Karnataka High Court
H D Manugowda vs State Of Karnataka on 28 August, 2024
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 05.08.2024
Pronounced on : 28.08.2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2024
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.5923 OF 2024
C/W
CRIMINAL PETITION No.5765 OF 2024
CRIMINAL PETITION No.6043 OF 2024
CRIMINAL PETITION No.6093 OF 2024
IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.5923 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
1. SRI H.K.SUJAY
S/O SRI KUBEREGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
OCCUPATION AGRICULTURIST
RESIDING AT HEBBALU KOPPALU VILLAGE
KRISHNARAJA NAGARA TALUK
MYSURU DISTRICT.
2. SRI H.N.MADHU
S/O SRI NARAYANAGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
OCCUPATION AGRICULTURIST
RESIDING AT HEBBALU KOPPALU VILLAGE
KRISHNARAJA NAGARA TALUK
2
MYSURU DISTRICT.
3. SRI S.T.KEERTHI
S/O SRI S.A.THAMMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
RESIDING AT HALEYOORU VILLAGE
HOSURU, CHUNCHANAKATTE HOBLI
SALIGRAMA TALUK
MYSURU DISTRICT.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI S.BASAVARAJ, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI GANAPATHY BHAT VAJRALLI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY K.R.NAGARA POLICE STATION,
MYSURU RURAL SUB-DIVISION
K.R.NAGARA
K.R.NAGARA TALUK
MYSURU DISTRICT.
NOW INVESTIGATING BY
INVESTIGATION OFFICER S I T
CID OFFICE
NO.1, CARLTON HOUSE, PALACE ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 001
REPRESENTED BY
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT BUILDING
BENGALURU - 560 001.
... RESPONDENT
(BY PROF.RAVIVARMA KUMAR, SPL.PP A/W
SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, SPL.PP)
3
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 439 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO GRANT REGULAR BAIL TO THE
PETITIONERS/ACCUSED NO.3, 4 AND 6 IN CR.NO.149/2024 FOR
THE OFFENCES P/U/S 364(A), 365 R/W 34 OF IPC AND SEC. 109
AND 120(B) OF IPC, WHICH IS PENDING ON THE FILE OF XLII
ADDL.C.M.M., BENGALURU, CRIME REGISTERED BY THE
K.R.NAGAR POLICE, MYSURU RURAL SUB-DIVISION AND NOW
INVESTIGATING BY THE S I T, CID CARLTON HOUSE, BENGALURU.
IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.5765 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
SRI SATHISH BABU @
SATHISH BABANNA
S/O LATE MR.NARASIMHE GOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS,
AGRICULTURIST,
RESIDENT OF HEBBALU KOPPALU
KRISHNARAJANAGARA TALUK,
MYSURU DISTRICT - 570 001.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI G.S.VENKAT SUBBA RAO, ADVOCATE)
AND:
STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY KRISHNARAJANAGARA POLICE
MYSURU RURAL SUB-DIVISION
MYSURU DISTRICT,
REPRESENTED BY
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
... RESPONDENT
(BY PROF.RAVIVARMA KUMAR, SPL.PP A/W
4
SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, SPL.PP)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 439 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO ENLARGE THE PETITIONER ON BAIL IN A
COMPLAINT REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT
KRISHNARAJANAGARA POLICE, MYSURU RURAL SUB-DIVISION,
MYSURU DISTRICT POLICE IN CR.NO.149/2024 BEFORE PRL.CIVIL
JUDGE (JR.DN.) AND JMFC, K.R.NAGAR, MYSURU DISTRICT, FOR
THE OFFENCES P/U/S 364A, 365 R/W 34 OF IPC AND UNDER
SECTIONS 109 AND 120B OF IPC VIDE ANNEXURE-A AND ETC.,
IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.6043 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
K.A.RAJGOPAL
S/O LATE AYYANNA,
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS,
RESIDING AT KALENAHALLI VILLAGE,
BALENAHALLI POST, HANAGODA HOBLI,
HUNUSUR TALUK,
MYSURU DISTRICT - 571 189.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI V.S.HEGDE, ADVOCATE)
AND:
STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY K.R.NAGAR POLICE STATION,
MYSORE RURAL SUB-DIVISION - 571 602,
(NOW INVESTIGATE BY SPECIAL
INVESTIGATION TEAM, CID
5
BENGALURU - 560 001)
REPRESENTED BY
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
S.I.T, C.I.D, BENGALURU)
... RESPONDENT
(BY PROF.RAVIVARMA KUMAR, SPL.PP A/W
SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, SPL.PP)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 439 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO RELEASE THE PETITIONER / ACCUSED NO.7
ON BAIL IN CR.NO.149/2024 OF RESPONDENT/K.R.NAGAR
P.S.,(NOW INVESTIGATED BY SPL.INVESTIGATION TEAM CID,
BENGALURU) FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 364(A),
365, 109, 120(b) R/W 34 OF IPC ON THE FILE OF THE XLII A.C.M.M
BENGALURU (SPL.COURT TO DEAL WITH CRIMINAL CASE RELATED
TO SITTING MP's AND MLA's TRIABLE BY MAGISTRATE).
IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.6093 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
H.D.MANUGOWDA
S/O DEVARASEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURE
RESIDENT OF
HEBBALU KOPPALU VILLAGE
K.R.NAGAR TALUK
MYSURU - 571 602.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI C.H.JADHAV, SR.ADVOCATE FOR
SRI CHETAN JADHAV, ADVOCATE)
6
AND:
STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY K.R.NAGAR POLICE STATION
MYSURU DISTRICT
REPRESENTED BY
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT BUILDING
BENGALURU - 560 001.
... RESPONDENT
(BY PROF.RAVIVARMA KUMAR, SPL.PP A/W
SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, SPL.PP)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 439 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO GRANT BAIL TO THE PETITIONER IN
CR.NO.149/2024 REGISTERED BY K.R.NAGAR P.S., MYSURU
DISTRICT FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 364(A), 365, READ WITH
SECTION 34 OF IPC AND UNDER SECTIONS 109, 120(b) OF IPC,
PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE LEARNED LXXXI ADDITIONAL CITY
CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU CITY (CCH-82)
(SPECIAL COURT EXCLUSIBELY TO DEAL WITH CRIMINAL CASES
RELATED TO ELECTED FORMER AND SITTING MPs/MLAs IN THE
STATE OF KARNATAKA).
THESE CRIMINAL PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 05.08.2024, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
7
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioners in all these petitions are accused in a solitary
crime i.e., Crime No.149 of 2024. Criminal Petition No.5923 of
2024 is preferred by accused Nos. 3, 4 and 6; Criminal Petition
No.5765 of 2024 is preferred by accused No.2; Criminal Petition
No.6043 of 2024 is preferred by accused No.7 and Criminal Petition
No.6093 of 2024 is preferred by accused No.5. Therefore, accused
Nos. 2 to 7 are before this Court in these petitions calling in
question a common order dated 11-06-2024 passed by the LXXXI
Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru in Criminal
Miscellaneous Nos. 4658 of 2024 c/w 4420, 4629 and 4824 of 2024
declining to enlarge these petitioners on grant of regular bail.
2. Heard Sri S.Basavaraju, learned senior counsel appearing
for the petitioners in Criminal Petition No.5923 of 2024;
Sri G.S.Venkat Subba Rao, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner in Criminal Petition No.5765 of 2024; Sri V.S. Hegde,
learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Criminal Petition
No.6043 of 2024; and Sri C.H. Jadhav, learned senior counsel
8
appearing for the petitioner in Criminal Petition No.6093 of 2024
and Sri Ravivarma Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the
respondent in all the cases.
3. Facts, in brief germane, are as follows:-
On 21-04-2024 certain videos purportedly containing alleged
sexual assault and various acts committed by the Hassan M.P
Sri Prajwal Revanna gets leaked and circulated online and a crime
in Crime No.149 of 2014 comes to be registered by one of the
victims of such alleged sexual assault. It is alleged that the victim
in Crime No.149 of 2024 was taken from her house 3 - 4 days prior
to the date of election to the Parliament by accused No.2
purportedly at the instance of accused No.1 and his wife, accused
No.8. Thereafter, the victim is said to have been brought back to
her house on the morning of the election day i.e., 26-04-2024. It is
during the said period, accused No.2 had warned and threatened
the victim and her family members that if the Police approach them
concerning any investigation, the victim and her husband should
become unavailable and avoid any interaction with the Police. On
9
28-04-2024 a separate crime in Crime No.107 of 2024 comes to be
registered against Sri. H.D. Revanna and Sri. Prajwal Revanna as
accused in the said crime. The allegations were for the offences
punishable under Sections 354A, 354D, 506, 509 and 376 of the
IPC. After registration of the said crime, it is the allegation, that on
29-04-2024 accused No.2 comes to the house of the complainant
and again warns that if the Police would come to know of anything,
there would be a case against the complainant and his mother and
that they both would be jailed. Accused No.2 is said to have taken
the complainant's mother along with him deceitfully in his Hero
Honda Splendor, a two wheeler.
4. On 1-05-2024 the complainant Raju came to know about
the viral video of his mother which has the ingredients of rape by
the son of accused No.1 and 8. On the very day i.e., 1-05-2024, it
is further alleged that accused No.2 was asked where the mother of
the complainant was and to bring her back. The complainant's
mother did not return. Thereafter, the complaint comes to be
registered in Crime No.149 of 2024 wherein several others were
included in the crime, alleging offences punishable under Sections
10
364A, 365 r/w 34 of the IPC. Accused No.2 then gets arrested by
the Police and the matter was transferred from the Court of the
learned Magistrate to the Special Court. On 3-05-2024 the case is
transferred to a Special Investigating Team ('SIT') for further
investigation. All the accused come into the fray after the SIT
continued investigation. Several of the accused file applications for
regular bail or anticipatory bail as the case would be. The
concerned Court grants bail to accused No.1 Sri. H.D. Revanna and
rejects bail applications filed by other accused. The bail granted to
Sri. H.D. Revanna is questioned by the SIT before this Court in
Criminal Petition No.4914 of 2024. The other accused are before
this Court in the subject petitions seeking their enlargement on bail,
as they have been in custody for close to three months.
