Delhi District Court
Ram Kishan vs The State(Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi) on 15 October, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-015164-2019
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.: 455/2019
RAM KISHAN,
S/o. Shri. Duli Chand,
R/o. House No. 8462,
Arya Nagar, Pahar Ganj,
New Delhi. ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) ... RESPONDENT
Date of filing : 13.11.2019
Date of institution : 14.11.2019
Date when judgment was reserved : 18.07.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 15.10.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal has been filed under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, referred to as 'Cr.P.C./Code') against the judgment dated 24.09.2019 (hereinafter referred to as 'impugned judgment'), passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate (Mahila Court)-01/ Ld. MM (Mahila Court)-01, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ld. Trial Court/Ld. MM') in case bearing 'State v. Ram Kishan, Crl. Case No. 8307/2018 ', arising out of FIR No. 319/2017, PS. Nabi Karim, under Sections 354A/509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'), convicting the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 354A(1)(i)/509 IPC, and the consequent order of sentence dated 18.10.2019 (hereinafter referred to as 'impugned order'), passed by the Ld. Trial Court, awarding the appellant;
C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 1 of 41
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15
16:10:57
+0530
rigorous imprisonment for a period of 01 (one) year along with fine of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) for the offence under Section 354A IPC; and simple imprisonment for a period of 06 (six) months along with fine of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) for the offence under Section 509 IPC, sentences to run concurrently, besides the appellant being entitled to the benefit of the provisions under Section 428 Cr.P.C. Correspondingly, the fine was directed to be released to the complainant/victim, as fine (hereinafter impugned judgment and impugned order are collectively referred to as the 'impugned judgment and order').
2. Succinctly, the case of the prosecution is premised on the complainant of the complainant/prosecutrix/victim, Ms. 'P1' (hereinafter referred to as the 'complainant/prosecutrix/ victim'), wherein she inter alia proclaimed that on 25.10.2017 at around 08:40 p.m., while she was returning to her home, the appellant, namely, Ram Kishan was present on the way/in gali, near Hotel Presidency (आज दिनांक 25.10.2017, को समय करीब 08:40PM अपने घर की तरफ आ रही थी तो राम किशन s/o दुली चंद R/o H.No. 8462, Arya Nagar, Pahar Ganj, Delhi रास्ते में होटल प्रेजिडेंसी के पास गली में खड़ा था). As per the complainant, while she was passing the appellant, he grabbed the hand of the prosecutrix and made lewd comments/talks to her (जैसे ही मैं उसके बगल से गुजरी तो उसने मेरा हाथ पकड़ लिया और मुझसे गलत बात कहने लगा।). Correspondingly, prosecutrix avowed that she somehow, freed her hand. At that, as per the 1 Identity of the prosecutrix and that of her relatives and other particular have been deliberately withheld in view of the decisions in; Birbal Kumar Nishad v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3464; X v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 279; and Saleem v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 3 HCC (Del) 365: 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2190.
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prosecutrix, the appellant started abusing the complainant by taking names of her parents (मैंने उससे अपना हाथ छु ड़ा लिया तो यह मेरे माता पिता का नाम लेकर जोर से गाली देने लगा।). Ergo, under said facts and circumstances and on the basis of the complaint of the prosecutrix, the instant FIR came to be registered, and investigation ensued. Markedly, during the ensuing investigation, the appellant was joined in the investigation as well as interrogated, wherein he admitted to his guilt as well as the appellant's disclosure statement, recorded (दौराने तफ्तीश दिनांक 01.11.17, को SI राज कु मार ने मुलजिम राम किशन s/o दुली चंद R/o H.No. 8462, Arya Nagar, Pahar Ganj, Delhi, को मुकदमा हजा कि तफ्तीश में शामिल किया और उससे पूछताछ अमल में लाई। मुलजिम रामकिशन ने दौराने पूछताछ अपना जुर्म कबूला और बाद पूछताछ मुलजिम का फर्द इनक्साफ भी दर्ज किया गया जिस पर मुलजिम ने अपनी इच्छा से अपने दस्तखत किये।).
2.1. Notably, during the course of investigation, statements of the complainant was got recorded, in terms of the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C. on 02.11.2017, wherein the prosecutrix, inter alia, proclaimed as under;
"...मैं उपरोक्त पते पर रहती हूँ । दिनांक 25.10.2017, को रात 8/8:30 बजे में काम पर से घर आ रही थी जो पडौसी सोनू ने मेरा हाथ पकड़ लिया में हाथ छु ड़ाकर घर भाग गयी। मम्मी पापा को बताया तो मम्मी-पापा उसके घर गए पर सोनू के मम्मी-पापा ने मेरे मम्मी-पापा से झगडा कर लिया। ..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.2. Conspicuously, upon such chargesheet being filed, Ld. Trial Court took cognizance of offence, specified therein vide order dated 08.06.2018 and summons were issued qua the appellant. Subsequently, upon the appellant's entering C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 3 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:11:04 +0530 appearance before the Ld. Trial Court and upon compliance of the provisions under Section 207 Cr.P.C., arguments on the aspect of charge were addressed by/on behalf of the appellant as well as by Ld. Addl. PP for State. Consequently, the Ld. Trial Court vide its order dated 30.01.2019, directed framing of charges under Sections 354A/509 IPC against the appellant herein inter alia under the following observations;
"...Arguments heard on the point of charge. Prima facie case punishable U/s 354A1(i) and 509 IPC are made out against accused. Charge framed accordingly, to which accused has pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
Admission/denial of documents conducted U/s 294 Cr.P.C. as per which accused has admitted the recording of statement of prosecutrix/complainant under Section 164 Cr.PC and the proceedings conducted by the Ld. MM, with respect to the same. However, he has denied the contents of the said statement. In view of same, statement of complainant/prosecutrix u/S. 164 Cr.P.C and the proceedings conducted by Ld. MM with respect to the same are exhibited as Ex. P1(colly), running into 4 pages. In view of the same Ld. MM is hereby dropped from list of witnesses Matter is not fixed at the stage of prosecution evidence.
Issue summons to complainant/prosecutrix and duty officer to appear before the Court for the purpose of evidence on ..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.3. Pertinent here to further reproduce the charges, consequently, framed against the appellant by the Ld. Trial Court on 30.01.2019, as under;
"...I, ***, M.M. Delhi do hereby charge you accused Ram Kishan, S/o Sh. Duli Chand, aged about 39 years, R/o H. No. 8462, Arya Nagar, Pahar Ganj, Delhi as under:-
That on 25.10.2017, at about 8.40pm near Presidency Hotel, within the jurisdiction of PS Nabi Karim you accused, you accused held the hand of C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 4 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.10.15 16:11:08 +0530 complainant/prosecutrix 'X' (name not written in order to protect the identity of the complainant/prosecutrix, however verbally told to the accused) and stated wrong talks to her and thereby made physical contact and advances to her involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures and thereby you have committed the offence punishable under Section 354A1(i) IPC and within my cognizance. Secondly, on the abovesaid date. time and place you accused intruded upon the privacy of the victim and also uttered words to her with the intention to insult her modesty and with the intention that such words be heard by her and thereby had committed an offence punishable U/s 509 IPC and within my cognizance.
