Karnataka High Court
Sri H P Ramesh vs State Of Karnataka on 25 November, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 24.09.2025
Pronounced on : 25.11.2025 R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.3982 OF 2023 (LA - RES)
BETWEEN:
1 . SRI H.P.RAMESH
S/O LATE PANCHAKSHARAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS.
2 . SUSHMITHA H.R.,
D/O H.P.RAMESH,
AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS.
BOTH ARE RESIDING AT
HARADAGERE VILLAGE,
NITTUR HOBLI, GUBBI TALUK,
TUMAKURU DISTRICT - 572 210.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI KISHAN K.S., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRINCIPLE SECRETARY,
2
REVENUE DEPARTMENT,
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2 . THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
TUMAKURU DISTRICT,
TUMAKURU.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.RASHMI RAO, HCGP)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASHING THE ORDER
PASSED BY THE R-2 IN CASE NO. LND (GUBBI) 01/2019-20 DATED
08/11/2021 (ANNEXURE-B) DENYING THE COMPENSATION TO THE
PETITIONERS FOR THEIR ILLEGALLY USED LANDS IN SY.NO. 51 OF
HARADAGERE VILLAGE; DIRECTING THE R-2 TO FORMALLY
ACQUIRE THE LAND MEASURING 09 GUNTAS (03 GUNTAS
ILLEGALLY USED FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCHOOL BUILDING
AND 06 GUNTAS OF LAND ILLEGALLY USED FOR FORMATION OF
ROAD) IN SY.NO.51 OF HARADAGERE VILLAGE AND AWARD
COMPENSATION FOR THE SAME IN TERMS OF THE PROVISIONS OF
THE RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND
ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT, 2013.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 24.09.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
3
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioners are before this Court calling in question an
order dated 08.11.2021, passed by respondent No.2 denying
payment of compensation for the usage of their lands in Survey
No.51 of Haradagere Village and seeks a consequential mandamus
to the respondents, to pay compensation for the land utilised, under
the provisions of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
2. Heard Sri Kishan G.S., learned counsel for the petitioners
and Smt. Rashmi Rao, learned High Court Government Pleader for
the respondents.
3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows:
The father of the first petitioner owned certain land
measuring 2 acres and 8 guntas in survey No.51 of Haradagere
Village. The first petitioner gifts the property in favour of the
second petitioner - daughter through a registered gift deed on
04.12.2017. It transpires that the first petitioner noticing the fact
that the government has utilised the land belonging to them for the
4
purpose of establishment of a school wayback in the year 1957,
submits several representations seeking compensation for having
constructed a government school and formation of the road in the
property. The representations were not considered and therefore,
the first petitioner had approached this Court in
W.P.No.12385/2016. A co-ordinate bench disposed the said writ
petition with a direction to consider the representations and pass
necessary orders. The result of the said direction is the impugned
order. The impugned order is passed after the first petitioner
invoked the Courts contempt jurisdiction in C.C.C.No.320/2022. It
is this order that drives the petitioners to this Court in the subject
petition.
4. Sri Kishan G.S., learned counsel for the petitioners submits
that the land of the petitioners admittedly is being utilised by
constructing a government school and formation of a road. If the
fact is admitted, it cannot be said that the petitioners would not be
entitled to any compensation.
5. Per contra, the learned High Court Government Pleader
would refute the submissions, contending that the land of the
5
petitioners was no doubt utilised but it was voluntarily handed over
by the father of the first petitioner long ago in the year 1957. It is
his submission that the first petitioner has kept quiet for ages and
he could not seek compensation after 65 years of the alleged usage
of land at the hands of the State. He would seek dismissal of the
petition.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and have
perused the material on record.
7. The afore-narrated facts, link in the chain of dates and
events are all a matter of record. The father of the first petitioner
submits plethora of representations before the second respondent
seeking compensation on the score that his land is utilised for
construction of a school building and formation of the road, which is
not in dispute. Non-consideration of the aforesaid representations,
lead the first petitioner to knock at the doors of this Court in
W.P.No.12385/2016. The said writ petition comes to be disposed
on 19.09.2019. The order reads as follows:
6
".... .... ....
5. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties,
I find from the materials on record that the petitioner
claims to be the absolute owner of the property bearing
Sy.No.51 measuring 2 acres 8 guntas. He is tracing the
title to certain documents. While it is important that
formation or widening of road has to be attended to on
priority, as it is a matter of public interest, it cannot be
forgotten that rights of the citizens cannot be jeopardized
in the said process. On the other hand, the claims of the
petitioner who assert his rights as owner of the land,
cannot be denied by taking decisions unilaterally by the
respondent - authorities. Under these circumstances, it is
necessary that the authority has to hear the petitioner
personally and pass an order as to whether the property on
which the road has been formed and the school building has
been constructed belongs to the petitioner or not. In this case,
the petitioner has produced some revenue records to show that
he is the owner of the property. His possession shall not be
disturbed except by due process of law and by acquiring the
properties by specifying the extent of land that would be
required for road widening or construction of the school
building. If the authority found that the road formation and the
school constructed the property does not belong to the
petitioner the petitioner is not entitled for any compensation.
6. In the light of the above, the writ petition is
disposed of with the following directions:
(i) Petitioner shall file statement of
objections along with the necessary
documents before the Deputy Commissioner,
Tumkur District, within a period of four weeks
from the date of receipt of a copy of this
order;
(ii) The Deputy Commissioner shall
consider the objections and hear the
petitioner by providing personal hearing and
thereafter pass a considered order;
7
(iii) After the enquiry, if the Deputy
Commissioner finds that the property in
dispute is a Government property, then the
petitioner is not entitled for any
compensation. If the property belongs to the
petitioner and he has not encroached the
land, the authorities have to proceed in
accordance with law to acquire the land by
specifying the extent of area required for the
formation of the road and construction of the
school building and by paying compensation
to the petitioner as per law."
(Emphasis supplied)
The result of the said direction is the passage of the
impugned order. The order dated 08.11.2021, insofar as it is
germane, reads as follows:
".... .... ....
5 ೇ ಎದುರು ಾರ ಾದ ೇತ ಾ ಾ ಗಳ , ಗು ಾಲೂಕು ಇವರು ಾ!ೆಯು 1957 ೇ
ಇಸ)ಯ* ಆರಂಭ.ೊಂ/ದು0, ಅ23 ಾರರ ತಂ ೆಯವರು ಸ4ಇ5ೆ67ಂದ ಾ!ೆಯ ಕಟ9ಡಗಳನು<
=>3ಸಲು ಅನುಮ@ =ೕ/ರು ಾA ೆ.ೆ ಸದ Bಾಗದ* ಾ!ೆ Cಾ ರಂಭDಂದ ಇ*ಯವ ೆ)ಗೂ
ನEೆಯು ಾA ಬಂDರುತA ೆ.ೆ ಆದ ೆ ಾ!ೆಯ
ಾ!ೆಯ Gೆಸ .ೆ ಜ>ೕನು ೊಂದIJಾKರುವLDಲ.
ೊಂದIJಾKರುವLDಲ ಈ ಹರದ.ೆ ೆ
ಸ.ನಂ
ನಂ.51/1
ನಂ ರ* 0-03 ಗುಂOೆ Bಾಗದ* ಾ!ೆಯು 1957 ಂದ ಪ ಸುAತ ವಷ3ದವ ೆ)ಗೂ
ನEೆಯು@AರುತA ೆ.ೆ ಆದ0 ಂದ ಇನು< ಮುಂ ೆಯೂ ೈ Iಕ ಅನುಕೂಲ ಾSK ಸದ Bಾಗವನು< ಾ!ೆಯ
ಉ ೆ0ೕಶ ೆS =ೕಡಲು ೋ ರು ಾA ೆ.ೆ
6 ೇ ಎದುರು ಾರ ಾದ ತಹ ೕ!ಾ0V, ಗು ಾಲೂಕು ಇವರು ಗು ಾಲೂಕು, =ಟೂ9ರು
GೋಬW, ಹರದ.ೆ ೆ .ಾ ಮದ ಸ.ನಂ.51/1 ರ ಜ>ೕ=ನ ಮೂಲಕ XಡುವW ಜ>ೕ=ನ* Gಾ*
ಪಹIಯಂ ೆ ಸು Yತ GೆZ.ಆV. [ GೆZ.\.ರ]ೕ^ ತಮYಪ_ ಉರು` ಪವನಕುaಾVರವರ ಪ@<
ಇವರ Gೆಸ .ೆ ಎಂಆV.18/2017-18 ರಂ ೆ 1-38 ಎಕ ೆ/ಗುಂOೆ ಜ>ೕನು ಾಖ!ಾKರುವLದು ಕಂಡು
ಬಂDರುತA ೆ. ಸ.ನಂ.51/1 ರ ಜ>ೕ=ನ* ನ ಾ ೆ ಕಂಡ ಾ ಇರುವLDಲ. ಾಲೂಕು ಸcೆ3ಯV ರವರು
ತJಾ dರುವ ನ ೆಯ* ೋ dರುವಂ ೆ .ೊಲರಹe9 ಮತುA ಹರದ.ೆ ೆ fೋ) ಾ!ೋ=.ೆ ಓEಾಡುವ
8
ಾಲು ಾ ಇದು0, Eಾಂಬ ೕಕರಣ ರiೆA =aಾ3ಣ aಾ/ರುವLDಲ Gಾಗೂ ಸ ಾ3 X ಯ Cಾ ಥ>ಕ
Cಾಠ ಾ!ೆ ಕಟ9ಡ)ರುತA ೆ ಎಂದು ವರD ಸ*dರು ಾA ೆ. ಾಲೂಕು ಸವ3ಯVರವರು ನ ೆಯ*
ಗುರು@dರುವಂ ೆ ಸ.ನಂ.51/1 ರ* ಹdರು ಬಣlDಂದ ಗುರು@dರುವ 0-04 ಗುಂOೆ ಪ ೇಶವL ರiೆA ಎಂದು
Gಾಗೂ ೆಂಪL ಬಣlDಂದ ಗುರು@dರುವ ಪ ೇಶ 0-02 ಗುಂOೆ ಜ>ೕನು Cಾಠ ಾ!ೆ ಕಟ9ಡ ಇರುವ
ಪ ೇಶcಾKರುತA ೆ ಎಂದು ವರDdರು ಾA ೆ.
