Jharkhand High Court
Jaiki Paradhi @ Jaiki @ Jk vs The Union Of India Through National ... on 10 April, 2026
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad
2026:JHHC:10397-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.170 of 2026
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Jaiki Paradhi @ Jaiki @ JK, S/o Patamidi Paradi, Aged- 35
years, R/0 village- Hirapur, P.O. & P.S.- Barhi, District -
Katni, State- Madhya Pradesh
... Appellant
Versus
The Union of India through National Investigation Agency
... Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
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For the Appellant : Mr. Ankit Apurva, Advocate
Ms. Arti Kumari, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate
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C.A.V on 06.04.2026 Pronounced on 10/04/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer
1. The instant appeal, preferred under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, is directed against the order dated 10.10.2025 passed by learned AJC-XVI- cum-Spl. Judge, NIA, Ranchi in Misc. Criminal Application No.1719 of 2025, [Special (NIA) Case No.02/2021] corresponding to R.C. No.02/2021/NIA/RNC, arising out of Toklo P.S. Case No.09 of 2021 registered for the offence under Sections 147, 148, 149, 353, 120B, 121, 121A, 307, 302 and 333 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.), Section 3/4 of Explosive Substances Act, Section 17 of the C.L.A. Act 1908 and under Sections 16, 20, 38 & 39 of the Unlawful
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB Activities (Prevention) Act 1967, whereby and whereunder, the prayer for regular bail of the appellant has been rejected.
Factual Matrix
2. The brief facts of the prosecution case leading to this Criminal Appeal is that the superintendent of Police Chaibasa, West Singhbhum, received information from various sources regarding the movement of Anal Da @ Toofan Da @ Patriram Manjhi and Maharaj Pramanik @ Raj Pramanik, both senior cadres of Central committee of CPI Maoist, along with other cadres of their groups were roaming in the hilly area of Lanji Mountain, under Toklo Police Station, District- West Singhbhum and planning to execute a big incident against security forces and disrupt the development and direction of Superintendent of Police, Chaibasa and senior officials, accordingly one special operation was launched from the Darkada (Jharjhara) base camp by the troops of Jharkhand Jaguar AG-II and C/197 CRPF BN.
3. It is further alleged that when informant along with search parties reached near slope of Lanji Hill, the troops of Jharkhand Jaguar AG II were on front and leading the operation and troops of CRPF/ 197 BN was
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB moving behind the Jharkhand Jaguar AG-II. Suddenly, at about 8.30 hours a heavy blast took place from the left flank approx. 100-150 meters on the hill from the base of Lanji Hill. In retaliation to the blast six rounds were fired by Constable Vijay Yadav of Jharkhand Jaguar towards the hill for his self-defence when the troops heard the sound of blast all the operation team took position for a while.
4. In the meantime, Section Commander of the Jharkhand Jaguar informed through wireless set that an IED blast has taken place and five jawans of his team and one Jawan of CRPF got injured and out of them three become martyred and rest injured were rescued to Medica hospital Ranchi. Later on, one head constable also attained martyrdom after reaching Medica hospital, Ranchi, Jharkhand.
5. Accordingly, a case was registered on the basis of written report made by Sub-inspector of police Ramdeo Yadav as Toklo P.S. Case No.09 of 2021 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 353, 120B, 121, 121A, 307, 302 and 333 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.), Section 3/4 of Explosive Substances Act, Section 17 of the C.L.A. Act 1908 and under Sections 16, 20, 38 & 39 of the
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 (UA(P) Act 1967) against the thirty three named accused persons along with 20-25 unknown members of banned terrorist Organisation i.e. CPI (Maoist).
6. Later on, considering the gravity of the offence, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India vide order dated 20.03.2021 directed National Investigation Agency (NIA), Ranchi to take over the investigation of the Toklo P.S.Case No.09 of 2021.
7. In compliance to the directions of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, (Order No. F.No.11011/25 dated 20.3.3021), NIA, Ranchi re- registered the aforesaid case as RC-02/2021/ NIA/RNC dated 24.03.2021 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 353, 120B, 121, 121A, 307, 302 and 333 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.), Section 3/4 of Explosive Substances Act, Section 17 of the C.L.A. Act 1908 and under Sections 16, 20, 38 & 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 (UA(P) Act 1967) against the accused persons.
8. After obtaining the administrative approval of the competent authority the case docket and case exhibits were transferred to the NIA by the Investigating agency and accordingly investigation was taken up by the NIA.
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9. Later on, it is surfaced that the present appellant was arrested in connection with another case being Kharsawa P.S. Case no. 105/2020 and he was in jail. Accordingly, the present appellant was produced and remanded in the instant case on 31.07.2021.
