Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Blue Sea Ventures Llp vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 31 March, 2026
APHC010086152026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3521]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
TUESDAY,THE THIRTY FIRST DAY OF MARCH
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
WRIT PETITION NO: 5034/2026
Between:
1.BLUE SEA VENTURES LLP, REP. BY ITS DESIGNATED PARTNER,
IDUPULAPATI SRINIVASA RAO, S/O I RADHAKRISHNA MURTHY,
ADDRESS GROUND FLOOR, LOTUS APARTMENT, BS LAYOUT,
SEETHAMMADHARA,VISAKHAPATNAM.
2.TIGERWOODS PROJECTS LLP, REP. BY ITS DESIGNATED
PARTNER, IDUPULAPATI SRINIVASA RAO, S/O I RADHAKRISHNA
MURTHY, ADDRESS GROUND FLOOR, LOTUS APARTMENT, BS
LAYOUT, SEETHAMMADHARA, VISAKHAPATNAM
3.IDUPULAPATI SRINIVASA RAO, S/O I RADHAKRISHNA MURTHY,
AGED 56 R/O F.NO.2511 B BLOCK, LASSUM OXYGEN TOWERS,
SEETHAMMADHARA, VISAKHAPATNAM.
4.IDUPULAPATI MADHAVI, W/O IDUPULAPATI SRINIVASA RAO R/O
F.NO.2511 B BLOCK, LASSUM OXYGEN TOWERS,
SEETHAMMADHARA, VISAKHAPATNAM.
...PETITIONER(S)
AND
1.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, DEPARTMENT OF HOME, REP.
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, SECRETARIAT BUILDINGS,
VELAGAPUDI, AMARAVATI.522237
2.THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, A.P. POLICE
HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI ANDHRA PRADESH.522503
3.THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, VIJAYAWADA, NTR
2
W.P.No.5034 of 2026
31.03.2026
Dr.YLR,J
DISTRICT.520002
4.THE ASST COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, CENTRAL DIVISION, NTR
POLICE COMMISSIONERATE, VIJAYAWADA.
5.THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER, PATAMATA POLICE STATION, NTR
DISTRICT. 520007
6.THE HDFC BANK, REP. BY ITS BRANCH MANAGER
SEETHAMMADHARA BRANCH, SEETHAMMADHARA,
VISAKHAPATNAM.530013
7.THE ICICI BANK, REP. BY ITS BRANCH MANAGER
SEETHAMMADHARA BRANCH, KRM COLONY MAIN ROAD,
SEETHAMMADHARA, VISAKHAPATNAM.530013
8.THE ICICI BANK, REP. BY ITS BRANCH MANAGER,
DWARAKANAGAR BRANCH, VISAKHAPATNAM.530013
...RESPONDENT(S):
Counsel for the Petitioner(S):
1.P VIVEK
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1.GP FOR HOME
2.KUNUKU RAJA SEKHAR
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
The Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following relief:-
"...to issue an order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of mandamus declaring the two notices dated i 21112025 u/s 106 BNSS issued by 4rt respondent and notice dated ii 12112025 u/s 94 BNSS issued by 5th respondent as without jurisdiction arbitrary illegal unjust malafide in violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India as well as principles of Natural Justice and consequently direct respondents 6 to 8 to defreeze the accounts of petitioners bearing nos 1 59299494454545 2 59109490444555 3 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J 3 50100238184931 4 249401000067 5 249401000812 6 006001037352 7 249405001523 8 249405001526 which were frozen in connection with Crime no 132 of 2025 of Patamata police station and to pass..."
2. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Home.
3. Sri P.Vivek, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the impugned notices directing debit freeze of the Petitioners' bank accounts are wholly without jurisdiction, arbitrary, and ex-facie illegal. The substratum of the dispute, as borne out from the record, emanates from contractual and commercial dealings relating to land transactions in Visakhapatnam. The belated registration of FIR nearly three years after the last alleged transaction, without preliminary enquiry, is in direct contravention of the binding guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P1. The Respondents, in registering the crime at Patamata Police Station, Vijayawada, despite the entire cause of action arising in Visakhapatnam, have acted beyond territorial jurisdiction, thereby vitiating the very foundation of the proceedings.