ಅ23 ಾರರು ಸ*dರುವ ಅ23ಯ* \ ಾ 23ತcಾK 2-00 ಎಕ ೆ )dAೕಣ3ದ ಜ>ೕನು ನನ<
mಾಗ ೆS ಬಂDರುತA ೆ. ಸದ ಜ>ೕನನು< ಅಳ ೆ aಾ/ ಾಗ ನನ.ೆ iೇ ದ ಜ>ೕ=ನ* 0-03 ಗುಂOೆ
)dAೕಣ3ದ* ಹರದ.ೆ ೆ Cಾ ಥ>ಕ ಾ!ಾ ಕಟ9ಡ)ರುವLದು ಕಂಡುಬಂDರುತA ೆ Gಾಗೂ ನನ<
ಜ>ೕ=ನ!ೇ 0-06 ಗುಂOೆ )dAೕಣ3ದ* ಹರದ.ೆ ೆ7ಂದ mೋ) ಾ!ೋ=.ೆ Gೋಗುವ ರiೆA
ಅnವೃDpಪ/dರು ಾA ೆ. ರiೆA ಮತುA ಾ!ೆ =>3ಸಲು ನನ< ಜ>ೕನನು< ಭೂiಾ4 ೕನ
ಪ/d ೊಂ/ರುವLDಲ.
ೊಂ/ರುವLDಲ ಭೂiಾ4 ೕನ ಪ/d ೊಳq ೇ ನನ.ೆ iೇ ದ rಾಸK Bಾಗದ* ಾ!ೆ ಮತುA ರiೆA
ಅnವೃDp ಪ/dರುವLದು ಾನೂನು fಾXರcಾKರುತA ೆ.ೆ ಾ!ೆ ಮತುA ರiೆA ಅnವೃDp ಪ/dರುವLದ ೆS ನನ<
Gಾಗೂ ನನ< ಕುಟುಂಬದವರ ಒ\_.ೆ ಇರುವLDಲ.
ಇರುವLDಲ ನನ.ೆ 2-00 ಎಕ ೆ ಜ>ೕನು ಟ9 ೆ fೇ ೆ ಜ>ೕನು
ಇರುವLDಲ,
ಇರುವLDಲ ಆದ0 ಂದ ಾ!ೆ ಮತುA ರiೆA ಅnವೃDp ಪ/dರುವ ಒಟು9 0-09 ಗುಂOೆ ಜ>ೕನನು<
ಭೂiಾ4 ೕನಪ/d ೊಂಡು ಸೂಕA ಪ Gಾರ =ೕಡfೇ ೆಂದು ೋ ಎದುರು ಾರರ ಕtೇ ಗW.ೆ ಮನ)
ಸ*dರು ಾA ೆ.ೆ
ಅ23 ಾರರು ಸ*dರುವ ಾಖ!ೆ, ಉಭಯತ ರ cಾದ Gಾಗೂ ಲಭu ಾಖ!ಾ@ಗಳನು<
ಪ ೕ*ಸ!ಾKರುತA ೆ.
1967-68 ೇ iಾ*ನ ಪಹIಯ* )cಾDತ ಸ.ನಂ
ನಂ.51/1
ನಂ ರ* ನಂಜಪ_ [ vಂದKರಯu
ಇವರ Gೆಸ .ೆ 4-33 ಎಕ ೆ/ಗುಂOೆ
ೆ ಗುಂOೆ ಇದು0, ನಂತರ ಎಂ.ಆV
ಎಂ ಆV.19/89-90
ಆV ರ* ಪಂ5ಾ ರಯu [ ನಂಜಪ_
ಇವ .ೆ 2-18 ಎಕ ೆ/ಗುಂOೆ
ೆ ಗುಂOೆ )mಾಗದಂ ೆ rಾ ೆJಾKರುತA ೆ,ೆ ಉW ೆ ಮೂಲ rಾ ೆ ಾರ ನಂಜಪ_
ಇವ ದ0 ಜ>ೕನು 2-15 ಎಕ ೆ/ಗುಂOೆ
ೆ ಗುಂOೆ dದ0ಗಂಗಮY ೋಂ ಉaಾಮGೇಶ4ರಯu ಇವ .ೆ )mಾಗದಂ ೆ
ಎಂ.ಆV
ಎಂ ಆV.10/1997-98
ಆV ರಂ ೆ rಾ ೆJಾKರುವLದು ಕಂಡುಬಂDರುತA ೆ.ೆ
ಎಂ.ಆV.20/2004-05 ರಂ ೆ ಪಂ5ಾ ರಯu ಇವರ Gೆಸ Kದ0 rಾ ೆಯು )mಾಗದ ಮೂಲಕ
GೆZ.\.ರ]ೕ^ [ ಪಂ5ಾ ರಯu ಇವ .ೆ rಾ ೆ ಪಹI ಬದ!ಾವ ೆ.ೊಂ/ರುತA ೆ. Gಾ* 2020-
21 ೇ iಾ*ನ ಪಹIಯಂ ೆ ಸು Y ಾ GೆZ.ಆV. [ ಎಂ.\.ರ]ೕ^ @ಮYಪ_ ಉರು`
ಪವನಕುaಾVರವರ ಪ@< ಎಂ.ಆV.GೆZ-8/2017-18 ಾನ ಎಂದು ಆV.e.d.ಯ*
ನಮೂ ಾKರುತA ೆ. ಅ23 ಾರ ಾದ GೆZ.\
GೆZ \.ರ]ೕ^
ರ]ೕ^ರವರು
ರ]ೕ^ರವರು )cಾDತ ಜ>ೕ=ನ* ತಮY ಹಕSನು<
ತಮY ಮಗW.ೆ ಾನಪತ ದ ಮೂಲಕ =ೕ/ರುವLದು ಕಂಡುಬಂDರುತA ೆ.ೆ
9
ಮುಖu ಕರು, ಸ ಾ3 X ಯ Cಾ ಥ>ಕ Cಾಠ ಾ!ೆ, ಹರದ.ೆ ೆ, ಗು ಾಲೂಕು ಇವರು
ಸ ಾ3 X ಯ Cಾ ಥ>ಕ ಾ!ೆ.ೆ ಸಂಬಂ dದಂ ೆ 1957-58 ೇ iಾ*ನ ಾಖ!ಾ@ ಪLಸAಕವನು<
(Admission Register) Gಾಗೂ 1969-70 ೇ iಾ*ನ* 2 ಕಟ9ಡಗಳ Gಾಗೂ 4 ೋ ೆಗಳನು< ಸ ಾ3ರ
ಮತುA .ಾ ಮಸw ಂದ =>3dರುವ ಬ.ೆx Gಾಗೂ ಾ!ೆಯ ಆಟದ ]ೖ ಾನ ಒಳ.ೊಂ/ರುವLದು
ಾಖ!ಾ@ಯನು< ಸ*dರು ಾA ೆ. ಇದ ಂದ ಪ iಾA)ತ ಾ!ೆಯು ಸುaಾರು 60 ವಷ3ಗಳ XಂD=ಂದ
Cಾ ರಂಭcಾK ಈ ತಹyವ
ತಹyವ ೆಗೂ ನEೆಯು@AರುವLದು ಕಂಡುಬಂDದು0, ಈ ಬ.ೆx XಂDನ rಾ ೆ ಾರ ಾಗ*
ಅವರ ವಂಶಸw ಾಗ*ೕ JಾವL ೇ ಆ ೇಪ ೆ ಸ*dರುವLDಲ.