5. The learned senior counsel Sri S.Basavaraju spearheading
the submissions qua all the accused who have been denied bail,
would take this Court through the order passed by the concerned
Court rejecting bail applications to contend that, the concerned
Court has fallen in error in denying bail to these petitioners on the
score that they have acted in a manner that would become the
11
ingredients of Section 364A of the IPC. It is his submission that the
case does not have any ingredients of Section 364A; at best it can
be under Section 365 of the IPC which is punishable only with an
imprisonment of three years and, therefore, bail ought not to have
been denied to these petitioners. All other counsel would toe the
lines of the learned senior counsel Sri S. Basavaraju in submitting
that investigation is complete and charge sheet is laid before the
concerned Court. The accused would not be required for any
custodial interrogation and as such they should be granted bail.
6. Per contra, Sri Ravivarma Kumar, learned Special Public
Prosecutor to the cases would vehemently refute the submissions to
contend that these petitioners are the ones who have indulged in
abduction and threatening of the complainant which is clearly borne
out from the record and with the active aid and assistance in
helping accused Nos. 1 and 8 these acts have happened. He would,
therefore, contend that these petitioners, if enlarged on bail would
become a threat to the society and that they would threaten the
witnesses. Therefore, he would submit that these petitioners should
be kept in prison only, as the ingredients of Section 364A are
12
clearly met and an offence under Section 364A is punishable with
life imprisonment. He would, therefore, seek dismissal of these
petitions.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The petitioners
are accused in Crime No.149 of 2024. Their applications seeking
enlargement on regular bail under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C.,
comes to be rejected. The reason for rejection of bail can be
gathered from a few paragraphs of the order passed by the
concerned Court and I deem it appropriate to notice those
paragraphs. They read as follows:
"34. The court has also carefully appreciated the
materials available against accused No.3 to 7 as deciphered
from the records. As already discussed above the records
indicate that the accused No.3 had also played active role in
accompanying the victim and accused No.2 from Saligrama to
the farm house of Accused No.7 Rajagopal. The record also
indicates that the mobile phone belonging to the victim was
handed over by Accused No.2 to Accused No.4 which he had
handed over to his brother to keep the same to his custody and
later on it was recovered by the investigating officer. The act of
13
accused No.3 to 5 is aiding and helping accused No.2 to take
the victim to the farm house of Accused No.7 Rajagopal clearly
indicates over art against them. It is also relevant to note that
accused No.6 Keerthi is the relative of Smt. Bhavani Revanna
and as per the statement of the victim the Accused No.6 had
accompanied her along with accused No.2 to the farm house of
Accused No.7 Rajagopal and later on the CDR extracts indicate
that he had conversed with accused No.7 towards keeping her in
his farm house. Lastly, the act of accused No.7 Rajagopal as
narrated in the statement would clearly indicate that he had
permitted the other accused persons to keep the victim in his
farm house and from there she had escaped. At the cost of
repetition it is clarified that the court is only looking into the
materials to consider the existence of prima facie case against
the accused persons only and not to appreciate the case as if it
is evidence.
35. It has also been vehemently argued by the learned
SPP that the petitioners are connected to family having a
significant political clout and when there are materials available
with respect to their active participation, the court has to
consider the fact of threat and also intimidation that may be
given to the witnesses or to the victims. It is also relevant to
note at this juncture, that the victim is already traced and
though it is submitted that now the custodial interrogation is not
required, still the detention of petitioners warrants for the
reasons that there are chances of tampering with investigation,
since it is not completed. Though the Court is not expressing
any opinion with respect to the merits of the case and also on
the veracity of the statements recorded under Section 161 of
Cr.P.C., and also of the victim under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., it
does indicates a specific role played by the petitioners in the
commission of the offence. Though the victim is traced as
rightly argued by the learned SPP that the present case is only a
tip of an iceberg wherein it is contended that there are several
victims who would not come forward to lodge the complaint if
threat or apprehension is hanging upon them. The court should
always balance the right of the parties and also has to ensure
that a fair trial is to be made available not only to the accused
but also to the complainant. The State is also an important
stakeholder and has to ensure the safety and well being of the
citizenry.
... ... ...
14
42. To sum up, it has been submitted by the learned SPP
that only through investigation it was revealed that the accused
No.3 to 7 are also involved in the aforesaid incident. It has also
been submitted that in order to commit the alleged offence, two
cars were being used by the accused persons i.e.,, one from the
initial place to the house of Smt. Bhavani Revanna and another
car from her house to reach the farm house of Accused No.7
Rajagopal. It is his submission that though the cars are
recovered, the conduct of the accused No.2 to 6 is also required
to be looked into. Learned counsel for petitioner has
vehemently argued that the accused No.2 is also a political
leader and it is also forthcoming from the materials which have
been produced. That apart, accused No.5 Madhu H.N., is the
President of Milk Diary and accused No.5 Manugowda H.D. is
member of Village Panchayath and the wife of accused No.6 is
Member of Zilla Panchayath. By pointing out the same, he has
vehemently argued that all the aforesaid accused person are
having their own political clout and they cannot be termed as
laymen who would refrain from interfering with the investigation
or tampering with the prosecution case. He has also argued that
the accused No.7 Rajagopal though has filed materials to
indicate that he had voluntarily appeared for the purpose of
investigation, he was the one who was misleading the
investigation and it is his contention that he had served as
Officer on Special Duty for accused No.1 for about 25 years and
at the time of investigation, he had feigned his ignorance with
respect to the identity of accused No.1 himself.
43. Lastly, it is argued by producing materials that
accused No.4 is a history sheeter and accused No.3 to 6 were
also having criminal antecedents against whom several criminal
cases were lodged. He has argued that the accused No.2 is none
other than the cousin of Smt. Bhavani Revanna and as such the
court by looking in to their antecedents and political clout may
reject the bail application. He has also relied upon the judgment
of Apex Court reported in (2023) 8 SCC 181 (Pratibha
Manchanda and another v. State of Haryana and another)
wherein it is held as follows:
"21. The relief of anticipatory bail is aimed at
safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial
tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and
protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also
15
presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance
between individual rights and the interests of justice. The
tight rope we must walk lies in striking a balance between
safeguarding individual rights and protecting public interest.
While the right to liberty and presumption of innocence are
vital, the court must also consider the gravity of the
offence, the impact on society, and the need for a fair and
free investigation. The court's discretion in weighing these
interests in the facts and circumstances of each individual
case becomes crucial to ensure a just outcome."
... ... ...
47. Last but not the least, the submission of learned SPP
that the Test of Identification Parade is to be conducted also
assumes importance, since the victim was to having knowledge
or acquaintance with accused No.3 to 6 prior to commission of
offence and for that matter with accused No.7 Rajagopal also.
It was accused No.2 Sathish Babanna who alone was known to
the victim. As such the prosecution has made out a case at this
juncture and hence, the bail petition is devoid of merits.
Accordingly, I answer point No.1 in the Negative.
48. Point No.2: In view of my answer to point No.1, I
proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
The bail application filed by petitioner/accued No.2 Sathish Babu @ Sathish Babanna in Crl.Misc.4658/2024;
The bail application filed by petitioners/accused No.3 to 5 H.K. Sujay, H.N. Madhu and H.D. Manu Gowda in Crl.Misc.4420/2024;
The bail application filed by petitioner/accused No.6 S.T. Keerthi in Crl.Misc.4629/2024;
The bail application filed by petitioner/accused No.7 K.A. Rajagopal in Crl.Misc.4824/2024;
Under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. are all hereby dismissed."
16The reasons rendered by the concerned Court are that accused No.3 has played an active role in accompanying the victim and accused No.2 from Saligrama to the farm house of accused No.7.
The record indicates that the mobile phone belonging to the victim was handed over to accused Nos. 2 to 4 which was recovered by the Investigating Officer. Therefore, accused Nos. 3 to 5 and 7 helped accused No.2 to take the victim to the farm house of accused No.7. The Court holds that there are clear overt acts against them. Accused No.6 is said to have accompanied the victim to the farm house of accused No.7. The officer in-charge of the Police Station, after the SIT submitted its report, has filed a charge sheet against all the accused i.e., accused Nos. 1 to 8. Insofar as each of the accused are concerned, the allegations in the charge sheet are as follows:
"... ... ...
2. DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä:-
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¢£ÁAPÀ 28.04.2024 gÀAzÀÄ DgÉÆæ 1 ºÉZï.r.gÉêÀtÚ ºÁUÀÆ CªÀgÀ ªÀÄUÀ ¥Àædé¯ï gÉêÀtÚ gÀªÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÝ ºÉƼɣÀgÀ¹Ã¥ÀÄgÀ mË£ï ¥Éưøï oÁuÁ ªÉÆ.£ÀA.107/2024 gÀ°è ¥ÀæPÀgÀt zÁR¯ÁV «±ÉõÀ vÀ¤SÁ vÀAqÀ gÀZÀ£ÉAiÀiÁVzÀÝ£ÀÄß w½zÀÄ DgÉÆæ 1 ºÉZï.r.gÉêÀtÚ, DgÉÆæ 8 ¨sÀªÁ¤ gÉêÀtÚ gÀªÀgÉÆA¢UÉ ¸ÉÃj C¥ÀgÁ¢üPÀ M¼À¸ÀAZÀ£ÀÄß gÀƦ¹ M¼À¸ÀAa£À ¨sÁUÀªÁV ¢£ÁAPÀ 29.04.2024 gÀAzÀÄ DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä gÀªÀgÀÄ DgÉÆæ 3 ¸ÀÄdAiÀiï, DgÉÆæ 4 ªÀÄzsÀÄ gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß ¨sÉÃnAiÀiÁV £ÀAvÀgÀ ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀ §½ ºÉÆÃV ¸ÀzÀjAiÀĪÀgÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É ¥ÀæPÀgÀt zÁR¯ÁVzÉ JAzÀÄ ¸ÀļÀÄî ºÉý AiÀiÁªÀiÁj¹, ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼ÉAiÀÄ §½ EzÀÝ ªÉƨÉÊ¯ï ¥sÉÆãï£ÀÄß §®ªÀAvÀªÁV QvÀÄÛPÉÆAqÀÄ ¹éZï D¥sï ªÀiÁr vÀ£Àß ¢éZÀPÀæ ªÁºÀ£À PÉJ-45-Dgï-1153 gÀ »gÉÆà ºÉÆAqÁ ¸ÉèAqÀgï ¨ÉÊPï£À°è C¥ÀgÀºÀgÀt ªÀiÁrPÉÆAqÀÄ §AzÀÄ £ÀAvÀgÀ DgÉÆæ 4 ªÀÄzsÀÄ gÀªÀgÀÄ vÀA¢zÀÝ PÉJ-09-JA©-8254 ªÀiÁgÀÄw ¸ÀÄdÄQ ¹é¥ïÖ PÁj£À°è DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä gÀªÀgÀÄ DgÉÆæ 3 ¸ÀÄdAiÀiï ºÁUÀÆ DgÉÆæ 4 ªÀÄzsÀÄ gÀªÀgÉÆA¢UÉ ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß ºÉ¨Áâ¼ÀÄ UÁæªÀÄ¢AzÀ DgÉÆæ 8 ¨sÀªÁ¤ gÉêÀtÚ gÀªÀjzÀÝ CªÀgÀ CtÚ ¥ÀæPÁ±ï gÀªÀgÀ ¸Á°UÁæªÀÄzÀ ªÀÄ£ÉUÉ PÀgÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ DgÉÆæ 8 ¨sÀªÁ¤ gÉêÀtÚ gÀªÀgÀ ¸À½ ©nÖgÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
£ÀAvÀgÀ DgÉÆæ 1 ºÉZï.r.gÉêÀtÚ ºÁUÀÆ DgÉÆæ 8 ¨sÀªÁ¤ gÉêÀtÚ gÀªÀgÀ ¤zÉÃð±À£ÀzÀAvÉ DgÉÆæ 2 ¸Àwñï¨Á§Ä gÀªÀgÀÄ DgÉÆæ 6 QÃwð J¸ï.n. gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß ¸Á°UÁæªÀÄPÉÌ §gÀªÀiÁrPÉÆAqÀÄ DgÉÆæ 6 QÃwð J¸ï.n. gÀªÀgÀ PÉJ-45-JA-4905 gÀ ªÀĺÉÃAzÀæ ªÉÆÃgÉÆÃeÁ PÁj£À°è ¸Á°UÁæªÀÄzÀ CgÉÆæ 8 ¨sÀªÁ¤ gÉêÀtÚ gÀªÀgÀ CtÚ£À ªÀģɬÄAzÀ DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä, DgÉÆæ 6 QÃwð J¸ï.n gÀªÀgÀÄ ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß PÀgÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ DgÉƦ 7 gÁeïUÉÆÃ¥Á¯ï.PÉ.J gÀªÀgÀ ºÀÄt¸ÀÆgÀÄ vÁ®ÆPÀÄ PÁ¼ÉãÀºÀ½î UÁæªÀÄzÀ vÉÆÃlzÀ ªÀÄ£ÉUÉ vÀqÀ gÁwæAiÀÄ°è PÀgÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃV CPÀæªÀĪÁV Ej¹zÀÝ §UÉÎ F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ°è ¸ÀAUÀ滹gÀĪÀ ¸ÁPÀëöåUÀ¼À DzsÁgÀzÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É RavÀ¥Àr¹PÉÆAqÀÄ DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä gÀªÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÝ PÀ®A 364J, 365, 109, 120(©) gÉ/« 34 L¦¹ jÃvÁå zÉÆõÁgÉÆÃ¥ÀuÉ ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
3. DgÉÆæ 3 ¸ÀÄdAiÀiï.ºÉZï.PÉ:-
PÁ®A £ÀA§gï 12 gÀ°è £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹gÀĪÀ DgÉÆæ 3 ¸ÀÄdAiÀiï gÀªÀgÀÄ ¥ÀæPÀgÀt ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼ÉAiÀÄ D²èî «rAiÉÆà §UÉÎ w½¢zÀÝgÀÆ ¸ÀºÀ F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ DgÉÆæ 1 ºÉZï.r.gÉêÀtÚ, DgÉÆæ 8 ¨sÀªÁ¤ gÉêÀtÚ ºÁUÀÆ DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä gÀªÀgÀÄ gÀƦ¹zÀÝ M¼À ¸ÀAa£À°è ¨sÁVAiÀiÁV DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä gÀªÀgÀ eÉÆvÉ ¸ÉÃj DgÉÆæ 4 ªÀÄzsÀÄ gÀªÀgÀ PÉJ-09-JA©-8254 ªÀiÁgÀÄw ¸ÀÄdÄQ ¹é¥ïÖ PÁj£À°è ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆãÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß 18 ºÉ¨Áâ¼ÀÄ UÁæªÀÄ¢AzÀ ¢£ÁAPÀ 29.04.2024 gÀAzÀÄ gÁwæ ªÉÃ¼É C¥ÀºÀgÀt ªÀiÁrPÉÆAqÀÄ DgÉÆæ 8 ¨sÀªÁ¤ gÉêÀtÚ gÀªÀgÀ CtÚ ¥ÀæPÁ±ï gÀªÀgÀ ¸Á°UÁæªÀÄzÀ ªÀÄ£ÉUÉ PÀgÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ §A¢gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. £ÀAvÀgÀ ¢£ÁAPÀ 03.05.2024 gÀAzÀÄ DgÉÆæ 3 ¸ÀÄdAiÀiï EvÀgÉ DgÉÆævÀgÁzÀ DgÉÆæ 4 ªÀÄzsÀÄ, DgÉÆæ 5 ªÀÄ£ÀÄUËqÀ ºÁUÀÆ DgÉÆæ 6 QÃwð J¸ï.n gÀªÀgÀ eÉÆvÉ ¸ÉÃj DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä gÀªÀgÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ 02.05.2024 gÀAzÀÄ zÀ¸ÀÛVj DVzÀÝjAzÀ ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß CPÀæªÀĪÁV EnÖzÀÝ DgÉÆæ 7 gÁeï UÉÆÃ¥Á¯ï.PÉ.J gÀªÀgÀ ºÀÄt¸ÀÆgÀÄ vÁ®ÆPÀÄ PÁ¼ÉãÀºÀ½î UÁæªÀÄzÀ vÉÆÃlzÀ ªÀģɬÄAzÀ ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß ¨ÉÃgÉ PÀqÉUÉ ¸ÀܼÁAvÀgÀ ªÀiÁqÀ®Ä ºÀUÀÆ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ ºÁ¢AiÀÄ£ÀÄß vÀ¦à¸À®Ä ¥ÀæAiÀÄwß¹gÀĪÀ §UÉÎ F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ°è ¸ÀAUÀ滹gÀĪÀ ¸ÁPÀëöåUÀ¼À DzsÁgÀzÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É RavÀ¥Àr¹PÉÆAqÀÄ DgÉÆæ 3 ¸ÀÄdAiÀiï gÀªÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÝ PÀ®A 364J, 365, 109, 120(©) gÉ/« 34 L¦¹ jÃvÁå zÉÆõÁgÉÆÃ¥ÀuÉ ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
4. DgÉÆæ 4 ªÀÄzsÀÄ.ºÉZï.J£ï:-
PÁ®A £ÀA§gï 12 gÀ°è £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹gÀĪÀ DgÉÆæ 4 ªÀÄzsÀÄ gÀªÀgÀÄ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼ÉAiÀÄ D²èî «rAiÉÆà §UÉÎ w½¢zÀÝgÀÆ ¸ÀºÀ F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ DgÉÆæ 1 ºÉZï.r.gÉêÀtÚ, DgÉÆæ 8 ¨sÀªÁ¤ gÉêÀtÚ ºÁUÀÆ DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä gÀªÀgÀÄ gÀƦ¹zÀÝ M¼À ¸ÀAa£À°è ¨sÁVAiÀiÁV DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä gÀªÀgÀ eÉÆvÉ ¸ÉÃj vÀ£Àß §½ PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛzÀÝ ¸ÁQë 27 ºÀjñÀ.n.JA gÀªÀgÀ PÉJ-09-JA©-8254 ªÀiÁgÀÄw ¸ÀÄdÄQ ¹é¥ïÖ PÁj£À°è DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä ºÁUÀÆ DgÉÆæ 3 ¸ÀÄdAiÀiïgÀªÀgÉÆA¢UÉ ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß ºÉ¨Áâ¼ÀÄ UÁæªÀÄ¢AzÀ ¢£ÁAPÀ 29.04.2024 gÀAzÀÄ gÁwæ ªÉÃ¼É C¥ÀgÀºÀgÀt ªÀiÁrPÉÆAqÀÄ DgÉÆæ 8 ¨sÀªÁ¤ gÉêÀtÚ gÀªÀgÀ CtÚ ¥ÀæPÁ±ï gÀªÀgÀ ¸Á°UÁæªÀÄzÀ ªÀÄ£ÉUÉ PÀgÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ §A¢gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É §½ EzÀÝ ªÉƨÉÊ¯ï ¥sÉÆãï£ÀÄß DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä PÀ¹zÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ DgÉÆæ 4 ªÀÄzsÀÄ gÀªÀjUÉ ¤ÃrzÀÝ£ÀÄß DgÉÆæ 4 ªÀÄzsÀÄ gÀªÀgÀÄ ¥ÀqÉ¢gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. £ÀAvÀgÀ ¢£ÁAPÀ 03.05.2024 gÀAzÀÄ DgÉÆæ 4 ªÀÄzsÀÄ EvÀgÉ DgÉÆævÀgÁzÀ DgÉÆæ 3 ¸ÀÄdAiÀiï, DgÉÆæ 5 ªÀÄ£ÀÄUËqÀ ºÁUÀÆ DgÉÆæ 6 QÃwð.J¸ï.n gÀªÀgÀ eÉÆvÉ ¸ÉÃj DgÉƦ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä gÀªÀgÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ 02.05.2024 gÀAzÀÄ zÀ¸ÀÛVj DVzÀÝjAzÀ ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß CPÀæªÀĪÁV EnÖzÀÝ DgÉÆæ 7 gÁeïUÉÆÃ¥Á¯ï.PÉ.J gÀªÀgÀ ºÀÄt¸ÀÆgÀÄ vÁ®ÆPÀÄ PÁ¼ÉãÀºÀ½î UÁæªÀÄzÀ vÉÆÃlzÀ ªÀģɬÄAzÀ ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß ¨ÉÃgÉ PÀqÉUÉ ¸ÀܼÁAvÀgÀ ªÀiÁqÀ®Ä ºÁUÀÆ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ ºÁ¢AiÀÄ£ÀÄß vÀ¦à¸À®Ä ¥ÀæAiÀÄwß¹gÀĪÀ §UÉÎ F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ°è ¸ÀAUÀ滹gÀĪÀ ¸ÁPÀëöåUÀ¼À DzsÁgÀzÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É RavÀ¥Àr¹PÉÆAqÀÄ DgÉÆæ 4 ªÀÄzsÀÄ gÀªÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÝ PÀ®A 364J, 365 109, 120(©) gÉ/« 34 L¦¹ jÃvÁå zÉÆõÁgÉÆÃ¥ÀuÉ ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.19
5. DgÉÆæ 5 ªÀÄ£ÀÄUËqÀ:-
