the learned Single Judge on the ground of showing interference in the award without appreciating the finding, upon which, the issue of regularisation has been answered in favour of the workmen by the Tribunal taking into consideration that all the workmen have performed their duties for a period of 240 days in a calendar year.
6. Mr. Anoop Kr. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent- Management of Rajhara Colliery of M/s CCL, has submitted by making response to the submission about the termination of services of the 6 workmen from 1985 that once the workmen have been terminated, there is no question of regularising them in service.
He further submits that fault lies on the part of the Union who was representing the workmen that even though the workmen have been terminated from service w.e.f. 11.08.1985 and the reference has been made by the appropriate Government vide order dated 15.09.1989 but no steps have been taken by them to modify the claim which has been made by the appropriate Government as also even before the Tribunal by making appropriate application but having not done so, no relief can be granted to the workmen who are not in service, so far as it relates to question of their regularisation in service.
He further submits that the learned Single Judge, even on merit, has taken into consideration the fact about the issue of regularisation as has been answered by the Tribunal on the ground of continuous service of 240 days which has been negated by the learned Single Judge by holding in the impugned order that merely due to the fact that the workmen have discharged their duties for a period of 240 days in a calendar year, does not ipso-facto entitle for any right for their regularisation.
In view of such background, submission has been made for dismissal of the present appeals.
7. This Court after having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of their rival submissions, deem it fit and proper to deal with some undisputed fact which is referred herein.
It is the case of the Union representing their workmen that the workmen were working since 1982 and performed their duties up to the year 1985 and as such on the ground of rendering service for a period of more than 240 days, the regularisation has been sought for, for which, 7 dispute has been raised before the competent authority, Management has been called upon for conciliation in the light of provision of Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act but the conciliation has failed, the appropriate Government has made reference in view of the provision of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act vide order dated 15.09.1989.
It further appears from the factual description as has been narrated in the award which is the part of the paper-book that the workmen have worked till 11.08.1985 and that is the reason, they have claimed for their regularisation on the ground of discharging their duties of 240 days of service in between the period from 1982 to 1985.
Reference has been made for adjudication of dispute pertaining to denial of claim of regularisation of 103 workmen, through the contractor, on shale picking and wagon picking jobs.
8. It requires to refer herein that the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1970) has been enacted with the object and intent to abolish the contract labour vis.-a-viz. to regulate it.
To achieve the aforesaid object, certain statutory provisions have been enacted i.e., registration of certain establishments as provided under Section 7, revocation of registration in certain cases under Section 8, the effect of non-registration as provided under Section 9, prohibition of employment of contract labour as provided under Section 10 and licensing of contractors as provided under Section 12 of the Act, 1970.
The reference of these provisions are being made since the same is necessary for the present case.
It is evident from the provision of Section 7 which requires such registration to certain establishments under which the Registering 8 Authority on completion of the formalities has provided therein to register the establishment and issue to the principal employer of the establishment, a certificate of registration containing such particulars as may be prescribed.
Under Section 8, power to revoke registration has been enacted to the Registering Officer, if he satisfied with the registration of any establishment has been obtained by misrepresentation or suppression of any material fact, but after giving opportunity of hearing to the principal employer of the establishment.
It is evident from the provision of Section 9 that no principal employer of an establishment, in the case of an establishment required to be registered under Section 7 but which has not been registered within the time fixed for the purpose under that Section and in the case of an establishment the registration in respect of which has been revoked under Section 8, employ contract labour in the establishment after the expiry of the period referred to in clause (a) or after the revocation of the registration referred to in clause (b), as the case may be.
Section 10 contains the provision of prohibition of employment of contract labour for which, appropriate Government is required to issue notification in the Official Gazette but before issuing any notification under sub-section (1), appropriate Government shall have regard to the conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in that establishment.
Section 12 contains the provision to provide licensing of contractors, in absence thereof, the contractor cannot be allowed to execute any work through contract labour.