ಸ*dರುವLDಲ ಅಂದ ೆ ಅ23 ಾರರ ಪz)3ಕರ
ಪz)3ಕರ
ಾಲDಂದಲೂ ಈ ಾ!ೆಯ ಕಟ9ಡ ಇರುವLದು ಕಂಡು ಬಂDರುತA ೆ.ೆ
ಸದ ಅ23 ಾರರ ಪzವ3ಜರು Gಾಗೂ ವಂಶಸwರು ಾ!ೆಯನು< =aಾ3ಣ aಾ/ರುವLದ ೆS
Gಾಗೂ ರiೆA =aಾ3ಣ aಾ/ರುವLದ ೆS JಾವL ೇ ಆ ೇಪ ೆಯನು< ಸ*ಸ ೇ ಇರುವLದ ಂದ ಾಖ!ೆಗಳ
ಪ ೕಲ ೆ7ಂದ ಸದ ಾ!ೆಯ ಕಟ9ಡವL ಸುaಾರು 60-70 ವಷ3ಗಳ Xಂ ೆ{ೕ =aಾ3ಣ.ೊಂ/ದು0,
XಂDನ rಾ ೆ ಾರರ Gಾಗೂ ಅವರ ಕುಟುಂಬದ ವಂಶಸw ಾಗ*ೕ XಂD=ಂದಲೂ ಈ ತಹyವ
ತಹyವ ೆ)ಗೂ
ಪ iಾA)ತ ಪ ೇಶದ* ಅನುಭವ ಅಥcಾ ಅnವೃDp ಪ/dರುವLದು ಕಂಡುಬಂDರುವLDಲ.
ಕಂಡುಬಂDರುವLDಲ ಸದ
ಪ iಾA)ತ ಪ ೇಶವL ಅಂದ ೆ 0-03 ಗುಂOೆ ಪ ೇಶದ* ಾ!ಾ ಕಟ9ಡ ಇರುವLದು ಇದು ಈ Xಂ ೆ{ೕ
=aಾ3ಣ aಾ/ರುವLದು ಅ23 ಾರರು ಇ@Aೕ5ೆ.ೆ ಅಳ ೆ ಅಮಯದ* ಸದ Bಾಗದ* ಕಟ9ಡ)ರುವLದು
ಕಂಡುಬಂDರುತA ೆಂದು @Wdರು ಾA ೆ. ಈ Bಾಗ ೆS ಭೂಪ Gಾರ ೋ ಅ23 ಾರರ ಪz)3ಕರು
ಭೂಪ Gಾರ ೋ ಅ23 ಸ*dಲ Gಾಗೂ ಕಟ9ಡ =aಾ3ಣcಾಗುವ ಸಂದಭ3ದ* JಾವL ೇ ಆ ೇಪ ೆ
ಸಹ ಸ*dರುವLದು
ಸ*dರುವLದು ಕಂಡುಬಂDರುವLDಲ.
ಕಂಡುಬಂDರುವLDಲ aಾನu ಉಚ~ ಾuJಾಲಯದ ಆ ೇಶವನು< ಸಹ
ಪ ೕ*dದು0, ಪ iಾA)ತ ಸ ಾ3 ಾ!ೆ ನEೆಸು@Aರುವ ಕಟ9ಡ 0-03 ಗುಂOೆ Gಾಗೂ ಈ XಂD=ಂದಲೂ
ಇರುವ ರೂ• ರiೆAಯನು< iಾವ3ಜ=ಕರು ಬಹಳ XಂD=ಂದಲೂ ಉಪ€ೕKಸು@AರುವLದ ಂದ ಈ
ಜ>ೕನನು< ಭೂiಾ4 ೕನ ಪ/d ೊಳ qವ ಅವಶuಕ ೆ ಕಂಡುಬಂDರುವLDಲ.
ಸುaಾರು 60-
60-70 ವಷ3ಗWಂದ ಇರುವ ಾ!ಾ ಕಟ9ಡ Bಾಗ Gಾಗೂ iಾವ3ಜ=ಕರ
ರೂ• ಈ ರiೆAಯನು< ಭೂiಾ4 ೕನಪ/d ೊಂಡು ಪ Gಾರ =ೕಡಲು ಅ23 ಾದರು
ೇಳ @AರುವLದ ಂದ ಈ ಸಂಬಂಧ ಸ ಮ Cಾ ಾರ/ ಾuJಾಲಯದ* ತಮY ಹಕSನು<
iಾw\d ೊಳqಲು ಅ23 ಾರ .ೆ ಮುಕA ಅವ ಾಶ)ರುತA ೆ ಎಂದು @Wd ೆಳKನಂ ೆ ಆ ೇ d ೆ.
ಆ ೇಶ
ಅ23 ಾರರು ಪ iಾA)ತ ಗು ಾಲೂಕು, =ಟೂ9ರು GೋಬW, ಹರದ.ೆ ೆ .ಾ ಮದ
ಸ.ನಂ.51/1 ರ* ಾ!ಾ ಕಟ9ಡದ Bಾಗ Gಾಗೂ iಾವ3ಜ=ಕ ರೂ• ರiೆA.ೆ
ಉಪ€ೕKಸು@Aರುವ BಾಗವL ಈ.ಾಗ!ೇ ಸುaಾರು 60 ವಷ3ಗWKಂತ Xಂ ೆ{ೕ ಾ!ೆಯ
ಕಟ9ಡ ಮತುA ರiೆA =aಾ3ಣcಾKರುವLದ ಂದ ಈಗ ಅ23 ಾರರು ಪ Gಾರ ೇಳ @Aರುವ
10
ಅ23ಯನು< @ರಸS d ೆ. ಅ23 ಾರರು ಸ ಮ Cಾ ಾರ/ ಾuJಾಲಯದ* ತಮY ಹಕSನು<
iಾw\d ೊಳqಲು @Wd ೆ."
(Emphasis added)
The afore-quoted order has again driven the petitioners to
this Court in the subject petition.
8. A co-ordinate bench of this Court owing to the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the petitioners on 25.07.2023, has
passed the following order:
"Learned AGA accepts notice for respondents.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
enquiry was held and report of which is enclosed at Annexure-B
pursuant to the direction made in W.P.No.12385/2016 and
specifically at paragraph No.6(iii) of the order.
Paragraph No.6(iii) of the order passed in W.P.No.12385/2016
reads as follows:
"After the enquiry, if the Deputy Commissioner finds
that the property in dispute is a Government property,
then the petitioner is not entitled for any
compensation. If the property belongs to the petitioner
and he has not encroached the land, the authorities
have to proceed in accordance with law to acquire the
land by specifying the extent of area required for the
formation of the road and construction of the school
building and by paying compensation to the petitioner
as per law."
It is submitted that despite enquiry, the authority has
declined payment of compensation on the ground that the relief
sought for is after 60 years and is belated.
11
Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of SUKH DUTT
RATRA AND ANOTHER VS. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
AND OTHERS - (2022) 7 SCC 508 to assert that the
question of limitation ought not to be raised as a defence
once the private property utilised for public purpose is
established.
Learned AGA submits that he would obtain
necessary instructions and if there is no dispute as
regards the title, necessary stand would be taken.
List this matter in the week commencing from
07.08.2023."
(Emphasis supplied)
On 14.08.2023, another co-ordinate bench passed the
following order:
"Though learned Counsel for the petitioners seeks to
place reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Sukh Dutt Ratra and Another Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh And
Others (2022) 7 SCC 508, this Court finds that there is some
distinction that could be drawn on the facts of the case. Here is
a case where a portion of the land then belonging to the
petitioner's grandfather was utilized for construction of a school
building and the school was established wayback in the year
1957-58. Only about 2 guntas of land has been utilized for
construction of a school building. Such facts do not appear to be
forcible utilization of a private property. It can be a case where
the then land owner had magnanimously given up a portion of
the land for construction of a school building. The petitioner,
grandson of such a person is now before this Court seeking
compensation for utilization of the land for construction of a
school building. On facts, it is also found that about 4 guntas of
land in the same Survey number has been utilised for formation
of a road. However, it is not clear from the findings recorded by
the Deputy Commissioner at Annexure 'B' as to when the road
was formed.