And I hereby direct you to be tried for the aforesaid offences by this court..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.4. Markedly, the appellants pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charges and claimed trial. Relevantly, during the course of trial, prosecution examined 05 (five) witnesses, i.e., PW-1/ASI Dharambir Singh; PW-2/Ct. Mahendra Kumar; PW-3/complainant/prosecutrix/'P'; PW-4/SI Raj Kumar; and PW-5/ASI Babita. As aforenoted, during the course of trial/at the stage of framing of charge, the appellant admitted the statement of the prosecutrix, recorded in terms of the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C. as Ex. PW1(Colly.), in terms of the provisions under Section 294 Cr.P.C. on 30.01.2019, leading to the Ld. Trial Court, dispensing with the examination of the corresponding witness(es). Subsequently, on conclusion of prosecution evidence, recording of statement of the appellant under Section 281/313 Cr.P.C. on 06.09.2019, as well as on conclusion of arguments on behalf of the appellant and the State, as aforementioned, the Ld. Trial Court vide impugned judgment and order, convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner, C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 5 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:11:12 +0530 as hereinunder noted.
3. Ld. Counsel/Ld. Legal Aid Counsel for the appellant outrightly contended that the impugned judgment and order were passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled principles of law, deserving their setting aside at the outset, as suffering with gross illegality. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that the impugned judgment and order were passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere assumptions and that no sound and cogent reasons have been assigned under the impugned judgment and order, besides the fact that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate the contents of the complaint and the evidence brought forth by the prosecution in its correct perspective. In this regard, Ld. Counsel outrightly asserted that though, the prosecutrix asserted in her statement, "... my father called at 100 number...", however, despite the same, no DD Entry regarding the alleged call made at 100 number or the alleged time, at which such information was tendered at the police station is forthcoming on record. Correspondingly, Ld. Counsel argued that the statement of prosecutrix's father has not been recorded by the police officials as well as, he/prosecutrix's father has not been cited as a witness in the instant case, which facts have not been considered by the Ld. Trial Court, while reaching a conclusion of appellant's guilt. It was further submitted by the Ld. Counsel that the police officials have not properly investigated the instant case, which fact was not considered by the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned judgment and order. In this regard, Ld. Counsel vehemently asserted that though as per the prosecutrix's own version, one person was present at the spot along with the C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 6 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:11:16 +0530 appellant, however, despite such assertion, the concerned police officials have neither made any endeavor to trace the said public person, nor such person has been joined in the investigation/trial. 3.1. Ld. Counsel/Ld. Legal Aid Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the impugned judgment is based on conjectures and surmises, in as much as the Ld. Trial Court, failed to appreciate the evidence led by the parties and also the documents on record. In this regard, Ld. Counsel argued that while passing the impugned judgment, Ld. Trial Court failed to consider material improvements/contradictions in the version put forth by various prosecution witnesses. In this regard, Ld. Counsel asserted that though, PW-4/SI Raj Kumar, proclaimed during the course of his cross examination, "... I along with the family of the Complainant as well as the family of the accused went to the P.S...", however, admittedly the appellant was not arrested on the same date of the incident. On the contrary, it was avowed that the appellant as only arrested on 25.10.2017, seven days after the alleged date of incident, in the police station, as proclaimed under the statement of PW-2/Ct. Mahender. Ergo, it was vehemently argued by the Ld. Counsel that there are several material contradictions in the version put forth by the prosecution witnesses, belying the case against the appellant herein. It was concomitantly argued by the Ld. Counsel that the defence of the appellant and that of possibility of appellant's false implication in the instant case by/at the behest of the prosecutrix has not been duly considered by the Ld. Trial Court. In this regard, Ld. Counsel argued that there was relationship between the family of the prosecutrix and the appellant and some dispute/quarrel between the said family. Ergo, the prosecutrix falsely implicated C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 7 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:11:21 +0530 the appellant in the instant case, solely to take revenge from appellant's family.
3.2. Ld. Counsel/Ld. Legal Aid Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court, even otherwise, did not consider that the allegations levelled by the prosecutrix are extremely vague and general, insufficient to attribute any criminality against the appellant. In this regard, Ld. Counsel asserted that the Ld. Trial Court completely overlooked that neither any public persons nor any eyewitnesses were joined in the investigation/trial of the present case and as per the Ld. Counsel, all the averments made against the appellant were false, imaginary and concocted. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel even the testimonies of prosecution witnesses are not reliable, besides it was reiterated that no proper and fair investigation was conducted by the police officials in the present case. Accordingly, Ld. Counsel vehemently asserted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to apply its judicial mind in a fair and proper manner and passed the impugned judgement in a whimsical manner. Even otherwise, it was submitted by the Ld. Counsel that the order of sentence was also passed by the Ld. Trial Court, impulsively, while failing to appreciate that the appellant was of tender/young age at the relevant point in time, as well as responsible for the look after and take care of his family members, besides there are no other cases pending against the appellant and that he has clean antecedents. Ld. Counsel for the appellant further vehemently argued that the punishment/penalty must not be retributive in nature, rather, humanizing, considering that sentencing an accused with severe sentence would subject his family members to grave depravity. Further, as per the Ld. C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 8 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.10.15 16:11:25 +0530 Counsel, substantial time has lapsed since the incident in question and in case relaxation/leniency is not afforded to the appellant, serious/severe repercussions may ensue to his physical and mental well-being. Consequently, the Ld. Counsel for the appellant inter alia prayed that the present appeal be allowed, and the impugned judgment and order be set aside.
4. Per contra, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the impugned judgment and order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as in consonance with the settled judicial precedents.
Ld. Addl. PP for the State further submitted that the testimony of the prosecutrix has not only been consistent, rather, of sterling quality, lucidly points out towards the only inference of guilt of the appellant. It was further submitted by the Ld. Addl. PP for the State that the appellant has even failed to prove its defence before the Ld. Trial Court. Concomitantly, it was submitted by the Ld. Addl. PP for the State, even the order of sentence was passed by the Ld. Trial Court, wary of the facts of the present case as well as settled law/judicial dictates. Ergo, it was submitted by the Ld. Addl. PP for the State that no ground of any indulgence or relaxation in either the impugned judgment or even in the order of sentence/impugned order, passed against the appellant are established, convincing this Court to grant any relaxation in favour of the appellant. Consequently, it was entreated that the present appeal be dismissed as amounting to gross abuse of process of law.
4.1. Ld. Counsel for the complainant/prosecutrix, while supplementing the arguments of Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the allegation against the accused is grave in C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 9 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:11:29 +0530 nature pertaining to woman's modesty/integrity, which ought to be dealt with strictly. It was further submitted by the Ld. Counsel that the complainant has been consistent in her deposition and gave a clear as well as detailed description of the alleged incidents, besides, as per the Ld. Counsel, there is no inconsistency in the complainant's statement made before the police officials, that made before the Ld. MM under Section 164 Cr.P.C. or in her examination in chief or cross examination before the Ld. Trial Court. It was further submitted that the defence tendered no explanation for the allegation or of the alleged false implication of the appellant in the instant case. Ld. Counsel further reiterated that the Ld. Trial Court correctly applied its judicial mind and held the appellant guilty, under the impugned judgment, deserving no indulgence from this Court.
