Madhya Pradesh High Court
Chandan Wood Products vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 15 February, 1988
Equivalent citations: [1988]173ITR585(MP)
JUDGMENT
G.G. Sohani, Actg. C.J.
1. By this reference under Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as " the Act"), the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Indore Bench, Indore, has referred the following questions to this court for its opinion :
"(i) Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the word 'forward' used in Section 144B(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, does not mean 'serve' ?
(ii) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessment made by the Income-tax Officer for the assessment year 1978-79 after recourse to Section 144B of the Income-tax Act was within time?"
The material facts giving rise to this reference, briefly, are as follows:
The assessee is assessed in the status of a registered firm. For the assessment year 1978-79, the accounting year for which ended on March 31, 1978, the assessee filed its return on July 31, 1978. As the Income-tax Officer proposed to make an addition exceeding Rs. one lakh to the income of the assessee, the Income-tax Officer forwarded the draft of the proposed order of assessment to the assessee on March 30, 1981, as required by the provisions of Section 144B of the Act. That draft order was received by the assessee on April 1, 1981. The assessee thereupon forwarded its objections. Hence, a reference was made by the Income-tax Officer to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 144B of the Act. On receipt of directions from the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, the Income-tax Officer completed the assessment on August 25, 1981. Aggrieved by the order of assessment, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). One of the contentions advanced on behalf of the assessee before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was that the assessment was barred by time and the provisions of Explanation 1(iv) to Section 153 of the Act were not attracted, because the draft assessment order was not served on the assessee within the period of limitation prescribed therefor which expired on March 31, 1981. This contention was rejected by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). On further appeal before the Tribunal, the Tribunal affirmed the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in this behalf. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal, the assessee sought a reference and it is at the instance of the assessee that the aforesaid questions of law have been referred to this court for its opinion.
The answers to the questions referred to this court for its opinion turn on the meaning to be given to the expression "forward" occurring in Section 144B(1) of the Act. It is not disputed that if the provisions of Explanation 1(iv) to Section 153 of the Act are attracted, then the assessment would be within the time prescribed therefor. The contention urged on behalf of the assessee is that the word " forward " used in Section 144B(1) of the Act means " serve ". To appreciate this contention, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of section 144B of the Act which are as follows:
" 144B. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where, in an assessment to be made under Sub-section (3) of Section 143, the Income-tax Officer proposes to make any variation in the income or loss returned which is prejudicial to the assessee and the amount of such variation exceeds the amount fixed by the Board under Sub-section (6), the Income-tax Officer shall, in the first instance, forward a draft of the proposed order of assessment (hereafter in this section referred to as the draft order) to the assessee.
(2) On receipt of the draft order, the assessee may forward his objections, if any, to such variation to the Income-tax Officer within seven days of the receipt by him of the draft order or within such further period not exceeding fifteen days as the Income-tax Officer may allow on an application made to him in this behalf. "
From a perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that whereas under Sub-section (1) of Section 144B, the Income-tax Officer has to forward a draft of the proposed order of assessment to the assessee under Sub-section (2) of Section 144B, the assessee is required to forward his objections, if any, to the Income-tax Officer within seven days or fifteen days, as the case may be, of the receipt by him of the draft order. It cannot be disputed that the expression "forward" occurring in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 144B of the Act has to be given the same meaning unless the context otherwise requires. It is well-settled that when the Legislature uses the same word in different parts of the same section, there is a presumption that the word is used in the same sense throughout. The Legislature has advisedly not used the word "serve" in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 144B of the Act. That would have caused hardship to the assessee. Learned counsel for the assessee was unable to point out any cogent reason for holding that the word "forward" occurring in Section 144B of the Act should not be given its natural meaning which is "to put in course of transmission" or to transmit. It has not been shown that the requirement of the context is such that the word "forward" occurring in Section 144B(1) of the Act has to be understood as meaning "serve". The Tribunal, in our opinion, was right in holding that the word "forward " used in Section 144B(1) of the Act did not mean " serve " and that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessment was within time.
2. Our answers to the questions referred to this court are, therefore, in the affirmative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of the reference.