12
Therefore, the respondent-Deputy Commissioner,
Tumkur District, is once again called upon to verify from
the records and state clearly as to when the road in
question was formed. The Deputy Commissioner shall
state as to when the kutcha road was formed and
thereafter when it was metalled. The Deputy
Commissioner shall also state as to whether the school is
still functioning in the same place including the 2 guntas
of land which were earlier utilized for construction of the
school building or whether the school has been shifted.
Relist this matter on 28.08.2023."
(Emphasis supplied)
On 15.07.2025, the following order is passed:
"Heard the learned counsel for petitioners.
The petitioners are before this Court seeking
compensation for utilization of their 7 guntas of land by the
State about 60 years ago. They had approached this Court in
W.P.No.12385/2016. A coordinate bench of this Court in terms
of the order dated 19.09.2019, disposed the said petition by the
following directions:
"6. In the light of the above, the writ petition is
disposed of with the following directions:
(i) Petitioner shall file statement of
objections along with the necessary documents
before the Deputy Commissioner, Tumkur
District, within a period of four weeks from the
date of receipt of a copy of this order;
(ii) The Deputy Commissioner shall
consider the objections and hear the petitioner
by providing personal hearing and thereafter
pass a considered order;
13
(iii) After the enquiry, if the Deputy
Commissioner finds that the property in dispute
is a Government property, then the petitioner is
not entitled for any compensation. If the
property belongs to the petitioner and he has
not encroached the land, the authorities have
to proceed in accordance with law to acquire
the land by specifying the extent of area
required for the formation of the road and
construction of the school building and by
paying compensation to the petitioner as per
law."
Pursuant to the order, the Deputy Commissioner holds an
enquiry. The result of the enquiry is an order that is passed,
which reads thus:
"ಸದ ಅ23 ಾರರ ಪzವ3ಜರು Gಾಗೂ ವಂಶಸwರು ಾ!ೆಯನು< ¤ªÀiÁðt aಾ/ರುವLದ ೆS Gಾಗೂ
ರiೆA =aಾ3ಣ aಾ/ರುವLದ ೆS JಾವL ೇ ಆ ೇಪ ೆಯನು< ಸ*ಸ ೇ ಇರುವLದ ಂದ ಾಖ!ೆಗಳ
ಪ ೕಲ ೆ7ಂದ ಸದ ಾ!ೆಯ ಕಟ9ಡವL ಸುaಾರು 60-70 ವಷ3ಗಳ Xಂ ೆ{ೕ =aಾ3ಣ.ೊಂ/ದು0, XಂDನ
rಾ ೆ ಾರರ Gಾಗೂ ಅವರ ಕುಟುಂಬದ ವಂಶಸw ಾಗ*ೕ XಂD=ಂದಲೂ ಈ ತಹyವ
ತಹyವ ೆ)ಗೂ ಪ iಾA)ತ
ಪ ೇಶದ* ಅನುಭವ ಅಥcಾ ಅnವೃDp ಪ/dರುವLದು ಕಂಡುಬಂDರುವLDಲ ಸದ ಪ iಾA\ತ ಪ ೇಶವL ಅಂದ ೆ
0-03 UÀÄAOೆ ಪ ೇಶದ* ಾ!ಾ ಕಟ9ಡ
ಕಟ9ಡ ಇರುವLದು ಇದು ಈ Xಂ ೆ{ೕ =aಾ3ಣ aಾ/ರುವLದು ಅ23 ಾರರು
ಇ@Aೕ5ೆ.ೆ ಅಳ ೆ ಅಮಯದ* ಸದ Bಾಗದ* ಕಟ9ಡ)ರುವLದು ಕಂಡುಬಂDರುತA ೆಂದು @Wdರು ಾA ೆ.ೆ ಈ
Bಾಗ ೆS ಭೂಪ Gಾರ ೋ ಅ23 ಾರರ ಪz)3ಕರು ಭೂಪ Gಾರ ೋ ಅ23 ಸ*dಲ Gಾಗೂ ಕಟ9ಡ
=aಾ3ಣcಾಗುವ ಸಂದಭ3ದ* JಾವL ೇ ಆ ೇಪ ೆ ಸಹ ಸ*dರುವLದು ಕಂಡುಬಂDರುವLDಲ.
ಕಂಡುಬಂDರುವLDಲ aಾನu ಉಚ~
ಾuJಾಲಯದ ಆ ೇಶವನು< ಪ ೕ*dದು0, ಪ iಾA)ತ ಸ ಾ3 ಾ!ೆ ನEೆಸು@Aರುವ ಕಟ9ಡ 0-03 ಗುಂOೆ Gಾಗೂ
ಈ XಂD=ಂದಲೂ ಇರುವ ರೂ• ರiೆAಯನು< iಾವ3ಜ=ಕರು ಸಹ §ºÀ¼À »A¢¤AzÀ®Æ
ಉಪ€ೕKಸು@AರುವLದ ಂದ ಈ ಜ>ೕನನು< ಭೂiಾ4 ೕನ ಪ/d ೊಳ qವ ಅವಶuಕ ೆ ಕಂಡುಬಂDರುವLDಲ.
ಕಂಡುಬಂDರುವLDಲ
ಸುaಾರು 60-70 ವಷ3ಗWಂದ ಇರುವ ಾ!ಾ ಕಟ9ಡ Bಾಗ Gಾಗೂ iಾವ3ಜ=ಕರ ರೂ• ರiೆAಯನು<
ಭೂiಾ4 ೕನಪ/d ೊಂಡು ಪ Gಾರ =ೕಡಲು ಅ23 ಾರರು ೇಳ @AರುವLದ ಂದ ಈ ಸಂಬಂಧ ಸ ಮ
Cಾ ಾರ/
ಾರ ಾuJಾಲಯದ* ತಮY ಹಕSನು< iಾw\d ೊಳqಲು ಅ23 ಾರ .ೆ ಮುಕA ಅವ ಾಶ)ರುತA ೆ ಎಂದು
@Wd ೆಳKನಂ ೆ ಆ ೇ d ೆ.ೆ
ಆ ೇಶ
ಅ23 ಾರರು ಪ iಾA)ತ ಗು ಾಲೂಕು,
ಾಲೂಕು =ಟೂ9ರು GೋಬW,
GೋಬW ಹರದ.ೆ ೆ .ಾ ಮದ ಸ.ನಂ
ನಂ.51/1
ನಂ ರ*
ಾ!ಾ ಕಟ9ಡದ Bಾಗ Gಾಗೂ iಾವ3ಜ=ಕ ರೂ• ರiೆA.ೆ ಉಪ€ೕKಸು@Aರುವ BಾಗವL ಈ.ಾಗ!ೇ ಸುaಾರು 60
14
ವಷ3ಗWKಂತ Xಂ ೆ{ೕ
ೆ{ೕ ಾ!ೆಯ ಕಟ9ಡ ಮತುA ರiೆA =aಾ3ಣcಾKರುವLದ ಂದ ಈಗ ಅ23 ಾರರು ಪ Gಾರ
ೇಳ @Aರುವ ಅ23ಯನು< @ರಸS d ೆ.ೆ ಅ23 ಾರರು ಸ ಮ Cಾ ಾರ/
ಾರ ಾuJಾಲಯದ* ತಮY ಹಕSನು<
iಾw\d ೊಳqಲು @Wd ೆ.ೆ
ಈ ಆ ೇಶವನು< ¢£ÁAPÀ:08-11-2021 ರಂದು ೆ ೆದ ಾuJಾಲಯದ* WÉÆö¸À¯Á¬ÄvÀÄ.
¸À»/-
08.11.2021
f¯Áè¢üPÁj
vÀĪÀÄPÀÆgÀÄ f¯Éè."
A perusal at the report or the report which forms the part
of the order would clearly indicate that the land of the petitioners
has been utilized by the State for the purpose of establishment of
a school and formation of the road.
The observation is, since the petitioners or their
ancestors did not object to the said utilization, no
acquisition need be made and therefore, the land belongs
to the government. The report on the face of it, is contrary
to law.
The government prima facie, cannot become an
encroacher of a private property.
Learned High Court Government Pleader seeks a week's
time to file statement of objections.
Objections be filed by the next date of hearing.
List this matter on 24.07.2025, in preliminary
hearing.
In the event, objections are not filed, appropriate
orders would be passed on hearing the learned counsel for
petitioners."
(Emphasis supplied)
15
Pursuant to the afore-quoted orders, the government has filed
statement of objections along with an affidavit. The relevant
paragraphs of the objections read as follows:
".... .... ....
5. It is submitted that according to the direction of the
Hon'ble Court, enquiry was conducted by the concerned
Government Authorities and Order was passed, on 08.11.2021
and it was found that Petitioner's 3 guntas of land was used for
school building and another 4 to 6 guntas of land was used for
formation of road.
