Madhya Pradesh High Court
Gambhir Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 7 September, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 MP 1711
Author: Rajendra Kumar Srivastava
Bench: Rajendra Kumar Srivastava
THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
PRINCIPAL SEAT AT JABALPUR
Bench : HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAJENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
Cr.A. No.3217/2013
Gambhir Singh
VS.
State of M.P.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shri Jagdish Sakale, learned counsel for the appellant.
Shri Amit Bhurrak, learned P.L. for the respondent/State.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
(07.09.2020) On the consent of both the parties, this case is heard finally.
2. This criminal appeal u/s 374(2) Cr.P.C. has been filed by the appellant being aggrieved by the judgment dated 03.12.2013 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Burhanpur in Session Trial No. 50/2010 whereby the Sessions Judge convicted the appellant for the offence punishable u/s 326 of IPC and sentenced him to undergo RI for 8 years with fine of Rs.5,00,000/-. Default stipulation of two year's R.I. has also been imposed by the trial Court.
3. As per prosecution case, on 10.06.2010, on account of previous dispute, the appellant assaulted the complainant/victim with axe on her back and thigh. Thereafter, the victim has been hospitalized at District Hospital Khandwa, subsequently referred to 2 Cr.A. No. 3217/2013 M.Y. Hospital, Indore. The medical report of victim is exhibited as Ex. P-3.
4. The police has lodged Dehati Nalishi (Ex. P-8) and on the basis thereof registered the FIR (Ex. P-18). The axe was seized from the possession of appellant/accused vide Ex. P-14. The seized articles were also sent for FSL, report is annexed as Ex. P-22. After completing all necessary proceedings, the police has filed the charge sheet before the JMFC Burhanpur for the offence under Sections 307 and 326 of IPC who committed the case to the Court of Session. The trial Court has framed the charge of Section 307 of IPC. The appellant/accused abjured his guilt and wanted trial. The learned trial Court has recorded the statements of prosecution witnesses as well as statement of accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. After evaluating the evidences produced by the prosecution, the trial Court found the appellant guilty under Section 326 of IPC and sentenced him as aforesaid.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court erred in passing the judgment of conviction whereas no evidence is available on record against the appellant. The learned trial Court overlooked the fact that the material witnesses of case have not supported the prosecution story and turned hostile. The trial Court erred in believing the testimony of victim (PW-2) Macchla Bai whereas her statement suffers from material contradictions and omissions. The trial Court has also ignored the fact of previous dispute between the father of appellant and complainant for the reason, the accused has been falsely implicated in the case. The 3 Cr.A. No. 3217/2013 prosecution has produced eye witness namely Ramesh (PW-6), Jitendra (PW-7), Laxmi Narayan (PW- 11) and Dinesh (PW-23) in trial who have not supported the prosecution case. He further submits that witnesses of seizure have also not supported the prosecution's case and thus the recovery of weapon has not been proved. The prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt even then the trial Court has convicted the appellant and passed the sentence of 8 years arbitrarily, more so, the Court has imposed huge fine amount of Rs.5,00,000/- without considering the means of the appellant/accused. With the aforesaid, he prays for allowing this appeal.
6. On the other hand, learned Panel Lawyer for the State opposes the arguments made by learned counsel for the appellant submitting that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence available on record. The learned trial Court did not make any error while passing the judgment of conviction against the present appellant. The witnesses of the case are duly stable with their version and there is no reason to disbelieve them. The prosecution has proved its case beyond any reasonable doubt. He submits that in the present case, the victim suffered from severe pain being paralyzed.
The act of present appellant was heinous and does not deserve for any mercy. The trial Court has rightly imposed the fine amount being concerned about the survival of victim. With the aforesaid submissions, he prays for dismissal of this appeal.
7. Heard both the parties and perused the record.
4 Cr.A. No. 3217/20138. On perusal of record, it appears that the allegation which found proved against the appellant is that he assaulted the victim/complainant with an axe repeatedly which resulted into grievous hurt to the complainant. As per Dr. Pradeep Bhargav (PW-8), both legs of the victim/complainant were paralyzed even more she lost her control in her motion. M.R.I was also performed and according thereof fracture in spinal cord and rib were also found to the complainant. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court regarding nature of injures and weapon is found correct.