4. It is further urged that the action of the Respondent Police in invoking Sections 106 and 94 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity 'the BNSS') to freeze bank accounts is a manifest abuse of process. Section 106 of 'the BNSS' contemplates seizure of stolen property, whereas 1 (2014) 2 SCC 1 4 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J Section 107 of 'the BNSS' alone governs attachment of property alleged to be proceeds of crime, and such attachment can only be affected upon orders of the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate. The Respondents, by directing debit freeze without recourse to the learned Magistrate, have arrogated to themselves powers not vested in them under law. Likewise, Section 94 of 'the BNSS' merely enables summoning of documents for investigation and does not confer authority to freeze accounts. The impugned notices, therefore, are ultra vires, bereft of statutory sanction, and liable to be set aside.
5. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners would also emphasize that this Court, while granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioners in Criminal Petition No.9451 of 2025, has already observed that the dispute is essentially civil and commercial in nature, custodial interrogation is unnecessary, and serious jurisdictional infirmities exist in the registration of the FIR. In the teeth of such judicial pronouncement, the Respondents' subsequent action of freezing accounts amounts to coercive pressure to settle civil scores, which is impermissible in law. The continuation of the debit freeze has paralysed the Petitioners' business operations, obstructed statutory compliances, and inflicted grave financial hardship, thereby infringing their right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
6. Finally, it is submitted that the impugned notices, issued without recording reasons, offend the principles of natural justice and are discriminatory, thus violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The 5 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J freezing of both personal and business accounts, including those of LLPs engaged in construction activity, has caused disproportionate hardship and irreparable injury. The Petitioners have a prima facie case, the balance of convenience lies in their favour, and irreparable loss would ensue if relief is denied. In these circumstances, it is prayed to quash the impugned notices and direct immediate restoration of the Petitioners' bank accounts.
7. Sri P.Ajay Babu, learned Assistant Government Pleader would submit that the allegations in the FIR disclose a clear case of cheating, dishonest misappropriation of property, and criminal breach of trust. The complainant, who was a designated partner of the LLPs, entrusted substantial sums amounting to Rs.11,99,68,000/- to the Petitioners for the purpose of acquiring land in Visakhapatnam. While a portion of the funds was utilized to register 5.38 acres in favour of the LLP, the Petitioners, in breach of trust, diverted the remaining funds and fraudulently registered 9.5 acres in the name of their own firm, Blue Sea Ventures LLP. Such conduct squarely attracts the penal provisions of Sections 406, 420 of 'the I.P.C.,' and cognate offences. The plea of the Petitioners that the dispute is purely civil in nature is untenable, for the dishonest intention and fraudulent misappropriation are writ large on the face of the record. The police, therefore, acted within their lawful authority in registering the crime and initiating investigation.
8. It is thus contended by the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the Petitioners, having prima facie indulged in fraudulent diversion of funds, 6 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J cannot seek to thwart investigation by invoking writ jurisdiction. The freezing of accounts is a necessary step to secure the proceeds of crime and ensure restitution to victims. On behalf of Respondent Nos.7 and 8, it is reiterated that the banks have acted bona fide and in strict conformity with statutory obligations, without any independent discretion. In these circumstances, the Writ Petition is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed, affirming the validity of the police action and exonerating the banks from any alleged illegality. Eventually, it is urged to dismiss the Writ Petition.
9. Sri Kunuku Raja Sekhar, learned Counsel for Respondent Nos.7 & 8 submits that the banks are statutory entities bound to comply with directions issued by competent authorities in the course of investigation. Upon receipt of notices under Sections 106 and 94 of 'the BNSS' from the police, the banks were duty-bound to freeze the accounts to prevent further dissipation of funds alleged to be proceeds of crime. The banks have no adjudicatory role in determining the legality or otherwise of such notices, their function is purely ministerial. Any grievance of the Petitioners as to jurisdiction or legality of the police action must be agitated against the issuing authority, not against the banks who merely complied with binding directions. The banks, therefore, cannot be faulted or mulcted with liability for acting in obedience to statutory notices. Ultimately, it is beseeched to pass appropriate order in the interest of justice.