PÁ®A £ÀA§gï 12 gÀ°è £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹gÀĪÀ DgÉÆæ 5 ªÀÄ£ÀÄUËqÀ gÀªÀgÀÄ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼ÉAiÀÄ D²èî «rAiÉÆà §UÉÎ w½¢zÀÝgÀÆ ¸ÀºÀ F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ DgÉÆæ 1 ºÉZï.r.gÉêÀtÚ, DgÉÆæ 8 ¨sÀªÁ¤ gÉêÀtÚ ºÁUÀÆ DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä gÀªÀgÀÄ gÀƦ¹zÀÝ M¼À ¸ÀAa£À°è ¨sÁVAiÀiÁV ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀÄ C¥ÀºÀgÀtPÉÌ M¼ÀUÁVzÁÝgÉ JAzÀÄ w½¢zÀÝgÀÆ ¸ÀºÀ ¸ÀzÀj C¥ÀºÀgÀtzÀ «ZÁgÀªÀ£ÀÄß ¥ÉưøÀjUÁUÀ°Ã CxÀªÁ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ PÀæªÀÄPÉÊUÉƼÀî®Ä ¸ÀA§AzÀ¥ÀlÖªÀjUÁUÀ°Ã ªÀiÁ»wAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¤ÃqÀzÉà ¢£ÁAPÀ 03.05.2024 gÀAzÀÄ DgÉÆæ 3 ¸ÀÄdAiÀiï, DgÉÆæ 4 ªÀÄzsÀÄ, DgÉÆæ 6 QÃwð J¸ï.n gÀªÀgÀ eÉÆvÉ ¸ÉÃj DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä gÀªÀgÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ 02.05.2024 gÀAzÀÄ zÀ¸ÀÛVj DVzÀÝjAzÀ ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß CPÀæªÀĪÁV EnÖzÀÝ DgÉÆæ 7 gÁeïUÉÆÃ¥Á¯ï.PÉ.J gÀªÀgÀ ºÀÄt¸ÀÆgÀÄ vÁ®ÆPÀÄ PÁ¼ÉãÀºÀ½î UÁæªÀÄzÀ vÉÆÃlzÀ ªÀģɬÄAzÀ ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß ¨ÉÃgÉ PÀqÉUÉ ¸ÀܼÁAvÀgÀ ªÀiÁqÀ®Ä ºÁUÀÆ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ ºÁ¢AiÀÄ£ÀÄß vÀ¦à¸À®Ä ¥ÀæAiÀÄwß¹gÀĪÀ §UÉÎ F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ°è ¸ÀAUÀ滹gÀĪÀ ¸ÁPÀëöåUÀ¼À DzsÁgÀÀzÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É RavÀ¥Àr¹PÉÆAqÀÄ DgÉÆæ 5 ªÀÄ£ÀÄUËqÀ gÀªÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÝ PÀ®A 364J, 365 109, 120(©) gÉ/« 34 L¦¹ jÃvÁå zÉÆõÁgÉÆÃ¥ÀuÉ ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
6. DgÉÆæ 6 QÃwð.J¸ï.n:-
PÁ®A £ÀA§gï 12 gÀ°è £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹gÀĪÀ DgÉÆæ 6 QÃwð.J¸ï.n gÀªÀgÀÄ F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ DgÉÆæ 1 ºÉZï.r.gÉêÀtÚ, DgÉÆæ 8 ¨sÀªÁ¤ gÉêÀtÚ ºÁUÀÆ DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä gÀªÀgÀÄ gÀƦ¹zÀÝ M¼À ¸ÀAa£À°è ¨sÁVAiÀiÁV ¢£ÁAPÀ 29.04.2024 gÀAzÀÄ DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä gÀªÀgÀ eÉÆvÉ ¸ÉÃj vÀ£Àß PÉJ-45-JA-4905 gÀ ªÀĺÉÃAzÀæ ªÉÆÃgÉÆÃeÁ PÁj£À°è ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß ¸Á°UÁæªÀÄzÀ DgÉÆæ 8 ¨sÀªÁ¤ gÉêÀtÚ gÀªÀgÀ CtÚ£À ªÀģɬÄAzÀ PÀgÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ DgÉÆæ 7 gÁeïUÉÆÃ¥Á¯ï.PÉ.J gÀªÀgÀ ºÀÄt¸ÀÆgÀÄ vÁ®ÆPÀÄ PÁ¼ÉãÀºÀ½î UÁæªÀÄzÀ vÉÆÃlzÀ ªÀÄ£ÉUÉ ¢£ÁAPÀ 29.04.2024 gÀ vÀqÀ gÁwæAiÀÄ°è PÀgÉzÀÄPÉƪÀÄqÀÄ ºÉÆÃV DgÉƦ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä gÀªÀgÀ ¤zÉÃð±À£ÀzÀAvÉ DgÉÆæ 7 gÁeïUÉÆÃ¥Á¯ï.PÉ.J gÀªÀjUÉ PÀgÉ ªÀiÁr ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß DgÉÆæ 7 gÁeïUÉÆÃ¥Á¯ï.PÉ.J gÀªÀgÀ vÉÆÃlzÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è CPÀæªÀĪÁV Ej¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ £ÀAvÀgÀ ¢£ÁAPÀ 03.05.2024 gÀAzÀÄ DgÉƦ 6 QÃwð J¸ï.n gÀªÀgÀÄ EvÀgÉ DgÉƦvÀgÁzÀ DgÉÆæ 3 ¸ÀÄdAiÀiï, DgÉÆæ 4 ªÀÄzÀÄ ºÀUÀÆ DgÉÆæ 5 ªÀÄ£ÀÄUËqÀ gÀªÀgÀ eÉÆvÉ ¸ÉÃj DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä gÀªÀgÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ 02.05.2024 gÀAzÀÄ zÀ¸ÀÛVj DVzÀÝjAzÀ ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß CPÀæªÀĪÁV EnÖzÀÝ DgÉÆæ 7 gÁeïUÉÆÃ¥Á¯ï.PÉ.J gÀªÀgÀ ºÀÄt¸ÀÆgÀÄ vÁ®ÆPÀÄ PÁ¼ÉãÀºÀ½î UÁæªÀÄzÀ vÉÆÃlzÀ ªÀģɬÄAzÀ ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß ¨ÉÃgÉ PÀqÉUÉ ¸ÀܼÁAvÀgÀ ªÀiÁqÀ®Ä ºÁUÀÆ 20 ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ ºÁ¢AiÀÄ£ÀÄß vÀ¦à¸À®Ä ¥ÀæAiÀÄwß¹gÀĪÀ §UÉÎ F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ°è ¸ÀAUÀ滹gÀĪÀ ¸ÁPÀëöåUÀ¼À DzsÁgÀzÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É RavÀ¥Àr¹PÉÆAqÀÄ DgÉÆæ 6 QÃwð.J¸ï.n gÀªÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÝ PÀ®A 364J, 365, 109, 120(©) gÉ/« 34 L¦¹ jÃvÁå zÉÆõÁgÉÆÃ¥ÀuÉ ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
7. DgÉÆæ 7 gÁeï UÉÆÃ¥Á¯ï.PÉ.J:-
PÁ®A £ÀA§gï 12 gÀ°è £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹gÀĪÀ DgÉÆæ 7 gÁeï UÉÆÃ¥Á¯ï.PÉ.J gÀªÀgÀÄ F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ DgÉÆæ 1 ºÉZï.r.gÉêÀtÚ gÀªÀgÀ §½ F »AzÉ ¸ÀĪÀiÁgÀÄ 27 ªÀµÀðUÀ¼À PÁ® D¥ÀÛ¸ÀºÁAiÀÄPÀ ºÁUÀÄ «±ÉõÁ¢üPÁjAiÀiÁV PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁrgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ¸ÀzÀjAiÀĪÀgÀÄ DgÉÆæ 1 ºÉZï.r.gÉêÀtÚ, DgÉÆæ 8 ¨sÀªÁ¤ gÉêÀtÚ gÀªÀgÀ ¤zÉÃð±À£ÀzÀAvÉ F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ EvÀgÉ DgÉÆæUÀ¼ÉÆA¢UÉ ¥ÀƪÀð ¤AiÉÆÃfvÀ C¥ÀgÁ¢üPÀ ¸ÀAa£À°è ¨sÁVAiÀiÁV F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ DgÉÆæ 2 ¸ÀwÃ±ï ¨Á§Ä ºÀUÀÆ DgÉÆæ 6 QÃwð J¸ï.n gÀªÀgÀÄ ¢£ÀAPÀ 29.04.2024 gÀ vÀqÀ gÁwæ PÀgÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ §AzÀ C¥ÀºÀgÀtPÉÆ̼ÀUÁzÀ ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß vÀ£Àß ºÀÄt¸ÀÆgÀÄ vÁ®ÆPÀÄ PÁ¼ÉãÀºÀ½î UÁæªÀÄzÀ vÉÆÃlzÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è CPÀæªÀĪÁV Ej¹PÉÆArgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ vÀ¤SÁ PÁ®zÀ°è ¸ÀvÀåªÀ£ÀÄß ªÀÄgɪÀiÁa ¸ÀļÀÄî ºÉý vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ ºÁ¢ vÀ¦à¸À®Ä ¥ÀæAiÀÄwß¹zÀÄÝ, £ÀAvÀgÀ vÁAwæPÀ ¸ÁPÁëöåzsÁgÀUÀ½AzÀ DgÉÆæ 7 gÁeïUÉÆÃ¥Á¯ï.PÉ.J gÀªÀgÀÄ DgÉÆæ 8 ¨sÀªÁ¤ gÉêÀtÚ ºÁUÀÆ vÀ¯ÉªÀÄgɹPÉÆArgÀĪÀ DgÉÆæ 9 Cfvï PÀĪÀiÁgï gÀªÀgÉÆA¢UÉ ¸ÀÄ¢üÃWÀðªÁV ¸ÀA¥ÀPÀðzÀ°èzÀÄÝPÉÆAqÀÄ ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼É ¸ÉÆêÀiÁQë @ ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÀÄ C¥ÀºÀgÀtPÉÌ M¼ÀUÁVzÁÝgÉ JAzÀÄ w½¢zÀÝgÀÆ ¸ÀºÀ ¸ÀzÀj C¥ÀºÀgÀtzÀ «ZÁgÀªÀ£ÀÄß ¥ÉưøÀjUÁUÀ°Ã CxÀªÁ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ PÀæªÀÄPÉÊUÉƼÀî®Ä ¸ÀA§AzÀ¥ÀlÖªÀjUÁUÀ°Ã ªÀiÁ»wAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¤ÃqÀzÉà ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼ÉAiÀÄ fêÀPÉÌ C¥ÁAiÀĪÁUÀ§ºÀÄzÁzÀAvÀºÀ ¥Àj¹ÜwAiÀÄ°è ¸ÀAvÀæ¸ÀÛ ªÀÄ»¼ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß vÀ£Àß vÉÆÃlzÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è ¢£ÁAPÀ 29.04.2024 jAzÀ 04.05.2024 gÀªÀgÉUÉ EnÖzÀÝ §UÉÎ F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ°è ¸ÀAUÀ滹gÀĪÀ ¸ÁPÀëöåUÀ¼À DzsÁgÀzÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É RavÀ¥Àr¹PÉÆAqÀÄ DgÉÆæ 7 gÁeï UÉÆÃ¥Á¯ï.PÉ.J gÀªÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÝ PÀ®A 364J, 365, 368, 109, 120(©) gÉ/« 34 L¦¹ jÃvÁå zÉÆõÁgÉÆÃ¥ÀuÉ ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
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22I, prima facie, find that the allegations against the accused are triable unless otherwise held. The issue now would be, in the teeth of filing of the charge sheet and the aforesaid allegations against them, whether these accused can be enlarged on grant of bail. I deem it appropriate to notice Section 364A of the IPC which forms the crux of the allegation against all the accused. Section 364A of the IPC reads as follows:
"364-A. Kidnapping for ransom, etc.--Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such kidnapping or abduction, and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt, or causes hurt or death to such person in order to compel the Government or any foreign State or international inter-governmental organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom, shall be punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine."
