Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Nallam Veera Satyanandam And Ors. vs State Of Andhra Pradesh on 26 April, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1996(2)ALD(CRI)115, 1996(2)ALT(CRI)191, 1996CRILJ4034, II(1997)DMC23
JUDGMENT
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Judge, Rajahmundry, in SC 198/93 dated 30-3-1994, whereby the trial Judge has convicted the appellants under Ss. 304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. He has sentenced each of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years under S. 304-B and rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years under S. 498-A of the Indian Penal Code.
2. The 1st appellant is the son of the remaining appellants. The 1st appellant was married to his niece, Aruna Kumari, who was his sister's daughter. PW-1 is the father while PW-2 is the mother of the deceased, Aruna Kumari. The marriage between the deceased Aruna Kumari and the 1st appellant took place on 18-5-1990. On 12-7-1992, Aruna Kumari at about 3 p.m. suffered burn injuries and succumbed to those injuries on the same day in the hospital at 7.30 p.m.
3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that, on demand, PW-1 paid an amount of Rs. 5,000/- as dowry to the appellants and had also agreed to give 1/3rd share in the house. But, after the invitation cards were printed, at the insistence of the 2nd appellant, PW-1 agreed to give half share in the house. He executed an agreement evidencing the transfer of half share in the house and handed over it to the 1st appellant at the time of the marriage. After the marriage, the deceased Aruna Kumari stayed for some time with the appellants. But, the appellants started to harass the deceased to get the agreement in question registered in favour of the 1st appellant and they started practising cruelty on her. The deceased Aruna Kumari was taken by PW-1 to his house for Sravanamasam Pujas in the month of August, 1990. During her visit, she narrated about the maltreatment and mis-behavior of the accused persons. Then, the 1st appellant visited the house of PW-1 and got the general power of attorney for management of half share in the house in question executed and registered in his favour which is at Ex.P-2. But he did not take Aruna Kumari with him. After request, the appellants took the deceased Aruna Kumari to their village in the year 1991. The deceased wrote four letters, which are Exs.P-4 to P-7, to her father PW-1, in which she has written that the 2nd and 3rd appellants used to harass her as also to instigate the 1st appellant to beat her and used to say that if she dies, the 1st appellant would get much dowry. She also wrote that the accused persons were demanding half portion in the suit house as also arrears of rent for 14 months. The 1st accused also tried to throttle her neck in an attempt to kill her. He also threatened that he would administer endrine to get rid of her. Aruna Kumari was brought back to the house of PW-1 and she narrated the entire incident to her parents. On 6-4-1992, a caste Panchayat was convened, in which PWs-3, 4 and 5 were present. The 1st and the 2nd appellants had also participated in it. They were advised by PWs-3, 4 and 5 to properly maintain the deceased Aruna Kumari and a draft was prepared, but they refused to sign it. On the next day, that is, on 7-4-1992, the 2nd and the 3rd appellants again visited PWs-3, 4 and 5 and agreed to give a letter of assurance and voluntarily signed on the letter of assurance, Ex.P-9. Thereafter, on 23-5-1992 PW-1 sent the deceased Aruna Kumari to the house of the appellants. On 28-5-1992, when PW-1 visited there, the deceased Aruna Kumari again complained that the appellants were harassing her for dowry. On 11-7-1992, on hearing that the cruelty was continued, PW-1 visited the appellants and complained about their mis-behaviour, consoled his daughter and returned. On 12-7-1992 at 3 p.m., the deceased sprinkled kerosene on her person and set it to fire. She received burn injuries and was removed to the hospital where the Judicial First Class Magistrate, PW-13, recorded her dying declaration, Ex.P-28. Immediately thereafter, Head Constable, PW-11, also recorded her statement, Ex.P-25 and registered a case vide FLR Ex.P-26 under S. 498-A, I.P.C. on the basis of Ex.P-25 against the accused persons and has also issued the FIR in under S. 304-B, I.P.C. Ex.P-27. The Medical Officer, PW-1, conducted autopsy the dead body of Aruna Kumari vide post-mortem report Ex. P-19. This is, in short, the prosecution case.
4. After usual investigation, the accused persons were charge-sheeted under Ss. 498-A and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code and, in the alternative, under S. 306 of the Indian Penal Code.
