Bombay High Court
State Of Maharashtra Through V.K. ... vs V. M/S. Plethico Pharmaceuticals on 7 August, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996CRILJ1000
JUDGMENT
1. In this criminal revision, the State of Maharashtra through Drugs Inspector, Food and Drug Administration, Maharashtra State, Akola, took exception to the order of First Addl. Sessions Judge, Akola, passed in Criminal Revision No. 60/93, entertaining the criminal revision challenging the order of issue of process against the non-applicants and consequently, quashing the proceedings of Criminal Case No. 209 of 1991 pending in the Court of J.M.F.C., Nagpur.
According to the learned counsel for applicant, the issue i.e. "issue of process" is an interlocutory order and the same is not subject to revision under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is involved in the present application and same issue is concluded and determined by the judgment of this Court in the case of Uttam Krishnaji Levarkar v. State of Maharashtra (1995 (1) Mah. LJ 95) (Per R. M. Lodha, J.), wherein it has been held that "Order issuing process on ex parte consideration of the complaint and material under Section 204 is an interlocutory order and is not subject to revision under Section 397 Criminal Procedure Code." Learned Brother relied on the case of K. M. Mathew v. State of Kerala . Dr. Kulkarni, the learned counsel for the non-applicants, vehemently submitted that the earlier decisions of this Court, other High Courts and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, are to the effect that "the order issuing process is not an interlocutory order because it affects the right of the party." were not brought to the notice of the Court. Thus, the judgment is per-incuriam and deserves fresh consideration by this Court and if this Court is not convinced, and it so deserves be referred to the larger Bench of this Court in view of the earlier decisions of this Court and of the Apex Court.
Shri L. G. Deshpande, learned A.P.P. and Dr. Kulkarni were heard at length.
2. The respondent No. 1 M/s. Plethico Pharmaceuticals deals in manufacturing of various products including drugs known as Ampicilline and Cloxacilline under valid licence from the Competent Authority. On 3rd May, 1991, the Drugs Inspector, Akola, took out a sample of Ampicilline and Cloxacilline having batch No. TEN B No. 0056 manufactured on 10/90 and having expiry date 3/92. One of the samples was sent for analysis to Maharashtra State Drugs Control Laboratory, Bombay on 4-7-1991. The report of the analysis dt/ 17-7-1991 was received by Drugs Inspector on 1-8-1991. The copy of the report was forwarded to the accused by the Drugs Inspector vide letter dt/ 3-8-1991. Accused received the same on 8-8-1991. On 14-11-1991, a letter was received from the accused with the request to send another sample to be sent to Central Laboratory, Calcutta. According to the accused, earlier letter was sent to the same effect on 2-9-1991. The Drugs Inspector filed the complaint in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Balapur on 24-12-1991. An application was moved by the Drugs Inspector requesting the Judicial Magistrate. First Class, Balapur, to forward another sample to the Central Drugs Laboratory, Calcutta for test and report. On 24th December, 1991 itself, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Balapur, registered the case as Criminal Case No. 209/91 and issued process to the non-applicants for the offence punishable under Sections 18(a)(1) read with Sections 17, 17A and 17B of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. After the receipt of the report of Analyser, specifying that the drug is sub-standard with further report that the contents of cloxacilline is less than prescribed amount of 42.61 % and after obtaining permission from the Competent Authority, the complaint was filed in the Court of J.M.F.C., Balapur.
3. The non-applicants/accused received the summons of the Court on 25-2-1993 directing them to remain personally present before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Balapur, on 29-3-1993. Being aggrieved by the order of the issue of process against the non-applicants accused, the non-applicants preferred revision in the Court of Sessions Judge, Akola, seeking relief to the effect that the proceedings of Criminal Case No. 209/91 pending before J.M.F.C. Balapur and the criminal complaint filed by the Drugs Inspector be dismissed.
4. The learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Akola, heard the learned Counsel of the parties at length, perused documents placed before him in Criminal Revision No. 60/93 and upheld the submissions made on behalf of the non-applicants/accused, repelling the submissions made by the learned A.P.P. Learned revisional Court rendered judgment and order dated 8-3-1994 and held that "When the Trial Court issued the process against the accused, there was no report of the Central Drugs Laboratory before the trial Court. The same was received after the process was issued and before the present Criminal Revision was filed. Due to the effect of the report of Director of Central Drugs Laboratory, pointed out above, the process issued by the learned Magistrate will have to be quashed and proceedings will have to be dropped."
