Bombay High Court
Sham Ramchandra Sonawane vs State Of Maharashtra on 19 September, 1991
Equivalent citations: 1992(1)BOMCR415
JUDGMENT S.M. Daud, J.
1. This is an application for bail by a person who is alleged to have committed offences punishable under sections 8(c) read with 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act).
2. The case against the applicant resulting in the registration of C.R. No. 13 of 1991 by the Narcotics Cell, Ghatkopar Unit, Bombay may be summarised thus :
Police Inspector S.R. Pawar of the afore-mentioned Cell received an information on 4-2-1991 that three persons viz., Siraj, Naeem and the applicant Sham were to engage in a transaction of narcotics at about 16.30 hrs. near Vijaya Bank. S.V. Road at Santacruz, Bombay. The information was brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner of the Cell who ordered his subordinates to lay a trap. A trap was arranged and the police party set out with two panchas. The party took positions at the place mentioned above. At about 16.30 hrs. came three persons answering to the physical description received by the Cell vis-a-vis Siraj, Naeem and Sham. The party led by P.I. Pawar surrounded the trio and made known their intentions. What transpired can be best described in the words of the panchanama thus :---
"The officers and men surrounded and detained them on the spot. P.I. Pawar disclosed his identity and informed them that the police wanted to take their personal searches. P.I. Pawar also told them that they had a right to have their personal searches taken by Gazetted Officer under section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act, 1985. He informed them that he is Gazetted Officer".
So far as the applicant Sham is concerned, he is said to have been holding one white coloured plastic bag in his right hand. The bag was found to contain two small cloth bags which were stitched. These bags were slit open and found to contain a powdery substance which gave off a strong odour. Small samples of the powdery substance were tested on a drug identification kit and both gave out a positive result indicating the powdery substance to be heroin. Samples were collected and sealed. After this the trio were marched to the Cell where P.S.I. Nigade who was also part of the raiding party lodged a report. Statements of various persons were recorded. In due course, the culprits were put up before the Special judge.
3. The applicant contends that he innocent and that the record such as it exists indicates a breach of sections 50, 55 and 57 of the NDPS Act. The requirements of the said sections are mandatory and absolute compliance therewith is necessary. Having regard to the violations, the applicant is entitled to bail. The State opposes the bail application and has filed an affidavit of P.I. Pawar to fortify the objections raised by it. Briefly stated, the contention is that there is no breach of the sections mentioned by the applicant in his application. At the hearing of the application Mr. Vakil representing Sham restricts himself to the contention that there has been a breach of section 50 of the Acts as also section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Code) which latter prescribes the conditions under which searches have to be carried out.
4. The application has to be considered in the background of certain provisions of the NDPS Act. Having regard to the fact that drugs have been allegedly recovered from Sham in a personal search the section relevant thereto is section 43 which to the extent relevant reads thus :---
"Any officer...mentioned in section 42 may---
(a) seize, in any place or in transit, any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance in respect of which he has reason to believe an offence punishable under Chapter IV has been committed.....
(b) detain and search any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed an offence punishable under Chapter IV, and, if such person has any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance in his possession and such possession appears to him to be unlawful, arrest him and any other person in his company".
Section 50 which is said to have been breached to the extent of the alleged search is worded thus :---
"50(1) when any officer duly authorised under section 42 is about to search any person under the provisions of ..... section 43, he shall, if such so requires, taken such person without unnecessary delay to the nearest Gazetted Officer of any of the departments mentioned in section 42 or to the nearest Magistrate.
(2) If such requisition is made, the officer may detain the person until he can bring him before the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate referred to in sub-section (1).
(3) The Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate before whom any such person is brought shall, if he sees no reasonable ground for search, forthwith discharge the person but otherwise shall direct that search be made".
Section 37 of the Act which has been brought about by the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act of 1988 reads as follows ":---
"37(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973---
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable ;
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless---
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in Clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail".
The relevant provision in the Code reads as follows :---
"437(1) When any person accused of ...any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained ...he may be released on bail but---
(i) such person shall not be released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life".
Section 439 of the Code enables a High Court or a Court of Sessions to direct the grant of bail in certain cases, but that is not relevant for the purposes of this case.
