Legal Document View

Unlock Advanced Research with PRISMAI

- Know your Kanoon - Doc Gen Hub - Counter Argument - Case Predict AI - Talk with IK Doc - ...
Upgrade to Premium
[Cites 32, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

Management Of Nettur Technical ... vs S. Muralikrishna on 26 May, 2000

Equivalent citations: 2001(1)KARLJ116

ORDER

1. Heard Mr. Kasturi for the petitioner and Sri S. Vasanthakumar for the respondent.

2. The impugned order in this revision is one passed by the Educational Appellate Tribunal in M.A. No. 36 of 1996, dated 25-10-1996 allowing the application under Section 96(3)(c) of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983, and granting stay of an order passed by the petitioner herein in No. KV/AB/GTC 96.

3. Normally, against an order of stay pending disposal of the appeal, no revision petition is entertainable. But in view of the question of law raised, it has been admitted. Now it is taken up for final disposal.

4. The question of law that is raised in the revision petition is:

"Whether an industry which is also having certain training programme for training certain persons for recruitment for its own purposes and for training them for outside job elsewhere would be an 'Educational Institution' within the meaning of the Karnataka Educational Act, 1983 (Act 1 of 1995)?"

5. The brief facts, as stated by the petitioner, is as follows: The petitioner which was founded under a trust called 'Nettur Technical Training Foundation' in the year 1963 with the sole object of giving vocational trainings to the persons who are interested in getting training for industrial jobs. This institution was started mainly with the co-operation and assistance of Government of Switzerland. This institution has a factory at Peenya in Bangalore and Vellore in Tamil Nadu. These two factories are registered under the Factories Act and licences have also been obtained under the said Act. The products produced in these two factories are as per the specifications prescribed by companies for their use in their factories. The companies which regularly place orders are Maruti Udyog Limited, Breaks India Limited, T.V.S. Suzuki Limited, Hero Honda, Crompton India Limited, etc. In order to supply these products, the Foundation gives vocational training to persons i.e., on the job training in various trades like tool and die making, turner, miller, fitter, electricians and in electronics, technicians. Since the petitioner has to give on the job training to the persons, some of them are absorbed by it and some seek jobs elsewhere. The petitioner has to have a training departments and these departments are called "Nettur Technical Training Centre". These centres are located at Dharwad, Peenya at Bangalore, Tellichery in Kerala and Gannavaram in Andhra Pradesh and Electronic City in Bangalore. In these training centres persons are given practical training in the various trades in which the persons are found suitable. It is not as if the training has given as per the choice of the persons, but after assessing the aptitude and skills. This training is imparted after certain selection procedure in these training centres.

6. The petitioner's training centres are not receiving any aid from the Government of Karnataka or India and the centres depended for their existence on the funds partially generated from the factories through the manufacturing of products for different companies.

7. The syllabi, training programme examination conducted are not according to the norms prescribed by the Universities or by the Governments or the Department of Technical Education but it is only evolved by the Foundation. The training centres are not recognised centres or institution like any Universities in India though two of its courses are recognized as equivalent to certain diplomas by Department of Technical Education, Karnataka for the purposes of obtaining jobs. It is not as if the petitioner confers any degrees or diplomas which is recognised by Universities. Except for the two courses recognised as equivalent to diploma by the Government of Karnataka, no other Government or Universities have recognised the Diploma or particular course offered by the petitioner. The persons who are required to train the trainees are engineers with experience and persons who have experience in a particular trade or job. They are not teachers in the strict sense but people who have job knowledge and experience to guide others to learn the particular trade, operation/job. These course participants are only trainees and no students. The selection of trainees are controlled by statutory body or Governmental agency.

8. The person who teaches in the training centres are all experienced tool and die makers or the persons who are sufficiently experienced in the particular field to train the trainees. The petitioner is not affiliated to any University nor has any University granted any affiliation. The respondent was one such Training Manager who was employed by the petitioner on a salary of about Rs. 6,300/- per month and he does not hold any degree in the field of technical education nor B.Ed., and he is an experienced Diploma Holder in the discipline of machining skills. In view of certain adverse reports received against the respondent, the petitioner was compelled to take a decision to terminate his services by the order dated 5-8-1996.

9. In the appeal now pending before the Tribunal, the order terminating the services of the respondent was challenged on the ground that he is a confirmed employee and there is no reason for terminating the services. On the other hand, it was contended by the petitioner management that on 5-8-1996 it has terminated the services of the respondent in exercise of the right of termination referred to in paragraph 5 of the letter of appointment. On 5-8-1996 the management had given one month's salary to the respondent. As per the terms of the appointment, the said amount was received by the respondent without any protest. There was no stigma attached to the termination and the termination was simpliciter in exercise of the rights flowing out of the contract of employment. There is no cause of victimization. It was also contended that the respondent was imparting training in tool and die making. There is no approved syllabus and University public examination or Government examination. It is not recognised Education Institution of the State Government. Therefore, the Act is not applicable and consequently the Court has no jurisdiction.