5. In this criminal revision, the State assailed the judgment and order dt/- 8th March, 1994 passed by the 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Akola, in Criminal Revision No. 60/93, on the ground that issue of process being an 'interlocutory order', as contemplated under Section 397 Criminal Procedure Code, the revision application was not maintainable in law. Secondly, the learned 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Akola, committed an error in relying on the material which was not before the trial Court, i.e. report of the analysis by Central Drugs Laboratory. Thus, the learned A.D. J., Akola exceeded his jurisdiction. The findings are further assailed on the ground that the learned 1st Addl. Sessions Judge erred in considering the report of the Central Drugs Laboratory as final and conclusive, thereby superseding the report of the Government Analyst.
6. Shri Deshpande, the learned counsel for the applicant/State specifically submitted that the order taking cognizance and issuing process is an interlocutory order and thus, no revision against the interlocutory order is tenable under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. Section 397 Cr.P.C. deals with the revisional powers of the High Court and the Sessions Court. Section 397 Cr.P.C. reads as under :
"(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation :- All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge, for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.
(3) If an application, under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Session Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them."
Sub-section (2) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. makes it abundantly clear that the revisional powers conferred on the revisional; Courts under sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any 'interlocutory Order' passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings.
7. This Court in the case of Uttam Krishnaji Levarkar v. State of Maharashtra (1995 (1) Mah LJ 95) (Cited supra), observed in Para 4 of the judgment as under :
"Issue of process is an interlocutory order and is not subject to revision under Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code. An order issuing the process on ex-parte consideration of the complaint and material under Section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code being only a step towards the trial, is interlocutory order."
8. Dr. Kulkarni, the learned counsel for the non-applicants, vehemently submitted that neither this Court while deciding the case of Uttam (cited supra), nor the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K. M. Mathew v. State of Kerala discussed the scope and ambit of the revisional powers of the Court. Similarly, in K. M. Mathew's case (cited supra), there is no finding by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that issue of the process is an interlocutory order. The Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the order of issuing summons is an interim order and not the judgment. Their Lordships discussed the scope of Section 204 of Criminal Procedure Code and specifically observed that the Magistrate who took cognizance and issued process, is empowered even in absence of specific provision, to drop the proceedings or rescind the process. Their Lordships, in paras 7 and 8 observed as :
"The High Court seems to be too technical in this regard. If one reads carefully the provisions relating to trial of summons cases, the power to drop proceedings against the accused cannot be denied to the Magistrate. Section 204 of the Code indicates that the proceedings before the Magistrate commences upon taking cognizance of the offence and the issue of summons to the accused. When the accused enters appearance in response to the summons, the Magistrate has to take proceedings under Chapter XX of the Code. But the need to try the accused arises when there is allegation in the complaint that the accused has committed the crime. If there is no allegation in the complaint involving the accused in the commission of the crime, it is implied that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed against the accused.
It is open to the accused to plead before the Magistrate that the process against him ought not to have been issued. The Magistrate may drop the proceedings if he is satisfied on reconsideration of the complaint that there is no offence for which the accused could be tried. It is his judicial discretion. No specific provision is required for the Magistrate to drop the proceedings or rescind the process. The order issuing the process is an interim order and not a judgment. It can be varied or recalled. The fact that the process has already been issued is no bar to drop the proceedings if the complaint on the very face of it does not disclose any offence against the accused."
9. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amar Nath v. State of Haryana has discussed the term interlocutory order in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Their Lordships observed :
"The term "interlocutory order" in S. 397(2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain right of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in S. 397. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2). But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court."
Further their Lordships held :
"That the order of the Magistrate summoning the appellants was one which was a matter of moment. If the appellants were not summoned, then they could not have faced the trial at all, but by compelling the appellants to face a trial without proper application of mind could not be held to be an interlocutory matter but one which decided a serious question as to the rights of the appellants to be put on trial. That being the position, a revision against the order was fully competent under S. 397(1) or under S. 482, because the scope of both these sections in a matter of this kind is more or less the same."