6. It is submitted that, the petitioner filed C.C.C.
No.320/2022 (Civil) against the respondents for non-
compliance of the order of the Hon'ble Court dated
19/09/2019. The said Contempt proceedings were
dropped with a liberty for the petitioner to file/challenge
the decision of the Deputy Commissioner before the
appropriate forum.
7. It is submitted that, after the dismissal of the contempt
proceedings, the Petitioner filed Review Petition No.788/2022,
which was withdrawn with liberty to pursue proper legal course.
8. It is submitted that, the father of the petitioner
had voluntarily allowed the use of the land for formation
of school and road which is in existence since 1957.
Neither the family members of the petitioner nor the
members of the village objected to the same. The
petitioner being well aware/ deemed to be aware of this
continued possession and use is now estopped from
claiming compensation. The petitioner who remained
silent for over 60 years cannot claim for compensation at
this stage. The petitioner's right to recover possession or
compensation is lost after the statutory period of 12
years as per the Limitation Act, 1963.
9. It is submitted that, the petitioner has claimed
for compensation for the use of land for public purpose
16
after 60 years. The claim of the petitioner is barred by
delay and latches. The possession of the Government has
been continuous, open and peaceful for 60 years thereby
barring any claim in the present stage. Extraordinary
delay disentitles a petitioner from relief under Article 226
of the Constitution of India.
10. It is submitted that, the land is used for noble
public purpose like education for 60 years. Disruption or
compensation at this stage would adversely affect public
interest and would set a wrong precedent. It is further
submitted that, by allowing the school to function
uninterruptedly, the land is deemed to have been
constructively dedicated to public use and such
dedications are irrevocable in nature once accepted by
the public and is acted upon."
(Emphasis added)
The State concedes that the petitioners land has long
stood in the service of public infrastructure for having been
utilised for construction of a government school and
formation of the road, all acts have undertaken more than
six decades ago. The State's defence however, rests on the
assertion that the father of the first petitioner has
voluntarily surrendered the land for the said purpose and
that, by reason of passage of time, the petitioners' right either
to reclaim possession or seek compensation has withered away with
17
statutory limitation of 12 years as obtaining under the Limitation
Act, 1963.
9. The question that now arises is, stark and
unavoidable - on the face of the State's unequivocal
admission that it has appropriated private land belonging to
the petitioners for public purposes - be it establishment of a
school or formation of a road, does the law permits the
petitioners to receive the compensation even today, or, it
should be non-suited on the ground of delay. Thus, the time
extinguishes the constitutional obligation to compensate or
does the rule of law compel the State to answer for its
actions even after an aeon.
10. Jurisprudence is replete with authoritative
pronouncements revealing a consistent and unwavering thread
woven by the Apex Court that, right to property preserved
under Article 300A of the Constitution of India is fortified by
the life and personal liberty mandated under Article 21,
cannot be rendered illusory by the mere lapse of years.
Delay even extending across half a century, does not semi
18
articulate the landowners claim to just compensation, when
it is admitted by the State that, it has, without legal
formalities taken over a private land. It thus becomes
imperative to draw inference from the aforesaid precedents.
11. The King's bench in the case of JOHN ENTICK CLERK
VS. NATHAN CARRINGTON AND THREE OTHERS1, has
delineated on the right on their own property.
".... ..... ....
Curia,--The defendants make two defences;
first, that they are within the stat. 24 Geo. 2, c. 44 ;
2dly, that such warrants have frequently been granted
by Secretaries of State ever since the Revolution, and
have never been controverted, and that they are legal
; upon both which defences tbe defendants rely.
A Secretary of State, who is a Privy Counsellor,
if he be a conservator of the peace, whatever power
he has to commit is by the common law : if he be
considered only as a Privy Counsellor, he is the only
one at the board who has exercised this authority of
late years ; if as a conservator, he never binds to the
peace ; no other conservator ever did that we can find
: he has no power to administer an oath, or take bail ;
but yet it must be admitted that he is in the full
exercise of this power to commit, for treason and
seditious libels against the Government, whatever was
the original source of that power ; as appears from the
cases of The Queen and Derby, The King and Earbury,
and Kendale and Roe's case.
We must know what a Secretary of State is,
before we can tell whether he is within the stat. 24
1
WILS.K.B.275; 1765 EWHC (KB) J98; 95 ER 807
19
Geo. 2, c. 44. He is the keeper of the King's signet
wherewith the King's private letters are signed. [289]
2 Inst. 556. Coke upon Articuli Super Chartas, 28 Ed.
1. Lord Coke's silence is a strong presumption that no
such power as he now exercises was in him at that
time ; formerly he was not a Privy Counsellor, or
considered as a magistrate ; he began to be significant
about the time of the Revolution, and grew great when
the princes of Europe sent ambassadors hither ; it
seems inconsistent that a Secretary of State should
have power to commit, and no power to administer an
oath, or take bail ; who can commit and not have
power to examine ? the House of Commons indeed
commit without oath, but that is nothing to the
present case ; there is no account in our law-books of
Secretaries of State, except in the few cases
mentioned ; he is not to be found among the old
conservators ; in Lambert, Crompton, Fitzherbert, &c.
&c. nor is a Privy Counsellor to be found among our
old books till Kendall and Roe's case, and I Leon. 70,
71, 29 Eliz. is the first case that takes notice of a
commitment by a Secretary of State ; but in 2 Leon.
175 the Judges knew no such committing magistrate
as the Secretary of State. It appears by the Petition of
Right, that the King and Council claimed a power to
commit ; if the Secretary of State had claimed any
such power, then certainly the Petition of Right would
have taken notice of it ; but from its silence on that
head we may fairly conclude he neither claimed nor
had any such power ; the Stat. 16 Car. 1, for
Regulating the Privy Council, and taking away the
Court of Star-Chamber, binds the King not to commit,
and in such case gives a habeas corpus ; it is strange
that House of Commons should take no notice of the
Secretary of State, if he then had claimed power to
commit. This power of a Secretary of State to commit
was derivative from the commitment per mandatum
Regis : Ephemeris Parliamentaria. Coke says in his
speech to the House, If I do my duty to the King, I
must commit without shewing the cause ; " 1 Leon.
70, 71, shews that a commitment by a single Privy
Counsellor was not warranted. By the Licensing
Statute of 13 & 14 Car. 2, cap. 33, sec. 15, licence is
20
given to messenger under warrant of the Secretary of
State to search for books unlicensed, and if they find
any against the religion of the Church of England, to
bring them before the Secretary of State ; the warrant
in that case expressed that it was by the King's
command. See Stamford's comment on the mandate
of the King, and Lambert, cap. Bailment. All the
Judges temp. Eliz. held that in a warrant or
commitment by one Privy Counsellor he must shew it
was by the mandate of the King in Council. See And.
297, the opinion of all the Judges; they remonstrated
to the King that no subject ought to be committed by
a Privy Counsellor against the law of the realm. Before
the 3 Car. 1 all the Privy Counsellors exorcised this
power to commit; from that æra they disused this
power, but then they prescribed still to commit per
mandatum Regis. Journal of the House of Commons
195. 16 Car. 1. Coke, Selden, &c. argued that the
King's power to commit, meant that [290] he had such
power by his Courts of Justice. In the case of The
Seven Bishops all the Court and King's Council admit,
that supposing the warrant had been signed out of the
Council, that it would have been bad, but the Court
presumed it to be signed at the board ; Pollexfen in his
argument says, we do not deny but the Council board
have power to commit, but not out of Council ; this is
a very strong authority ; the whole body of the law
seem not to know that Privy Counsellors out of Council
had any power to commit, if there had been any such
power they could not have been ignorant of it ; and
this power was only in cases of high treason, they
never claimed it in any other case. It was argued that
if a Secretary of State hath power to commit in high
treason, he hath it in cases of lessor crimes : but this
we deny, for if it appears that he hath power to
commit in one case only, how can we then without
authority say he has that power in other cases} he is
not a conservator of the peace ; Justice Rokeby only
says he is in the nature of a conservator of the peace :
we are now bound by the cases of The Queen and
Derby, and The King and Earbury.