5. The trial Judge framed charges against all the appellants under Ss. 498-A and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code and in the alternative under S. 306 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellants denied their guilt and claimed to be tried.
6. The learned trial Judge, on assessment of the evidence on record, reached the conclusion that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that the appellants are guilty for causing dowry death of Aruna Kumari and they had also practiced cruelty on her because she could not bring more dowry. The trial Judge also held that under the circumstances, there was no need for framing alternative charge under S. 306 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial Judge convicted the appellants under Ss. 304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them as aforesaid and he further ordered that the sentences shall run concurrently.
7. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and sentence, the accused persons have preferred this appeal.
8. It has been contended by Sri Praveen Kumar, the learned counsel of the appellants, that the dying declaration, Ex.P-28, establishes that, while preparing tea, the sari of Aruna Kumari came in contact with the burning kerosene stove and caught fire and, therefore, her death is accidental death. Immediately after recording of the dying declaration, Ex.P-28 by the Magistrate, the Head Constable, PW-11, recorded the statement of deceased, Ex.P-25, in which allegations have been made against the appellants that they had practised cruelty because she could not bring sufficient dowry as per their demand and thus, this dying declaration is inconsistent with the earlier dying declaration which was recorded by the Magistrate in which it was mentioned that the deceased had received burn injuries due to accident. It is further urged on behalf of the appellants that whatever dowry was agreed to be paid by PWs-1 and 2 to the appellants, that was paid at the time of the marriage and, therefore, fresh demand would not attract the ingredients of S. 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. The 2nd and the 3rd appellants are maternal grand parents of the deceased Aruna Kumari and, therefore, it appears highly improbable that they would have practised cruelty on her particularly when the allegations made by the prosecution witnesses are vague. In the Memo Ex.P-21 prepared by the Doctor and sent to the Magistrate, it is mentioned that it was a case of accidental burns caused to Aruna Kumari. Relying on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, , it is submitted on behalf of the appellants that the letters, which are Exs.P-4 to P-7, cannot be relied upon because the death of Aruna Kumari had not taken place within a very short time from the time of writing the letters. She died long after writing the said letters and, therefore, the statements made therein are not admissible under S. 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. It has also been urged on behalf of the appellants that until and unless it is proved that fresh demand for dowry was made in pursuance of the agreement reached between the parties prior to the marriage, it cannot be said that a demand for dowry was made within the meaning of S. 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act'), with the result the appellants cannot be convicted under S. 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. Reliance has been placed on the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nikku Ram, .
9. On the other hand, it has been argued by the learned Public Prosecutor for the State that there is overwhelming evidence on record that in pursuance of the agreement entered at the time of the marriage, demand for dowry was made by the appellants as also fresh demand of dowry was made and because the demands could not be fulfilled by PW-1, all the appellants taunted the deceased and practised cruelty on her due to which she poured kerosene oil on her person and set it to fire due to which later she died in the hospital. It has also been urged on behalf of the State that there is evidence on record that no kerosene stove was found near the place of incident and from the evidence of the treating doctor, it is established that the entire body of the deceased was found drenched in kerosene oil except her scalp and palm and thus the possibility of accidental death is completely ruled out. Her statement made to the Magistrate which is at Ex.P-28 has been demonstrated to be an incorrect statement of facts and it appears that in the presence of the 3rd appellant, she made the statement that from the burning stove her sari caught fire while she was preparing tea. The second statement of Aruna Kumari which is at Ex.P-25 is corroborated by the evidence of the doctor as also by the evidence of PWs-4 and 5 and, therefore, the lower Court has committed no error in correctly appreciating the evidence and recording the finding that the deceased Aruna Kumari had committed suicide by pouring kerosene oil on her person and setting it to fire. It has also been urged on behalf of the State that all the letters, which are at Exs.P-4 to P-7, are relevant documents and a perusal of them establishes that the appellants had practised cruelty continuously on the deceased Aruna Kumari. From the evidence of PWs-5, 6 and 7, it is established that on the date of the incident, they heard cries coming from the house of the accused-appellants. They went there and found Aruna Kumari in burnt condition. She was taken to the hospital. I get from the evidence of the Medical Officer PW-10 that Aruna Kumari had received 90% burns and she died due to burn injuries. This evidence has not been challenged during cross-examination. Agreeing with the lower Court, I hold that Aruna Kumari had died of burn injuries on 12-7-1992 in the hospital at about 7.30 p.m.