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the effect of the 9 Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation Vrs. United Labour Union and Ors., reported in (1997) 9 SCC 377, wherein it was held that on abolition of contract labour system from any establishment under Section 10 of the Act by the appropriate Government, the logical and legitimate consequences were that the erstwhile regulated contract labourer covered to be treated as direct employee of the employer on whose establishment they were earlier working and they would be entitled to be treated as regular employees from the day on which the contract labour system in the establishment for the work which they were doing gets abolished.
Ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of AIR India Statutory Corporation Vrs. United Labour Union and Ors. (supra), has been examined by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. Vrs. National Union Waterfront Workers & Ors., reported in (2001) 7 SCC 1, wherein it was held that there is no provision under the CLRA Act whether expressly or by necessary implication which provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuance of a notification by the appropriate Government under Section 10(1), prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any other establishment and overruled the judgment in AIR India Statutory Corporation Vrs. United Labour Union and Ors. (supra) making it clear that neither Section 10 nor any other provision in the CLRA Act provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuance of a notification by the appropriate Government under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act.
The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of AIR India 10 Statutory Corporation Vrs. United Labour Union and Ors. (supra) has been held to be not a good law by laying down the ratio in the case of SAIL at paragraph-125 and 126 which reads hereunder as:-
"125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus:
(1) (a) Before January 28, 1986, the determination of the question whether Central Government or the State Government, is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in view of the definition of the expression appropriate Government as stood in the CLRA Act, on the answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry; or the establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be the appropriate Government;
otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government;
(b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act; if (i) the concerned Central Government company/undertaking or any undertaking is included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the Central Government, or (b) by railway company; or (c) by specified controlled industry, then the Central Government will be the appropriate Government otherwise in relation to any other establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the appropriate Government.
(2) (a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the appropriate Government :
(1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the case may be, and;
(2) having regard to
(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the establishment in question; and
(ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub- section (2) of Section 10;
(b) inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on December 9, 1976 does not satisfy the afore-
said requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented. 11 (3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a notification by appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any establishment. Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working in the concerned establishment;
(4) We over-rule the judgment of this court in Air Indias case (supra) prospectively and declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including High Court, for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India's case (supra), shall hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final.
(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance of various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of the contract labour in the concerned establishment subject to the conditions as may be specified by it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder.
(6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act in respect of the concerned establishment has been issued by the appropriate Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the principal employer intends to employ regular workmen he shall give preference to the erstwhile contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to maximum age appropriately taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications other than technical qualifications.
126. We have used the expression industrial adjudicator by design as determination of the questions afore-mentioned requires inquiry into disputed questions of facts which cannot conveniently be made by High Courts in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, in such cases the appropriate authority to go into those issues will be 12 industrial tribunal/court whose determination will be amenable to judicial review."
10. It is evident from the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. Vrs. National Union Waterfront Workers & Ors. (supra), wherein the issue of automatic absorption/regularisation has been discarded with the ratio to decide the question of regularisation by taking into consideration about the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaking to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance of various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of the contract labour in the concerned establishment subject to the conditions as may be specified by it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder [para 125 (5) of the judgment rendered in the case of SAIL].
It further laid down the proposition at paragraph-126 that the aforementioned fact is required to be inquired into, which cannot be conveniently be made by the High Courts in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, therefore, in such cases the appropriate authority to go into those issues will be industrial tribunal/court whose determination will be amenable to judicial review.