5. The arguments of the Ld. Counsel/Ld. Legal Aid Counsel for the appellant, Ld. Addl. PP for the State as well as that of Ld. Counsel for the complainant/prosecutrix have been heard and the record(s), including the Trial Court Record, written submissions/arguments filed by the parties as well as the case laws relied, thoroughly perused.
6. At the outset, this Court deems it apposite to enunciate the scope of jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal against conviction. In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court2 in Atley v. State of U.P., 1955 SCC OnLine SC 51, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while delving into the ' scope and ambit' of appellate court's jurisdiction, against an appeal against acquittal or an appeal against conviction, inter alia noted as 2 Reference further made to; Padam Singh v. State of U.P., (2000) 1 SCC 621.
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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under;
"8. ... It is also well settled that the Court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State [1951 SCC 1207:
AIR 1952 SC 52]; Wilayat Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1951 SCC 898: AIR 1953 SC 122]. In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions...."
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Correspondingly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Narendra Bhat v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 17 SCC 785, iterated in respect of the foregoing as under;
"3. This Court has in a series of judgments held that a court exercising appellate power must not only consider questions of law but also questions of fact and in doing so it must subject the evidence to a critical scrutiny. The judgment of the High Court must show that the Court really applied its mind to the facts of the case as particularly when the offence alleged is of a serious nature and may attract a heavy punishment."
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Quite evidently, from a conjoint reading of the aforenoted judicial dictates it can be perspicuously deduced that the jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal against conviction extends to reappreciation of the entire material placed on record of the trial court and to arrive at an independent conclusion as to C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 11 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:11:37 +0530 whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not. In fact, as aforenoted, court(s), while exercising its appellate jurisdiction, is not only required to consider the question of law, rather, also question of facts to affirmatively reach a conclusion of guilt or innocence of an accused. In fact, it is trite law 3 that non-re- appreciation of the evidence on record in an appeal may affect the case of either the prosecution or even an accused. Needless to reemphasize that an appellate court is to be further wary of fact that presumption of innocence of an accused, even extents until an accused is held guilty by the final court of appeal and that such a presumption is neither strengthened by acquittal nor weakened by a conviction in the trial court.
9. Therefore, being cognizant of the aforesaid principles, however, before proceeding with the determination of the rival contentions of the parties, this Court deems it pertinent here to reproduce the relevant provisions under law/IPC, for the purpose of present adjudication, as under;
"354A. Sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harassment-(1) A man committing any of the following acts-
(i) physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures; or
(ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or
(iii) showing pornography against the will of a woman; or
(iv) making sexually coloured remarks, shall be guilty of the offence of sexual harassment. (2) Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (i) or clause (ii) or clause (iii) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
(3) Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (iv) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term 3 State of Gujarat v. Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave, (2021) 2 SCC 735.C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 12 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.10.15 16:11:41 +0530 which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
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509. Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman-Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and also with fine"
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Conspicuously, it is observed from a perusal of the aforenoted provisions, in particular, from a scrupulous analysis of Section 354A IPC that the said provision envisages criminality against any man who engages in unwelcome physical contact and advances explicit sexual behavior, demands sexual favors, shows pornography against a woman's will, or makes sexually colored remarks. In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to make note of the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in V. Madhusoodhanan v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC Online Ker 6867 , wherein the Hon'ble Court, while explicating the basic ingredients and contours of the provisions under Section 354A IPC, noted as under;
"8. ...On reading the penal provision, the same deals with sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harassment. It has been specifically provided that if a man commits an act of physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures, the same is an offence under Section 354A(1)(i) of IPC. When a man commits an act and makes a demand or request for sexual favour, the same is an offence under Section 354A(1)(ii) of IPC. Similarly, when a man commits an act showing pornography against the will of a woman, the same also is an offence under Section 354A(1)(iii) of IPC. Coming to Section 354A(1)(iv) of IPC, any man C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 13 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:11:47 +0530 making sexually coloured remarks to a woman is guilty of the offence of sexual harassment..."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Here, this Court further deems it pertinent to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi 4 in T. Manikadan v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2017 SCC Online Del 6440, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while inter alia explicating the ingredients of offences under Section 354 and 354A IPC and the difference between the said provisions, noted as under;
"9. Thus when the modesty of a woman is outraged or it is likely to be outraged coupled with an assault or criminal force, Section 354 IPC would be attracted. Though assault can be by mere gesture or preparation intending or knowing that it is likely that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend use of criminal force. This is an act more than mere physical contact with advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures. Ingredients of Section 354 IPC would show that the same mandate an actus reas of assault or criminal force with an intention to outrage or likely to outrage the modesty whereas a mere physical contact with advances as noted above would attract Section 354A IPC. Though in certain fact situations there may be cases where there may be an overlap of both Sections 354 and 354A IPC however, there may be cases which may exclusively fall either in Section 354 or Section 354A IPC. Once an offence falls under Section 354 IPC even if ingredients of Section 354A IPC are satisfied, the accused will be punished for Section 354 IPC the same being more serious in nature as it prescribes the minimum sentence of one year and term for imprisonment which may extend to five years."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. In as much as the applicability/culpability under Section 509 IPC is concerned, prosecution is inter alia required to prove, '(i) intention on the part of an accused to insult the 4 Amit @ Lalu v. State, Crl. Appeal No. 858/2016, dated 25.05.2017 (DHC).
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modesty of a woman; and that the (ii) insult must be caused by;
(a) uttering any words, or making any sound or gesture, or exhibiting any object intending that such word or sound shall be heard or that the gesture or object shall be seen by such woman, or (b) by intruding upon the privacy of such a woman' . Relevantly, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Varun Bhatia v. State, 2023 SCC Online Del 5288, while explicating the contours of the provisions under Section 509 IPC, noted as under;
"18. Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code delineates two pivotal components for establishing an offence: firstly, the presence of an intention to insult the modesty of a woman, and secondly, the manner in which this insult is perpetrated. The cornerstone of this provision is the requirement of intent, where the accused must possess a deliberate intention to affront or insult the modesty of a woman. This intent sets apart ordinary speech or actions from those that amount to an offence under Section 509. The insult itself can take place through two distinct modes. It can occur verbally or visually by uttering specific words, making sounds, or displaying gestures or objects, with the deliberate intent that these words, sounds, gestures, or objects are heard or seen by the woman involved. Alternatively, insult can manifest as an intrusion upon the woman's privacy, meaning thereby encroaching upon her personal space or violating her sense of privacy intentionally, in a manner that affronts her modesty. In essence, Section 509 emphasizes that intent is the linchpin of this offence, necessitating a deliberate affront to a woman's modesty for the Section to be invoked.