10. In the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (From Bombay 3 Judges), approving the ratio laid down in the case of Amar Nath (cited supra). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court discussed the meaning and scope of 'interlocutory order' in para 13 of the judgment, as under :
"Ordinarily and generally the expression 'interlocutory order' has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term "final order." But an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. If it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by Section 397(1). On such a strict interpretation, only those orders would be revisable which are orders passed on the final determination of the action but are not appealable under Chapter XXIX of the Code. This does not seem to be the intention of the Legislature when it retained the revisional power of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the 1898 Code."
There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final, but yet it may not be an interlocutory order. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub-section (2) of S. 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Art. 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of S. 397(2). It is neither advisable, nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two.
Considering the facts and circumstances and objections raised, their Lordships held :
"An order rejeccting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of S. 397(2)."
11. This Court in the case of Hasmukh J. Jhaveri v. Sheela Dadlani (1981 Mh. LJ 304) (V. S. Kotwal, J.), has discussed the scope and function of "interlocutory order" under Section 397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, as under :
"The term interlocutory order as used in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been used in a restricted sense and not in a broad and realistic sense. It merely denotes an order of purely interim or temporary nature. The emphasis in this category is no the word "purely," which would again highlight the concept that the nature of the order must be pure and simple, temporary or interim in character and ostensibly deceptive appearance of a temporary character should not be confused with the real and outright temporary nature. Such orders pertaining to some matters in the proceeding which merely and purely assume the character of steps-in-aid of proceeding can be embarced by the said terminology, which again affords a pointer about the nature and categories of the orders that are purely temporary or interim, without actually affecting or even touching substantially any right or material aspect of the proceeding. Though a stamp of finality to the proceeding or termination of the proceeding may be quite a relevant and important consideration, yet it is not a sole criteria of the test in that behalf. As also, the potential capacity to terminate proceeding or to give it a label of finality, is also not the only and conclusive criteria, though it by itself is a relevant feature. Therefore, the fact that the main proceeding is kept alive does not ipso facto give a stamp to several such orders as "interlocutory order." Consequently it is not permissible to equate the expression "interlocutory order" as invariably being the converse of the term "final order." An order of moment would obviously be lifted out of the sweep of the said terminology. Irrespective of the order bearing stamp of finality, there may be an intervening stage which can be called as intermediate stage at which an order may be passed which in turn may be called as 'intermediate order,' which neither gives the finality to the proceeding nor is purely interim or temporary and as such is not an interlocutory order, but would fall in between and in certain cases such order can be said to be not "interlocutory." An order which (a) decides; or (b) even touches the important rights or liabilities of the parties; cannot be said to be interlocutory. An order which (a) substantially affects the rights of the parties; or (b) decides certain rights of the parties cannot be termed as interlocutory. So also, an order which - (a) adjudicates; or (b) even affects-(i) either the rights of the parties; (ii) even any particular aspect of the trial of the proceeding cannot be also termed as interlocutory order."
Before the Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Napoleon Daniel John v. State of Maharashtra (1980 Mh. LJ 639), the question was whether issuing process against the accused is an interlocutory order. This Court relying on the case of Amarnath (cited supra), held that a order rejecting plea of the accused on a point which when accepted would put an end to the proceedings will not be an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2), Criminal Procedure Code and as such revision is not barred.
This Court again in case of Kishanlal Girdharlal Dayama v. Parwatibai Narsingdas (Tapsi Maharaj) (Aurangabad Bench) (I. G. Shah, J.), placing reliance on the cases of Amar Nath, Madhu Limaye, Hasmukh Jhaveri and Nepoleon Daniel John (all cited supra), held that the order directing the process to be issued is not an interlocutory order as contemplated under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. His Lordship observed as follows :
"The term interlocutory order in Section 397(2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in a broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes order of a purely interim or temporary nature which does not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties, cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against the order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397."