11. Herein, the workmen have agitated the dispute against the denial of claim of regularisation by taking the ground more particularly that each of the workmen have performed their duties for a period of more than 240 13 days but as would appear from the award, no plea of engagement of workmen through the contractor treating it as sham and camouflage has been agitated but the Tribunal has answered the award only on the ground of rendering service of 240 days which the learned Single Judge has not accepted for passing direction of regularisation, which according to our considered view, is the perfect finding passed upon the perfect reasoning as would appear from the impugned order, it is for the reason that regular discharge of continuous service of 240 days is required to be considered in a case of termination as per the provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 i.e., the workmen have been discharged after rendering continuous service of 240 days and if any dispute would be raised, the consideration of continuous period of service as provided under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, is to be considered but so far as the question of regularisation/absorption in pursuance to the provision of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, the primary and basic thing are required to be seen as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Limited (supra) that if in spite of issuance of prohibitory notice under Section 10(1) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, if any work having perennial in nature, if taken through the Contractor, the same if established as camouflage and sham transaction, the conclusion would be the order of absorption, irrespective of period of service whether it is 240 days, more than that or less than it, therefore, even if the workmen would have been found to be rendered continuous service of 240 days, it will be of no aid so far as regularisation of service under the provision of CLRA as because irrespective of period of service if the workman has been found to be engaged by the contractor and the engagement through the 14 contractor if decided by the Industrial Adjudicator as camouflage and sham one, the appropriate order of regularisation will be required to be passed.
Herein in the instant case as would appear from the award that the Management has taken the issue about the work which was not under the prohibited category of jobs but the aforesaid fact has not been answered by the Tribunal and merely on the ground of continuous service of 240 days has passed the award, therefore, in view of the judgment rendered in the case of Steel Authority of India Limited (supra), the aforesaid finding has not been approved by the learned Single Judge which according to us does not suffer from error as per the detailed discussion made as above.
12. It is not in dispute that power of judicial review so far as the award pertaining to industrial dispute is concerned, but it can certainly be reviewed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if there is any perversity in finding or the award has been passed ignoring the position of law or in violation of principle of natural justice.
This Court at this stage also needs to consider the scope of the High Court for issuance of writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan reported in A.I.R. 1964 477 Supreme Court, wherein at paragraph no.7 their Lordships have been pleased to held as follows:-
"The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an 15 opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. The issue about inference in the aforesaid order has recently been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of General Manager Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa & Others Vs. Sri Giridhari Sahu & Others in Civil Appeal No. 8071 of 2010, has reiterated the view about the scope of issuance of writ of certiorari by the High Court laying down therein the proposition of law that if the finding recorded by the court is erroneous and based upon perversity, the order is fit to be quashed/set aside.
13. The other fact also requires to be considered, since the same has been brought to the notice of this Court by Mr. Majumdar, learned senior counsel for the appellant with respect to the consequence of termination of the workmen w.e.f. 11.08.1985 and in such circumstances can a terminated employee be regularised?
14. There is no denial in the position of law that regularisation can only 16 be done with respect to serving employee and once the relationship of the employer and employee/workmen ends, there is no question of regularisation of service.
15. Herein, it is the admitted case of the appellant-writ petitioner that the workmen have not been allowed to discharge their duties on or after 11.08.1985, therefore, the same will be treated to be termination and once the workmen have been terminated from service, there is no question of their regularisation.
Further it requires to refer herein that the fact about stopping the workmen from allowing them to render their work were available on or after 11.08.1985 i.e., prior to the date of the order passed by the appropriate Government by which, the reference has been made as per the order dated 15.09.1989 but no steps have been taken for alteration of the reference rather the fact has been allowed to go as was existed on or before 11.08.1985, now the question is that the Tribunal although has passed the award for regularisation but whether it can be given effect to once the workmen have been retrenched from service on or after 11.08.1985, the answer would be in negative, since there cannot be any regularisation of the retrenched employee.
It further appears that the reference which was made on 15.09.1989 has been modified vide corrigendum dated 30.05.1990, but no steps for amending the reference by questioning the termination from service has been sought to be made by the workmen, therefore, this Court is of the view that there cannot be an order of regularisation on this account also no inference is required in the order passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the award of tribunal has been quashed and set aside.
16. This Court on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove, is of 17 the view that the learned Single Judge has committed no error in passing the impugned order/judgment.
17. Accordingly, both the appeals are held to be devoid of merit, accordingly, are dismissed.
(Dr. Ravi Ranjan, C.J.) (Sujit Narayan Prasad,J.) Rohit/-
A.F.R.