9. The learned counsel for the appellant raised the point that the trial Court has convicted the accused only on the basis of testimony of injured/complainant Macchla Bai (PW-10) even her statement containing material contradictions and omissions. On legal point of view, it is stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the single testimony of injured/complainant is sufficient to convict the accused. In the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex court in the case of Bhajan Singh v. State of Haryana, reported in (2011) 7 SCC 421, has held as under:-
"36. The evidence of the stamped witness must be given due weightage as his presence on the place of occurrence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that he was present at the time of occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. Such a witness comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. "Convincing evidence is required to discredit an 5 Cr.A. No. 3217/2013 injured witness." Thus, the evidence of an injured witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein."
10. Further, In the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex court in the case of Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras reported in AIR 1957 SC 614:-
"10.............High Courts in India in which the court insisted or corroboration of the testimony of a single witness, not as a proposition of law, but in view of the circumstances of those cases. On a consideration of the relevant authorities and the provisions of the Evidence Act, the following propositions may be safely stated as firmly established:
(1) As a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated.
One credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character. (2) Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon, for example in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character.
(3) Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in a matter like this and much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes.
11. In view of these considerations, we have no hesitation in holding that the contention that in a murder case, the court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too broadly stated. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, has categorically laid it down that "no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any fact". The legislature determined, as long ago as 1872, presumably after due consideration of the pros and cons, that it shall not be necessary for proof or disproof of a fact, to call any particular number of witnesses. In England, both before and after the passing of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there have been a number of statutes as set out in Sarkar's Law of Evidence -- 9th Edn., at pp. 1100 and 1101, forbidding convictions on the testimony of a single witness. The 6 Cr.A. No. 3217/2013 Indian Legislature has not insisted on laying down any such exceptions to the general rule recognized in Section 134 quoted above. The section enshrines the well recognized maxim that "Evidence has to be weighed and not counted". Our Legislature has given statutory recognition to the fact that administration of justice may be hampered if a particular number of witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence, where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime, would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. Even as the guilt of an accused person may be proved by the testimony of a single witness, the innocence of an accused person may be established on the testimony of a single witness, even though a considerable number of witnesses may be forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case for the prosecution. Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well-established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely:
(1) Wholly reliable.
(2) Wholly unreliable.
(3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.
12. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way -- it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses. Situations may arise and do arise where 7 Cr.A. No. 3217/2013 only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact. The court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The law reports contain many precedents where the court had to depend and act upon the testimony of a single witness in support of the prosecution. There are exceptions to this rule, for example, in cases of sexual offences or of the testimony of an approver; both these are cases in which the oral testimony is, by its very nature, suspect, being that of a participator in crime. But, where there are no such exceptional reasons operating, it becomes the duty of the court to convict, if it is satisfied that the testimony of a single witness is entirely reliable. We have therefore, no reasons to refuse to act upon the testimony of the first witness, which is the only reliable evidence in support of the prosecution"
11. It is also stated by the Hon'ble Apex Court that where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, his/her presence cannot be doubted as he/she was injured in the incident. His deposition must be given due weightage. His/her deposition cannot be brushed aside merely because there were some trivial contradiction or omission.
12. On perusal of statement of complainant/victim Macchla Bai (PW-10), it appears that she is stable with her earlier version of FIR and police statement that appellant/accused assaulted her on back and thigh with axe. She also accepted previous enmity between the parties. The injuries sustained by the complainant are duly corroborated with the medical report and statement of Dr. Pradeep Bhargav (PW-8).
13. Further, the prosecution has also produced some eye witnesses namely Ramesh (PW-6), Jitendra (PW-7), Kiran (PW-9), 8 Cr.A. No. 3217/2013 Narmada Bai (PW-10) and Laxmi Narayan (PW-11). Out of them Ramesh, Jitendra and Laxminarayan were declared hostile.
However, Laxmi Narayan (PW-11) has denied to see the appellant assaulting the victim/complainant but he stated that after the incident he saw the appellant/accused armed with axe. Ramesh (PW-6) also saw the appellant/accused armed with weapon after the incident.
Kiran (PW-9) and Narmada Bai (PW-10) saw the incident and stated against the appellant/accused. The weapon was also sent for chemical examination in which human blood was found present, however, blood group has not been identified and the witnesses of seizure have been turned hostile too.
14. It is true, in the case, some of the witnesses have not supported the prosecution case but looking to the fact that the injured/complainant specifically stated against the applicant in her Court statement and injuries sustained by her are dully corroborated with the medical evidence, I am of the view that finding of trial Court regarding conviction under offence 326 IPC requires no interference.
Consequently, the findings of trial court regarding conviction under section 326 IPC is hereby affirmed.