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21. In essence, both Section 354 and Section 509 of Indian Penal Code addressed the issue of outraging the modesty of a woman, but they do so in distinct ways. Section 354 primarily deals with cases involving physical assault or the use of force against a woman, wherein her modesty is violated through actions that involve direct contact or physical harm. On the other hand, Section 509 concerns instances where words, gestures, or acts are employed with the deliberate intent to insult or offend a woman's modesty, without necessarily involving physical force. This distinction in legal provisions reflects the C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 15 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.10.15 16:12:05 +0530 recognition that outraging a woman's modesty can take various forms, both physical and verbal, and the law seeks to address each of these forms distinctly to ensure justice and protection for women in different situations. In the present case, the complainant has raised allegations solely under Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused.
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34. 'Modesty of women' refers to a culturally and socially defined set of behaviors, manners, and dress codes that are intended to preserve a woman's sense of privacy, decency, and dignity. It encompasses the idea of maintaining a respectful and reserved demeanor, particularly in terms of appearance to safeguard a woman's personal space, honor, and reputation. The concept of modesty can vary across different cultures and societies and is often associated with norms related to interactions, and conduct in public and private settings. It is rooted in the belief that certain behaviors and appearances are deemed appropriate to protect a woman's honor and prevent any potential harm or exploitation.
*** *** ***
65. Insulting a woman or being rude to her and not behaving with her as she would have expected you to behave in a chivalrous manner will not be covered under the definition of outraging the modesty of a woman, depending on facts and circumstances of each case...."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Germane for the purposes of present discourse to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 4 SCC 371, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while inter alia cogitating on the meaning of the term, 'modesty', though in the context of provisions under Section 354 IPC, inter alia remarked as under;
"12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined. The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this Section is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex. The act of pulling a woman, removing her C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 16 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:12:08 +0530 saree, coupled with a request for sexual intercourse, is such as would be an outrage to the modesty of a woman; and knowledge, that modesty is likely to be outraged, is sufficient to constitute the offence without any deliberate intention having such outrage alone for its object. As indicated above, the word 'modesty' is not defined in IPC. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (Third Edn.) defines the word 'modesty' in relation to woman as follows:
"Decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or lowe; Shame-fast, Scrupulously chast."
*** *** ***
14. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language defines modesty as "freedom from coarseness, indelicacy or indecency; a regard for propriety in dress, speech or conduct". In the Oxford English Dictionary (1933 Edn.), the meaning of the word 'modesty' is given as "womanly propriety of behavior; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct (in man or woman); reverse or sense of shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or coarse suggestions"..."
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Concomitantly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Major Singh, 1966 SCC Online SC 51, whist confronted with the issue, 'whether a female child of seven-and- a-half months could be said to be possessed of 'modesty' which could be outraged', remarked as under;
"15. I think that the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The modesty of an adult female is writ large on her body. Young or old, intelligent or imbecile, awake or sleeping, the woman possesses a modesty capable of being outraged. Whoever uses criminal force to her with intent to outrage her modesty commits an offence punishable under Section 354. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive, as for example, when the accused with a corrupt mind stealthily touches the flesh of a sleeping woman. She may be an idiot, she may be under the spell of anaesthesia, she may be sleeping, she may be unable to appreciate the significance of the act; nevertheless, the offender is punishable under the section."
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
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(Emphasis supplied)
15. Nonetheless, at this stage, this Court deems it further pertinent to note that the superior courts have persistently avowed that in order for the provisions under Section 509 IPC to be invoked, merely insulting a woman is not sufficient, rather, insult to the modesty of a woman is an essential ingredient of the said provision. In this regard, the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in Abhijeet J.K. v. State of Kerala, 2020 SCC Online Ker 703 , in unambiguous terms, noted as under;
"8. Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code provides that, whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and also with fine.
9. Utterance of any word or making of any sound or gesture by a person, intending to insult the modesty of a woman, attracts the offence punishable under Section 509 I.P.C., if such act was made intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture shall be seen by such woman.
10. There is distinction between an act of merely insulting a woman and an act of insulting the modesty of a woman. In order to attract Section 509 I.P.C., merely insulting a woman is not sufficient. Insult to the modesty of a woman is an essential ingredient of an offence punishable under Section 509 I.P.C. The crux of the offence is the intention to insult the modesty of a woman.
11. Section 509 I.P.C. criminalises a 'word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman' and in order to establish this offence it is necessary to show that the modesty of a particular woman or a readily identifiable group of women has been insulted by a spoken word, gesture or physical act (See Khushboo v. Kanniammal: (2010) 5 SCC 600: AIR 2010 SC 3196)."
(Emphasis supplied) C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 18 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.10.15 16:12:15 +0530
16. Quite evidently, for a prosecution under Section 509 IPC to sustain, it is imperative that there are definite allegations of insult to the modesty of woman or intrusion into her privacy and that merely insulting a woman is different from insulting the modesty of woman. Clearly, in the former case, the allegations would fall short to even make a prima facie case for the offence under Section 509 IPC. Reference, in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in Basheer v. State of Kerala, 2014 SCC Online Ker 6013 , wherein the Hon'ble Court, while quashing a proceeding under Section 509 IPC, remarked as under;
"3. The learned Magistrate, and also the learned Sessions Judge erred in law to find that this prosecution can proceed under Section 509 IPC. Mere insult will not attract Section 509 IPC. For a prosecution under Section 509 IPC there must be a definite allegation of insult to the modesty of woman or intrusion into the privacy of woman. Thus the allegation must involve modesty of woman or privacy of woman. Mere insult or false allegation will not attract a prosecution under Section 509 IPC. In Annexure A2 complaint the 2nd respondent does not have a case that the petitioners herein had insulted her modesty as a woman, or that they had intruded into her privacy in any manner. If at all the petitioners had spread or published any insulting and defamatory matters, she can initiate prosecution for defamation under Section 500 IPC, provided, the allegations would come under the definition of defamation under Section 499 IPC. Any way mere insult or insulting words, or abuse will not attract a prosecution under Section 509 IPC. In this case there is absolutely nothing in the complaint preferred by the 2nd respondent, or in the final report submitted by the police to indicate that the petitioners had in any manner insulted her modesty or intruded into her privacy. Merely insulting a woman is different from insulting the modesty of woman. The subject of insult for a prosecution under Section 509 IPC must be the modesty of woman and not the woman as such. When there is nothing to make out the essential elements of the offence under Section 509 IPC, the C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 19 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.10.15 16:12:18 +0530 prosecution against the petitioners cannot proceed under the law. I find that the present prosecution is an abuse of legal and judicial process. If at all the 2nd respondent has a grievance or complaint that the petitioners herein had made or published any defamatory material against her alleging misappropriation of amount, she will have to pursue appropriate remedy, if at all such allegations would constitute the offence of defamation. The present prosecution cannot proceed because the complaint does not contain the essential elements or ingredients of the offence under Section 509 IPC."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Ergo, in light of the foregoing understanding, this Court would now proceed with the evaluation of the material placed on record, in particular, the testimonies of various witnesses before the Ld. Trial Court. In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly note that the fulcrum of the prosecution's case vest on the testimony of the complainant/prosecutrix/'P'/PW-3, who inter alia asserted in her deposition that on 25th day of some month, three years prior to her deposition, she was returning to her house from her work. Further, as per PW-3, at around 08:40 p.m., when she reached 2- 3 lanes near her house, the appellant was standing there with his friends. It was further proclaimed by PW-3 that the appellant, namely, Ram Kishan abused her/PW-3 and caught hold of her/PW-3's hand. Correspondingly, it was avowed by PW-3 that she rescued herself from the appellant, whereupon he/the appellant abused her/PW-3 by calling bad words for her/PW-3's parents. PW-3 further proclaimed that thereafter, she reached her house and narrated the entire incident to her parents. Further, as per PW-3, while she was narrating the incident to her parents, appellant's family also reached at her/PW-3's house and started quarreling with them. Consequently, as per PW-3, call was made C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 20 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:12:21 +0530 by her/PW-3's father to the police at 100 number, whereafter, the police reached at the spot and she/PW-3 along with her parents went to the police station. PW-3 also asserted that she tendered her complaint (Ex. PW3/A) as well as informed about the place of incident to the Investigation Officer/IO and he prepared the site plan (Ex. PW3/B). It was further testified by PW-3 that her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. ( Ex. PW3/C) was also got recorded before the concerned Ld. MM. Needless to mention that the prosecutrix correctly identified the appellant as the accused/perpetrator during the course of his deposition before the Ld. Trial Court. Further, upon a leading question being posed by Ld. Addl. PP for the State, PW-3 affirmed that the date of occurrence was 25.10.2017.