Section 364A of the IPC deals with kidnapping for ransom and several forms of hues if a person is detained or kidnapped or abducted and is threatened to cause death or hurt or gives a reasonable apprehension that the victim may be put to death or hurt. A perusal of the contents of the charge sheet would, in the prima facie opinion of the Court, for consideration of bail, is not 23 indicative of any ingredients of Section 364A of the IPC. What can perhaps be laid against these petitioners is Section 362 or Section 365 of the IPC. They read as follows:
"362. Abduction.--Whoever by force compels, or by any deceitful means induces, any person to go from any place, is said to abduct that person.
... ... ...
365. Kidnapping or abducting with intent secretly and wrongfully to confine person.--Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person with intent to cause that person to be secretly and wrongfully confined, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
Section 362 deals with abduction and Section 365 deals with kidnapping or abduction with intent secretly and wrongfully to confine a person for which the punishment may extend to seven years. In the teeth of the aforesaid allegations and the offences under Sections 364A and 365 of the IPC and in the teeth of the prosecution filing the final report i.e., the charge sheet, whether these petitioners are still to be directed to be housed in the prison is what is required to be considered.
9. The consideration that would weigh at the time of registration of crime, and later at the time when the Police after 24 investigation file a charge sheet are entirely different, for the purpose of consideration of the case of the accused for grant of bail.
Quoting the judgments right from the beginning where the Apex Court held that bail is a rule and jail is an exception, would only bulk this order. It would suffice if reference is made to two of the judgments of the Apex Court - one, in the case of SATENDER KUMAR ANTIL v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION1 and the other, in the case of GURWINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB2. In the case of SATENDER KUMAR ANTIL, the Apex Court while dealing with setting the accused on liberty has held as follows:
"Precedents
51.Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23]: (SCC pp. 84-89, paras 2-5) "2. Though we issued notice to the State of Bihar two weeks ago, it is unfortunate that on 5-2-1979, no one has appeared on behalf of the State and we must, therefore, at this stage proceed on the basis that the allegations contained in the issues of the Indian Express dated 8-1-1979 and 9-1-1979 which are incorporated in the writ petition are correct. The information contained in these newspaper cuttings is most distressing and it is sufficient to stir the conscience and disturb the equanimity of any socially motivated lawyer or judge. Some of the undertrial 1 (2022) 10 SCC 51 2 (2024) 5 SCC 403 25 prisoners whose names are given in the newspaper cuttings have been in jail for as many as 5, 7 or 9 years and a few of them, even more than 10 years, without their trial having begun. What faith can these lost souls have in the judicial system which denies them a bare trial for so many years and keeps them behind bars, not because they are guilty, but because they are too poor to afford bail and the courts have no time to try them. It is a travesty of justice that many poor accused, 'little Indians, are forced into long cellular servitude for little offences' because the bail procedure is beyond their meagre means and trials do not commence and even if they do, they never conclude. There can be little doubt, after the dynamic interpretation placed by this Court on Article 21 in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] that a procedure which keeps such large numbers of people behind bars without trial so long cannot possibly be regarded as "reasonable, just or fair" so as to be in conformity with the requirement of that article. It is necessary, therefore, that the law as enacted by the legislature and as administered by the courts must radically change its approach to pre-trial detention and ensure "reasonable, just and fair" procedure which has creative connotation after Maneka Gandhi case [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] .
3. Now, one reason why our legal and judicial system continually denies justice to the poor by keeping them for long years in pre-trial detention is our highly unsatisfactory bail system. It suffers from a property oriented approach which seems to proceed on the erroneous assumption that risk of monetary loss is the only deterrent against fleeing from justice. The Code of Criminal Procedure, even after its re-enactment, continues to adopt the same antiquated approach as the earlier Code enacted towards the end of the last century and where an accused is to be released on his personal bond, it insists that the bond should contain a monetary obligation requiring the accused to pay a sum of money in case he fails to appear at the trial. Moreover, as if this were not sufficient deterrent to the poor, the courts mechanically and as a matter of course insist that the accused should produce sureties who will stand bail for him and these sureties must again establish their solvency to be able to pay up the amount of the bail in case the accused fails to appear to answer the charge. This system of bails operates very harshly against the poor and it is only the non-poor who are able to take advantage of it by getting 26 themselves released on bail. The poor find it difficult to furnish bail even without sureties because very often the amount of the bail fixed by the courts is so unrealistically excessive that in a majority of cases the poor are unable to satisfy the police or the Magistrate about their solvency for the amount of the bail and where the bail is with sureties, as is usually the case, it becomes an almost impossible task for the poor to find persons sufficiently solvent to stand as sureties. The result is that either they are fleeced by the police and revenue officials or by touts and professional sureties and sometimes they have even to incur debts for securing their release or, being unable to obtain release, they have to remain in jail until such time as the court is able to take up their cases for trial, leading to grave consequences, namely, (1) though presumed innocent, they are subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail life, (2) they are prevented from contributing to the preparation of their defence, and (3) they lose their job, if they have one, and are deprived of an opportunity to work to support themselves and their family members with the result that the burden of their detention almost invariably falls heavily on the innocent members of the family. It is here that the poor find our legal and judicial system oppressive and heavily weighted against them and a feeling of frustration and despair occurs upon them as they find that they are helplessly in a position of inequality with the non-poor. The Legal Aid Committee appointed by the Government of Gujarat under the chairmanship of one of us, Mr Justice Bhagwati, emphasised this glaring inequality in the following words:
The bail system, as we see it administered in the criminal courts today, is extremely unsatisfactory and needs drastic change. In the first place it is virtually impossible to translate risk of non- appearance by the accused into precise monetary terms and even its basic premise that risk of financial loss is necessary to prevent the accused from fleeing is of doubtful validity. There are several considerations which deter an accused from running away from justice and risk of financial loss is only one of them and that too not a major one. The experience of enlightened Bail Projects in the United States such as Manhattan Bail Project and D.C. Bail Project shows that even without monetary bail it has 27 been possible to secure the presence of the accused at the trial in quite a large number of cases. Moreover, the bail system causes discrimination against the poor since the poor would not be able to furnish bail on account of their poverty while the wealthier persons otherwise similarly situate would be able to secure their freedom because they can afford to furnish bail. This discrimination arises even if the amount of the bail is fixed by the Magistrate is not high, for a large majority of those who are brought before the courts in criminal cases are so poor that they would find it difficult to furnish bail even in a small amount.
The Gujarat Committee also pointed out how the practice of fixing the amount of bail with reference to the nature of the charge without taking into account relevant factors, such as the individual financial circumstances of the accused and the probability of his fleeing before trial, is harsh and oppressive and discriminates against the poor:
The discriminatory nature of the bail system becomes all the more acute by reason of the mechanical way in which it is customarily operated. It is no doubt true that theoretically the Magistrate has broad discretion in fixing the amount of bail but in practice it seems that the amount of bail depends almost always on the seriousness of the offence. It is fixed according to a schedule related to the nature of the charge. Little weight is given either to the probability that the accused will attempt to flee before his trial or to his individual financial circumstances, the very factors which seem most relevant if the purpose of bail is to assure the appearance of the accused at the trial. The result of ignoring these factors and fixing the amount of bail mechanically having regard only to the seriousness of the offence is to discriminate against the poor who are not in the same position as the rich as regards capacity to furnish bail. The courts by ignoring the differential capacity of the rich and the poor to furnish bail and treating them equally produce inequality between the rich and the poor : the rich who is charged with the same offence in the same circumstances is able to secure his release while the poor is unable to do 28 so on account of his poverty. These are some of the major defects in the bail system as it is operated today.
The same anguish was expressed by President Lyndon B. Johnson at the time of signing the Bail Reforms Act, 1966:
Today, we join to recognise a major development in our system of criminal justice : the reform of the bail system.
This system has endured--archaic, unjust and virtually unexamined --since the Judiciary Act of 1789.
The principal purpose of bail is to insure that an accused person will return for trial if he is released after arrest.
How is that purpose met under the present system? The defendant with means can afford to pay bail. He can afford to buy his freedom. But poorer defendant cannot pay the price. He languishes in jail weeks, months and perhaps even years before trial.
He does not stay in jail because he is guilty.
He does not stay in jail because any sentence has been passed.
He does not stay in jail because he is any more likely to flee before trial.
He stays in jail for one reason only--because he is poor....
The bail system, as it operates today, is a source of great hardship to the poor and if we really want to eliminate the evil effects of poverty and assure a fair and just treatment to the poor in the administration of justice, it is imperative that the bail system should be thoroughly reformed so that it should be possible for the poor, as easily as the rich, to obtain pre-trial release without jeopardising the interest of justice.