10. The Medical Officer, PW-10, has stated that except the scalp, right palm and soles of feet, other parts of the body of Aruna Kumari were burnt and the body was smelling With kerosene oil. He has further stated that if the sari of a woman catches fire accidentally from a kerosene stove, there would be no chance of the entire body smelling with kerosene oil. It is only when the entire body is sprayed with kerosene oil, there is a chance of body getting kerosene smell. It is true that the doctor has stated in cross-examination that there is a possibility of the body getting kerosene smell when the kerosene flames emerging from the kerosene stove come into contact with the body. There is no iota of evidence on record that a kerosene stove was found in the room where Aruna Kumari was seen in flames by the neighbours. It is pertinent to note that in cross-examination it was not even suggested to the prosecution witnesses that kerosene stove was found burning or kerosene stove was found lying in the place of occurrence. On the other hand, from the evidence of the Investigating Officer, PW-14 which is corroborated on material particulars by the evidence of PWs-5 and 9, it appears that an empty match box, a tin containing few drops of kerosene oil, burnt match sticks, a plastic cap of the tin were found in the room of the deceased with burnt pieces of sari and everything was smelling with kerosene. The cot lying there was also partly burnt. They did not find any kerosene stove on the place of occurrence. The presence of the tin containing drops of kerosene and the partly burnt match sticks and smell of kerosene oil from them as also from the cot rules out the possibility of the saree catching fire from the kerosene flames of the burning stove particularly in the light of this fact that no container for preparing tea etc., was found in the place of occurrence. It would be apposite to mention here that hearing the hues and cries of the deceased, though neighbours came to save the burning Aruna Kumari, but the 1st appellant, who is her husband, and the remaining appellants, who are not only her in-laws, but also her maternal grand parents, did not care to enter the room at the relevant time which betrays their guilty conscience. Had it been a case of accident, it is but natural that they would have immediately rushed to the scene of occurrence. It is also pertinent to note that the 1st and the 2nd appellants did not care to take the dying Aruna Kumari to the hospital, nor there is any evidence that they even accompanied her.
11. It is true that the Doctor, PW-10, has stated in cross-examination that in Ex.P-20 it is mentioned that the deceased has stated to have sustained the burns due to stove accident and it is also true that she made a statement before the Magistrate which is at Ex. P-28 that while preparing tea, her sari caught fire. But it is pertinent to note that she has not stated before the Magistrate that it was a case of stove accident. As found in the preceding paragraphs, neither kerosene stove was found nor any container having material for preparing tea was found during the spot inspection in the place of occurrence. On the other hand, a tin containing drops of kerosene oil and burnt match sticks and empty match box etc., were found in the place of occurrence. From the articles as also from the entire body of the deceased, kerosene smell was coming. I have also found that from the surrounding circumstances as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the possibility of accidential death is completely ruled out and, therefore, it is not possible to place reliance neither on the relevant contents of Ex.P-20, the requisition memo, nor on the dying declaration Ex.P-28 recorded by the Magistrate. In the Indian set up, a dying woman who is usually sentimental by birth and suffers from the weakness of saving her husband, bearing his high-handedness on sentimental grounds makes incorrect statements at times. Thus, there appears to be nothing unusual when the dying Aruna Kumari stated before the Doctor and the Magistrate that she caught fire while preparing tea which statement as shown above does not appear to be correct in the light of the aforementioned well established circumstance.
12. PW-4 has stated on oath that in the hospital the deceased had told him that she was harassed for dowry and when he and others did not take any action, she poured kerosene oil on herself and set it to fire. But he had not stated so in his case diary statement which fact is proved by the Investigating Officer, PW 14. This is a material omission and, therefore, it amounts to contradiction and it impairs, his testimony and, therefore, the oral dying declaration said to have been made to PW 4 does not inspire confidence and, therefore, it is excluded from consideration.