5. To take up Mr. Vakil's submission vis-a-vis the breach of section 50 of the NDPS Act, it is contended that the breach consisted in (i) Sham not being told of his right to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, (ii) Sham not being told that his person was to be searched for recovery of drugs and (iii) Sham being misled by being told that he had a right to be searched by a Gazetted Officer and not before as provided for by section 50 of the Act: On the subject as to whether section 50 of the Act is directory or mandatory the High Courts have taken a divergent view. The Punjab High Court in Bhajan Singh v. State of Haryana, in Civil Appeal No. 312-S.B. of 1987 decided on 5-5-1987 has held:---
"The provisions of the Act being mandatory have to be strictly construed specially in view of the minimum sentence of imprisonment and fine prescribed under the Act leaving no discretion to the trial Court to impose a lesser sentence of imprisonment or fine in any case whatsoever irrespective of the quantum of recovery".
One of the sections which the learned Judge held to be mandatory was section 50. The said Judge in Hakam Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, reported in 1988 Cri. L.J. 528 has observed that to make section 50 meaningful the officer carrying out a search of the suspect has to inform him that he has a right to be taken before a Gazetted Officer or the nearest Magistrate so that he can be searched in their presence. Says the learned Judge---
"Before making a search, the provisions of section 50 of the Act lay down that the Officer who is duly authorised will not conduct any search if the person to be searched so requires, before taking such person to the nearest Gazetted Officer of any of the Department mentioned in section 42 of the Act or to the nearest Magistrate. The words "if such person so requires", are mandatory and the officer has to ask the person if he wanted to be taken to the said nearest Gazetted Officer or to the nearest Magistrate. Unless the person to be searched is informed about his right the said words would not come into operation".
So far as the Bombay High Court is concerned the contrary view has commended itself to various Division Benches of this Court. Kantharia, J., in Wilfred Joseph Dawood Lema v. State of Maharashtra, 1990 Cri. L.J. 1034 has opined that a Police Officer wanting to search the suspect is under no obligation to inform the suspect that he has a right to be searched in the presence of the nearest Gazetted Officer or the nearest Magistrate. In case the suspect so desires he has to articulate his desire and it will then be for the Police Officer to take him before a Gazetted Officer or the nearest Magistrate for the intended search. This view of the learned Judge was affirmed by the third Judge-Kurdukar, J., -to whom the matter was referred upon a difference of opinion between H.H. Kantharia and D.N. Mehta, JJ. In Shakal Abdul Gaffoor v. Union of India and another, reported in 1991(1) Bom.C.R. 270 another Division Bench of this Court has held that a Police Officer wanting to carry out a search of the suspect is not under an obligation to inform the suspect of his having a right to be taken before a Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate for being searched. What is mandatory according to this Bench is a duty cast upon the Officer carrying out the search to intimate the suspect before any search is taken that the same is actuated on the suspicion of his being in possession of drugs. Followed by this Bench is the decision of a Division Bench of the Panaji Bench in Sureshkumar Khandelval v. State, reported in 1989(2) Goa Law Times 1. Mr. Vakil does not dispute that the pre-dominant view of this High Court is against his contention about section 50 in its entirety, being mandatory. He however submits that there has been a breach of section 50 in the instant case, and, in two particulars, both of which cannot be ignored. The first failure is said to lie in the failure of the police party led by P.I. Pawar to inform Sham that he was to be searched in respect of drugs. Secondly, instead of being told that he was entitled to call upon the searching party to take him before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate for being searched, he was misled by being told that he could be searched by a Gazetted Officer. The Public Prosecutor meets this argument by pointing out certain decisions of this High Court wherein it has been held that even if sections 41 to 58 be held to be mandatory, any infirmity would not in any way lessen the guilt of the accused. Decisions in support of this contention are (i) Abdul Sattar v. State, (P.B.) (ii) Hemant Vyankatesh Agwan v. The State of Maharashtra, and (iii) Abdul Karim v. State of Maharashtra, 1990 Mh.L.J. 991. In fact, the decision in Hemant's case goes to the extent of saying that the provisions of section 50 are only directory. To counter this Mr. Vakil submits that even if section 50 be deemed to be directory the enforcement authorities are not to render it nugatory by completely ignoring the requirements of the section. He submits that the decision in Mari Appa v. State of M.P., 1990 Cri.L.J. 1990, has been relied by a learned Single Judge of this Court and by implication that decision has become a binding precedent as far as every Single Judge of this Court is concerned. The decision in Mari Appa's case has been followed by Chaudhary. J., in Criminal Application No. 1624 of 1991 decided on 17-8-1991. Chaudhari, J., after a survey of a large number of cases on the subject has observed---
"In this connection, I find myself in complete agreement with the view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Mari Appa's case, 1990 Cri. L.J. 1990".