15. As far as sentence is concerned, the trial Court has awarded 8 years of jail sentence with fine of Rs.5,00,000/-. Under Section 326 of IPC, the Court is empowered to be awarded the sentence of life imprisonment or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years. There is no limit of minimum sentence period is prescribed. Looking to the evidence adduced by the prosecution and gravity of offence, I am persuaded 9 Cr.A. No. 3217/2013 with the discretion exercised by the learned trial Court in respect of quantum of jail sentence i.e. 8 years, same is found adequate and justifiable. The learned counsel for the appellant also raised the argument regarding imposition of huge fine amount i.e. 5 lakh rupees.
In this regard, under IPC, Section 63 to 70 provides the general principle regarding imposition of the fine. The language of Section 63 itself indicates that the fine amount shall not be excessive. In this regard, in the case of Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan Vs. State of Gujrat reported in (2013) 1 SCC 570, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
12. It is clear and reiterated that the term of imprisonment in default of payment of fine is not a sentence. To put it clear, it is a penalty which a person incurs on account of non-payment of fine. On the other hand, if sentence is imposed, undoubtedly, an offender must undergo unless it is modified or varied in part or whole in the judicial proceedings. However, the imprisonment ordered in default of payment of fine stands on a different footing. When such default sentence is imposed, a person is required to undergo imprisonment either because he is unable to pay the amount of fine or refuses to pay such amount.
Accordingly, he can always avoid to undergo imprisonment in default of payment of fine by paying such an amount. In such circumstance, we are of the view that it is the duty of the court to keep in view the nature of offence, circumstances in which it was committed, the position of the offender and other relevant considerations such as pecuniary circumstances of the accused person as to character and magnitude of the offence before ordering the offender to suffer imprisonment in default of payment of fine. The provisions of Sections 63 to 70 IPC make it clear that an amount of fine should not be harsh or excessive. We also reiterate that where a substantial term of imprisonment is inflicted, an excessive fine should not be imposed except in exceptional cases.
16. In another case Shantilal Vs. State of M.P. reported in (2007) 11 SCC 243, while dealing with the matter under NDPS Act, the Supreme Court has considered the provision of Section 63 to 70 10 Cr.A. No. 3217/2013 of IPC considering the financial condition of accused in priority coupled with the serious prejudice would cause to his family members. The Court has also referred the commentary of Ratanlal and Dhirajlal. The relevant paras are also quoted as under :-
32. A general principle of law reflected in Sections 63 to 70 IPC is that an amount of fine should not be harsh or excessive. The makers of IPC were conscious of this problem. The authors of the Code, therefore, observed:
"Death, imprisonment, transportation, banishment, solitude, compelled labour, are not, indeed, equally disagreeable to all men. But they are so disagreeable to all men that the legislature, in assigning these punishments to offences, may safely neglect the differences produced by temper and situation. With fine, the case is different. In imposing a fine, it is always necessary to have as much regard to the pecuniary circumstances of the offender as to the character and magnitude of the offence. The mulct which is ruinous to a labourer is easily borne by a tradesman, and is absolutely unfelt by a rich zamindar. It is impossible to fix any limit to the amount of a fine which will not either be so high as to be ruinous to the poor, or so low as to be no object of terror to the rich. There are many millions in India who would be utterly unable to pay a fine of fifty rupees; there are hundreds of thousands from whom such a fine might be levied, but whom it would reduce to extreme distress; there are thousands to whom it would give very little uneasiness; there are hundreds to whom it would be a matter of perfect indifference, and who would not cross a room to avoid it. The number of the poor in every country exceeds in a very great ratio the number of the rich. The number of poor criminals exceeds the number of rich criminals in a still greater ratio. And to the poor criminal it is a matter of absolute indifference whether the fine to which he is liable to be limited or not, unless it be so limited as to render it quite inefficient as a mode of punishing the rich. To a man who has no capital, who had laid by nothing, whose monthly wages are just sufficient to provide himself and his family with their monthly rice, it matters not whether the fine for assault be left to be settled by the discretion of the courts, or whether a hundred rupees be fixed as the maximum. There are no degrees in impossibility. He is no more able to pay a hundred rupees than to pay a lakh. A just and wise Judge, even if entrusted with a boundless discretion, will not, under ordinary circumstances, ... would leave it quite in the power of an unjust or inconsiderate Judge to inflict on 11 Cr.A. No. 3217/2013 such an offender all the evil which can be inflicted on him by means of fine....