10. The Trial Court relying upon the ruling in Pushpa v Kittur Rani Channamma Memorial Committee, held that the institution is an educational institution coming within the purview of the Act; therefore the Act is applicable. On the question of granting stay, the Trial Court felt a prima facie case in favour of the employee and consequently granted the stay. It is this order that is being challenged in the above revision petition.

11. It is contended that the petitioner is not an educational institution within the meaning of Act 1 of 1995. The definition of Section 2(14) of the Act does not include the petitioner's two factories which carry on manufacturing activity and persons are given on the job as well as the training centres. Merely imparting training would not amount to an educational institution within the meaning of the Act. Even under the Apprentice's Act, 1961, the petitioner and the other employers are obliged to train certain persons in the training centres as well as in the factories. This is a statutory obligation not only of the petitioner but also all other industries which takes apprentices required to give training to become an educational institution. Section 2(27) also do not come to the aid of the respondent. The entire provision of the Act make it clear that it applies only to the schools, colleges and other educational institutions which impart education which are recognised and which are also affiliated to the Universities and require to impart education and confer degrees or certificates/diplomas. Those institutions present students for public examination conducted by the Government of the Universities and no such ingredient is present in the case on hand; therefore the Tribunal was entirely wrong in assuming that the Act applies to the petitioner. The petitioner is not an autonomous body and is not required to follow any syllabus prescribed by the Government for its various diploma or certificate courses. The diploma granted to such candidates in his own captive examinations is a private diploma and has no recognition in any statute or by any University. It is also submitted that the Tribunal has got no power to grant stay and cannot put the clock back.

12. The question to be decided in the revision petition is the one that is referred to in the beginning. So far as the petitioner is concerned, it is seen from the rules and regulations that it is applicable to all training centres. The object of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983 reads as follows:

"An Act to provide for better organisation, development, discipline and control of the educational institutions in the State.
Whereas, it is considered necessary to provide for the planned development of educational institutions inclusion of healthy educational practice, maintenance and improvement in the standards of educational and better organisation discipline and control over educational institutions in the State with a view to fostering the harmonious development of the mental and physical faculties of students and cultivating a scientific and secular outlook through education".

13. The application of the Act has been prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act, which is as follows:

"(3) It applies to all educational institutions and tutorial institutions in the State except,
(i) institutions for scientific or technical education financed by the Central Government and declared by Parliament by law to be institutions of National importance;
(ii) institutions of higher education which shall be deemed to be University as declared by the Central Government by a notification, under Section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (Central Act III of 1956);
(iii) institutions established or maintained and administered by or affiliated to or recognised by the University of Agricultural Sciences insofar as the matter pertaining to them are dealt within the University of Agricultural Sciences Act, 1963 (Karnataka Act 22 of 1963);

(iii-a) educational institutions affiliated to or recognised by the Council of Indian School Certificate Examination or Central Board of Secondary Education respectively;

(iv) insofar as the matters pertaining to colleges and institutions are dealt within;

(a) the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (Central Act, CXI of 1956);

(b) the Dentists Act, 1948 (Central Act XVI of 1948);

(c) the Pharmacy Act, 1948 (Central Act VIII of 1948);

(d) the Karnataka State Universities Act, 1976 (Karnataka Act 28 of 1976);

(d-a) the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987;

(d-b) the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (Central Act 73 of 1993);

(e) the Karnataka Ayurvedic and Unani Practitioners' Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1961 (Karnataka Act 9 of 1961); and

(f) the Karnataka Homeopathic Practitioners' Act, 1961 (Karnataka Act 35 of 1961);

(g) such other class or classes of institutions, subject to such conditions and to such extent as the State Government may, by notification, specify:

Provided that nothing in Chapter III, Section 35 of Chapter V, Chapter VII and Chapters IX to XV (both inclusive) except Sections 57 and 58 of Chapter X shall be applicable to commerce institutions".
Section 2(3) defines an approved school as follows:
" 'Approved school' means any school in any specified area imparting primary education which,
(a) is under the management of the State Government or a local authority; or
(b) being under any other management, is recognised by the State Government or by an officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by a school hoard as approved school for the purpose of this Act".