18. Markedly, upon being cross-examined, by/on behalf of the appellant, PW-3 asserted as under;
"XXXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for the accused.
It is correct that my house and the house of the accused are situated nearby. At the time of incident, I was doing job as Compounder in a clinic of Dr. J.D. Gupta, situated in Main Bazar in front of Sai Mandir. When I reached near hotel Presidency, accused was present there along with his friends. I do not know the friends of the accused. No one helped me. I had told the same to the police. Police had not investigated from the Panwala etc. in my presence. At that time, accused was in drunken condition. It is correct that the accused was also reached along with his family at my house for quarrel. Police reached at the spot within 15-20 minutes after the 100 number call. I had not called from the spot the police as I firstly wanted to tell my parents about the incident. The family of accused reached my house after about 20 minutes when I reached my house. I had told the incident to my parents. It is correct that on 25.10.2017, accused along with his family also went to the PS. Police has not arrested the accused. Police had only interrogated the accused. I do not know whether the police had medically examined the C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 21 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:12:24 +0530 accused or not for his drunkenness. My family and the family of the accused were remained in the PS for about one hour. I do not remember when the police arrested the accused. It is wrong to suggest that being neighbours, we used to quarrel with each other. It is wrong to suggest that prior to the indent, we had quarreled regarding the fact that accused used to drink and misbehave with me and my family. It is wrong to suggest that accused had not caught my hand. It is wrong to suggest that there was huge noise from the house of the accused and my family was furious over the noise and due to which, we had framed a false case against the accused. It is wrong to suggest that on 25.10.2017, police had not registered the FIR, as nothing has happened with me. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely at the instance of the IO..."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Apposite at this stage to further refer to the deposition of PW-4/SI Raj Kumar, who proclaimed that on 25.10.2017, while being on emergency duty at PS. Nabi Karim, DD No. 37A (Ex. PW1/D1) was marked to PW-4 by the SHO regarding a quarrel. Consequently, PW-4 is asserted to have reached at H. No. 8460, Arya Nagar, Pahar Ganj, Nabi Karim, Delhi, where he/PW-4 met with the prosecutrix and her parents. PW-4 further avowed that he recorded the statement of the prosecutrix (Ex. PW3/A) and prepared tehrir over it (Ex. PW1/A). Consequently, as per PW-4, the rukka was handed over to the Duty Officer for the registration of the FIR. Further, as per PW-4, thereafter, the investigation in the present case was marked to IO W/ASI Babita. As per PW-4, on 01.11.2017, investigation in the present case was again marked to him/PW-4 by the order of SHO. On that day, as per PW-4, the appellant came to the police station, whereupon investigation of matter was carried out. Thereafter, PW-4 along with Ct. Mahendra and the appellant are asserted to have visited appellant's house, where C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 22 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:12:28 +0530 his/appellant's identity and address were verified and he/the appellant was arrested vide arrest memo Ex. PW2/A. Concomitantly, PW-4 proclaimed that he also recorded the disclosure statement of the appellant (Ex. PW2/B) as well as recorded the statement of Ct. Mahendra under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Needless to mention, PW-4 duly identified the appellant as accused/perpetrator before the Ld. Trial Court. Relevantly, in her cross examination, PW-4 deposed, as under;
"XXXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for the accused.
After receiving the PCR call, I reached at the house of the complainant within 10-15 minutes. Firstly, the house of the complainant is situated when we went from the PS to the house of the complainant and then the house of the accused is situated. I remained at the house of the complainant till I recorded her statement. I left the house of the complainant alone after recording her statement. At that time, I did not visit the house of the accused. Complainant told the address of the accused to me in her statement. It is wrong to suggest that after recording the statement of the complainant, I along with the family of the complainant as well as family of the accused came to the PS. It is wrong to suggest that the accused has been falsely implicated in the present case. I did not verify the mobile number mentioned in DD no.37A. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely."
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Notably, PW-1/ASI Dharambir Singh proclaimed before the Ld. Trial Court that on 25.10.2017, at around 10:30 p.m., SI Raj Kumar handed over one rukka to him/PW-1 for the registration of FIR. Consequently, as per PW-1, he made an endorsement on the complaint, and endorsed at point X on the tehrir vide Ex. PW1/A. Further, as per PW-1, he got the case registered from the computer operator on duty, which was registered under his/PW-1's supervision and directions. It was C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 23 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.10.15 16:12:31 +0530 further avowed by PW-1 that one of the print outs of the instant FIR was attached in the FIR register, maintained at the police station as per rules. PW-1 further produced the register containing the instant FIR (Ex. PW1/B) before Court and after registration of the FIR, he/PW-1 handed over the signed copy of the FIR and original rukka to Ct. Moninder, who further handed over the same to W/ASI Babita. PW-1 further proved the certificate under Section 65B of Indian Evidence Act, 1872/Evidence Act as Ex. PW1/C. Markedly, under his cross examination, PW-1 affirmed that he also recorded DD No. 37A (Ex. PW1/D1) and handed over the said DD to Ct. Moninder at around 08:40 p.m. for giving it further to SI Raj Kumar. However, it was denied by PW-1 that he did not receive any rukka and tehrir and also denied that the IO himself prepared the said documents in the police station.