10. On 07.09.2021 charge-sheet was submitted against 19 accused persons and investigation continued further against the two remanded accused persons including the present appellant.
11. The appellant had preferred Misc. Cr. Application No.308 of 2022 before the NIA Special Court, Ranchi but the same has been rejected vide order dated 04.05.2022 against which the Appellant preferred Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 383 of 2023 before this Court but the same was dismissed as withdrawn on 12.04.2023.
12. Consequently, the above-named appellant had again preferred the regular bail application vide Misc. Cr. Application No.1284 of 2023 before the NIA Special Court, Ranchi for regular bail but the same had been rejected vide order dated 10.05.2023 against which the present appellant has preferred an appeal being Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1141 of 2023 has been filed
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB but vide order dated 10.01.2024 the same has also been rejected on merit by this Court.
13. Thereafter, the present appellant had again preferred an application being Criminal Misc. Application No.2127 of 2024 for bail before the Special Court which was again dismissed on 29.07.2024 against which the present appellant had preferred Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.1277 of 2024 but vide order dated 22.10.2024 the same had also been dismissed by this Court on merit.
14. Thereafter, the present appellant had again preferred an application being Criminal Misc. Application No. 1719 of 2025 for bail before the Special Court which was again dismissed on 10.10.2025, against which the present appellant had preferred the instant Criminal Appeal.
Argument on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellant:
15. It has been contended on behalf of appellant that earlier the prayer for regular bail of the appellant has been rejected by this Court on merit in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1141 of 2023 vide order dated 10th January, 2024 and Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1277 of 2024 vide order dated 22.10.2024.
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16. Prayer for regular bail has been renewed before the learned trial court on the ground of prolonged custody and delay trial. According to the appellant, altogether 169 witnesses are to be examined but still only 37 witnesses have been examined and as such by making reference of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the prayer has been made for renewal of regular bail, before the learned AJC- XVI-cum-Spl. Judge, NIA, Ranchi but the same was dismissed vide order dated 10.10.2025 without taking into consideration the aforesaid facts.
17. The order passed by learned AJC-XVI-cum-Spl. Judge, NIA, Ranchi is under challenge by filing the instant appeal.
18. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that altogether 169 witnesses are to be examined out of which only 37 witnesses, the day when the instant appeal was filed, has been examined and as per instruction, and as such there is no likelihood of conclusion of the trial at an early date, hence keeping the appellant in judicial custody since 31.07.2021, it will amount to violation of principle as laid down under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
19. Submission has been made that the impugned order passed by the learned trial court is against the weight of evidence collected during the investigation and without
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB application of judicial mind and as such the same deserves to be set aside. The name of the appellant has come only on the confessional statement of co-accused and this appellant has been involved by way of threat and torture, which has no evidentiary value in the eye of law.
20. It has been submitted that the appellant is in custody since year 2021 and, as such, taking into consideration the long custody and probable delay in conclusion of trial, it is a fit case where the impugned order may be interfered with.
Argument by the learned counsel for the respondent- NIA:
21. While on the other hand, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel being assisted by Mr. Saurav Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-NIA has vehemently opposed the prayer for renewal of regular bail.
22. It has been submitted by referring to the order 10th January, 2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1141 of 2023 and order dated 22.10.2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1277 of 2024 by this Court that the prayer for bail of the appellant on earlier occasion was rejected considering the facts on merit and no new development has occurred so as to consider the case of the appellant for renewal of bail.
23. It has been submitted by referring to paragraph 57 of the order dated 10th January, 2024 passed in Cr. Appeal
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB (DB) No. 1141 of 2023, wherein the culpability of the appellant has been shown to be direct since it has been referred therein that there is direct and serious allegation against the appellant that in connivance with A-11 Sukhram Ramtai, he supplied potash, explosive chemical at Chakradharpur station to CPI Maoist A-7, which subsequently was handed over to A-3, A-33, A-34 and A-42 to deliver the same to the armed cadres of CPI A-13, A-14 and A-42, who used the said Potash in IED blast on 04.3.2021 when armed troops were moving on the forward slope of Lanji forest hills under PS Toklo, in which three security personnel were killed and few became seriously injured. The same fact has been taken into consideration while considering the prayer for renewal of bail in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1277 of 2024 and thereafter the prayer for bail was rejected by passing reasoned order dated 22.10.2024.
24. It has further been contended by referring to paragraphs 58 & 59 wherein this Court, distinguishing the case of Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713, has considered the number of witnesses in the present case, i.e., only 169 witnesses, which is very much less in comparison to 276 witnesses in Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb (Supra), therefore, principle laid down therein will not apply in the instant case.