13. PWs 2 and 3 have stated in one voice that at the time of marriage, PW 1 had paid Rs. 5,000/- in cash to the 1st accused. It was also agreed that PW-1 will give 1/3rd share in the house, but after the invitation cards were printed, the 1st and the 2nd accused asked PW 1 to give half share in the suit house. They did not accept the request of PW 1 and pressurised him to give half share in the suit house and, therefore, PW 1 was compelled to agree to do so. PWs 1 and 2 have stated that the deceased stayed with the appellants after the marriage and in Sravanamasam Nomulu she was brought to their house. She then had complained about the maltreatement given to her by the appellants for bringing lesser dowry. Thereafter, the 1st appellant visited the house of PW-1 and on his demand a registered power of attorney Ex. P2 was executed and handed over to him. He went along with the power of attorney, but did not take Aruna Kumari with him. Afterwards, she was taken by PWs 1 and 2 and she stayed for about two months with her husband. I get from the evidence of PW 3 that during her stay with the accused, he had visited her when the deceased told him that she was harassed by the appellants for dowry whereupon he took the deceased and reached her to the house of PW 1.
14. PW 1 has further stated that the deceased was writing letters stating that the accused-appellants were giving her trouble and they were compelling her to get the other half share in the house property in their name. A perusal of the letter Ex. P-4 reveals that the deceased had written to PW 1 that the 2nd and 3rd appellants were giving her trouble and they were encouraging the 1st appellant to beat her. Allegations of harassment caused by the 1st appellant and pressurising her to get half share in the house have been mentioned in the letters which are at Ex.P5 and 6. It is also mentioned in those letters that the 1st appellant was demanding money and gold. It is further mentioned in those letters that when she used to cry, the 1st accused used to close her mouth. The attempt of throttling her neck has also been alleged in these letters.
15. I get from the evidences of PWs 1 and 3 that the deceased was brought to the house of PW 1 in the month of August, 91 and she stayed there upto May, 1992. In the meantime the caste panchayat was convened. PWs 4 and 5 have stated that they had tried to amicably settle the matter and had advised the 2nd and the 3rd appellants to take proper care of Aruna Kumari and on their assurance, the letter Ex.P8 was prepared, but they refused to sign it. On the next day, when they decided to report the matter with the police, the 1st and the 2nd appellant went there and promised to take proper care of Aruna Kumari and an assurance letter Ex. P9 was drafted and both these appellants, that is to say, the 1st and the 2nd appellant, signed on the same. PW 4 was the scribe of this letter. In pursuance of this assurance on 23-5-1992. Aruna Kumari was sent to the house of the appellants. On 25-5-1992, when PW 1 visited her daughter, she told him that there was no change in the attitude of the appellants. He consoled her and came back. PW 1 has further stated that on 14-6-1992, he got an information that her daughter was subjected to harassment and, therefore, on 15-6-1992 he wrote a letter Ex. P10 to do something in the matter and personally went there on 11-7-1992 on which date Aruna Kumari told him that the accused persons were threatening to kill her and they were harassing her. The 2nd and the 3rd appellants had instigated their son, the 1st appellant, to pour kerosene oil on her and set her to fire. On asking about the cause of harassment, the appellants kept quiet. He again consoled his daughter and came back to his village. On 12-7-1992, he was informed that his daughter was admitted in the Government Hospital, Kothapet because her condition was serious. Therefore, he went there and found her daughter dead due to burn injuries. His statement is corroborated by the evidence of PWs 4 and 5 who have proved the cruelty practised by the appellants on the deceased for bringing more dowry. They have also told that firstly the appellant refused to sign the assurance letter Ex.P8, but later the 1st and the 2nd appellants voluntarily executed an assurance letter, Ex. P-9.
16. There is unchallenged testimony of PWs 1 and 2 on record that their daughter Aruna Kumari had studied upto 7th standard and the letters which are at Ex.P4 to P7 are in her hand writing. These are inland letters sent by post and these inland letters bear postal seals wherein relevant dates have also been printed. Therefore, the genuineness of these documents cannot be doubted. From the perusal of the letters which are at Ex.P4 to P7 as also from the assurance letter Ex.P9 it is established that cruelty was continuously practised on the deceased Aruna Kumari for bringing more dowry from PW 1. There is also evidence on record that arrears of rent for the house portion of the house given in dowry to the 1st appellants was demanded.