Counsel submits that this being the conclusion reached by Chaudhary, J., and there being no contrary decision of this Court on the subject of the applicability of Mari Appa's case to the subject of bail under the NDPS Act, I am bound by the ratio of the Mari Appa's decision. Chaudhary, J., says---
"For my own reasons indicated above, which find support from the aforesaid ruling. Which I am inclined to follow as, with respect, it does not come in conflict with the ratio of any of the decisions of this Court referred to above because these do not relate to the stage of bail, I am inclined to follow the test laid down in the above decision".
The learned Judge then proceeds to quote a passage from Mari Appa's case which reads as follows:---
"The material placed before the Court must be judicially considered for reaching the required satisfaction and in doing so, such material which ex-facie cannot be legally admitted in evidence, must as of necessity, be excluded from consideration. It is here that the procedural safeguards as provided under the law come into play".
There is a great deal in the judgment of Chaudhary, J., to commend itself. But it seems to fly in the face of the binding decisions of this Court. While a Court may not be exactly powerless to appraise and analyse material said to appear against the suspect when considering an application for bail of a person accused of an offence under the NDPS Act, the limitations imposed by section 37 of the NDPS Act should not be lost sight of. First, section 37 keeps intact limitations on granting of bail appearing in the Code or any other law for the time being in force. Next, unlike the Code the Legislature in enacting section 37 has advisedly used different words. In section 437 of the Code the Court is enjoined not to release a person on bail "if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life". This limitation is trifling compared to the limitation imposed by section 37 of the NDPS Act which fetters the Court from grant of bail unless "the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail". Under the Code the suspect is not to be released on bail if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he is guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Section 37 of the NDPS Act lays down the converse by prescribing that the person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment for five years or more under the NDPS Act, can be released only if there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The words "any offence" appearing in the second part have of course to be read to mean an offence under the NDPS Act, and, possibly one, which prescribes punishment for a term of imprisonment of five years or more. In the face of section 37 it would not be enough to say that there has been an infraction of some requirement of section 50 of the Act to entitle the suspect to be released on bail. As observed earlier this Court has more than once held that the provisions of section 50 are not mandatory, except the requirement that the suspect prior to his search be informed that the search is for the purpose of recovery of drugs. Even if this duty be not performed, the result would not be a vitiation of the entire search. This is because it is well settled that an illegality tainting a search does not preclude the reception of evidence obtained by the illegal search. It was argued, and, with some justification, that the spirit of section 50 of the Act has not been followed in the instant case. Mr. Vakil says and I am inclined to agree with the contention that the Gazetted Officer spoken of by section 50 of the NDPS Act, has to be a person other than one participating in the search who also happens to be a Gazetted Officer. But as said earlier, even if this requirement is not followed and even if the same be held to be mandatory, the result would not be the conclusion that there would come into existence reasonable grounds for believing the suspect to be not guilty of an offence punishable with imprionment for a term five years or more. I should not be understood as saying that accused would not be entitled at the trial to prove that the infraction has caused a great deal of prejudice to him thereby rendering the evidence sought to be adduced by the prosecution entirely doubtful. Neither should I be understood as saying that even at the stage of bail the Court is powerless to consider the alleged breaches as a basis for concluding that the suspect has not committed the offence ascribed to him. It would all depend upon the circumstance of the case. Here, there is no doubt that suspect Sham was virtually precluded from seeking to exercise the option of demanding that he be taken before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate so that he could have the protection of their presence while being searched. P.I. Pawar of course told him-so say the panchanama and the connected papers-that the had a right to have his personal search taken by a Gazetted Officer. That, is not the intent of section 50 which makes it clear that the right of suspect is not to be searched by a Gazetted Officer but to be searched before a Gazetted Officer. The learned Public Prosecutor wants me to hold that there has been substantial compliance with section 50 as the suspect was given a right greater than what is provided under the statute. It is not possible to agree with the submission for even if Sham somehow understood that he was being offered the right mentioned in section 50, P.I. Pawar foreclosed that option by informing him in the next breath about himself being a Gazetted Officer. This, in other words, was telling Sham that he dare not exercise the right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer for the person searching him was himself a Gazetted Officer. The conclusion we reach is that Sham was not told that his person was to be searched in connection with drugs and next that he was mis-informed about his right to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. What effect these breaches have will be considered later.