21
The Secretary of Sate is no conservator nor a
justice of the peace, quasi secretary, within the words
or equity of the Stat. 24 Geo. 2, admitting him (for
arguments sake) to be a conservator, the preamble of
the statute shews why it was made, and for what
purpose ; the only grantor of a warrant therein
mentioned, is a justice of the peace ; justice of peace
and conservator are not convertible terms ; the cases
of construction upon old statutes, in regard to the
warden of the Fleet, the Bishop of Norwich, & c. are
not to be applied to cases upon modern statutes. The
best way to construe modern statutes is to
follow the words thereof ; let us compare a
justice of peace and a conservator ; the justice is
liable to actions, as the statute takes notice, it is
applicable to him. who acts by warrant directed
to constables ; a conservator is not intrusted
with the execution of laws, which by this Act is
meant statutes, which gives justices jurisdiction
; a conservator is not liable to actions; be never
acts : he is almost forgotten ; there never was an
action against a conservator of the peace as such
; be is antiquated, and could never be thought of
when this Act was made ; and ad ea quae
frequenter accidunt jura adaptantur. There is no
act of a constable or tithingman as conservator
taken notice of in the statute; will the Secretary
of State be ranked with the highest or lowest of
these conservators? the Statute of Jac. 1, for
officers acting by authority to plead the general
issue, and give the special matter in evidence,
when considered with this Statute of 24 Geo. 2,
the latter seems to be a second part of the Act of
Jac. 1, and we are all clearly of opinion that
neither the Secretary of nor the messengerss are
within the Stat. 24 Geo. 2, but if the messengers
had been within it, as they did not take a
constable [291] with them according to the
warrant, that alone would have been fatal to
them, nor did they pursue the warrant in the
execution thereof, when they carried the plaintiff
and his books, &c. before Lovel Stanhope, and
not before Lord Halifax; that was wrong, because
a Secretary of State cannot delegate his power,
but ought to act in this part of his office
personally.
22
The defendants having failed in their defence under
the Statute 24 Geo. 2 ; we shall now consider the
special justification, whether it can be supported in
law, and this depends upon the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of State; for if he has no jurisdiction to
grant a warrant to break open doors, locks,
boxes, and to seize a man and all his books, &c.
in the first instance upon an information of bis
being guilty of publishing a libel, the warrant will
not justify the defendants : it was resolved by B. R.
in the case of Shergold v. Holloway, that a justice's
warrant expressly to arrest the party will not justify
the offcer, there being no jurisdiction. 2 Stran, 1002.
The warrant in our case was an execution in the
first instance, without any previous summons,
examination, hearing the plaintiff, or proof that
he was the author of the supposed libels ; a
power claimed by no other magistrate whatever
(Scroggs C.J. always excepted) ; it was left to
the discretion of these defendants to execute the
warrant in the absence or presence of the
plaintiff, when he might have no witness present
to see what they did ; for they were to seize all
papers, bank bills, or any other valuable papers
they might take away if they were so disposed;
there might be nobody to detect them. If this be
lawful, both Houses of Parliament are involved in
it, for they have both ruled, that privilege doth
not extend to this case. In the case of Wilkes, a
member of the Commons House, all his books and
papers were seized and taken away; we were told by
one of these messengers that he was obliged by his
oath to sweep away all paper whatsoever ; if this is
law it would be found in our books, but no such law
ever existed in this country ; our law holds the
property of every man so sacred, that no man
can set his foot upon his neighbour's close
without his leave ; if he does he is trespasser,
though he does no damage at all ; if he will tread
upon his neighbour's ground, he must justify it
by law. The defendants have no right to avail
themselves of the usage of these warrants since
the Revolution, and if that would have justified
23
them they have not averred it in their plea, so it
could not be put, nor was in issue at the trial ;
we can safely say there is no law in this country
to justify the defendants in what they have done
; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts
of society ; for papers are often the dearest
property a man can have. This case was compared
to that of stolen goods ; Lord Coke denied the
lawfulness of granting warrants to search for stolen
goods, 4 Inst. 176, 177, though now it prevails to be
law ; but in that case the justice and the informer
must proceed with great caution ; there must be an
oath that the [292] party has had his goods stolen,
and his strong reason to believe they are concealed in
such a place ; but if the goods are not found there, he
is a trespasser ; the offcer in that case is a witness ;
there are none in this case, no inventory taken ; if it
had been legal many guards of property would have
attended it. We shall now consider the usage of these
warrants since the Revolution ; if it began then, it is
too modern to be law ; the common law did not begin
with the Revolution ; the ancient constitution which
had been almost overthrown and destroyed, was then
repaired and revived ; the Revolution added a new
buttress to the ancient venerable edifice : the K. B.
lately said that no objection had ever been taken to
general warrants, they have passed sub silentio : this
is the first instance of an attempt to prove a modern
practice of a private office to make and execute
warrants to enter a man's house, search for and take
away all his books and papers in the first instance, to
be law, which is not to be found in our books. It must
have been the guilt or poverty of those upon whom
such warrants havo been executed, that deterred or
hindered them from contending against the power of a
Secretary of State and the Solicitor of the Treasury, or
such warrants could never have passed for lawful till
this time. We are inclined to think the present warrant
took its first rise from the Licensing Act, 13 & 14 Car.
2, c. 33, and are all of opinion that it cannot be
justified by law, notwithstanding the resolution of the
Judges in the time of Cha. 2, and Jac. 2, that such
search warrants are lawful. State Trials, vol. 3, 58, the
24
trial of Carr for a libel. There is no authority but of the
Judges of that time that a house may be searched for
a libel, but the twelve Judges cannot make law ; and if
a man is punishable for having a libel in his private
custody, as many cases say he is, half the kingdom
would be guilty in the case of a favourable libel, if
libels may be searched for and seized by whomsoever
and wheresoever the Secretary of State thinks fit. It is
said it is better for the Government and the public to
seize the libel before it is published ; if the Legislature
be of that opinion they will make it lawful. Sir Samuel
Astry was committed to the Tower, for asserting there
was a law of State distinct from the common law. The
law never forces evidence from the party in whose
power it is ; when an adversary has got your deeds,
there is no lawful way of getting them again but by an
action. 2 Stran. 1210, The King and Cornelius. The
King and Dr. Purnell, Hil. 22 Geo. B. R. Our law is
wise and merciful, and supposes every man
accused to be innocent before he is tried by his
peers : upon the whole, we are all of opinion that
this warrant is wholly illegal and void. One word
more for ourselves ; we are no advocates for
libels, all Governments must set their faces
against them, and whenever they come before
us and a jury we shall set our faces against them
; and if juries do not prevent them they may
prove fatal to liberty, destroy Government and
introduce anarchy ; but tyranny is better than
anarchy, and the worst Government better than
none at all.
Judgment for the plaintiff."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court following the afore-quoted judgment of the
King's bench, in the case of WAZIR CHAND v. STATE OF
25
HIMACHAL PRADESH AND DISTRICT MAGISTRATE,
CHAMBA2, has held as follows:
"... ... ...
8. It was contended before us that the learned
Judicial Commissioner was in error in thinking that in
order to determine the legality of the seizures and to
determine the point whether there had been any
infringement of the petitioner's fundamental rights it was
necessary to determine the true nature of the title in the
goods seized and that the petitioner could not be granted
any relief till he was able to establish this. It was argued
that the goods having been seized from the actual
possession of the petitioner or his servants, the Chamba
concern, being admittedly under the exclusive control of
Trilok Nath or Wazir Chand, the determination of the
question whether Wazir Chand had obtained possession
fraudulently was not relevant to this inquiry, and that the
only point that needed consideration was whether the
seizures were under authority of law or otherwise, and if
they were not supported under any provisions of law, a
writ of mandamus should have been issued directing the
restoration of the goods so seized.
9. It seems to us that these contentions are well founded.
The Solicitor General appearing for the respondents was unable
to draw our attention to any provision of the Code of Criminal
Procedure or any other law under the authority of which these
goods could have been seized by Chamba Police at the instance
of Jammu Police. Admittedly these seizures were not made
under the orders of any Magistrate. The provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure authorising Chamba Police to make
a search and seize the goods are contained in Sections 51, 96,
98 and 165. None of these sections, however, has any
application to the facts and circumstances of this case. Section
51 authorises in certain circumstances the search of arrested
persons. In this case no report of the commission of a
cognizable offence had been made to Chamba Police and
2
(1954) 1 SCC 787
26
no complaint had been lodged before any Magistrate
there and no warrant had been issued by a Chamba
Magistrate for making the search or for the arrest of any
person. That being so, Sections 51, 96 and 98 had no
application to the case.
10. .....
11. All that the Solicitor General could urge in the case
was that on the allegation of Prabhu Dayal, the goods seized in
Chamba concerned an offence that had been committed in
Jammu and being articles regarding which an offence had been
committed, the police was entitled to seize them and that Wazir
Chand had no legal title in them. Assuming that that was so,
goods in the possession of a person who is not lawfully in
possession of them cannot be seized except under
authority of law, and in absence of such authority, Wazir
Chand could not be deprived of them. On the materials
placed on this record it seems clear that unless and until Prabhu
Dayal proved his allegations that the Chamba concern was part
and parcel of the Jammu partnership firm (which fact has been
denied) and that Trilok Nath who was admittedly one of the
partners had no right to put Wazir Chand in possession of the
property, no offence even under Section 406 could be said to
have been committed about this property. Jammu Police
without having challaned any of the accused before a
Magistrate in Jammu, and without having obtained any
orders of extradition from a Magistrate (if the offence
was extraditable) could not proceed to Chamba and with
the help of Chamba Police seize the goods and attempt to
take them to Jammu by a letter of request written by the
District Magistrate of Jammu to the District Magistrate of
Chamba."