It appears to us that the punishment of fine is a peculiarly appropriate punishment for all offences to which men are prompted by cupidity; for it is a punishment which operates directly on the very feeling which impels men to such offences. A man who has been guilty of great offences arising from cupidity, of forging a bill of exchange, for example, of keeping a receptacle for stolen goods, or of extensive embezzlement, ought, we conceive, to be so fined as to reduce him to poverty. That such a man should, when his imprisonment is over, return to the enjoyment of three-fourths of his property, a property which may be very large and which may have been accumulated by his offences, appears to us highly objectionable. Those persons who are most likely to commit such offences would often be less deterred by knowing that the offender had passed several years in imprisonment, than encouraged by seeing him, after his liberation, enjoying the far larger part of his wealth."
[See Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes, 26th Edn., (2007), pp. 221-22.] The authors further stated: (Ratanlal & Dhirajlal at pp. 226-27) "The next question which it became our duty to consider was this: When a fine has been imposed, what measures shall be adopted in default of payment? And here two modes of proceeding, with both of which we were familiar, naturally occurred to us. The offender may be imprisoned till the fine is paid, or he may be imprisoned for a certain term, such imprisonment being considered as standing in place of the fine. In the former case, the imprisonment is used in order to compel him to part with his money; in the latter case, the imprisonment is a punishment substituted for another punishment. Both modes of proceeding appear to us to be open to strong objections. To keep an offender in imprisonment till his fine is paid is, if the fine be beyond his means, to keep him in imprisonment all his life; and it is impossible for the best Judge to be certain that he may not sometimes impose a fine which shall be beyond the means of an offender. Nothing could make such a system tolerable except the constant interference of some authority empowered to remit sentences; and such constant interference we should consider as in itself an evil. On the other hand, to sentence an offender to fine and to a certain fixed term of imprisonment in default of payment, and then to leave it to himself to determine whether he will part with his money or lie in gaol, appears to us to be a very objectionable course. The high authority of Mr Livingstone is here against us. He allows the criminal, if sentenced to a fine exceeding one-fourth of his property, to compel the Judge to commute the excess 12 Cr.A. No. 3217/2013 for imprisonment at the rate of one day of imprisonment for every two dollars of fine, and he adds, that such imprisonment must in no case exceed ninety days. We regret that we cannot agree with him; the object of the penal law is to deter from offences, and this can only be done by means of inflictions disagreeable to offenders. The law ought not to inflict punishments unnecessarily severe; but it ought not, on the other hand, to call the offender into council with his Judges, and to allow him an option between two punishments. In general, the circumstance that he prefers one punishment raises a strong presumption that he ought to suffer the other. The circumstance that the love of money is a stronger passion in his mind than the love of personal liberty is, as far as it goes, a reason for our availing ourselves rather of his love of money than of his love of personal liberty for the purpose of restraining him from crime. To look out systematically for the most sensitive part of a man's mind, in order that we may not direct our penal sanctions towards that part of his mind, seems an injudicious policy.
We are far from thinking that the course which we propose is unexceptionable; but it appears to us to be less open to exception than any other which has occurred to us. We propose that, at the time of imposing a fine, the Court shall also fix a certain term of imprisonment which the offender shall undergo in default of payment. In fixing this term, the Court will in no case be suffered to exceed a certain maximum, which will vary according to the nature of the offence. If the offence be one which is punishable with imprisonment as well as fine, the term of imprisonment in default of payment will not exceed one-fourth of the longest term of imprisonment fixed by the Code for the offence. If the offence be one which by the Code is punishable only with fine, the term of imprisonment for default of payment will in no case exceed seven days."
** ** ** **
** ** ** **
** ** ** **
39. We are mindful and conscious that the present case is under the NDPS Act. Section 18 quoted above provides penalty for certain offences in relation to opium poppy and opium. Minimum fine contemplated by the said provision is rupees one lakh ("fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees"). It is also true that the appellant has been ordered to undergo substantive sentence of rigorous imprisonment for ten years which is minimum. It is equally true that maximum sentence imposable on the appellant is twenty years. The learned counsel for the State again is right in submitting that Clause (b) of sub-section (1) 13 Cr.A. No. 3217/2013 of Section 30 CrPC authorises the court to award imprisonment in default of payment of fine up to one- fourth term of imprisonment which the court is competent to inflict as punishment for the offence. But considering the circumstances placed before us on behalf of the appellant-accused that he is very poor; he is merely a carrier; he has to maintain his family; it was his first offence; because of his poverty, he could not pay the heavy amount of fine (rupees one lakh) and if he is ordered to remain in jail even after the period of substantive sentence is over only because of his inability to pay fine, serious prejudice will be caused not only to him, but also to his family members who are innocent. We are, therefore, of the view that though an amount of payment of fine of rupees one lakh which is minimum as specified in Section 18 of the Act cannot be reduced in view of the legislative mandate, ends of justice would be met if we retain that part of the direction, but order that in default of payment of fine of rupees one lakh, the appellant shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months instead of three years as ordered by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Here in the case, on perusal of arrest memo (Ex. P-1), in column No. 11 the qualification of accused is mentioned as 5 th pass and his occupation has been shown as wage labourer. The income of accused is specified as rupees 1001 to 2000 per month only. Further, in the statement of accused recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., in column of occupation, labour is mentioned. Under M.P. Criminal Courts Rules and orders, rule 279 speaks about the sentence of fine.