21. Germane for the purpose of the present discourse to also refer to the deposition of PW-2/Ct. Mahendra Kumar, who deposed before the Ld. Trial Court that on 01.11.2017, he was posted at PS Nabir Karim as Constable and on the said day, the IO/SI Raj Kumar, joined him/PW-2 in the investigation of the present case. Further, as per PW-2 at around 10:30 p.m. SI Raj Kumar called the appellant, who was correctly identified by PW-2 in Court, to the police station and thereafter, he/PW-2 along with SI Raj Kumar as well as the appellant went to H. No. 8462, Arya Nagar, Nabi Karim, Delhi. There, as per PW-2, SI Raj Kumar arrested the appellant vide arrest memo (Ex. PW2/A) and recorded his disclosure statement (Ex. PW2/B). Apposite here to further refer the cross examination of PW-2, as under;
C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 24 of 41
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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"XXXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for the
accused.
It is correct that IO / SI Raj Kumar has recorded my statement under Section 161 Cr.PC at the spot. It is correct that the fact regarding 'going to spot along with the accused' is not mentioned in my statement u/s 161 Cr.PC. We had left the PS for the spot at around 10:30 PM. It is wrong to suggest that all the proceedings have been done while sitting in the PS and accused himself come to the PS. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely."
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Apposite to further refer to the deposition of PW-5/ W/ASI Babita, who testified that on 25.10.2017, she was posted at PS Nabi Karim as W/ASI and on the said day, the duty officer handed over original tehrir and copy of FIR of the present case, with instructions to investigate the present case. Consequently, as per PW-5, she along with the copy of FIR went to the prosecutrix's house, where she met with the complainant. Further, as per PW-5, at the said spot, she prepared the site plan (Ex. PW3/B) at the instance of the prosecutrix. Correspondingly, as per PW-5, in the meanwhile, she received a call from the police station that NGO had reached the PS, leading to her/PW-5's return to the police station with the prosecutrix, where her counseling was conducted. PW-5 also avowed that she recorded the statement of the prosecutrix under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as well as received her counseling report (Mark A). Concomitantly, PW-5 asserted that on 02.11.2017, statement of the prosecutrix under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was got recorded before the Ld. MM.
23. Markedly, in her cross examination, PW-5 asserted, as under;
"XXXXXX by ***, Ld. Counsel for the accused.
C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 25 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.10.15 16:12:40 +0530
It is correct that the challan of the present case is registered. After completion of the investigation, challan was filed by me. It is correct that I had mentioned in my challan that on 01.11.2017, the investigation of this case was implemented by SI Raj Kumar, I wrote the same in my police challan. It is wrong to suggest that I got the police investigation on the same. I recorded the statement of complainant u/s 164 Cr. PC on the same day. I had not made any other witness however, I had done the investigation in the present case. It is wrong to suggest that I had framed a false and fabricated case against the accused. It is wrong to suggest that I had not prepared the site plan on the instance of complainant. It is wrong to suggest that I had not recorded any witnesses in the present case. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Consequently, in light of the foregoing this Court would proceed with the determination of the rival contentions raised by the parties before this Court. In this regard, it would be pertinent to outrightly deal with the contention/objection of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant, inter alia, to the effect that the conviction of the appellant could not have been premised on the sole testimony of the complainant/prosecutrix/victim/PW-3 'P' in the absence of corroboration from any independent witnesses. Appositely, in order to deal with the said contentions, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while dealing with evidentiary value of the sole victim/prosecutrix, noted as under;
"21. ...The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 26 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:12:43 +0530 corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations."
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Pertinent in respect of the foregoing to further refer to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pratap Singh, 2016 SCC Online Del 3207 , wherein the Hon'ble Court in an akin context observed, as under;
"17. It is now well-settled that conviction for an offence of rape/sexual assault can be based on the sole testimony of prosecutrix. if the same is found to be natural, trustworthy and worth being relied on. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars..."
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Demonstrably, it is observed from above that it is a settled law that conviction for an offence of sexual nature/one affecting modesty of woman, can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. In fact, even on a general principle, it has been recurrently avowed5 by superior courts in a catena of decisions that there is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness if the version of such a witness is clear and reliable, reason underlying the same being; 'the evidence has to be weighed and not counted'. Notably so, in the instances of sexual offences, courts have even gone on to the extent to appreciate and declare6 that to seek corroboration to the 5 Kusti Mallaiah v. State of A.P., (2013) 12 SCC 680.
6State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 and Munna v. State of M.P., (2014) 10 SCC 254 C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 27 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:12:47 +0530 testimony of the prosecutrix/victim, before relying upon the same would amount to adding insult to the injury sustained by such victim and have, consequently, deprecated such practice. Unmistakably, the reasons for the same can be easily inferred from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court 7 in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550, wherein the Hon'ble Court observed as under;
"17. We think it proper, having regard to the increase in the number of sex violation cases in the recent past, particularly cases of molestation and rape in custody, to remove the notion, if it persists, that the testimony of a woman who is a victim of sexual violence must ordinarily be corroborated in material particulars except in the rarest of rare cases. To insist on corroboration except in the rarest of rare cases is to equate a woman who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that her story of woe will not be believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars as in the case of an accomplice to a crime. Ours is a conservative society where it concerns sexual behaviour. Ours is not a permissive society as in some of the western and European countries. Our standard of decency and morality in public life is not the same as in those countries. It is, however, unfortunate that respect for womanhood in our country is on the decline and cases of molestation and rape are steadily growing. An Indian woman is now required to suffer indignities in different forms, from lewd remarks to eve-teasing, from molestation to rape. Decency and morality in public life can be promoted and protected only if we deal strictly with those who violate the societal norms. The standard of proof to be expected by the court in such cases must take into account the fact that such crimes are generally committed on the sly and very rarely direct evidence of a person other than the prosecutrix is available. Courts must also realise that ordinarily a woman, more so a young girl, will not stake her reputation by levelling a false charge concerning her chastity."7
Reference also made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in; Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217.
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
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(Emphasis supplied)
27. Concurrently, this Court is also cognizant of the fact that the incidents of sexual offences usually occur in secrecy, out of public gaze and even in the cases where witnesses to such events exit, they may not be forthcoming in supporting the prosecution's case. Unmistakably, under such circumstances, to discard the sole testimony of a prosecutrix/victim, consistent in material particulars and withstanding the rigors of cross- examination, would amount to causing gross prejudice as well as aggravating the plight of such victim/prosecutrix on one hand, while acting as impetus for the potential perpetrators of similar offences to proceed with their nefarious designs. Needless to mention the same would not only perpetuate a sense of blameworthiness in the prosecutrix/victim of such offences, rather, expose such a victim to stigmatization and penalization in the hands of the society despite the courage exhibited by her to speak out against her perpetrator. Indisputably, such a recourse would act antagonist to, both, the rule or law as well as the sense of justice, on which the entire criminal jurisprudence and rule of law are premised. Accordingly, the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the accused persons pertaining to the lack of corroboration in the testimony of the victim in the instant case, necessitates appreciation by this Court in light of the foregoing observations.
28. Correspondingly, in order to accurately appreciate the contention of Ld. Counsel for the accused persons pertaining to contradictions/discrepancies in the testimonies of various prosecution witnesses, it would be germane at this stage to explore the judicial precedents governing the law of contradictions in the testimony of the witness. In this regard, this C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 29 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.10.15 16:12:53 +0530 Court deems it apt to outrightly make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505, wherein the Hon'ble Court inter alia observed as under;
"10. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper- technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals..."