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10. Sri Madhava Rao Nalluri, learned Counsel for Respondent No.6 submits that upon receipt of the notices dated 21.11.2025 and 12.11.2025 issued under Sections 106 and 94 of 'the BNSS', by Respondent Nos.4 and 5 respectively, the Bank acted in a purely ministerial and non-discretionary capacity, implementing the debit freeze of the concerned accounts in strict and bona fide compliance with what appeared, on the face of the notices, to be lawful directions issued by officers of the State in exercise of their statutory powers, and that the Bank neither instigated, participated in, nor derived any benefit from the said freeze, its role being that of a neutral conduit bound by statutory compulsion and regulatory discipline, that it would be manifestly unjust, wholly inequitable, and contrary to established principles of banking law and institutional accountability to mulct the Bank with any liability, adverse finding, or punitive consequence for having discharged what it genuinely and reasonably believed, at the relevant point of time, to be its lawful and non- negotiable obligation to a law enforcement authority, particularly when the Bank possessed no independent mechanism to verify the jurisdictional competence of the issuing authority or the statutory correctness of the provision invoked, that the moment this Court is pleased to pass any order quashing the impugned notices and directing de-freezing of the accounts, the Bank shall, with utmost promptitude and in complete deference to the judicial mandate of this Court, restore full and unencumbered operational access to all the accounts in question, without any demur, delay, or condition whatsoever, 8 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J and that in view of the foregoing, the Respondent No.6 submits that this Court may be pleased to exonerate the Bank from all allegations of illegality, arbitrariness, or complicity in the impugned action, and may be further pass directions as this Court deems just and proper, ensuring that the Bank is protected from any civil or criminal liability arising out of its bona fide compliance with the said notices, in the interest of justice, equity, and sound judicial policy.
11. This Court has bestowed its anxious and careful consideration upon the rival contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the respective parties and has meticulously perused the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition, the impugned notices dated 21.11.2025 issued under Section 106 of 'the BNSS') by the Respondent No.4, the Assistant Commissioner of Police, and the notice dated 12.11.2025 issued under Section 94 of 'the BNSS' by the Respondent No.5, the Station House Officer, Patamata Police Station, Vijayawada, NTR District, directing debit freeze of eight bank accounts belonging to the Petitioners, including personal accounts of the Petitioner Nos.3 & 4 and the business accounts of Petitioner Nos.1 & 2-LLPs. The core constitutional and statutory questions that fall for consideration in the present writ proceeding are:
1. Whether the Respondent Police possessed the requisite statutory authority under Sections 94 and 106 of 'the BNSS' to issue unilateral notices directing debit freeze of bank accounts without prior judicial sanction?9 W.P.No.5034 of 2026
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2. Whether the registration of Crime No.132 of 2025 at Patamata Police Station, Vijayawada, in respect of a dispute arising entirely within the territorial limits of Visakhapatnam, is sustainable in law?
12. In this regard it is apposite to refer to the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court and other High Courts, relied on by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen2, at paragraph Nos.21 & 22 held as under:
"21. In the background of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, the line of precedents which have taken the position that "seizure orders" are vitiated for delay in compliance with the reporting obligation are declared to be manifestly erroneous and are accordingly, overruled. The relevant question to be determined was not whether the duty of the police to report the seizure to the Magistrate is mandatory or directory. Instead, what ought to have been inquired into was whether the exercise of the seizure power was subjected to compliance of reporting obligation, as illustrated in Section 105-ECrPC.
22. Merely because we have held that non-reporting of the seizure forthwith by the police officer to the jurisdictional court would not vitiate the seizure order, it would not mean that there would be no consequence whatsoever as regards the police officer, upon whom the law has enjoined a duty to act in a certain way. Since there is an obligation cast on the officer to report the seizure forthwith, it becomes necessary to understand the meaning of the expression "forthwith" as used in Section 102(3)CrPC. For, without a clear understanding of the said expression, the Magistrate would not be in a position to determine whether the obligation cast on the police officer has been properly complied with. In this background, the expression "shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate"
occurring in sub-section (3) of Section 102 requires to be examined."