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB
25. Further submission has been made that the present appellant is having two criminal antecedents of like nature.
26. So far as the contention of the appellant regarding the probable delay in conclusion of the trial is concerned, it has been submitted on behalf of respondent-NIA that the trial is in progress and and number of witnesses have been pruned from 169 to 78 and since the 37 witnesses have already been examined therefore, the trial will be concluded expeditiously.
27. Further, the learned Special Judge is now having exclusive Court to deal with the NIA cases and as such it is incorrect on the part of the appellant to take the ground that there is no likelihood of conclusion of trial in near future.
28. It has further been submitted that since the trial is in progress and if at this moment the appellant will be released on bail, there is every likelihood of hindrance to be caused in conclusion of early trial as also there are chances of tampering with the evidence of witnesses since in the NIA matters the protected witnesses are to be examined and there is every likelihood of disclosure of their identity which ultimately will be fatal to the prosecution.
29. Learned counsel for the respondent-NIA on the aforesaid grounds has submitted that the impugned order
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB requires no interference by this Court and hence the instant appeal is fit to be dismissed.
Analysis
30. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties, gone across the finding recorded in the impugned order as also the allegations made and available in the FIR and the material collected in course of investigation as also the pleadings made in the memo of appeal and the counter affidavit.
31. This Court has already dealt with the case of the appellant in detail on merit while dealing with the prayer for bail of the appellant on earlier occasion in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1143 of 2023 and Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1277 of 2024 which were dismissed vide order dated 10th January, 2024 and 22.10.2024 respectively.
32. It is evident therefrom as per the reference of the prosecution story that the superintendent of Police Chaibasa, West Singhbhum, received information from various sources regarding the movement of Anal Da @ Toofan Da @ Patriram Manjhi and Maharaj Pramanik @ Raj Pramanik, both senior cadres of Central committee of CPI Maoist, along with other cadres of their groups were roaming in the hilly area of Lanji Mountain, under Toklo Police Station, District- West Singhbhum and planning to execute a big incident against security forces and disrupt
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB the development and direction of Superintendent of Police, Chaibasa and senior officials, accordingly one special operation was launched from the Darkada (Jharjhara) base camp by the troops of Jharkhand Jaguar AG-II and C/197 CRPF BN.
33. When informant along with search parties reached near slope of Lanji Hill, the troops of Jharkhand Jaguar AG II were on front and leading the operation and troops of CRPF/ 197 BN was moving behind the Jharkhand Jaguar AG-II. Suddenly, at about 8.30 hours a heavy blast took place from the left flank approx. 100-150 meters on the hill from the base of Lanji Hill. In retaliation to the blast six rounds were fired by Constable Vijay Yadav of Jharkhand Jaguar towards the hill for his self-defence when the troops heard the sound of blast all the operation team took position for a while.
34. In the meantime, Section Commander of the Jharkhand Jaguar informed through wireless set that an IED blast has taken place and five jawans of his team and one Jawan of CRPF got injured and out of them three become martyred and rest injured were rescued to Medica hospital Ranchi. Later on, one head constable also attained martyrdom after reaching Medica hospital, Ranchi, Jharkhand.
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB
35. Accordingly, a case was registered being Toklo P.S. Case No.09 of 2021 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 353, 120B, 121, 121A, 307, 302 and 333 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.), Section 3/4 of Explosive Substances Act, Section 17 of the C.L.A. Act 1908 and under Sections 16, 20, 38 & 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 (UA(P) Act 1967) against the thirty three named accused persons along with 20-25 unknown members of banned terrorist Organisation i.e. CPI (Maoist).
36. Later on, considering the gravity of the offence, National Investigation Agency (NIA), Ranchi has taken over the investigation of the Toklo P.S.Case No.09 of 2021 and the case was re-registered as RC-02/2021/ NIA/RNC dated 24.03.2021.
37. Later on, it is surfaced that the present appellant was arrested in connection with another case being Kharsawa P.S. Case no. 105/2020 and he was in jail. Accordingly, the present appellant was produced and remanded in the instant case on 31.07.2021.
38. On 25.01.2022 NIA filed the 1st supplementary Charge-sheet against two accused persons including the present appellant under sections 120B read with 307, 302 and 333 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.), Section 4/6 of Explosive Substances Act, and under Sections 16, 18, 20, 38 & 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967.
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB
39. The appellant had preferred Misc. Cr. Application No.308 of 2022 before the NIA Special Court, Ranchi but the same has been rejected vide order dated 04.05.2022 against which the Appellant preferred Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 383 of 2023 before this Court but the same was dismissed as withdrawn on 12.04.2023.