(Emphasis supplied)
29. Similarly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rammi v. State of M.P., (1999) 8 SCC 649, while dealing with similar issue, remarked as under;
"24. When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true witness can possibly escape from making some discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can successfully make his C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 30 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.10.15 16:12:56 +0530 testimony totally non-discrepant. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny."
(Emphasis supplied)
30. Patently, from a conjoint reading of the above, it is unambiguously deduced that minor discrepancies, which do not go into the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses, cannot be permitted to be annexed with any undue weight. In fact, it is trite law 8, the discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution and those which emanate due to normal errors of perception or observation should not be given importance and must necessarily be discarded. The rationale behind the same is quite obvious, as elucidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324, inter alia recording as under;
"30. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Where the omissions amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and other witnesses also make material improvement while deposing in the court, such evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. However, minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground on which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety. The court has to form its opinion about the credibility of the witness and 8 Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, 1988 Supp SCC 241 C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 31 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:13:00 +0530 record a finding as to whether his deposition inspires confidence.
"9. Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. But it can be one of the factors to test credibility of the prosecution version, when the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility." [Ed.: As observed in Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh, (2004) 9 SCC 186, p. 192, para 9.
Therefore, mere marginal variations in the statements of a witness cannot be dubbed as improvements as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in material particulars i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited..."
(Emphasis supplied)
31. Consequently, to recapitulate, in order to discard the testimony of a witness, it is imperative that the same is replete with material improvements, contradictions and variation. In contrast, law provides for due concession for marginal variations and normal discrepancies in the statement/testimony of a witness, which are bound to occur due to normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Ergo, in light of the foregoing, when the testimonies of the witnesses brought on record, in particular that of the complainant/PW-3/'P'/victim is scrupulously analyzed, it is observed that the victim unambiguously and consistently deposed that on 25th day of a month, around three years prior to her deposition, while she was returning to her house from her work and at around 08:40 p.m., had reached 2-3 lanes near her house, the appellant was present there along with his friends. Further, as noted herein, PW-3 further asserted that the appellant, abused her C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 32 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:13:03 +0530 and caught hold of her/PW-3's hand at that time and when she rescued herself, the appellant abused her/PW-3 by calling bad words for her/PW-3's parents. PW-3 further proclaimed that thereafter, she reached her house and narrated the entire incident to her parents and while she was narrating the incident to her parents, appellant's family also reached at her/PW-3's house and started quarreling with them. Consequently, as per PW-3, call was made by her/PW-3's father to the police at 100 number, whereafter, the police reached at the spot and she/PW-3 along with her parents went to the police station. PW-3 also asserted that she tendered her complaint (Ex. PW3/A) as well as informed the lace of incident to the Investigation Officer/IO and he prepared the site plan (Ex. PW3/B). It was further testified by PW-3 that her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Ex. PW3/C) was also got recorded before the concerned Ld. MM. Needless to reiterate that upon leading question being posed by Ld. Addl. PP for the State, prosecutrix affirmed that the incident had happened on 25.10.2017. Pertinent to note that the complainant/PW-3 has thoroughly been consistent in her initial complaint (Ex. PW3/A) as well as her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., in as much as the incident in question is concerned. In fact, this Court is in concurrence with the observation of the Ld. Trial Court that the complainant, steadily deposed inter alia regarding the appellant's holding her hand on the said date and of her rescuing herself from the appellant as well as of the appellant's abusing her by calling bad words for her parents. Correspondingly, this Court further concurs with the observation of the Ld. Trial Court that nothing material has come forth despite the cross examination of the complainant, at the behest of C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 33 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.10.15 16:13:06 +0530 the appellant. Clearly, under such circumstances, even in the considered opinion of this Court, the appellant has not been able to shake the creditworthiness of the deposition of the complainant in the instant case.
32. Simultaneously, this Court also concedes with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the defence led by the appellant before the Ld. Trial Court has not been proved by the appellant either by adducing evidence/witnesses or by even producing any supportive document, affirming that he was in fact the victim in the instant case. At the same time, this Court further noted that the 'so called' discrepancies/inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainant, in the considered opinion of this Court, are not material or significant so as to belie the sterling nature of her deposition before the Ld. Trial Court. However, notwithstanding the foregoing, this Court finds itself difficult to concede with/yield to the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that from the material placed on record, in particular, from a conscientious analysis of the deposition of PW-3/prosecutrix, ingredients of offences are proved 'beyond reasonable doubt' against the appellant herein. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the prosecutrix/PW-3 merely asserted under her testimony that the appellant abused her and caught hold of her hand, when she was returning to her home at around 08:40 p.m., on the fateful day and that when she rescued herself from the appellant, "...accused abused me again by calling bad words for my parents...". Clearly, except from such assertion, nothing is forthcoming under the deposition of PW-3 that appellant's unwelcome touch/grabbing of her/PW-3's hand, accompanied with any explicit sexual overtures from the end of the appellant. Needless C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 34 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:13:10 +0530 to mention that though, PW-3 asserted that the appellant abused her and upon her withdrawal, called bad words for her/PW-3's parents. However, despite such avowal, the nature and tenor of words spoken by the appellant or the abuses hurled or whether or not the acts of the appellant or the words uttered by him towards the prosecutrix, in fact, encompassed any sexual overtures/sexual entreaty is not forthcoming anywhere under the deposition of PW-3. Needless to further mention that the same is notwithstanding the fact that the law is trite that mere physical contact, without an intention to outrage modesty of the woman would not in itself, constitute the commission of offence under Section 354A of IPC. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court (Kalaburagi Bench) in Lokesh v. State of Karnataka, Crl. Appeal No. 200082/2019, dated 11.07.2023, wherein the Hon'ble Court, whilst being confronted with an akin conundrum, remarked as under;
"16. To constitute an offence punishable under Section 354A of IPC, a man must have committed the act of physical contact involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures. In the instant case, the allegation is that the accused held the hands of the victim, however, there is no allegation that, the same involved unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures. Mere physical contact without an intention to outrage modesty of the woman would not alone constitute the commission of offence under Section 354A of IPC, unless the same involves unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures. Hence, the conviction of the offence punishable under Section 354A of IPC is also not sustainable."
(Emphasis supplied)
33. Congruently, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Madras High Court in Murugesan v. Inspector of Police, Samayanallur Circle, Sholavanthan Police Station, Madurai C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 35 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:13:13 +0530 District, Crl. A. (MD) No. 117 of 2018, dated 15.07.2025 , wherein the Hon'ble Court, while setting aside the conviction of an accused therein, under Section 354 IPC inter alia noted that pulling of a woman's hand is not enough to prove the offence of outraging modesty (under Section 354 IPC), without proof of requisite mens rea. Appoiste to reproduce the relevant extracts from the said dictate, as under;
"19. Even the statement of the witnesses are vague and generalized manner, from which, it is difficult to infer the knowledge of the accused that he is aware that he was trying to outrage the modesty of the woman and did it with that intention. In the absence of any other evidence as to incidental conversation, it is not known whether the accused had pulled the hands of the victim with the only intention of outraging her modesty.