4. It is high time that our Parliament realises that risk of monetary loss is not the only deterrent against fleeing 29 from justice, but there are also other factors which act as equal deterrents against fleeing. Ours is a socialist republic with social justice as the signature tune of our Constitution and Parliament would do well to consider whether it would not be more consonant with the ethos of our Constitution that instead of risk of financial loss, other relevant considerations such as family ties, roots in the community, job security, membership of stable organisations, etc. should be the determinative factors in grant of bail and the accused should in appropriate cases be released on his personal bond without monetary obligation. Of course, it may be necessary in such a case to provide by an amendment of the penal law that if the accused wilfully fails to appear in compliance with the promise contained in his personal bond, he shall be liable to penal action. But even under the law as it stands today the courts must abandon the antiquated concept under which pre-trial release is ordered only against bail with sureties. That concept is outdated and experience has shown that it has done more harm than good. The new insight into the subject of pre-trial release which has been developed in socially advanced countries and particularly the United States should now inform the decisions of our courts in regard to pre-trial release. If the court is satisfied, after taking into account, on the basis of information placed before it, that the accused has his roots in the community and is not likely to abscond, it can safely release the accused on his personal bond. To determine whether the accused has his roots in the community which would deter him from fleeing, the court should take into account the following factors concerning the accused:
1. The length of his residence in the community,
2. his employment status, history and his financial condition,
3. his family ties and relationships,
4. his reputation, character and monetary condition, 30
5. his prior criminal record including any record of prior release on recognizance or on bail,
6. the identity of responsible members of the community who would vouch for his reliability,
7. the nature of the offence charged and the apparent probability of conviction and the likely sentence insofar as these factors are relevant to the risk of non-
appearance, and
8. any other factors indicating the ties of the accused to the community or bearing on the risk of wilful failure to appear.
If the court is satisfied on a consideration of the relevant factors that the accused has his ties in the community and there is no substantial risk of non-appearance, the accused may, as far as possible, be released on his personal bond. Of course, if facts are brought to the notice of the court which go to show that having regard to the condition and background of the accused, his previous record and the nature and circumstances of the offence, there may be a substantial risk of his non- appearance at the trial, as for example, where the accused is a notorious bad character or a confirmed criminal or the offence is serious (these examples are only by way of illustration), the court may not release the accused on his personal bond and may insist on bail with sureties. But in the majority of cases, considerations like family ties and relationship, roots in the community, employment status, etc. may prevail with the court in releasing the accused on his personal bond and particularly in cases where the offence is not grave and the accused is poor or belongs to a weaker section of the community, release on personal bond could, as far as possible, be preferred. But even while releasing the accused on personal bond it is necessary to caution the court that the amount of the bond which it fixes should not be based merely on the nature of the charge. The decision as regards the amount of the bond should be an individualised decision depending on the individual financial circumstances of the accused and the probability 31 of his absconding. The amount of the bond should be determined having regard to these relevant factors and should not be fixed mechanically according to a schedule keyed to the nature of the charge. Otherwise, it would be difficult for the accused to secure his release even by executing a personal bond. Moreover, when the accused is released on his personal bond, it would be very harsh and oppressive if he is required to satisfy the court--and what we have said here in regard to the court must apply equally in relation to the police while granting bail--that he is solvent enough to pay the amount of the bond if he fails to appear at the trial and in consequence the bond is forfeited. The inquiry into the solvency of the accused can become a source of great harassment to him and often result in denial of bail and deprivation of liberty and should not, therefore, be insisted upon as a condition of acceptance of the personal bond. We have no doubt that if the system of bail, even under the existing law, is administered in the manner we have indicated in this judgment, it would go a long way towards relieving hardship of the poor and help them to secure pre-trial release from incarceration. It is for this reason we have directed the undertrial prisoners whose names are given in the two issues of the Indian Express should be released forthwith on their personal bond. We should have ordinarily said that personal bond to be executed by them should be with monetary obligation but we directed as an exceptional measure that there need be no monetary obligation in the personal bond because we found that all these persons have been in jail without trial for several years, and in some cases for offences for which the punishment would in all probability be less than the period of their detention and, moreover, the order we were making was merely an interim order. The peculiar facts and circumstances of the case dictated such an unusual course.
5. There is also one other infirmity of the legal and judicial system which is responsible for this gross denial of justice to the undertrial prisoners and that is the notorious delay in disposal of cases. It is a sad reflection on the legal and judicial system that the trial of an accused should not even commence for a long number of 32 years. Even a delay of one year in the commencement of the trial is bad enough : how much worse could it be when the delay is as long as 3 or 5 or 7 or even 10 years. Speedy trial is of the essence of criminal justice and there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice. It is interesting to note that in the United States, speedy trial is one of the Constitutionally guaranteed rights. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.
So also Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that:
Every one arrested or detained ... shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.
We think that even under our Constitution, though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] . We have held in that case that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be "reasonable, fair and just". If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not "reasonable, fair or just", such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21, and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release. Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot be 'reasonable, fair or just' unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as "reasonable, fair or just" and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty 33 enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally freed from the charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after such trial would constitute violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. That is a question we shall have to consider when we hear the writ petition on merits on the adjourned date. But one thing is certain, and we cannot impress it too strongly on the State Government that it is high time that the State Government realised its responsibility to the people in the matter of administration of justice and set up more courts for the trial of cases. We may point out that it would not be enough merely to establish more courts but the State Government would also have to man them by competent Judges and whatever is necessary for the purpose of recruiting competent Judges, such as improving their conditions of service, would have to be done by the State Government, if they want to improve the system of administration of justice and make it an effective instrument for reaching justice to the large masses of people for whom justice is today a meaningless and empty word."
52.Hussain v. Union of India [Hussain v. Union of India, (2017) 5 SCC 702 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 638] : (SCC pp. 717-18, paras 28-30) "28. Judicial service as well as legal service are not like any other services. They are missions for serving the society. The mission is not achieved if the litigant who is waiting in the queue does not get his turn for a long time.
The Chief Justices and Chief Ministers have resolved that all cases must be disposed of within five years which by any standard is quite a long time for a case to be decided in the first court. Decision of cases of undertrials in custody is one of the priority areas. There are obstructions at every level in enforcement of right of speedy trial--vested interests or unscrupulous elements try to delay the proceedings. Lack of 34 infrastructure is another handicap. In spite of all odds, determined efforts are required at every level for success of the mission. Ways and means have to be found out by constant thinking and monitoring. The Presiding Officer of a court cannot rest in a state of helplessness. This is the constitutional responsibility of the State to provide necessary infrastructure and of the High Courts to monitor the functioning of subordinate courts to ensure timely disposal of cases. The first step in this direction is preparation of an appropriate action plan at the level of the High Court and thereafter at the level of each and every individual judicial officer. Implementation of the action plan will require serious efforts and constant monitoring.
29. To sum up:
29.1. The High Courts may issue directions to subordinate courts that--
29.1.1. Bail applications be disposed of normally within one week;
29.1.2. Magisterial trials, where accused are in custody, be normally concluded within six months and sessions trials where accused are in custody be normally concluded within two years;
29.1.3. Efforts be made to dispose of all cases which are five years old by the end of the year;
29.1.4. As a supplement to Section 436-A, but consistent with the spirit thereof, if an undertrial has completed period of custody in excess of the sentence likely to be awarded if conviction is recorded such undertrial must be released on personal bond. Such an assessment must be made by the trial courts concerned from time to time;
29.1.5. The above timelines may be the touchstone for assessment of judicial performance in annual confidential reports.
29.2. The High Courts are requested to ensure that bail applications filed before them are decided as far as possible within one month and criminal appeals where accused are in custody for more than five years are concluded at the earliest;35
29.3. The High Courts may prepare, issue and monitor appropriate action plans for the subordinate courts;
29.4. The High Courts may monitor steps for speedy investigation and trials on administrative and judicial side from time to time;
29.5. The High Courts may take such stringent measures as may be found necessary in the light of judgment of this Court in Harish Uppal [Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45] .
30. Accordingly, we request the Chief Justices of all the High Courts to forthwith take appropriate steps consistent with the directions of this Court in Hussainara Khatoon (7) [Hussainara Khatoon (7) v. State of Bihar, (1995) 5 SCC 326 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 913] , Akhtari Bi [Akhtari Bi v. State of M.P., (2001) 4 SCC 355 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 714] , Noor Mohammed [Noor Mohammed v. Jethanand, (2013) 5 SCC 202 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 754] , Thana Singh [Thana Singh v. Central Bureau of Narcotics, (2013) 2 SCC 590 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 818] , Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee [Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 731 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 39] , SCC para 15, Imtiyaz Ahmad [Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of U.P., (2012) 2 SCC 688 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] , [Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of U.P., (2017) 3 SCC 658 : (2017) 3 SCC 665 : (2017) 2 SCC (Civ) 311 : (2017) 2 SCC (Civ) 318 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 228 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 235 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 724 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 731] , Harish Uppal [Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45] and Resolution of Chief Justices' Conference and observations hereinabove and to have appropriate monitoring mechanism in place on the administrative side as well as on the judicial side for speeding up disposal of cases of undertrials pending in subordinate courts and appeals pending in the High Courts."
(emphasis in original)
53.Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2005) 7 SCC 387 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1674] : (SCC pp. 390-92, paras 8-10) "8. It is no doubt true that this Court has repeatedly emphasised the fact that speedy trial is a fundamental right implicit in the broad sweep and 36 content of Article 21 of the Constitution. The aforesaid article confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not reasonable, fair, or just, such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. It has also been emphasised by this Court that the procedure so prescribed must ensure a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. It is conceded that some amount of deprivation of personal liberty cannot be avoided, but if the period of deprivation pending trial becomes unduly long, the fairness assured by Article 21 would receive a jolt. These are observations made in several decisions of this Court dealing with the subject of speedy trial. In this case, we are concerned with the case where a person has been found guilty of an offence punishable under Section 302IPC and who has been sentenced to imprisonment for life. The Code of Criminal Procedure affords a right of appeal to such a convict. The difficulty arises when the appeal preferred by such a convict cannot be disposed of within a reasonable time. In Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab [Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 291 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 559] this Court dealt with such a case. It is observed : (SCC pp. 292-93, para 2) '2. ... The practice not to release on bail a person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment was evolved in the High Courts and in this Court on the basis that once a person has been found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, he should not be let loose, so long as his conviction and sentence are not set aside, but the underlying postulate of this practice was that the appeal of such person would be disposed of within a measurable distance of time, so that if he is ultimately found to be innocent, he would not have to remain in jail for an unduly long period. The rationale of this practice can have no application where the court is not in a position to dispose of the appeal for five or six years. It would indeed be a travesty of justice to keep a person in jail for a period of five or six years for an offence which is ultimately found not to have been committed by him. Can the court ever compensate him for his incarceration which is found to be unjustified? Would it be just at all for the court to tell a 37 person:"We have admitted your appeal because we think you have a prima facie case, but unfortunately we have no time to hear your appeal for quite a few years and, therefore, until we hear your appeal, you must remain in jail, even though you may be innocent?" What confidence would such administration of justice inspire in the mind of the public? It may quite conceivably happen, and it has in fact happened in a few cases in this Court, that a person may serve out his full term of imprisonment before his appeal is taken up for hearing. Would a judge not be overwhelmed with a feeling of contrition while acquitting such a person after hearing the appeal? Would it not be an affront to his sense of justice? Of what avail would the acquittal be to such a person who has already served out his term of imprisonment or at any rate a major part of it? It is, therefore, absolutely essential that the practice which this Court has been following in the past must be reconsidered and so long as this Court is not in a position to hear the appeal of an accused within a reasonable period of time, the Court should ordinarily, unless there are cogent grounds for acting otherwise, release the accused on bail in cases where special leave has been granted to the accused to appeal against his conviction and sentence.'