13. Thus, in Shento Varghese supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court, while adverting to paragraphs 21 and 22 of the judgment, unequivocally held that the earlier line of authorities which proceeded on the premise that a delay in compliance with the statutory reporting obligation would per se vitiate a seizure order stood erroneously decided and were, therefore, expressly 2 (2024) 7 SCC 23 10 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J overruled. The Court clarified that the true test is not whether the obligation of the police to report the seizure to the learned Magistrate is to be characterised as mandatory or directory, but whether the exercise of the power of seizure itself was undertaken in consonance with the statutory requirement of reporting, as exemplified in Section 105- E of 'the Cr.P.C.' Further, the Hon'ble Court emphasised that although non- reporting of the seizure "forthwith" may not invalidate the seizure order, such omission is not without legal consequence for the police officer who is duty- bound to comply with the statutory mandate. For this purpose, the Court underscored the necessity of ascertaining the true import of the expression "forthwith" occurring in Section 102(3) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' observing that only upon a correct appreciation of this expression can the learned Magistrate determine whether the reporting obligation has been duly fulfilled in accordance with law.
14. The High Court of Kerala in Headstar Global (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala3, at paragraph Nos.12 & 13 held as under:
"12. Going by Section 107 of BNSS, a police officer investigating a crime has to approach the jurisdictional Magistrate seeking attachment of any property believed to be derived directly or indirectly from criminal activity or the commission of an offence. The Magistrate may thereupon order attachment after hearing all parties concerned or issue an interim order for attachment, if issuing notice to the owner will defeat the purpose of attachment and seizure. After confirming that the attached property is the proceeds of crime, the Magistrate can direct the District Magistrate to distribute the property among those affected by the crime. Thus Section 107 confers the jurisdictional Magistrates with explicit authority to act swiftly in cases involving proceeds of crime.3
2025 SCC OnLine Ker 3546 11 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J
13. Another aspect of importance is that, while Section 106 speaks of seizure, Section 107 deals with attachment, forfeiture and restoration. Seizure under Section 106 can be carried out by a police officer and an ex post facto report submitted to the Magistrate. On the other hand, attachment under Section 107 can be effected only upon the orders of the Magistrate. The logic behind this distinction being that the purpose of seizure is more to secure the evidence during an investigation, whereas attachment is intended to secure the proceeds of crime by preventing its disposal and thus ensuring its availability for legal procedure such as forfeiture and distribution to the victim/s."
15. Therefore, the High Court of Kerala in Headstar Global (P) Ltd. supra, eloquently elucidated that Section 107 of 'the BNSS' vests the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate with the exclusive and plenary authority to order attachment of property believed to constitute the proceeds of crime, the police officer being mandated to approach the Magistrate for such attachment, which may be ordered after affording an opportunity of hearing to all concerned or, in exigent circumstances where issuance of notice would defeat the very object of attachment, by way of an interim order; and upon confirmation that the property indeed represents proceeds of crime, the Magistrate may further direct its distribution through the District Magistrate to those aggrieved. The Court further drew a sharp doctrinal distinction between Section 106, which contemplates mere seizure by the Investigating Officer followed by an ex post facto report to the Magistrate, and Section 107, which governs attachment, forfeiture, and restoration, and which can be invoked only upon a reasoned order of the Magistrate. The rationale for this demarcation, as underscored by the Court, lies in the differing purposes of the provisions: seizure under Section 106 serves primarily to secure evidence necessary for investigation, 12 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J whereas attachment under Section 107 serves the higher statutory purpose of securing the alleged proceeds of crime by preventing their dissipation and ensuring their availability for forfeiture, restitution, and victim compensation, thus reinforcing the indispensable judicial oversight contemplated by the statutory scheme.
16. The High Court of Delhi in Malabar Gold & Diamond Ltd. v. Union of India4, at paragraph Nos.18 & 19 held as under:
"18. Thus, it is fairly trite now that Section 106 of the BNSS empowers the police only to seize property for evidentiary purposes and does not confer any authority to attach or debit- freeze bank accounts. Attachment or freezing of bank accounts, being measures directed at securing alleged proceeds of crime, can be undertaken only under Section 107 of the BNSS and strictly upon orders of a competent Magistrate, after following the prescribed procedural safeguards.
19. In light of these provisions, it is also pertinent to note that any blanket or disproportionate freezing of bank accounts, particularly where the account holder is neither an accused nor even a suspect in the offence under investigation, is manifestly arbitrary, and in the teeth of the fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) and 21 and of the Constitution of India, which encompass the right to livelihood and freedom to carry on trade and business. Such indiscriminate debit freezing, without any finding of complicity, has the inevitable effect of paralysing the day-to-day business operations of an otherwise innocent entity, resulting in loss of commercial goodwill and financial consequences, thereby subjecting a non-complicit account holder to punitive consequences."