(Emphasis supplied)
Later, the Apex Court in the case of VIDYA DEVI v. STATE
OF HIMACHAL PRADESH3, has held as follows:
3
(2020) 2 SCC 569
27
"... ... ...
12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of
her property in 1967, when the right to property was a
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III
of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to
private property [State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose,
(1953) 2 SCC 688 : AIR 1954 SC 92] , which could not
be deprived without due process of law and upon just
and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental
right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act,
1978, however, it continued to be a human right [Tukaram
Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ)
491] in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under
Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen
of his property except in accordance with the
procedure established by law. The obligation to pay
compensation, though not expressly included in Article
300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [K.T. Plantation
(P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 : (2011)
4 SCC (Civ) 414]
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his
private property, without following due process of law,
would be violative of a human right, as also the
constitutional right under Article 300-A of the
Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment
in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur
Chenai [Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur
Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627] , wherein this Court held that:
(SCC p. 634, para 6)
"6. ... Having regard to the provisions contained in
Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its
power of "eminent domain" may interfere with the right of
property of a person by acquiring the same but the same
must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation
therefor must be paid."
(emphasis supplied)
28
12.4. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy [N.
Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 517],
this Court held that: (SCC p. 526, para 21)
"21. If the right of property is a human right as also
a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away
except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the
Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act
seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the
provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must
be strictly construed."
(emphasis supplied)
12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of
U.P. [Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011)
9 SCC 354 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673] , this Court recognised
the right to property as a basic human right in the following
words: (SCC p. 379, para 30)
"30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by
different political thinkers that some amount of property
right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and
economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of
the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support
of property. "Property must be secured, else liberty cannot
subsist" was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view
that property itself is the seed-bed which must be
conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish, is
the consensus among political thinkers and jurists."
(emphasis supplied)
12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of
Gujarat [Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, 1995
Supp (1) SCC 596] , this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 627,
para 48)
"48. ... In other words, Article 300-A only limits the
powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law. There has to be no
deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any
other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under
29
Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no
deprivation."
(emphasis supplied)
12.7. In this case, the appellant could not have been
forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal
sanction, and without following due process of law, and
depriving her payment of just compensation, being a
fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in
1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the appellant or
her predecessors had "orally" consented to the acquisition is
completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and
legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the appellant of her
property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule
of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of
their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is
placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana
Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1
SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] wherein it was held
that the State must comply with the procedure for
acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible
statutory mode. The State being a welfare State
governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a
status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh
Kumar [State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10
SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769] held that the right
to property is now considered to be not only a
constitutional or statutory right, but also a human
right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of
individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health,
employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted
dimension.
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the
State before the High Court, that since it has been in
continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it would
tantamount to "adverse" possession. The State being a
30
welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of
adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person
guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such
property for over 12 years. The State cannot be permitted to
perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of
adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens,
as has been done in the present case.
12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay
and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable
to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of
a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock
the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is
a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised
judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of
a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights,
and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose.
There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to
exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial
justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it.
[P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 :
1975 SCC (L&S) 22]
12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram
Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ)
491] , this Court while dealing with a similar fact situation,
held as follows: (SCC p. 359, para 11)
"11. There are authorities which state that delay and
laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of
these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of
compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago,
recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities
and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true
that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay
and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his
fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or
226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a
different scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State
took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants
31
without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked
repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The
State must either comply with the procedure laid down for
acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible
statutory mode."
(emphasis supplied)
13. In the present case, the appellant being an
illiterate person, who is a widow coming from a rural area
has been deprived of her private property by the State
without resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The
appellant has been divested of her right to property
without being paid any compensation whatsoever for
over half a century. The cause of action in the present
case is a continuing one, since the appellant was
compulsorily expropriated of her property in 1967
without legal sanction or following due process of law.
The present case is one where the demand for justice
is so compelling since the State has admitted that the
land was taken over without initiating acquisition
proceedings, or any procedure known to law. We
exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and
142 of the Constitution, and direct the State to pay
compensation to the appellant.
14. The State has submitted that in 2008 it had
initiated acquisition proceedings in the case of an adjoining
landowner viz. Shri Anakh Singh pursuant to a direction
given by the High Court in Anakh Singh v. State of
H.P. [Anakh Singh v. State of H.P., 2007 SCC OnLine HP
220] The State initiated acquisition only in the case where
directions were issued by the High Court, and not in the case
of other landowners whose lands were compulsorily taken
over, for the same purpose, and at the same time. As a
consequence, the present landowner has been driven to
move the Court in their individual cases for redressal.
15. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of
the present case, the respondent State is directed to pay the
compensation on the same terms as awarded by the
Reference Court vide order dated 7-7-2015 in Anakh
Singhcase [Anakh Singh v. State of H.P., 2007 SCC OnLine
HP 220] (i.e. Land Reference No. 1 of 2011 RBT No. 01/13)
32
along with all statutory benefits including solatium, interest,
etc. within a period of 8 weeks, treating it as a case of
deemed acquisition. An affidavit of compliance is directed to
be filed by the State before this Court within 10 weeks."
(Emphasis supplied)
All of the afore-quoted judgments bear consideration by the
Apex Court in the case of SUKH DUTT RATRA AND ANOTHER VS.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND OTHERS4, wherein the
Apex Court in an identical circumstance has held as follows:
"12. Lastly, it was argued that in light of the disputed
questions of fact relating to limitation, construction of the
road, and verbal consent for the same -- the appropriate
forum would be the civil court, and thus the impugned order
required no intervention.
Analysis and conclusion
13. While the right to property is no longer a
fundamental right ["Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment)
Act, 1978"], it is pertinent to note that at the time of
dispossession of the subject land, this right was still included
in Part III of the Constitution. The right against deprivation
of property unless in accordance with procedure established
by law, continues to be a constitutional right under Article
300-A.
14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that
nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without due
process, or authorisation of law. The recognition of this dates
back to the 1700s to the decision of the King's Bench in
Entick v. Carrington [Entick v. Carrington, 1765 EWHC (KB)
J98 : 95 ER 807] and by this Court in Wazir Chand v. State
of H.P. [Wazir Chand v. State of H.P., (1955) 1 SCR 408 :
4
(2022) 7 SCC 508
33
AIR 1954 SC 415] Further, in several judgments, this Court
has repeatedly held that rather than enjoying a wider
bandwidth of lenience, the State often has a higher
responsibility in demonstrating that it has acted within the
confines of legality, and therefore, not tarnished the basic
principle of the rule of law.
15. When it comes to the subject of private property,
this Court has upheld the high threshold of legality that must
be met, to dispossess an individual of their property, and
even more so when done by the State. In Bishan Das v.
State of Punjab [Bishan Das v. State of Punjab, (1962) 2
SCR 69 : AIR 1961 SC 1570] this Court rejected the
contention that the petitioners in the case were trespassers
and could be removed by an executive order, and instead
concluded that the executive action taken by the State and
its officers, was destructive of the basic principle of the rule
of law. This Court, in another case -- State of U.P. v.
Dharmander Prasad Singh [State of U.P. v. Dharmander
Prasad Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 505 : (1989) 1 SCR 176] , held
: (SCC p. 516, para 30)
"30. A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume
possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even
after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture
or otherwise. The use of the expression "re-entry" in the lease
deed does not authorise extra-judicial methods to resume
possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after
the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and
forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be
dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the
present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not
place it in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it is
under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement
that all actions of Government and Governmental authorities
should have a "legal pedigree"."
16. Given the important protection extended to an
individual vis-à-vis their private property (embodied earlier
in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in Article 300-
A), and the high threshold the State must meet while
acquiring land, the question remains -- can the State, merely
on the ground of delay and laches, evade its legal
responsibility towards those from whom private property has
34
been expropriated? In these facts and circumstances, we find
this conclusion to be unacceptable, and warranting
intervention on the grounds of equity and fairness.
17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the
State's actions, or lack thereof, have in fact compounded the
injustice meted out to the appellants and compelled them to
approach this Court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of
acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred only at
the behest of the High Court. Even after such judicial
intervention, the State continued to only extend the benefit
of the Court's directions to those who specifically approached
the courts. The State's lackadaisical conduct is discernible
from this action of initiating acquisition proceedings
selectively, only in respect to the lands of those writ
petitioners who had approached the court in earlier
proceedings, and not other landowners, pursuant to the
orders dated 23-4-2007 (in Anakh Singh v. State of H.P.
[Anakh Singh v. State of H.P., 2007 SCC OnLine HP 220] )
and 20-12-2013 (in Onkar Singh v. State [Onkar Singh v.
State, CWP No. 1356 of 2010, order dated 20-12-2013 (HP)]
), respectively. In this manner, at every stage, the State
sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring land required
for public use in the manner prescribed by law.
18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and
laches which conclude either way--as contended by both
sides in the present dispute--however, the specific factual
matrix compels this Court to weigh in favour of the appellant
landowners. The State cannot shield itself behind the ground
of delay and laches in such a situation; there cannot be a
"limitation" to doing justice. This Court in a much earlier case
-- Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service
[Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, (1969)
1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] , held : (AIR pp. 335-36,
para 11)
"11. ... 'Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party
has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded
as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and
neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet
35
put the other party in a situation in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are
most material.
But in every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that
delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always
important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the
nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in
taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the
remedy'."
19. The facts of the present case reveal that the State
has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner, actively tried to
limit disbursal of compensation as required by law, only to
those for which it was specifically prodded by the courts,
rather than to all those who are entitled. This arbitrary
action, which is also violative of the appellants' prevailing
Article 31 right (at the time of cause of action), undoubtedly
warranted consideration, and intervention by the High Court,
under its Article 226 jurisdiction. This Court, in Manohar
[State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126] --a similar
case where the name of the aggrieved had been deleted
from revenue records leading to his dispossession from the
land without payment of compensation held : (SCC pp. 128-
29, paras 6-8)
"6. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants, we
are satisfied that the case projected before the court by the
appellants is utterly untenable and not worthy of emanating
from any State which professes the least regard to being a
welfare State. When we pointed out to the learned counsel
that, at this stage at least, the State should be gracious
enough to accept its mistake and promptly pay the
compensation to the respondent, the State has taken an
intractable attitude and persisted in opposing what appears to
be a just and reasonable claim of the respondent.
7. Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights
available to the citizens are declared by the Constitution.
Although Article 19(1)(f) was deleted by the Forty-fourth
36
Amendment to the Constitution, Article 300-A has been placed
in the Constitution, which reads as follows:
'300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by
authority of law.--No person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law.'
8. This is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority
for deprivation of the respondent's property by the appellants
who are State authorities. In our view, this case was an
eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction of the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution."
20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi [Tukaram Kana
Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corpn. (MIDC),
(2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491 : (2012) 13 SCR
29] while dealing with a similar fact situation, this Court held
as follows : (SCC p. 359, para 11)
"11. There are authorities which state that delay and
laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these
authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of
compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery
of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other
categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there
are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches
debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental
right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the
Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario
altogether. The functionaries of the State took over possession
of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of
law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the
benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with
the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any
other permissible statutory mode."
21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this
Court finds that the contentions raised by the State, do
not inspire confidence and deserve to be rejected. The
State has merely averred to the appellants' alleged
verbal consent or the lack of objection, but has not
placed any material on record to substantiate this
plea. Further, the State was unable to produce any
evidence indicating that the land of the appellants had
been taken over or acquired in the manner known to
37
law, or that they had ever paid any compensation. It is
pertinent to note that this was the State's position,
and subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as
well, in the other writ proceedings.
22. This Court is also not moved by the State's
contention that since the property is not adjoining to that of
the appellants, it disentitles them from claiming benefit on
the ground of parity. Despite it not being adjoining (which is
admitted in the rejoinder-affidavit filed by the appellants), it
is clear that the subject land was acquired for the same
reason--construction of the Narag Fagla Road, in 1972-1973,
and much like the claimants before the Reference Court,
these appellants too were illegally dispossessed without
following due process of law, thus resulting in violation of
Article 31 and warranting the High Court's intervention under
Article 226 jurisdiction. In the absence of written consent
to voluntarily give up their land, the appellants were
entitled to compensation in terms of law. The need for
written consent in matters of land acquisition
proceedings, has been noted in fact, by the Full Court
decision of the High Court in Shankar Das [Shankar
Das v. State of H.P., 2013 SCC OnLine HP 681] itself,
which is relied upon in the impugned judgment [Sukh
Dutt Ratra v. State of H.P., 2013 SCC OnLine HP 3773].
23. This Court, in Vidya Devi [Vidya Devi v. State
of H.P., (2020) 2 SCC 569 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 799]
facing an almost identical set of facts and
circumstances -- rejected the contention of "oral"
consent to be baseless and outlined the responsibility
of the State : (SCC p. 574, para 12)
"12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of
law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their
property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed
on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v.
Maharashtra Industrial Development Corpn. [Tukaram
Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial Development
Corpn. (MIDC), (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ)
491 : (2012) 13 SCR 29] wherein it was held that the
State must comply with the procedure for acquisition,
requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.
The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of
38
law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is
provided by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh
Kumar [State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10
SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769] held that the right to
property is now considered to be not only a
constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right.
Human rights have been considered in the realm of
individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood,
health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a
multi-faceted dimension."
24. And with regard to the contention of delay
and laches, this Court went on to hold : (Vidya Devi
case [Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., (2020) 2 SCC 569 :
(2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 799] , SCC pp. 574-75, para 12)
"12.12. The contention advanced by the State of
delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is
also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be
raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the
circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the
Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial
discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and
reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It
will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and
the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose.
There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts
to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do
substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not
defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1
SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22] "
25. Concluding that the forcible dispossession of
a person of their private property without following
due process of law, was violative [ Relying on
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur
Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627 : 2005 Supp (3) SCR 388; N.
Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC
517; Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P.,
39
(2011) 9 SCC 354 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673 : (2011) 12
SCR 191 and Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of
Gujarat, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596 : 1994 Supp (1) SCR
807.] of both their human right, and constitutional
right under Article 300-A, this Court allowed the
appeal. We find that the approach taken by this Court
in Vidya Devi [Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., (2020) 2
SCC 569 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 799] is squarely
applicable to the nearly identical facts before us in the
present case.
26. In view of the above discussion, in view of this
Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142
of the Constitution, the State is hereby directed to treat the
subject lands as a deemed acquisition and appropriately
disburse compensation to the appellants in the same terms
as the order of the Reference Court dated 4-10-2005 in Land
Ref. Petition No. 10-LAC/4 of 2004 (and consolidated
matters). The respondent State is directed, consequently to
ensure that the appropriate Land Acquisition Collector
computes the compensation, and disburses it to the
appellants, within four months from today. The appellants
would also be entitled to consequential benefits of solatium,
and interest on all sums payable under law w.e.f. 16-10-
2001 (i.e. date of issuance of notification under Section 4 of
the Act), till the date of the impugned judgment [Sukh Dutt
Ratra v. State of H.P., 2013 SCC OnLine HP 3773] i.e. 12-9-
2013."
On a coalesce of the judgments quoted hereinabove,
stretching back to the judgment of the King's bench in the case of
JOHN ENTICK CLERK VS. NATHAN CARRINGTON quoted supra,
the law has stood as an unyielding sentinel guardian to an
individual against any intrusion by the State particularly,
when it concerns a private land. The same is followed in the
40
subsequent judgments, where the Courts insist that the State
must justify its every trespass into the private domain by
pointing to a clear legal mandate. Delving deep into the issue
of trespass in the case at hand is unnecessary, as the State has
admitted the trespass. Thus, when the State by its own hand
has taken away the possession of the citizen's private land,
whether by force oversight or voluntarily handed over, it
must meet the threshold of justification by grant of
compensation. As held by the Apex Court in the judgments such
as BISHAN DAS V. STATE OF PUNJAB reported in AIR 1961 SC
1570 and STATE OF U.P. V. DHARMANDER PRASAD SINGH
reported in (1989) 2 SCC 505, the law demands not only
authority, but procedure; not only power, but propriety.
Therefore, the principle that emerges with crystalline clarity is 'no
individual's private property shall be wrested away by the
State save through the due process ordained by law'. To do
otherwise, or to permit what is done otherwise, to stand would be
to do violence to the constitutional fibre. In the light of the State's
own admission that the land having been utilised without recourse
to lawful acquisition, this Court is of the considered opinion that
41
compensation must inevitably follow. The petition thus, deserves to
succeed.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
a. The writ petition is allowed.
b. The impugned order dated 08.11.2021, passed by respondent No.2 stands quashed. c. The respondents are directed to determine compensation under the provisions of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and pass necessary orders, in accordance with law, within three months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order.
Ordered accordingly.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE nvj CT:MJ