40. Consequently, the above-named appellant had again preferred the regular bail application vide Misc. Cr. Application No.1284 of 2023 before the NIA Special Court, Ranchi for regular bail but the same has been rejected vide order dated 10.05.2023 against which the Criminal Appeal being Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.1141 of 2023 had been preferred but the same was dismissed vide order dated 10th January, 2024 by this Court.
41. For ready reference, relevant paragraphs of the order dated 10th January, 2024 are quoted as under:
"24. At this juncture, it will be purposeful to discuss the core of Section 43D(5) of the Act, 1967 which mandates that the person shall not be released on bail if the court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations made are prima facie true apart from the other offences the appellant is accused of committing offences as stipulated under chapter IV and VI of UA(P) Act, 1967.
25. The reason of making reference of the provision of Section 43D(5) of the Act that in course of investigation, the investigating agency has discovered the material against the appellant attracting the offence under various Sections of UA(P) Act. Since, this Court is considering the issue of
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB bail based upon now also under the various sections of UA(P) Act and hence, the parameter which has been put under the provision of Section 43D(5) of the Act is also required to be considered.
26. The requirement as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, 1967 in the matter of grant of regular bail fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation Agency Vrs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, reported in [(2019) 5 SCC 1] wherein at paragraph 23 it has been held by interpreting the expression "prima facie true" as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the Act, 1967 which would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigation agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the First Information Report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It has further been observed that it must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. The degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is "prima facie true", as compared to the opinion of the accused "not guilty" of such offence as required under the other special enactments. For ready reference, paragraph 23 of the aforesaid judgment is required to be quoted herein which reads hereunder as :-
"23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or otherwise. Our attention was invited to the decisions of this Court, which has had an occasion to deal with similar special provisions in TADA and MCOCA. The principle underlying those decisions may have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in relation to the offences under the 1967 Act as well. Notably, under the special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB Substances Act, 1985, the Court is required to record its opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is "not guilty" of the alleged offence. There is a degree of difference between the satisfaction to be recorded by the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is "not guilty" of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable 11 grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is "prima facie" true. By its very nature, the expression "prima facie true" would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the first information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is "prima facie true", as compared to the opinion of the accused "not guilty" of such offence as required under the other special enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application or framing of charges in relation to offences under the 1967 Act...."
27. It is, thus, evident from the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (Supra) that it is the bounden duty of the Court to apply its mind to examine the entire materials on record for the purpose of satisfying itself, whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused or not.
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36.It is evident from the perusal of charge-sheet that NIA in his investigation found that cadre of the CPI (Maoist) hatched conspiracy with the help of the supplied potash by the appellant which is mentioned in para 17.10.2 of the chargesheet. For ready reference the aforesaid para is being quoted herein under:-
"17.10.2: Offences established against the arrested accused Jaiki Paradhi @ Jaiki @ JK (A-12) :
It is established from the investigation that A- 12 is an associate of CPI(Maoist), a banned terrorist organization declared Government of India. Accused A-12 procured potash from one Nyaz Ahamad, aged about 28 years, son of Mustaq Ahamad, resident of Beohari, PS Beohari, District Shahdol, Madhya Pradesh, a fire cracker shop owner. On receiving the potash from Nyaz, A-12 delivered the same to A-11 & A-7 at Chakradharpur, West Singhbhum, Jharkhand. A total of approximately 700 Kgs of potash has been procured by A- 12 on multiple occasions. The whole network of obtaining Potash was functioning on the directions and supervision of charge sheeted absconding accused persons A-13, A- 14 and A-43. The said Potash was used by the armed cadres of CPI (Maoist) as an explosive chemical in IED blasts. Therefore, as per averments made in Pre-Paras, it is established that A-12 became a member of CPI (Maoist). A-12 had procured and provided Potash which was used in the incident at Lanji, resulting in the killing of 03 police personnel and causing serious injuries to 03 others. Thereby, accused A-12 has committed offences u/s. 120B (Substantively) of IPC & Sections 16, 18, 20, 38 & 39 of UA(P) Act, 1967 and Sections 4 & 6 of Explosive Substance Act".
49. Thus, from perusal of the various annexures and paragraphs of the charge sheet, it prima facie appears that the appellant has associated himself with terrorist organisation CPI (Moist) knowingly and aided the said organisation voluntarily to further its terrorist activities.
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB Recently, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has also held in the case of Arup Bhuyan Vrs. State of Assam & Anr., reported in (2023) 8 SCC 745 that being a member of the banned organization is also an offence under the UA(P) