Delhi High Court
Union Of India & Another vs Ravi Parkash Jain & Ors. on 10 May, 1999
Equivalent citations: 1999IVAD(DELHI)181, 79(1999)DLT787, (1999)122PLR33
Author: K.S. Gupta
Bench: K.S. Gupta
ORDER K.S. Gupta, J.
1. In this appeal directed against the order dated 3rd March 1997 of a learned single Judge passed in I.A.No.1918/93 C.M.2855/98 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 seeking condensation of delay of about 478 days in filing the appeal has been filed by the appellants.
2. It is alleged in the application that the Central Registry of the Land and Development office received a letter dated 20th February 1998 from Ravi Prakash Jain, one of the respondents, enclosing therewith a photostat copy of the certified copy of the order dated 3rd March 1997 (received by the Advocate on 11th March 1997) and cheque for Rs.79,986/-. The dealing assistant put up the case file on 17th March 1998 to the Superintendent who on 19th March 1998, returned the same for preparing a brief history of the case. On 1st May 1998 the dealing assistant resubmitted the file to the Superintendent. In the meantime on 6th May 1998 representative of the respondents called on the Deputy Land & Development Officer and brought to his notice the said order dated 3rd March 1997 and the pending request for sale permission. Deputy Land & Development Officer directed the section to put up the status of the cse by 12th May 1998. On 12th May 1998 the file was put up to Deputy Land & Development Officer who referred the file to Assistant Legal Advisor attached to the office of Land & Development Officer for advice on 13th May 1998. Almost simultaneously Government advocate was orally requested to apply for certified copy of the said order. This request was followed by a letter dated 15th May 1998 to the standing counsel. On 15th May 1998. Assistant Legal Advisor sought clarifications of certain facts which were given on 16th May 1998. Thereafter on 19th May 1998 Assistant Legal Advisor gave advise to file an appeal against the order dated 3rd March 1997. Accordingly, on 19th May 1998 the Law Ministry (Litigation section) was requested to appoint counsel for the purpose of filing appeal.
3. It is further stated that the facts disclosed that there was considerable delay on the part of dealing assistant and Superintendent in processing the case between February and May, 1998. Thus, the conduct of both of them was officially enquired into by Deputy Land and Development Officer and in his preliminary report he found that dealing assistant and Superintendent were Prima facie negligent in processing the aforesaid letter dated 20th February, 1998. Notice to show cause why disciplinary proceedings be not initiated against them have been issued to dealing assistant and Superintendent.
4. After the government counsel was appointed by the Law Ministry to file appeal same has been filed on 23rd July 1998.
5. It is also alleged that officials who we rentrusted with the task of pursuing the case prior to 20th February, 1998 contacted the counsel for L&DO on 20th February 1996. As per the notings available on the file, the counsel intimated that he was not aware about the position of the case and the departmental officials should inspect the court file. From the notings on the file dated 29th March 1996 it appears that dealing official contacted the Suit branch of this court on 27th March 1996? and was informed that the case had been decided by the court and so the record section may be contacted. Concerned dealing official then contacted the Incharge of records who told that inspection will have to be applied for and the inspection can be done on 30th March 1996 at 10 AM. However, no action was taken thereafter till March 1998. Preliminary enquiry is being conducted to find out the lapse on the part of the officials who were pursuing the case before the single Judge and on the basis of preliminary findings appropriate legal action will be taken against the defaulting official(s). It is asserted that till 20th February 1998 the appellants did not receive any communication about the order dated 3rd March 1997 from the counsel nor were they aware of that order. In case the delay is not condoned great hardship will be caused to the appellants as the question involved in appeal is important and relates to policy of the Government regarding charging unearned increase. It is stated that there is sufficient ground for condensation of the delay in question. Application is Supported by the affidavit of Syed Ashraf, Deputy Land and Development Officer.
6. Respondent No.1 has contested the application by filing reply wherein it is categorically denied that the appellants have been able to make out sufficient ground for condoning the delay in question.
