Gauhati High Court
National Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors. vs Gurbox Singh And Ors. on 20 December, 2002
Equivalent citations: (2003)2GLR233
Author: P.P. Naolekar
Bench: P.P. Naolekar
JUDGMENT P.G. Agarwal, J.
1. Heard Mr. S. S. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. B. M. Sarma, learned counsel for the respondents.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 8.12.1999 passed by Shri A. C. Bhuyan, Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Jorhat in Money Suit No. 14/95.
3. The facts in brief are that the respondent plaintiff Sri Gurbox Singh instituted Money Suit No. 14/95 stating, inter alia, that he is the owner of a vehicle No. NLZ-1563 and the same was insured with the appellant defendant National Insurance Co. Ltd. During the subsistence of the Insurance policy, i.e., on 29.6.1989 the vehicle was completely damaged by a mob at Sonaibali and Samaguri P. S. Case No. 130/89 under sections 147/148/149/353/337/338/333 IPC was registered in that connection. For the loss of the vehicle the plaintiff instituted M.A.C. No. 14/90 before the Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nagaon and vide order dated 16.12.1994 the learned Tribunal non-suited the plaintiff with the observation that the Tribunal has got no jurisdiction to pass award in the matter and the owner of the vehicle may approach the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. Thereafter the said Money Suit was filed which was contested by the appellant insurance company. Vide the impugned order the learned Civil Court decreed the suit for a sum of Rs. 2,60,000 along with interest, etc. Hence the present appeal.
4. Sri Sarma, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the suit was barred by limitation and, as such, the judgment and decree is liable to be quashed. There is no dispute at the Bar that the vehicle was damaged on 28.6.1989 and the Money Suit was filed on 15.3.1995, that is, after more than three years. Learned counsel for the respondent plaintiff further submits that as the plaintiff was prosecuting his case before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal with due diligence as such the time spent in the above civil proceeding is required to be excluded in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Section 14 of the Limitation Act reads as follows :
"14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. - (1) in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or in a court of appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it."
5. In a recent case of Ghasi Ram v. Chait Ram Saini, (1998) 6 SCC 200 it is held by the Apex Court that the party seeking benefit of Subsection (1) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act must fulfil the following four - conditions :
"(1) The plaintiff who filed the suit had been prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence.
(2) The earlier proceeding resorted to by the plaintiff was based on the same cause of action.
(3) The former proceeding was prosecuted by the plaintiff in good faith in a court. , (4) The court, due to the defect of Jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, was unable to entertain such proceeding."
6. In this case there is no dispute at the Bar that the application before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was filed on 8.2.1990 and the said MAC Case No. 14/90 was disposed of vide order dated 16.12.1994. Thus, if the period from 8.12.1990 to 16.12.1994 is excluded, the Money Suit shall be within time. Learned counsel for the appellant, further submits that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was not a Civil Court or a Court as provided under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and, as such. Section 14 of the said Act is not applicable and the above period cannot be excluded.
7. The object of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is to protect a plaintiff acting bona fide, from the consequences of some mistakes in prosecuting his claim. In the case of Globe Transport Corporation v. Triveni Engineering Works and Anr. (1983) 4 SCC 707 the Apex Court observed :
"The party pursuing suit in good faith in a Court having no jurisdiction is entitled to exclusion of that period."
Several judicial pronouncements provided that the provisions of Section 14 are to be interpreted liberally.
8. Recently, in the case of P. Sarathy v. State Bank of India (2000) 5 SCC 355 the Apex Court had the occasion to consider the scope and ambit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and it held :
"In Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Coop. Bank Ltd. This Court, while considering the question under the Contempt of Courts Act, held that the Registrar under the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act was a Court. It was held that the Registrar had not merely the trappings of a court but in many respects he was given the same power as was given to an ordinary civil court by the Code of Civil Procedure including the powers to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of documents and to hear the-parties. The court referred to the earlier decision in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees, Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay and Brajanandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain. The Court approved the rule laid down in these cases that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to given a decision or a definite judgment which has FINALITY and AUTHORITATIVENESS which are the essential tests of a judicial, pronouncement.
In Pritam Kaur v. Sher Singh the proceedings before the Collector under the Redemption of Mortgages (Punjab) Act (2 of 1913) were held to be civil proceeding, it was held that the 'court', contemplated under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, does not necessarily mean the 'civil court' under the Code of Civil Procedure. It was further held that any tribunal or authority, deciding of right of parties, will be treated to be a 'court'. Consequently, benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act was allowed in that case. This decision was followed by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Bansiram v. Khazana"
9. This Court also in the case of Jyotirmoy Bhattacharjee v. Union Bank of India and Anr. (1991) 2 GLR 39 held that a proceeding under the Assam Recovery of Loans Act or the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act before a Certificate Officer is a civil proceeding and Section 14(1) is applicable. There has been divergence of judicial opinion on the point, whether Claims Tribunal is a Civil Court ? One view is that it is a civil court for all intention and purposes ; whereas the other view is that it cannot be considered as a civil court. However, in view of the decision in P. Sarathy (supra) the word 'civil court' need not detain us as the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not confined in respect of 'civil court' only.
10. Chapter 12 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for constitution of the Claims Tribunal in respect of claims arising out of the use of the Motor Vehicles and laid down a detail procedure. Section 175 of the Motor Vehicles Act reads as follows :
"Bar on Jurisdiction of Civil Courts. - Where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the Claims Tribunal in respect of the claim for compensation shall be granted by the Civil Court."
11. Thus we find that where a claim Tribunal has been constituted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court have been ousted to consider any plea for compensation arising out of the use of motor vehicle. Admittedly, in the present case the said Tribunal refused to decide the matter on merit for lack of jurisdiction and referred the parties to approach the civil court. At this stage, we may look into the provisions of Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which reads as follows :
"Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals. - (1) In holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit.
(2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed ; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
(3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry."
12. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case we have no manner of doubt that the proceedings before the Tribunal is a civil proceeding and the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act shall be applicable. Accordingly it is held that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are 'courts' and proceedings before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals are civil proceedings. In view of the above, the time spent by the respondent plaintiff before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is to be excluded as provided under Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act. Hence, the suit is not bared by limitation.
13. In this case, we find that there is no dispute at the Bar that the vehicle was insured with the appellant and the said vehicle got damaged completely. Learned counsel for the 'appellant further submits that the learned Civil Judge erred in awarding a sum of Rs. 2,60,000 as compensation only on the ground that the vehicle was insured for the above amount. The amount for which a particular property has been insured cannot be the guiding principles for determining the compensation, that is the maximum limit to which the compensation can be awarded or the insurer can be made liable to pay. The amount of compensation shall depend on the value of the loss caused. The plaintiff in his deposition under oath have categorically stated that the vehicle was purchased by him for Rs. 1,92,000 and that too about 3 years prior to the occurrence. Hence, naturally there will be some depreciation in the value of the vehicle. After deducting a sum of Rs. 42,000 towards depreciation for the use of the vehicle by the insurer for three years, we find that the total loss caused to the plaintiff is to the tune of Rs. 1,50,000 only and, as such, the plaintiff is entitled to the same. The appellant has also disputed the grant of interest @ 12%. In view of the present rate regarding interest, the plaintiff shall be entitled to the interest of the above amount @ 10% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till the payment thereof.
14. In the result, the appeal stands disposed of with the above modification in the decretal amount.