Section 2(14) reads as follows:

" 'Education institution' means any institution imparting education referred to in Section 3 and includes a private educational institution but does not include an institution under the direct management of the University or of the Central Government or a tutorial institution".

14. Section 2(27) defines what a "private educational institution" is, which reads as follows:

" 'Private educational institution' means any educational institution imparting education referred to in Section 3, established and administered or maintained by any person or body of persons, but does not include an educational institution,
(a) established and administered or maintained by the Central Government or the State Government or any local authority or any other authority designated or sponsored by the Central Government or the State Government;
(b) established and administered by any University established by law;
(c) giving, providing or imparting only religious instructions, but not any other instructions; or
(d) imparting instruction for which there is no approved syllabi or course of studies or Government or University Examination".

Section 2(30) defines recognised educational institution as follows:

" 'Recognised educational institution' means an educational institution recognised under this Act and includes one deemed to be recognised thereunder".

Section 2(39) reads as follows:

" 'Tutorial institution' means an unrecognized institution established or run by not less than two persons for systematically imparting education or instruction to twenty or more persons in any subject with a view to prepare them to appear for an examination in any branch of education conducted or recognised by the State Government or the Universities in the State or anybody or authority under this Act or any other law for the time being in force".

15. Section 7(5) deals with the recognition of educational institution in the following fashion:

"In every recognised educational institution:
(a) the course of instruction shall conform to the curricula and other conditions under sub-section (1); and
(b) no part of the working hours prescribed shall be utilised for any purpose other than instruction in accordance with the curricula".

Viewed from this angle, it is seen that a technical training centre cannot fit in with any of the above definitions. Section 2(27) clearly indicate certain institutions which are not educational institutions.

16. The Tribunal has taken the view that the training given by the institution has been recognised by the Director of Technical Education in Karnataka. But what the Tribunal has omitted to note is that there is no approved syllabi or course of syllabus by the Government or any other University examination. While considering the word 'recognised school', the Supreme Court has held in Principal and Others v Presiding Officer and Others, which is as follows:

"From the above definitions, it is clear that no school can be treated as a recognised school unless it is recognised or acknowledged by the 'appropriate authority'. In case of the school in question, it is the Administrator or the officer authorised by him who could accord recognition to it. A perusal of letters dated April 6, 1976, February 1, 1977 and June 6, 1977 of the Directorate of Education, New Delhi (at pages 90, 95 and 162 of the record) makes it clear beyond any shadow of doubt that the school was not recognised in terms of the Act till the end of April, 1977 and it was only with effect from May 1, 1977 i.e., long after the relevant date viz., August 8, 1975 that the approval or recognition was accorded to it vide letter No. F 22 (15) Z-XI(B)-1968/2003, dated June 6, 1977 of the Directorate of Education, Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi. This position has been admitted even by respondent 2 in para 4 of the Supplementary Affidavit filed by him before this Court. Even according to para 2 of the said affidavit, the recognition of the school by the Competent Authority was not there on the relevant date. The observation of the Tribunal in regard to the point under consideration appear to be based on a misconception of the true legal position. It seems to think that since the name of the school figured in the list of the Higher Secondary and Middle Schools in the Union Territory of Delhi for 1974-75 prepared by the Statistical Branch of the Directorate of Education of the Delhi Administration, the school must be treated as a 'recognised school'. This is clearly a wrong assumption. The fact that the name of the school finds a mention in the aforesaid list is not enough to clothe it with the status of a 'recognised school'. It appears to us that since the school was affiliated to the Board, the Delhi Administration caused its name to be included in the aforesaid list. The fact that the school is affiliated or attached to the Board is also of no consequence and cannot justify the conclusion that the school is a 'recognised school'. There is a significant difference between 'affiliation' and 'recognition'. Whereas, 'affiliation' it may be noted is meant to prepare and present the students for public examination, 'recognition' of a private school is for other purposes mentioned in the Act and it is only when the School is recognised by the 'Appropriate Authority that it becomes amenable to other provisions of the Act. Again the fact that the school was in existence at the commencement of the Act cannot confer on it the status of a recognised school and make it subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. To clothe it with that status, it is essential that it should have been a 'recognised private school' as defined in Section 2(j) of the Act. In view of all this, we have no hesitation in holding that the school was not a 'recognised private school' on the relevant date and was, therefore, not amenable to the provisions of the Act".

It is not disputed that this institution is not recognised by the authorities either under the Karnataka Education Act or any other Acts for the time being. In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court the narrow meaning given by the Tribunal to the institution in question is not sustainable.