*** *** ***
22. Though pulling the hands of a woman by a man would throw shock to the sense of decency of a woman, that should be coupled with the criminal intention of the accused. If the accused had any other intention like pulling the victim away from the center of a road or to assert any other accident that cannot be considered as commission of an offence of outraging the modesty without a detailed and clear evidence about the intention, it can be presumed automatically from any generalized or vague statements given in the evidence. Such vague or generalized statements will only earn a benefit of doubt in favour of the accused as regards his criminal intention to commit the offence. Though the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the intention, the learned trial Judge did not appreciate the same properly..."
(Emphasis supplied)
34. Consequently, this Court reiterates that when the facts of the present case are meticulously evaluated, PW-3 merely avowed that the appellant grabbed hold of her hand and on her withdrawal, abused her. However, as aforenoted, except for such general declaration, nothing is forthcoming on record of C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 36 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.10.15 16:13:17 +0530 the Ld. Trial Court so as to explicate whether the act of the appellant was attended with any explicit sexual overture, so as to bring the same within the purview of provisions under Section 354A IPC. Needless at this stage to reiterate, in light of the foregoing that one of the significant ingredients of the offence under Section 354A IPC is that the appellant physically contacted or advanced towards a victim, with unwelcome and explicit sexual overture. Clearly, the terms, 'explicit sexual overture', in this regard gain significant momentum for the said offence and the prosecution is inter alia obligated to prove that the accused's act were explicit, rather, than implicit in nature. Needless to mention that there may be instances where a victim/complainant may not like the acts of the accused or may not be comfortable with the same. However, in order to attribute criminality under Section 354A IPC, prosecution is required to prove/demonstrate that such acts of accused were entrenched with explicit sexual overtures. Reference in this regard is further made to the decision in Shanta Kumar v. Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, 2017 SCC Online Del 11388, wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in similar context, noted as under;
"15. Undoubtedly, physical contact or advances would constitute sexual harassment provided such physical contact is a part of the sexually determined behaviour. Such physical contact must be in the context of a behaviour which is sexually oriented. Plainly, a mere accidental physical contact, even though unwelcome, would not amount to sexual harassment. Similarly, a physical contact which has no undertone of a sexual nature and is not occasioned by the gender of the complainant may not necessarily amount to sexual harassment."
(Emphasis supplied)
35. Correspondingly, this Court finds itself difficult to C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 37 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.10.15 16:13:20 +0530 concur with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the ingredients of offence under Section 509 IPC are attracted against the appellant in the instant case, beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, this Court reiterates that except for the prosecutrix's assertion that the appellant, "...Accused Ram Kishan abused me and caught hold my hand..." and "...accused abused me again by calling bad words for my parents...", nothing else is forthcoming on record to demonstrate that the appellant, in fact, uttered any word, or made any sound or gesture, or exhibited any object, intending to insult the modesty of the prosecutrix and further, "... intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman...". Quite evidently, as aforenoted that not only are the allegations of abuse or bad words general in nature, rather, the prosecutrix has even failed to explicate what exact words were uttered by the appellant at the relevant point in time, so as to insult prosecutrix's modesty. Needless to mention in this regard that there is no evidence as to the 'so called' 'bad words' used by the appellant against the prosecutrix or her parents or the abuse hurled by the appellant against her, so as to give any indication whether the said abuses/bad words were meant to insult the modesty of the prosecutrix. As aforenoted, superior courts have persistently avowed that mere use/utterance of insult or insulting words, or abuse by an accused, would not be sufficient to attract the provisions under Section 509 IPC, bereft of any indication that such words/insults were meant to outrage the modesty of a woman. In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Madhushree Datta v. State of Karnataka, C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 38 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.10.15 16:13:23 +0530 (2025) 3 SCC 612, wherein the Hon'ble Court remarked in similar context, as under;
"29. The conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that it will be essential for this Court to carefully assess the evidence presented, in order to determine whether there is sufficient material to establish the intention and knowledge on the part of the appellants, to insult the modesty of the complainant or, to put it pithily, whether any act was intended to shock the sense of decency of the complainant being a woman.
30. The term "filthy language", when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant's modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section 509IPC. Had there been references to specific words used, contextual details, or any gestures--whether preceding, succeeding, or accompanying these words--that could demonstrate a criminal intent to insult the modesty, and it might have assisted the prosecution in establishing the case against the appellants."
(Emphasis supplied)
36. Clearly, upshot of the foregoing discussion is that though, the prosecutrix has been consistent in her deposition regarding the alleged incident, as aforenoted, in her deposition before the Ld. Trial Court as well as her earlier statements under Sections 161/164 Cr.P.C., however, despite the same, in the considered opinion of this Court, prosecution has not been able to prove ingredients of offences/charges levelled against the appellant herein. As aforenoted, mere grabbing of hand of the prosecutrix without any acts/correspondingly incident demonstrating explicit sexual overtures on the part of the appellant as well as mere assertion of the prosecutrix that the appellant abused her and used bad words against her parents, without explicating the exact words used by the appellant are not, in the considered opinion of this Court, sufficient to attribute C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 39 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:13:26 +0530 criminality against the appellant under Section 354A and Section 509 IPC, respectively.
37. Consequently, in conspectus of the above and inter alia keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the present case, in light of the arguments addressed and the legal provisions/judicial precedents, in the considered opinion of this Court, prosecution has been unable to prove the requisite mens rea on the part of the appellant to attribute criminality against the appellant for the offences with which he had been charged. On the contrary, in light of the foregoing, it is reasonably deduced that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond pale of doubt in the instant case. Needless to further mention at this stage that it is trite law9 that if two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused and the other adversely against it, the view favoring the accused must be accepted.
38. Accordingly, in light of the foregoing explication/ discussion, the present appeal deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. Consequently, the judgment dated 24.09.2019 and the consequent order of sentence dated 18.10.2019, passed by Ld. MM (Mahila Court)-01, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in case bearing 'State v. Ram Kishan, Crl. Case No. 8307/2018', arising out of FIR No. 319/2017, PS. Nabi Karim, under Sections 354A/509 IPC, convicting and sentencing the appellant, respectively, in the manner as hereinunder noted, are hereby set aside. The appellant is hereby admitted to bail on him furnishing of a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand only) along with one surety of the like amount, to the satisfaction of this Court, as required under section 437A 9 Raghunath v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 398 C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 40 of 41 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:13:30 +0530 Cr.P.C./Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ('BNSS' for short). Further, as requested, the bail bond(s) be furnished by the appellant, within a period of ten days from the date of this judgment
39. Trial Court Record be sent back along with a copy of this judgment.
40. Appeal file be consigned to record room after due compliance. Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.10.15 16:13:34 +0530 Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal) on 15.10.2025. ASJ-03, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi C.A. No. 455/2019 Ram Kishan v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page 41 of 41