17. Ergo, the High Court of Delhi in Malabar Gold & Diamond Ltd. supra, unequivocally reaffirmed that Section 106 of 'the BNSS' confers upon the police only a limited power of seizure for evidentiary purposes and does not, in any manner, authorise the attachment or debit- freezing of bank accounts, 4 2026 SCC OnLine Del 297 13 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J which are intrusive measures permissible solely under Section 107 of 'the BNSS' and only upon the issuance of a reasoned order by a competent Magistrate after strict adherence to the procedural safeguards contemplated by law. The Court further underscored that any blanket or disproportionate freezing of bank accounts, particularly in circumstances where the account holder is neither an accused nor even a suspect in the underlying criminal investigation, amounts to manifest arbitrariness and constitutes a direct infraction of the fundamental guarantees under Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India, which safeguard the right to livelihood and the freedom to carry on trade or business. Such indiscriminate and unbridled debit- freezing, bereft of any foundational finding of complicity, inevitably paralyses the day- to- day business operations of an otherwise innocent entity, erodes commercial goodwill, and inflicts severe financial prejudice, thereby subjecting a non- complicit account holder to consequences that are punitive in effect though wholly unjustified in law.
18. Learned Assistant Government Pleader has relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy5, wherein at paragraph Nos.6 & 12 held as under:
"6. A plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 102 indicates that the police officer has the power to seize any property which may be found under circumstances creating suspicion of the commission of any offence. The legislature having used the expression "any property"
and "any offence" have made the applicability of the provisions wide enough to cover offences created under any Act. But the two 5 (1999) 7 SCC 685 14 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J preconditions for applicability of Section 102(1) are that it must be "property" and secondly, in respect of the said property there must have been suspicion of commission of any offence. In this view of the matter the two further questions that arise for consideration are whether the bank account of an accused or of his relation can be said to be "property" within the meaning of sub-section (1) of Section 102 CrPC and secondly, whether circumstances exist, creating suspicion of commission of any offence in relation to the same. Different High Courts in the country have taken divergent views in this regard. In the case of Swaran Sabharwal v. Commr. of Police [1988 Cri LJ 241 (Del) (DB)] a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court examined the question whether a bank account can be held to be "property" within the meaning of Section 102 CrPC. In the said case, proceeds realised by sale of official secrets were deposited by the accused in his wife's account. The Court in that case came to hold that it is not quite sure whether monies deposited in a bank account can be seized by means of a prohibitory order under the provisions of Section 102 but even assuming that a bank account is a "property" within the meaning of Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the further consideration must be satisfied namely that the property has been found under circumstances which create the suspicion of the commission of an offence. But in that case it is not the discovery of the property that has created suspicion of commission of an offence but on the other hand the discovery of the bank account is a sequel to the discovery of commission of offence inasmuch as the police suspected that some of the proceeds realised by the sale of the official secrets have been passed on to the bank account of the wife of the accused. Therefore, the Court was of the opinion that the provisions of Section 102 cannot be invoked. In the case of Purbanchal Road Service v. State [1991 Cri LJ 2798 (Gau)] a learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court examined the provisions of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the validity of an order by a police officer, prohibiting the Bank from paying amount to the accused from his account. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the word "seize" used in Section 102 CrPC means actual taking possession in pursuance of a legal process and, therefore, in exercise of the said power, a bank cannot be prohibited not to pay any amount out of the account of the accused to the accused nor can the accused be prohibited from taking away any property from the locker, as such an order would not be a "seizure" within the meaning of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Single Judge agreed with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Textile Traders Syndicate Ltd. v. State of U.P. [AIR 1960 All 405 : 1960 Cri LJ 871] In the Allahabad case on which the Gauhati High Court relied upon (Textile Traders [AIR 1960 All 405 : 1960 Cri LJ 871] ), what was decided by the Court is, once money passes on from the accused to some other person or to the bank, money itself becomes unidentifiable and, therefore, there cannot be any question of seizure of the same by the police officer. 15 W.P.No.5034 of 2026