17. Relying on the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984 Cri LJ 1738) (supra), it is urged on behalf of the appellants that the letters which are at Ex.P4 to P7 cannot be admitted in evidence as dying declaration because the death has taken place after a long time of marriage. The principle laid down in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984 Cri LJ 1738) (SC) (supra) has been discussed by a single Bench of this Court in the case of R. Bikshapathi v. State of A.P., 1989 Cri LJ 1186 (AP) and it has been held that letters that have been written by the deceased to her relations, or friends regarding harassment or cruelty also have got a material bearing and, therefore, even if these 4 letters are not treated as dying declarations, the allegations made in the same have got material bearing because the allegation of continous cruelty on the deceased has been mentioned in them. It is next submitted that after writing those letters, PW 1 had executed the power of attorney Ex.P2 in favour of the 1st appellant and, therefore, the demand for dowry was satisfied and hence the letters lose importance. The 1st appellant was authorised to maintain the property but not to sell it and, therefore, the demand of dowry in the shape of half share in the suit house continued for which PW 1 had agreed at the time of marriage, though on the insistence of the 1st and the 2nd appellants. As noted above, there is evidence on record that demand for arrears of rent in respect of the half share in the house was made by the 1 st appellant. The rent of half portion of the house was also a part of the dowry and, therefore, practising cruelty on Aruna Kumari for not fulfilling this demand also comes within the mischief of dowry as defined under Section 2 of the Act.
18. In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nikku Ram, , it is held by the Apex Court :
"We shall first take up the second facet. A perusal of the judgment shows that dowry had been defined at the relevant time as under :
"It means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly :-
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to the marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or, to any other person;
at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahir in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies".
Despite the aforesaid definition having stated that the property or valuable security given or agreed to be given has to be as "consideration for the marriage", demands made after the marriage could also be a part of the consideration, according to us, because an implied agreement has to be read to give property or valuable securities, even if asked after the marriage, as a part of consideration for marraige. When the Dowry Prohibition Act was enacted, the Legislature was well aware, of the fact that demands for dowry are made, and indeed very often, even after the marriage has been solemnized, and this demand is founded on the factum of marriage only. Such demands, therefore, would also be, in our mind, as consideration for marriage.
The definition as amended by the aforesaid two Acts does not, however, leave anything to doubt that demands made after the solemnization of marriage would be dowry. This is because the definition as amended reads as below.
"In this Act 'Dowry' means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly - (a) by one party to marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) By the parents of either party to marriage or by any other person to either party to the marraige or to any other person;
at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of person to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies."
"The aforesaid definition makes it clear that the property or the valuable security need not be as a consideration for marriage, as was required to be under the unamended definition. This apart, the addition of the words, "any time" before the expression "after the marriage" would clearly show that even if the demand is long after the marriage the same could constitute dowry, if other requirements of the section are satisfied."
19. It has been urged on behalf of the appellants that as per the observation made by the Apex Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nikku Ram (supra), though the property or valuable security need not be a consideration for marriage and even if the dowry is demanded after the marriage, it would constitute a dowry only when the other requirements of Section 2 of the Act are satisfied. Because there is no evidence that there was agreement to give the remaining portion of the house in question, the alleged demand by the 1st appellant would not come within the mischief of dowry as defined in Section 2 ibid.
20. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court in Para 11 of the judgment has observed that under the unamended Section 2 of the Act, the demand made after the marriage could also be a part of consideration because an Implied agreement has to be read to give property or valuable security even if asked after the marriage as a part of consideration for marriage. This clinches the issue. Even if there is no material on record to hold that before or at the time of marriage or at any time subsequent thereto PW 1 had agreed to transfer the remaining portion of the house in question in favour of the 1st appellant, but by necessary implication it can be presumed that the demand was made in pursuance of the previous agreement because there is no evidence on record that after the demand was made, PW 1 had refused to transfer the remaining portion of the house in favour of the 1st appellant. Even otherwise, as noted above, the half portion of the house as per the agreement entered at the time of the marriage was not transferred legally in favour of the 1st appellant by PW 1 and, therefore it can be safely presumed that cruelty was practised so that a legal document in accordance with law for transferring the half share in the suit house may be executed by PW 1.
21. For the foregoing reasons, agreeing with the learned trial Judge, I reach the conclusion that all the appellants had continuously practised cruelty on the deceased Aruna Kumari for the promise made at or before the time of marriage for transferring the half portion of the house in question, was not fulfilled as also their demand for more gold and transfer of the remaining portion of house in question and arrears of' rent remained unfulfilled inspite of repeated demands.