The said rule, clearly stated that fines should be regulated so as to accord with the circumstances of the offender and should not under any circumstances be excessive. For better elaboration, rule 279 is reproduced herein under:
"279.Fines should be regulated so as to accord with the circumstances of the offender and should not under any circumstances be excessive (Section 63 of the Indian Penal Code). Fines are sometimes imposed which are manifestly impossible of realization, while 14 Cr.A. No. 3217/2013 there is reason to fear that many which are imposed in petty cases, though realized, are paid only with difficulty. In dealing with petty cases fines should not be fixed at particular amounts as a matter of course, without much thought as to how they will be felt by the particular individual on whom they are imposed. It is a first principle in inflicting this mode of punishment that it is necessary to have as much regard to the pecuniary circumstances of the offender as to the character and magnitude of the offence. Fines should never in any case be imposed which are not likely to be realized at all, and they should never be imposed in petty cases with such severity as not to be easily realizable. Indiscriminate imposition of fines without due regard to the capacity of the accused to pay only result in the waste of the time of the Court and the police in attempting to realize the amounts, in the harassment of the convict or his dependents, or in the vicarious payment of the fine by persons interested in the convict."
18. On the case in hand, while imposing fine amount, the learned trial Court has not considered the inability of accused to pay such huge fine amount. The Court has also not considered about serious prejudice would cause to family members of accused/appellant. It is well settled principle of law that while imposing fine, it is necessary to have as much regard to the pecuniary circumstances of the accused person as to the character and magnitude of the offence, and where substantial term of imprisonment is inflicted, an excessive should not accompany it except in exceptional cases. Herein, the trial Court imposed 8 years jail sentence, under Section 326 of IPC, there is no limit prescribed of minimum sentence. The accused has completed 8 years of jail sentence on 01.11.2019 and at present he is serving the sentence of default stipulation.
19. Considering the aforesaid, to secure the ends of justice, I am of the view that the fine amount should be reduced up to Rs.
15 Cr.A. No. 3217/201315,000/- (Fifteen thousand rupees only) in lieu of Rs.5,00,000/-.
Likewise, default stipulation of 2 years R.I. shall also be reduced to 1 year.
20. The whole fine amount shall be given to the complainant/victim as compensation. Looking to the serious debility of Victim- Machhla Bai which caused in aforesaid incident, one more aspect is required to be considered that Section 357-A Cr.P.C.
consonance with Madhya Pradesh Crime Victim Compensation Scheme 2015, which provides the arrangement of grant of compensation to the victim. However, the Section 357-A of Cr.P.C.
has been incorporated on 31.12.2009 and the Scheme was notified and came into force on 31.03.2015, after the judgment passed by trial Court. In this regard, in the case of Mohd. Kaleem Vs. State of U.P. passed in Criminal Appeal No. 1726/2012, the High Court of Allahabad has held as under :-
"10.Under the Scheme, registration of F.I.R. will give rise to a claim to compensation which, of course, will be determined according to mechanism provided in the Scheme. Thus, even if offence is committed before the date of launch of Scheme, if F.I.R. is lodged and process of criminal justice administration is set in motion subsequent thereto, in appropriate cases victim will be entitled to compensation under the Scheme. Intention of Scheme is to compensate the victim who suffers on account of failure of State to provide protection. "
21. The aforesaid observation has passed by the Allahabad High Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction.
16 Cr.A. No. 3217/201322. Therefore, it is apparent that Section 357-A of Cr.P.C. is having retrospective effect and the appellate Court is competent to direct for grant of compensation.
23. In this view of the matter, the victim is at liberty to apply to the State/District Legal Services Authority asking compensation for the said mental, physical and social sufferings. If such application is filed, it shall be considered and decided by such authority within the stipulated time as specified in Section 357-A of Cr.P.C. and necessary steps shall also be taken for paying her compensation.
24. Accordingly, this appeal is disposed off.
(Rajendra Kumar Srivastava) Judge sp Digitally signed by SAVITRI PATEL Date: 2020.09.07 16:54:49 +05'30'