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12. Having considered the divergent views taken by different High Courts with regard to the power of seizure under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and whether the bank account can be held to be "property" within the meaning of the said Section 102(1), we see no justification to give any narrow interpretation to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is well known that corruption in public offices has become so rampant that it has become difficult to cope up with the same. Then again the time consumed by the courts in concluding the trials is another factor which should be borne in mind in interpreting the provisions of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the underlying object engrafted therein, inasmuch as if there can be no order of seizure of the bank account of the accused then the entire money deposited in a bank which is ultimately held in the trial to be the outcome of the illegal gratification, could be withdrawn by the accused and the courts would be powerless to get the said money which has any direct link with the commission of the offence committed by the accused as a public officer. We are, therefore, persuaded to take the view that the bank account of the accused or any of his relations is "property" within the meaning of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and a police officer in course of investigation can seize or prohibit the operation of the said account if such assets have direct links with the commission of the offence for which the police officer is investigating into. The contrary view expressed by the Karnataka, Gauhati and Allahabad High Courts, does not represent the correct law. It may also be seen that under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, in the matter of imposition of fine under sub-section (2) of Section 13, the legislatures have provided that the courts in fixing the amount of fine shall take into consideration the amount or the value of the property which the accused person has obtained by committing the offence or where the conviction is for an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13, the pecuniary resources or property for which the accused person is unable to account satisfactorily. The interpretation given by us in respect of the power of seizure under Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code is in accordance with the intention of the legislature engrafted in Section 16 of the Prevention of Corruption Act referred to above. In the aforesaid premises, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court of Bombay committed error in holding that the police officer could not have seized the bank account or could not have issued any direction to the bank officer, prohibiting the account of the accused from being operated upon. Though we have laid down the law, but so far as the present case is concerned, the order impugned has already been given effect to and the accused has been operating his account, and so, we do not interfere with the same."
19. Ergo, in Tapas D. Neogy supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court decisively held that Section 102(1) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' by its wide legislative sweep, empowers 16 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J the police to seize "any property," which includes bank accounts of an accused or their relations when such accounts exhibit a direct and proximate nexus with the alleged offence. Rejecting the restrictive interpretations adopted by the Delhi, Gauhati, and Allahabad High Courts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that excluding bank accounts from the purview of seizure would defeat the very object of Section 102 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' particularly in cases involving corruption and illicit monetary gains. The Court further harmonised this interpretation with the legislative intent underlying the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which contemplates scrutiny of pecuniary resources derived through unlawful means. While affirming the legality of freezing bank accounts under Section 102 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' the Court, in the factual circumstances of that case, refrained from interfering as the impugned order had already been acted upon and the account was operational.
20. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks6, authoritatively reiterated that although the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary, such discretion is neither arbitrary nor unstructured but is guided by self- imposed restraints evolved through constitutional jurisprudence. Ordinarily, the High Court refrains from exercising its writ jurisdiction where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy exists; however, this rule of alternative remedy is not an inflexible bar. The Apex Court has consistently carved out well- recognised exceptions 6 (1998) 8 SCC 1 17 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J wherein the existence of an alternate remedy does not preclude the invocation of writ jurisdiction, namely, (i) where the petitioner seeks enforcement of fundamental rights, (ii) where there is a violation of the principles of natural justice, and (iii) where the impugned action, order, or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or where the vires of a statute is under challenge. These exceptions, which trace their doctrinal roots to landmark precedents from the formative years of constitutional adjudication, continue to hold the field with undiminished vigour and serve to prevent the High Court's writ jurisdiction from being trapped in a "forensic whirlpool" of procedural rigidity.
21. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P7 has reaffirmed the well- settled principle that while the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is wide and discretionary, such discretion is exercised within the contours of self- imposed judicial restraints, foremost among them being the rule that a writ petition is ordinarily not maintainable where an efficacious and adequate alternative statutory remedy exists. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently recognised equally well- defined exceptions to this rule, namely: where the impugned action is in patent violation of the statutory mandate; where the authority has acted in defiance of fundamental principles of judicial procedure; or where the order has been passed in breach of the principles of natural justice. The Court has further emphasised that when the statute itself provides a comprehensive 7 (2021) 6 SCC 771 18 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J mechanism for redressal of grievances, or where a statutory appellate forum is available, the High Court should not entertain a writ petition in derogation of such statutory dispensation. These doctrinal principles, rooted in decades of constitutional jurisprudence, continue to govern the exercise of writ jurisdiction and ensure that Article 226 is invoked only in exceptional circumstances warranting judicial intervention.