22. The Head Constable, PW 11, has deposed that he had recorded the statement of the deceased in the hospital on 12-7-1992 at 5.30 p.m. which is at Ex. P25 and had taken her thumb impression on it. The Doctor has also certified regarding the mental condition of the patient. The Doctor, PW 10, has corroborated the statement of PW 11. A look on the statement of the deceased which is at Ex. P25 reveals that demand forgetting more dowry was continuously made by the appellants and they used to harass her for getting the same. She was fed up with this and, therefore, she poured kerosene oil on herself and set it to fire.
23. Relying on Smt. Kamala v. State of Punjab, and State of Gujarat v. Khumansingh Karsan Singh (sic) AIR 1974 SC 1614 (sic), it has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the 1st dying declaration which is at Ex. P28 is inconsistent with the statement, Ex. P25 and, therefore, the 2nd dying declaration Ex. P 25 should be excluded from consideration.
24. In Smt. Kamala v. State of Punjab,(1993 Cri LJ 68) (SC) (supra), the deceased had made 4 dying declarations revealing inconsistencies vis-a-vis naming the culprit. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Khumansingh Karsan Singh, AIR 1974 SC 1614 (sic) (supra), the deceased-wife first alleged that her mother-in-law had burnt her and in the subsequent dying declaration, after meeting with her father, she implicated her husband also. Under these circumstances, the inconsistency between the two dying declarations, according to the Apex Court, suggested possibility of tutoring and falsely involving both the accused persons due to strained relations could not be ruled out.
25. Both the above cases are distinguishable on facts for the simple reason that neither in Ex. P28 nor in Ex. P25, the deceased has alleged that the appellants had poured kerosene oil on her and set her to fire. No allegation for making an attempt to murder had been made in these statements. The 1st dying declaration which is at Ex. P28 has been found by me to be incorrect for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs. The 2nd declaration Ex. P25 stands fully corroborated by the evidence of PWs. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as also from the documentary evidence which is Ex.P4 to P6 and P9. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the statement Ex. P25 is doubtful or it should be excluded from being considered as it is inconsistent with the dying declaration which is at Ex. P28.
26. For the reasons aforesaid, the statement Ex. P25 which is now treated a dying declaration of Aruna Kumari after her death establishes that she ended her life because she was fed up due to harassment and cruelty practised on her by the appellants for not bringing more dowry from her father.
27. Thus, evaluating the evidence on record, agreeing with the learned trial Judge, I reach the conclusion that all the three appellants are guilty under Section 304B as also under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code.
28. It is lastly urged on behalf of the appellants that the 1st appellant is the husband as also the maternal uncle of the deceased Aruna Kumari while the remaining appellants are not only in-laws, but also the maternal grand parents of the deceased Aruna Kumari and they are aged also, and therefore, a lenient view should be taken in imposing the sentence.
29. In case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nikku Ram (supra), the Apex Court has observed :-
"Dowry, dowry and dowry. This is the painful repetition which confronts, and at times haunts, many parents of a girl child in this holy land of ours where, in good old days the belief was 'where woman is worshipped, there is abode of God'. We have mentioned about dowry thrice, because this demand is made on three occasions : (i) before marriage (ii) at the time of marriage; and (iii) after the marriage. Greed being limitless, the demands become insatiable in many cases, followed by torture of the girl, leading to either suicide in some cases or murder in some."
30. True that the 2nd and the 3rd appellants are the maternal grand parents of the deceased Aruna Kumari as also her in-laws' but it is shocking to note that they practised cruelty not only on her daughter-in-law but to her 17 years old grand daughter who was connected with them by blood, and yet instead of preventing their son, that is the 1st appellant, they instigated him to practice cruelty on their grand daughter-cum-daughter in law and that too for greed of dowry from none else but from their own daughter. The offence of dowry death is a steep rise. Looking to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the case, I do not see any ground to disagree with the findings of the, lower Court regarding the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellants. Misplaced leniency may cause injustice to the society of which the appellants are also members. In result, the appeal fails. The judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Judge are maintained. The bail bonds and the surety bonds are cancelled. They are ordered to surrender before the trial Court to serve the sentence of imprisonment imposed on them. In the event of default, warrant of arrest should be issued against them and after their arrest, they should be sent to jail to suffer the rigorous imprisonment imposed on them.
31. Appeal dismissed.