9. Similar observations are found in some of the other decisions of this Court which have been brought to our notice. But, however, it is significant to note that all these decisions only lay down broad guidelines which the courts must bear in mind while dealing with an application for grant of bail to an appellant before the court. None of the decisions lay down any invariable rule for grant of bail on completion of a specified period of detention in custody. Indeed in a discretionary matter, like grant or refusal of bail, it would be impossible to lay down any invariable rule or evolve a straitjacket formula. The court must exercise its discretion having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances. What the relevant facts and circumstances are, which the court must keep in mind, has been laid down over the years by the courts in this country in a large number of decisions which are well known. It is, therefore, futile to attempt to lay down any invariable rule or formula in such matters.
10. The counsel for the parties submitted before us that though it has been so understood by the courts in 38 Punjab, the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Dharam Pal case [Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, 1999 SCC OnLine P&H 925 : (2000) 1 Chan LR 74] only lays down guidelines and not any invariable rule. Unfortunately, the decision has been misunderstood by the Court in view of the manner in which the principles have been couched in the aforesaid judgment. After considering the various decisions of this Court and the difficulties faced by the courts, the High Court in Dharam Pal case [Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, 1999 SCC OnLine P&H 925 : (2000) 1 Chan LR 74] observed : (SCC OnLine P&H para 18) '18. ... We, therefore, direct that life convicts, who have undergone at least five years of imprisonment of which at least three years should be after conviction, should be released on bail pending the hearing of their appeals should they make an application for this purpose. We are also of the opinion that the same principles ought to apply to those convicted by the courts martial and such prisoners should also be entitled to release after seeking a suspension of their sentences. We further direct that the period of five years would be reduced to four for females and minors, with at least two years imprisonment after conviction. We, however, clarify that these directions shall not be applicable in cases where the very grant of bail is forbidden by law."
(Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court, in GURWINDER SINGH's case, though cancels the bail so granted, observes about the guidelines for grant of bail.
It is held as follows:
".... .... ....
29. On a textual reading of Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act, the inquiry that a bail court must undertake while deciding bail applications under the UAP Act can be summarised in the form of a twin-prong test:
(1) Whether the test for rejection of the bail is satisfied?39
1.1. Examine if, prima facie, the alleged "accusations" make out an offence under Chapter IV or VI of the UAP Act;
1.2. Such examination should be limited to case diary and final report submitted under Section 173CrPC;
(2) Whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail in light of the general principles relating to grant of bail under Section 439CrPC ("tripod test")?
On a consideration of various factors such as nature of offence, length of punishment (if convicted), age, character, status of accused, etc. the court must ask itself:
2.1. Whether the accused is a flight risk?
2.2. Whether there is apprehension of the accused tampering with the evidence?
2.3. Whether there is apprehension of accused influencing witnesses?
30. The question of entering the "second test" of the inquiry will not arise if the "first test" is satisfied. And merely because the first test is satisfied, that does not mean however that the accused is automatically entitled to bail. The accused will have to show that he successfully passes the "tripod test".
Test for rejection of bail : Guidelines as laid down by Supreme Court inWatali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383]
31. In the previous section, based on a textual reading, we have discussed the broad inquiry which courts seized of bail applications under Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act read with Section 439CrPC must indulge in. Setting out the framework of the law seems rather easy, yet the application of it, presents its own complexities. For greater clarity in the application of the 40 test set out above, it would be helpful to seek guidance from binding precedents.
32. In this regard, we need to look no further than Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383] which has laid down elaborate guidelines on the approach that courts must partake in, in their application of the bail limitations under the UAP Act. On a perusal of paras 23 to 24 and 26 to 27, the following 8-point propositions emerge and they are summarised as follows:
32.1.Meaning of "prima facie true" : (Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1 :
(2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383] , SCC p. 24, para 23) On the face of it, the materials must show the complicity of the accused in commission of the offence.
The materials/evidence must be good and sufficient to establish a given fact or chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted by other evidence.
32.2.Degree of satisfaction at pre charge-sheet, post charge-sheet and post-charges -- compared : (Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1 :
(2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383] , SCC p. 28, para 26) "26. ... once charges are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion was founded upon the materials before the Court, which prompted the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to justify the framing of charge. In that situation, the accused may have to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the Court that despite the framing of charge, the materials presented along with the charge-sheet (report under Section 173CrPC), do not make out reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against him is prima facie true. Similar opinion is required to be formed by the Court whilst considering the prayer for bail, made after filing of the first report made under Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case."41
32.3.Reasoning, necessary but no detailed evaluation of evidence : (Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383] , SCC p. 27, para 24) "24. ... the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage--of giving reasons for grant or non-grant of bail-- is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage."
32.4.Record a finding on broad probabilities, not based on proof beyond doubt : (Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383] , SCC p. 27, para 24) "The Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise."
32.5.Duration of the limitation under Section 43- D(5) : (Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383] , SCC p. 27, para 26) "26. ... the special provision, Section 43-D of the 1967 Act, applies right from the stage of registration of FIR for the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the trial thereof."
32.6.Material on record must be analysed as a "whole"; no piecemeal analysis : (Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1 :
(2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383] , SCC p. 28, para 27) "27. ... the totality of the material gathered by the investigating agency and presented along with the report and including the case diary, is required to be reckoned and not by analysing individual pieces of evidence or circumstance."
32.7.Contents of documents to be presumed as true : (Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383] , SCC p. 28, para 27) 42 "27. ... The Court must look at the contents of the document and take such document into account as it is."
32.8.Admissibility of documents relied upon by prosecution cannot be questioned : (Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1 :
(2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383] , SCC pp. 24 & 28, paras 23 & 27) The materials/evidence collected by the investigation agency in support of the accusation against the accused in the first information report must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence.... In any case, the question of discarding the document at this stage, on the ground of being inadmissible in evidence, is not permissible.
33. It will also be apposite at this juncture to refer to the directions issued in Devendar Gupta v. NIA [Devendar Gupta v. NIA, 2014 SCC OnLine AP 192 : (2014) 2 ALD (Cri) 251] wherein a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh strove to strike a balance between the mandate under Section 43-D on one hand and the rights of the accused on the other. It was held as follows : (SCC OnLine AP) "The following instances or circumstances, in our view, would provide adequate guidance for the Court to form an opinion, as to whether the accusation in such cases is "prima facie true":
(1) Whether the accused is/are associated with any organisation, which is prohibited through an order passed under the provisions of the Act;
(2) Whether the accused was convicted of the offences involving such crimes, or terrorist activities, or though acquitted on technical grounds; was held to be associated with terrorist activities;
(3) Whether any explosive material, of the category used in the commission of the crime, which gave rise to the prosecution; was recovered from, or at the instance of the accused;
(4) Whether any eyewitness or a mechanical device, such as CC camera, had indicated the involvement, or 43 presence of the accused, at or around the scene of occurrence; and (5) Whether the accused was/were arrested, soon after the occurrence, on the basis of the information, or clues available with the enforcement or investigating agencies."
(emphasis supplied)"
(Emphasis supplied) On the facts of the case, the Apex Court rejects the application filed by the accused therein. The accused was charged with offences punishable under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. If the law laid down is fitted to the facts obtaining in the case on hand, it cannot but be said that the petitioners are to be enlarged on grant of bail.
10. It is further germane to notice the judgment rendered by the coordinate Bench of this Court in granting bail to accused No.8 in the case of SMT. BHAVANI REVANNA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA3. The observations made therein assume certain significance and they read as follows:
"(C) Section 364A of IPC which is brought on the statute book vide Act 42 of 1993 w.e.f. 22.05.1993 has the following text:3
Criminal Petition No.5125 of 2024 decided on 18th June 2024 44 "Section 364A kidnapping for ransom, etc. Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such kidnapping or abduction, and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt, or causes hurt or death to such person in order to compel the Government or any foreign State or international inter governmental organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom, shall be punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine."
The Apex Court in para 10 of STEPHEN supra has analysed the intent & content of this provision by observing as under:
"10. The first ingredient of Section 364A is that there should be a kidnapping or abduction of any person or a person should be kept in detention after such kidnapping or abduction. If the said act is coupled with a threat to cause death or hurt to such person, an offence under Section 364A is attracted. If the first act of kidnapping or abduction of a person or keeping him in detention after such kidnapping is coupled with such conduct of the person kidnapping which gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that the kidnapped or abducted person may be put to death or hurt, still Section 364A will be attracted. In the light of this legal position, now we refer to the evidence of the child-PW-2."
Further, what is observed at para 15 shows the practical application of this provision and therefore a relevant part thereof is reproduced below:
"15......The call records could have been the best possible evidence for the prosecution to prove the threats allegedly administered by the accused and the demand of ransom. Even taking the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 as correct, all that is proved is that they received a phone call from someone for demanding ransom and the person threatened to kill their son in case ransom is not paid. However, the prosecution is not able to connect the alleged demand and the threat with both the accused. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 364A of IPC were not proved by the prosecution inasmuch as the prosecution failed to lead 45 cogent evidence to establish the second part of Section 364A about the threats given by the accused to cause death or hurt to such person. In a given case, if the threats given to the parents or the close relatives of the kidnapped person by the accused are established, then a case can be made out that there was a reasonable apprehension that the person kidnapped may be put to death or hurt may be caused to him. However, in this case, the demand and threat by the accused have not been established by the prosecution."