22. At the threshold, it is imperative to advert to the constitutional jurisdiction invoked by the Petitioners. Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in its majestic amplitude, confers upon this Court the power to issue writs, orders, or directions to any person or authority, including the Government, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. It is now a settled proposition of constitutional law, enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a long and unbroken line of decisions, that where an executive or police action is shown to be without jurisdiction, arbitrary, or in violation of fundamental rights, the High Court is not only empowered but is indeed duty-bound to exercise its writ jurisdiction to protect the citizen against unlawful State action. The debit freeze of a bank account, far from being a mere administrative act, is a severe civil consequence that directly impinges upon the fundamental right to carry on trade and business guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, the right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and the right to equality before law under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As authoritatively held by the Hon'ble Supreme 19 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India8, the expression 'personal liberty' in Article 21 of the Constitution of India is of the widest amplitude and encompasses within its sweep the right to livelihood and the right to carry on a vocation. Any executive action that arbitrarily and disproportionately extinguishes these rights, without the authority of law and without adherence to the principles of natural justice, must necessarily succumb to the constitutional mandate of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This Court is further fortified in its view by the principle that judicial review of executive action is not merely a power but a constitutional obligation, particularly where the action of the State apparatus operates to coerce, harass, or pressurise citizens in matters that are essentially civil or commercial in character. The maintainability of the present Writ Petition is, therefore, beyond cavil, and the preliminary objection, if any, as to the exercise of writ jurisdiction in the present factual matrix is hereby overruled.
23. Turning to the first and foremost legal infirmity in the impugned action, this Court must closely examine the statutory framework of 'the BNSS' as applicable to the seizure and attachment of property in the course of a criminal investigation. Section 106 of 'the BNSS', which is the successor provision to Section 102 of the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, empowers a police officer to seize any property that is alleged or suspected to have been 8 (1978) 1 SCC 248 20 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J stolen, or which is found in circumstances that create suspicion of the commission of any offence.
24. The crucial and determinative feature of the power under Section 106 of 'the BNSS' is that it is a power of seizure, and not a power of attachment. The power contemplated under Section 106 of 'the BNSS' is exercisable in relation to tangible stolen property and pertains to the securing of evidence during investigation. The Respondents, however, have sought to employ Section 106 of 'the BNSS' to issue notices to banks directing a blanket debit freeze of all accounts held by the Petitioners, which, in the considered opinion of this Court, constitutes a manifest and fundamental misapplication of the provision.
25. The distinction between seizure under Section 106 of 'the BNSS' and attachment under Section 107 of 'the BNSS' is not a mere terminological subtlety but a substantive legal distinction of profound consequence. Section 107 of 'the BNSS', which corresponds to Section 102A of 'the Cr.P.C.,' as introduced by amendment, expressly deals with the attachment of property that is believed to constitute proceeds of crime. Critically, attachment under Section 107 of 'the BNSS' can only be effected upon orders of the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate, thereby ensuring judicial oversight over a grave step that directly interferes with a citizen's property rights.
26. The Respondent Police, by issuing unilateral notices directing debit freeze without approaching the learned Magistrate and without obtaining judicial sanction, have arrogated to themselves a power that the Legislature 21 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J has, in its wisdom, vested exclusively in the judiciary. This usurpation of judicial power by an executive authority is constitutionally impermissible and renders the impugned notices void ab initio. The law on this point has been extensively and authoritatively laid down by the High Court of Kerala in Headstar Global (P) Ltd. supra wherein it was categorically held that debit freeze of bank accounts amounts to attachment and not mere seizure, and that such action without the sanction of a learned Magistrate is without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed.
27. More importantly, this Court in M/S.Mineral On Ground v. State of A.P9, unequivocally held that an Investigating Officer is not vested with any unilateral or unfettered authority to direct the freezing of bank accounts in the absence of judicial sanction, and that any such coercive measure, particularly one having the effect of extinguishing commercial operations and paralysing the financial substratum of the affected party, must strictly conform to the statutory architecture embodied in Sections 94 and 107 of 'the BNSS'. This Court has held that while Section 94 of 'the BNSS' facilitates only the procurement of documents during investigation, the power to effect attachment or freezing of accounts inheres exclusively in the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate under Section 107 of 'the BNSS', and any deviation from this mandatory procedure renders the action wholly without jurisdiction. It has further been held that the executive cannot resort to blanket or 9 W.P.No.3870 of 2026 dated 31.03.2026 22 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J disproportionate freezing orders without identifying specific tainted amounts or establishing a demonstrable nexus between the alleged proceeds of crime and the accounts sought to be immobilised. This Court have additionally underscored that such actions, when taken without notice, without reasons, and without minimal compliance with principles of natural justice, amount to arbitrary State action violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Constitution of India, and that the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 must be exercised to nullify such ultra vires and coercive executive measures.
28. The second ground of invalidity, which is equally potent and decisive, relates to the misuse of Section 94 of 'the BNSS' by Respondent No.5 to direct the debit freeze of the Petitioners' accounts. Section 94 of 'the BNSS', which is substantially analogous to Section 91 of the erstwhile Cr.P.C., deals with the power to summon or require the production of any document or other thing that is necessary or desirable for the purpose of investigation, inquiry, or trial. The provision is, in its essential character, a procedural tool designed to facilitate the gathering of documentary evidence in the course of investigation. It empowers the police to summon bank statements, transaction records, and other documents for the purpose of scrutiny during investigation. It does not, expressly or by necessary implication, confer any power upon the police to direct banks to freeze accounts or to impose any restraint upon financial transactions. The language of Section 94 of 'the BNSS' is couched in terms of production of documents and not in terms of immobilisation or impoundment of 23 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J financial assets. To construe Section 94 of 'the BNSS' as conferring a power to freeze bank accounts would be to stretch the plain language of the statute beyond its natural and grammatical meaning, which is an interpretive exercise that is impermissible in law. As the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements10, penal and coercive provisions must be strictly construed, and no power can be assumed to exist in a statutory provision unless it is expressly granted or arises by necessary implication. The invocation of Section 94 of 'the BNSS' to justify a debit freeze, therefore, is without legal basis, and the notice dated 12.11.2025 issued by Respondent No.5 under the said provision is ex-facie illegal and must be set aside.
29. It is a well-established principle of constitutional jurisprudence that the executive cannot, by resorting to alternative modes of coercion, render illusory the protection extended by a court of law to a citizen. The impugned action must, therefore, be condemned as a colourable exercise of power, motivated not by any genuine investigative necessity but by the purpose of pressurising the Petitioners to settle what is, in substance, a civil commercial dispute, and is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It also bears emphasis that the continued debit freeze has caused complete paralysis of the business operations of the Petitioner Nos.1 & 2-LLPs, which are engaged in construction activity and are obligated to meet statutory compliances and salaries. The disproportionality of the freeze vis-à-vis any legitimate 10 (2005) 1 SCC 368 24 W.P.No.5034 of 2026 31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J investigative interest is self-evident and constitutes an independent ground for setting aside the impugned notices on the touchstone of proportionality, which is now firmly recognised as an essential component of the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh11.
30. In the result, for all the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned notice dated 21.11.2025 issued by the Respondent No.4 under Section 106 of 'the BNSS' and the notice dated 12.11.2025 issued by the Respondent No.5 under Section 94 of 'the BNSS', directing debit freeze of the Petitioners' bank accounts, are manifestly without jurisdiction, arbitrary, and ex-facie illegal, being violative of Sections 94, 106, and 107 of 'the BNSS', Article 14, and Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and the binding judicial precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
31. The Writ Petition is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned notices are hereby quashed and set aside. Respondent Nos.6, 7, and 8, being the banks concerned, are directed to forthwith de-freeze and restore full operational access to all eight bank accounts of the Petitioners after receipt of copy of this order.
32. It is clarified that this order shall not be construed as a bar to the Respondent Police from pursuing investigation in accordance with law, 11 (2016) 7 SCC 353.
25W.P.No.5034 of 2026
31.03.2026 Dr.YLR,J provided that any further steps to attach or restrain the Petitioners' properties shall be taken strictly in conformity with the procedure prescribed under Section 107 of 'the BNSS', or under any relevant provisions of any law in force by approaching the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate. The Respondent Police is at liberty to summon documents and bank statements in accordance with Section 94 of 'the BNSS' in its true and proper scope, namely, for production of documents required for investigation, and not for the purpose of freezing accounts. There shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.
________________________ Dr.Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J.
Date: 31.03.2026 VTS