7. It has been contended by the learned counsel of the appellants that the appellants were not the parties to Suit No.93/82 Kedar Nath & another Vs. Dr. R.C. Agarwal & others wherein on the basis of compromise between the parties a decree for specific performance was passed on 23.5.1986. In I.A.1918/93 filed in the said suit later on, the stand taken by the appellants was that as the application for permission was made to L&DO in 1988 the unearned increase was to be calculated with reference to the rates prevailing in 1988 and the demand raised by L&DO of the amount of Rs.21,66,510/- towards unearned increase was justified. Thus the view taken by the learned single judge in the order under appeal that the relevant date for the purpose of considering the unearned increase has to be the time fixed in the agreement entered into between the parties to the suit in 1979, is erroneous. Further, according to the learned counsel because of malafide actions on the part of dealing assistant and Superintendent in processing the case between February to May 1998 as also of the officials dealing with the case prior to 20th February 1998, the appellants cannot be made to suffer loss of revenue of more than Rs.20 lakhs towards unearned increase and the application discloses sufficient ground for condensation of delay in question. On the contrary, submission advanced on behalf of the respondents has been that the appellants have not explained the delay from 3rd March 1997 to 20th February 1998, 20th February 1998 to 17th March, 1998 and 19th March 1998 to 1st May 1998 and the application thus deserves to be dismissed. In support of the submission reliance has been placed on the decisions in Ramlal and others Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd, ; State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and others, and P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala and another, .
8. The contours of the area of discretion in the matter of condensation of delay by the courts also came to be considered by the Supreme Court in the decision in G. Ramegowda, Major etc Vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, . In that case delay on the part of Land Acquisition Officer in preferring three appeals being Nos.290/73, 293/73 and 289/73 was condoned by the High Court of Mysore (Karnataka) by a common order dated 14th June 1973 and correctness thereof was assailed by the claimants-respondents before the Supreme Court. The grievance of the State in the said three appeals was that the lands which had been purchased in the year 1962 for a sum of Rs.7000/- per acre, were acquired pursuant to the preliminary notification dated 2nd March, 1963 and the award of the Land Acquisition Officer granting Rs.58,000/- per acre was unduly generous having regard to the fact that the acquisition was just about a year after the purchase of the lands by the claimants and further that the enhancement by civil court in land reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to Rs. 1,35,200/- per acre suffered from the vice of extreme excessiveness. After noticing the averments made in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government in the appeals that on account of the fraud played by the concerned Government pleaders delay in filing the appeal had occurred and more than a crore of rupees would be the loss to the Government, it was observed by the Supreme Court as under:-
"There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bonafides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression `sufficient cause' in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides is imputable to the party seeking condensation of the delay. In Katiji's case (supra), this Court said:
"When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay."
'It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.' In litigation on which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals.
The law of limitation, is, no doubts, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it.
Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes 'sufficient cause' for purposes of Section 5 it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have 'a little play at the joints'. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning - of course, within a reasonable limit - is necessary if the judicial approach is not rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process.
9. Before turning to the facts of the instant case it may be noticed that the ratio in the decisions in Ram Lal & others Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and others (supra) that when no negligence, inaction or lack of bonafide is imputable to a party the delay deserves to be condoned, has been affirmed in G. Ramegowda's case (supra). Ratio in P.K. Ramachandran's case (supra), however, has no application to the facts of the present case inasmuch as in that case in the impugned order the High Court had not recorded any satisfaction that the explanation for the delay was either reasonable or satisfactory which was an essential pre-requisite to condensation of delay.
10. It is admitted by the appellants that they received a photocopy of the certified copy of the order dated 3.3.1997 alongwith the letter dated 20th February 1998 from Ravi Prakash Jain, one of the respondents. However, according to the appellants there was delay in processing the case between February to May 1998 on the part of dealing assistant and Superintendent and after calling for their explanations, notices have been issued to them to show cause why discilinary proceedings be not initiated against them. Further, for the period prior to 20th February 1998 preliminary enquiry has been conducted and appropriate disciplinary action is being taken against the defaulting officials. Delay from 3rd March, 1997 to 20th February, 1998, 20th February, 1998 to 13th march, 1998 and 19th March, 1998 to 1st May 1998 which is stated to have not been explained satisfactorily as per the respondents, was on the part of the said dealing assistant, Superintendent and officials of appellant No.1. The appellants allege that no intimation was given by the Government Advocate about the hearings that took place from time to time nor were they aware of the passing of the aforementioned order dated 3rd march, 1997 before the letter dated 20th February 1998 was received by them from respondent No.1 Considering the facts of the case as also ratio in G. Ramegowda's case (supra) we are satisfied that the appellants have made out sufficient cause for condoning the delay in question. Accordingly, that delay is condoned. Application is disposed of.
11. List on 24th May 1999 for admission.