12. A full survey and purport of the propositions laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and this Court vis-a-vis the concept of the 'interlocutory order' is taken into consideration, that order which substantially affects the liability or decides certain rights of the parties, cannot be said to be an 'interlocutory order.' The order of the issue of process, without application of mind and considering the material placed on record, definitely affects the rights of the party, such order can be treated as 'intermediate order' or 'interim order.' The High Courts and Sessions Judges, in their revisional power, can call for and examine the record of the proceedings pending before any inferior criminal Court within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings. The High Court has to exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of Justice. In view of the ratio laid down by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases cited supra that the order of the issue of summons or process to the accused is not an 'interlocutory order,' thereby does not affect the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court u/S. 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of K. M. Mathew (cited supra) did not observe that the order issuing summons is an interlocutory order, but according to their Lordships, the order of issue of the process is an 'interim order' and not the judgment. Dr. Kulkarni has rightly submitted that the learned counsel appearing before my Brother Shri Lodha J. in the case of Uttam (cited supra), did not place the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court on the point and thereby the judgment in that case is definitely per incuriam. In view of the ratio laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases of Amar Nath, Madhu Limaye and Bombay High Court in the cases of Hasmukh J. Jhaveri and Nepolean Danial John and Kishanlal (cited supra), that the order taking cognizance on the complaint of the Drug Inspector, registering Cri. Case No. 209/91 by the J.M.F.C., Balapur and the order of the issue of process, affects the rights of the N.As.) accused, such order cannot be termed as an 'interlocutory order' attracting the provisions of S. 397(2) Cr.P.C. In view of the above observations, it is not a fit case to refer to the larger bench.
13. The second limb of the argument of Shri L. G. Deshpande, the learned 'A' panel counsel, is that the learned First Addl. Sessions Judge, Akola, committed an error in observing that the report of the Central Drugs Laboratory, Calcutta, supersedes the report of the Government Analyst. The learned revisional Court has considered sub-section (4) of Section 25 of the Drugs and Cosmatics Act, 1940. According to Shri Deshpande, the learned 'A' panel counsel appearing for the applicant, the evidence of an expert is of an advisory nature and cannot be a conclusive one. The report or the opinion is not an evidence. In the book "The Law of Evidence" by Ratanal and Dhirajlal, authors expressed their view in respect of Section 51 of the Evidence Act as :
"Where the opinion of an expert is receivable, the grounds or reasoning upon which such opinion is based may also be inquired into. Opinion is no evidence, without assigning the reason for such opinion. The correctness of the opinion can better be estimated in many instances when the reasons upon which it is based are known. If the reasons are frivolous or inconclusive the opinion is worth nothing."
The report has two parts; one of facts and another of the opinion.
In the case of Nagar Mahapalika Kanpur v. Ram Niwas , His Lordship observed :
"........The certificate of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory is final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein, but not of any opinion expressed therein. Courts of Law can record a finding of their own after taking into consideration the facts stated in the certificate of the Director and other evidence on record."
Madras High Court in the case of T. Babulal v. Drug Inspector I, Madras (1969 Cri LJ 699), in the last para of its judgment, observed :
"The report of the Central Drugs Laboratory, and the result thereof are treated as conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. It does not necessarily follow that the Court should accept what is stated in the report as conclusive."
In the case of Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey (1992 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 598), Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that expert opinion is not binding on the Court it being advisory in nature. The Court has to form its own opinion considering the material, date and the opinion on technical aspects rendered by the expert. Para 34 of the judgment needs to be reproduced.
"A medical witness called in as an expert to assist the Court is not a witness of fact and the evidence given by the medical officer is really of an advisory character given on the basis of the symptoms found on examination. The expert witness is expected to put before the Court all materials inclusive of the date which induced him to come to the conclusion and enlighten the Court on the technical aspect of the case by explaining the terms of science so that the Court although, not an expert may form its own judgment on those materials after giving due regard to the expert's opinion because once the expert's opinion is accepted, it is not the opinion of the medical Officer but of the Court."
14. Dr. Kulkarni, the learned counsel for the non-applicants, vehemently submitted that the Drugs Inspector along with the complaint in the Court., filed a separate application to send the sample to the Central Drugs Laboratory, Calcutta, on the request of the accused. It means that the accused have taken objection to the report of the Government Analyst under Section 25(3) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. As an objection was taken by the accused to the report of the Government Analyst, the Food Inspector ought to have waited for the result of the analysis by Central Drugs Laboratory, Calcutta. Dr. Kulkarni vehemently argued that the report of the Government Analyser has no finality. However, in accordance with sub-section (4) of Section 25 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the report of the Central Drugs Laboratory Calcutta is final. Dr. Kulkarni further submitted that the certificate of Director is final and thereby supersedes the report of the Government Analyser. A reliance has been placed on the case of Murlidhar Dullabhcas Wani v. State of Maharashtra (1978 Mh LJ 149). The case before the Division Bench of this Court was under the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. In view of the report of the Director of Central Food Laboratory showing the sample being not adulterated, according to the Division Bench order of their Court, the Magistrate must discharge the accused.