17. It is further seen that the petitioner own two factories and they are involved in manufacturing activities. What is given here is only job training. As rightly contended that even in the Apprentices Act, 1961 training is given to various persons. But such an Act cannot be brought within the purview of the Education Act so as to confer jurisdiction on the educational institution. It is also seen that there is no approved syllabus or course of study of the Government or University examination. The recognition for the purpose of appointment by the Government is different from recognition by the concerned authorities for the purpose of education. This definition was lost sight of by the Tribunal. It is to be appreciated that Act 1 of 1995 makes it clear that such an Act is applicable only to schools and colleges and other educational institutions. Those institutions impart education which taken his recognition and those institutions are also affiliated to the University. The petitioner is certainly an autonomous body and is not required to follow any syllabus prescribed by the Government for its various diploma or certified courses. The diploma given are private in nature, it has no recognition in any State or any University.

18. Reliance also was placed upon the dictum in N.V.R. Ram v Indian Institute of Management. The proposition relied upon is as follows:

"Where the termination of services of the petitioner was a termination simpliciter in accordance with the rights of the parties under the letter of appointment, an appeal to the Tribunal is not maintainable. A termination simpliciter would not confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal.
Sections 6, 7 and 8 must be read together and so construed, it is necessary to read down the word 'order' in Section 8 to mean an order passed either under Section 6 or Section 7 and communicated under Section 7.
Rights flowing out of a contract between the parties can be agitated before the Tribunal only if they strictly fall within the ambit of Sections 6 and 7 of the Act.
Where the letter of appointment was not disputed, the Tribunal is only required to satisfy itself whether the employer by virtue of the right under the contract had power to terminate the employment. In this position the Tribunal does not err in not recording evidence as to the nature and cause of victimisation. Neelakanta v Desai is not good in view of AIR 1975 SC 344.
Assuming there is a case of victimisation, the right of the employer to terminate the services under the contract cannot be curtailed where the contract gives such right. Under contractual employment the employee cannot assert any legal right which does not flow from the terms of the contract. For any grievance for breach of contract, claim for damages lies in the Civil Court".

19. The respondent produced G.O. No. ED 105 TPE 79, dated 6-1-1996, Bangalore, recognising four years course in tool and die making of Nettur Technical Training Foundation has equivalent to Diploma in Mechanical Engineering (Machine Tool Technology) awarded by the Board of Technical Education. It is contended further that the syllabus has a nexus to the recognition. Therefore, the institution must be held to be an educational institution within the meaning of the Act. The respondent also relied upon the notification of the Government of Karnataka concerning the Department of Technical Education and contended that the students are all selected and allotted the course conducted by the NTTF in tool and die making under the free seats and payment seat categories through the Counsel which shows that even the admission of the students is controlled by the Government. It is also submitted that the prospectus issued by the petitioner-institution mentions about the courses being recognised by the Government. It is further submitted that recognition of diploma course run by the petitioner-management is not an empty formality of a purely technical requirement. The petitioner-management has deliberately suppressed the material facts and has failed to disclose the relevant facts before this Court regarding the real nature of the recognition to run the course and the actual syllabi prescribed and hence the application for offering itself to the scrutiny by the Committee formed by the Department of Technical Education about the syllabi prescribed.

20. So far as the first submission is concerned, the recognition by the Government is a conditional and it is mentioned "for the job purpose only". What is the purport of such restriction and why such condition is attached is not explained nor any reason is given by the respondent as to why such a contingency has been provided for in the Government Order. The issue of notification by the Department of Technical Education is only consequence of the recognition and that is also recorded in the prospectus. The more relevant factor is that in the light of the dictum of the Supreme Court there could be a proper recognition by the appropriate authority. So long as the recognition is conditional and it is not an absolute recognition and so long as it is not clear as to whether approved syllabi or course of study of the Government are being imparted in the said institution, it cannot be said that it is an educational institution coming within the meaning of the Education Act. It is also seen that Chapter XV of the Act mentions about the control of the private institutions by the Government. Section 102 of the Act prescribes about the Code of Conduct for Governing Council. This chapter is not made applicable to the institutions in question so as to bring it within the four corners of the Act.

21. The entire exercise embarked upon by the respondent is to bring it within the meaning of the Education Act so as to save his job if any. It is seen that the post with which he was appointed was the post of Training Instructor, but he has now become Deputy Manager. When he was appointed as a teacher in the beginning and subsequently promoted as Deputy Manager, it cannot be considered as the post of a teacher forever, even after promotion.

22. For the above reasons, I find that the order of the Tribunal is not sustainable and the appeal itself is not maintainable before the Tribunal.

23. In this view, setting aside the order of the Tribunal and answering the question raised in favour of the petitioner, the revision petition is allowed. No costs.