(D) There is force in the submission of Mr.C.V.Nagesh that the provisions of Sec.364A of IPC do not appear to be invokable in the case at its present stage, although new facts that may arguably emerge during the progressive investigation may warrant its attraction. There is not even a whisper that the argued risk to abductee's life is at the instance of petitioner. Even otherwise, no assumption of the kind can be made against the petitioner who is not named by the complainant or by his mother in her sections 161 & 164 statements that are furnished in a sealed cover. Much discussion in this regard is avoided, lest the ongoing investigation should be affected. If the said provision is found to be prima facie not invokable, then the remaining offences alleged against the Accused, obviously do not attract the capital punishment, life imprisonment or imprisonment for ten years also. Companion Sec.365 is also a species of the offence of abduction/kidnapping and it prescribes a maximum punishment of only seven years. Therefore, it cannot be gainfully argued that in matter like this, no bail, anticipatory or regular can ever be granted, as a Thumb Rule. The off quoted slogan of Krishna Iyer in STATE OF RAJASTHAN vs. BALCHAND ALIAS BALIAY, AIR 1997 SC 2447 that 'Bail is rule and jail is an exception' has not yet been rendered "much ado signifying nothing". It still animates our Criminal Jurisprudence subject to all just exceptions, such as cases of terrorism, PMLA, treason, attack on Defence/Police Personnel, etc. Of course, there are exceptions to these exceptions, is also true. However, such a case has not been made out by respondent here. That being the position, the contention that the case 46 involves heinous offences that should abhor the request for bail, regular or anticipatory, does not merit acceptance.
(E) Learned Special Public Prosecutor contends that the Police need the petitioner for custodial interrogation and this version of Police has to be accepted at face value, no discretion availing to the court to examine its veracity. In support of this he presses into service the decision in - 11 CBI vs. VIKAS MISHRA, (2023) 6 SCC 49. Para 17 which was specifically read out by him is as under:
"17. No accused can be permitted to play with the investigation and/or the court's process. No accused can be permitted to frustrate the judicial process by his conduct. It cannot be disputed that the right of custodial interrogation/investigation is also a very important right in favour of the investigating agency to unearth the truth, which the accused has purposely and successfully tried to frustrate. Therefore, by not permitting CBI to have the police custody interrogation for the remainder period of seven days, it will be given a premium to an accused who has been successful in frustrating the judicial process."
A perusal of the above paragraph does not reveal the proposition passionately canvassed by him. A decision is an authority for the proposition that it lays down in a given fact matrix of a case and not for all that which logically follows from what has been so laid down, said Lord Halsbury more than a century ago in QUINN vs. LEATHEM, (1901) AC 495. Further, it is not the case of the State that the petitioner had frustrated the judicial process, which is a predominant factor in the said ruling.
(F) Mr.C.V.Nagesh is right in telling that the version of the Police as to the requirement of custodial investigation is liable to be examined by the court, personal liberty of individual being constitutionally sacrosanct. This view gains support from a latest decision in ASHOK KUMAR vs. STATE OF UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 274, wherein at para 12 the Apex Court has observed as under:
"12. There is no gainsaying that custodial interrogation is one of the effective modes of investigating 47 into the alleged crime. It is equally true that just because custodial interrogation is not required that by itself may also not be a ground to release an accused on anticipatory bail if the offences are of a serious nature. However, a mere assertion on the part of the State while opposing the plea for anticipatory bail that custodial interrogation is required would not be sufficient. The State would have to show or indicate more than prima facie why the custodial interrogation of the accused is required for the purpose of investigation."
If the proposition canvassed by the learned Special Public Prosecutor that the courts under no circumstance can examine the tenability of the police claim for custodial interrogation is accepted, that would strike the death knell of sacrosanct guarantees of freedom & liberty gloriously - enacted in the Constitution, they have been progressively construed by the courts. In our evolved system, the freedom has been broadened from precedent to precedent. Makers of Constitution have founded a Welfare State for us in the light of lessons drawn from the experience during the Colonial Regime. Our Constitution does not enact Idi Amin Jurisprudence, nor does our Criminal Justice System. Despite vociferous submissions, why the police want custodial interrogation has not been even nearly substantiated and therefore, it cannot be granted, law having heavily loaded against such a claim.
(G) Learned Special Public Prosecutor on his own having produced the police papers in sealed covers submitted that the abductee was manhandled; that she was made to spend days without food; further that all through she remained in the same clothes, is not supported by the evidentiary material, on record and nor from the perusal of the sealed cover material. In the Statement of Objections at para 34 it is written as under:
"
"34. It is submitted that during the victim's confinement, the Petitioner was in touch with Accused No.7 through her driver's phone. The Accused No.7 enquired about the supply of clothing to the victim, and the Petitioner made the arrangements 48 for the clothes through her driver and Accused No.6 - Keerthi."
The victim herself in her Sec.164(5) Statement that was recorded on 08.05.2024 has specifically stated that she was given food. However, from this paradoxical version, one cannot hastily jump to a view that the victim was in the custody/confinement of the petitioner/accused, matter being in bail jurisdiction. She has not uttered anything about the so called manhandling during confinement. Even in her Sec.161 Statement recorded on 18.05.2024 there is nothing of the kind. The fact remains that the abductee is back home.
(H) The next contention of learned Special Public Prosecutor that the Petitioner despite intimation refused to come for investigation and therefore she should not be granted advance bail, appears to be too far fetched. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that there was every reason to believe that she would be arrested at once, if she appeared before police. This version is plausible since it is the specific and emphatic case of Police that they require her for custodial interrogation and court cannot say 'no' to it. When the police sends notice in terms of Sec.41A of Cr.P.C., the citizen should comply with the same, hardly needs to be stated, compulsive elements of law being what they are. However, matter will not be as simple as it purports to be. This court takes judicial notice of cases wherein police had effected arrest & detention despite noticee in due compliance appearing before them for interrogation/investigation. Unless such notices assure citizens of 'no arrest/detention', one cannot falter their knocking at the doors of court for redressal of their grievance. Citizens have a feel of distrust in the governmental functionaries in general and police personnel in particular. A section of the society sees the State as the first opponent, if not as the enemy. It was Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936) who poetically said "Believe all, but none too much" applies qua Police too.
(I) The contention that the petitioner despite grant of interim anticipatory bail which stipulates condition of 49 co-operation, has not co-operated in investigation, is difficult to agree with. The interim order dated 07.06.2024 directed the petitioner to go before the Investigating Officer on the same day, and admittedly she did it. On that day she was asked 21 questions and she answered all of them. Similarly, as instructed, again she appeared before them on 08.06.2024. She was given a bank of 34 questions and she has not left even one of them unanswered. Once again, as instructed, she appeared before the police on 12.06.2024 and answered all the 25 questions. In all, thus she answered 80 questions. The police cannot insist that an accused should give answers in the way as the police desire. After all in our evolved Criminal Jurisprudence, an accused is presumed to be innocent and that she has a constitutional guarantee against compulsive self incrimination vide Article 20(3) as widely interpreted by the Apex Court in NANDINI SATPATHY vs. P.L.DANI, AIR 1978 SC 1025. Even now the petitioner is ready & willing to further participate in the ongoing investigation whenever & wherever the police want her. The number of appearance and duration of interrogation are not to be taken as restricted by this court since investigation pertains to the domain of Investigating Agency and the Agency controls it.
(J) The submission of learned Special Public Prosecutor that petitioner has not prevented her son from sexually abusing several women & from fleeing the country and therefore, she should not be granted bail, again is too farfetched, to say the least. Control of the patriarch of the family that obtained in Roman Law does not appear as a justiciable norm in our set up. Petitioner's son is facing criminal cases and after his return from abroad, he has been taken into custody by the police for investigation, is not in dispute. But, what duty a mother owes in law to prevent her major children from committing offences, has not been shown by turning the pages of statute book or by citing rulings. History & epics bear testimony to the fact that children of noble parents may commit delinquencies. Vice versa may also be true. Nothing is placed on record to show that in the cases of sexual abuse of women registered against her 50 son, petitioner happened to be an abettor. The said abuses allegedly happened in the property belonging to the petitioner, can only be a poor factor. The facts of those cases cannot be much read into the case registered against the petitioner while deciding her advance bail petition.
(K) The next contention of the learned Special Public Prosecutor that the petitioner hails from political background cannot be disputed. Her father-in-law is a former Prime Minister of this country; her husband was a Cabinet Minister in the State Government and now is a sitting MLA; her husband's brother is a Cabinet Minister in the Union Government. Her son is an Ex.MP. Also, there are some other relatives holding significant political positions. However, all that cannot be a sole consideration for denying bail in a matter like this, especially when petitioner is a married woman having a settled family and roots in the society. There are umpteen decisions of Apex Court and of this Court wherein, bail/anticipatory bail has been accorded to women accused of even heinous offences punishable with death or life imprisonment. They hardly need to be enlisted. Therefore, there is no Thumb Rule that arguably in serious matters like this, invocation of bail jurisdiction should never be permitted."
(Emphasis supplied) In the light of the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court and that of the coordinate Bench of this Court, these petitioners are also entitled to be enlarged on bail, albeit, with stringent conditions.
11. Much emphasis is laid upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of WILLIAM STEPHEN v. STATE OF TAMIL 51 NADU - (2024) 5 SCC 258 wherein the Apex Court was considering interpretation of Section 364A of the IPC, while it would be a matter of trial for the petitioners to come out clean once cognizance is taken by the concerned Court for the relevant offences. Today, this Court is answering enlargement on bail and parameters of examination are entirely different for consideration of trial and enlargement on bail. In view of the preceding analysis, I deem it appropriate to grant these petitioners - Accused 2 to 7 the relief that they seek i.e., their enlargement on bail with certain stringent conditions.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) The Criminal Petitions are allowed.
(ii) The petitioners-accused No.2 to 7 shall be enlarged on bail in connection with Crime No.149/2024 registered before K.R.Nagar Police Station, subject to the following conditions:
(a) Each of the petitioners, in the respective petitions, shall execute a personal bond for a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs 52 only) with two solvent sureties for the like-sum to the satisfaction of the jurisdictional court.
(b) The petitioners shall not threaten or allure the prosecution witnesses in whatsoever manner.
(c) The petitioners shall appear before the jurisdictional Court on all future hearing dates, unless exempted by the concerned Court.
(d) The petitioners shall not get involved in similar offences.
(e) The petitioners shall not leave the territorial limits of the trial Court without prior permission of the trial Court.
(f) The prosecution is at liberty to seek
cancellation of bail, in the event of any
violation, of the aforesaid conditions.
Sd/-
(M. NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
bkp/CT:MJ