6. The next breach pointed out by Mr. Vakil is the failure of the searching party to send for residents of the locality who in addition had the qualification of being respectable. Section 100 of the Code relates to searches in respect of closed places and persons residing in or being in charge of such places. In terms, section 100 does not apply to the search of persons de hors the closed places. Even so, the Panaji Bench in Abdul Sattar's case, (P.B.) has laid down that the mere fact of witnesses participating in the search not being residents of the locality would not be sufficient to vitiate the proceeding.
7. To turn now to the two infirmities surrounding the search, the question is whether this would lead to the satisfaction of there being reasonable ground for the belief that Sham is not guilty of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under the NDPS Act? Chaudhary, J., in coming to the view he did, observed-
"The position that emerges from a survey of these decisions is that in so far as Bombay High Court is concerned, the view taken is that although the provisions of section 41 to 58 may be read to be mandatory, the violation thereof where shown does not ipso facto vitiate the conviction of the accused unless prejudice is established by the accused. It also emerges that the question of reliability of evidence of the panchas has also to be decided on the touch-stone of prejudice to be established by the accused apart from its inherent untrustworthiness. However, the question whether the violation of the provisions of section 41 to 58 of the Act and/or of section 100(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code has not been decided in the context of bail applications. In my opinion, different tests will have to be applied at the stage of bail for two important reasons. Firstly, at that stage, the accused has no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses or establish prejudice which he can hope only to do at the stage of trial Secondly, the provisions would be applicable right from the inception of the investigation. It would be fallacious or pernicious to leave the question of their compliance to be looked into only at the sage of trial. Such a situation is fraught with the danger of the prosecution agency ignoring altogether the compliance of the provisions which contain in-built safeguards to the accused, with impunity and with ulterior purpose in a given case. That would bring into peril the liberty of the citizen guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution ..... The consequences of a person being trapped in a Narcotic Case are indeed serious and grave. There are stringent limitations on grant of bail under section 37 of the Act. Once a person is denied bail, he has to languish in jail for several years as experience shows that trials do not take place at least for a couple of years. It would be cruel to tell a person that you may have been arrested because officers of the Cell say that you have committed the offence, and no matter we do not bother to comply with the provisions of law, you may languish in jail for several years and establish prejudice at the trial and may be, you may then be found to have been innocent. Courts must therefore be vigilant to protect the rights of the accused .... That possibility has to be found to exist at the stage of bail on prima facie consideration of the matter and only after reaching satisfaction that he is reasonably believed to be guilty. The burden under sections 54 and 35 of the NDPS Act would shift upon the accused only after the prosecution discloses, prima facie, that he is guilty".
There is much in the above passage to commend itself. But it is, with respect, not possible to agree with everything said by the learned Judge. It is possible for the suspect at the stage of bail to says that he is not guilty of the offence and that there is reason to believe him to be innocent. But this is not to be equated with the suspect being under no greater obligation than to show a trifling breach of some provisions irrespective of whether it is directory or mandatory and then ask the Court to presume that he is innocent so that he can secure his release under section 37 which section prescribes bail only where the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence. The burden upon the suspect seeking bail in cases falling under section 37 of the NDPS Act is far heavier and a breach of this or that provision will not necessarily enable him to secure his release. What would, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Here, there is no doubt of the suspect being misinformed of his right to be searched by a Gazetted Officer. Next. P.I. Pawar was indulging in sophistry when telling the suspect that he could be searched by a Gazetted Officer and in the very next breath intimating that he himself was one such officer. The information about P.I. Pawar being a Gazetted Officer was in the nature of an intimidation that the suspect dare not insist upon being taken to another Gazetted Officer. But this is not all. Other circumstances should not be lost sight of. Sham was found in a public place in board daylight upon a busy street of Bombay and in possession of a large quantity of heroin. The drug could not have been planted upon him and, at least at this stage, the presumption will be that the Officers have acted fairly and reasonably. Having regard to this situation, it would be unwise to yet attribute to the enforcement Officers a desire to somehow implicate a blameless person. Therefore, even if there have been breaches of section 50 of the Act that cannot be said to be a case for inferring that Sham's innocence has been made out.
The result is that the application fails and is hereby rejected.