15. Shri Deshpande, the learned 'A' panel counsel, submitted that the lower revisional Court has committed an error in considering the report or the material which was not before the trial Court. Thus, it was beyond the scope of the revisional Court to consider the matter placed before him. Under Section 397 Cr.P.C., the revisional Court has to the call for the record from the trial Court and examine it to see the legality, correctness or propriety of any findings. Admittedly, in the case in hands, the trial Court only took the cognizance on the complaint made by the Drugs Inspector and registered the criminal case. While registering the case against the non-applicants, the report of the Central Laboratory, Calcutta, admittedly, was not before the trial Court. Therefore act of considering the material which was not before the trial Court, is beyond the revisional scope of the Sessions Court under the provisions of Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This Court in the case of Rakesh Nemkumar Porwal v. Narayan Dhondu Joglekar (1993 Mh LJ 630) in para 8 considering the facts, observed :
".....the law is well settled in so far as this Court will necessarily have to be circumscribed by the record that is produced before it. That record is the record of the material that was placed before the learned Magistrate on 9-8-1991. Admittedly, the affidavit and the certificate that are now shown to us were not before the learned Magistrate and, therefore, it would be highly improper and impermissible for us to base any decision on such material that was not before the trial Court. It is well settled law that in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no new material can be introduced by either party in support of their contentions before the High Court."
Their Lordships also referred the case of Smt. Chand Dhawan v. Jawahar Lal reported in 1992 (1) SVLR (CR) 270, in which Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed :
"The well settled position that at the stage of quashing, the Court cannot rely on new material that is sought to be produced before the High Court."
16. In view of the facts and circumstances in the case, Shri Deshpande the learned 'A' panel counsel, specifically submitted that the learned revisional Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 397 Cr.P.C., but to remand the case before the trial Court to consider afresh on the basis of the new material so introduced. In the similar circumstances before us and considering the gravity of the offence under the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the sentence, in the interest of Justice, the matter needs to be remanded to the trial Court for its consideration. A reliance has been placed on the case of Khacheru Singh v. State of U.P.(1982 Cri LJ 629 (2) : (1982 All CJ 285 (1) : AIR 1982 SC 782 (2). In the case before the Lordships, issuance of summons to accused was challenged before the Sessions Court. The Sessions Court quashed the order directing the issue of summons. High Court confirmed the same. Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows :
"We do not see any justification, though we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, for the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Meerut in Criminal Revision No. 83 of 1979, which was affirmed by the High Court of Allahabad by its order dated 7-5-80. All that the learned Magistrate had done was to issue a summons to respondent No. 2 Satyavir Singh. If, eventually, the learned Magistrate comes to the conclusion that no offencce was made out against Satyavir Singh, it will be open to him to discharge or acquit him, as the case may be. But it is difficult to appreciate why the order issuing "summons" to the accused should be quashed. We, therefore, set aside the orders passed by the Sessions Court and the High Court, restore that of the learned Special Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Meerut, dated February 2, 1979 and remit the matter to the trial Court for disposal in accordance with law."
17. In view of the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases cited supra, the order to issue process to the accused is not an interlocutory order, thereby does not affect the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. Thus, the learned lower revisional Court committed no error or illegality while entertaining the revision. However, the learned revisional Court wrongly considered the material placed before him which was not before the trial Court and, thus, exceeded in his jurisdiction and powers. The material i.e. report of the Central Drugs Laboratory, Calcutta, not being before the trial Court, Justice demands that the proper course would be to remit the matter to the trial Court for consideration according to law. Hence it is remitted to trial Court.
18. In view of this, there is no need to discuss the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 25 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
19. In the result, the judgment and order dt/- 8th March, 1994, passed by the First Addl. Sessions Judge, Akola in Criminal Revision No. 60/93, is quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted to trial Court to consider and decide it according to law, not being influenced by the observations of the learned lower Revisional Court made in its judgment and order dt/- 8-3-1994 and as well the observations of this Court. Thus, the instant criminal revision is allowed. No costs.
20. Petition allowed.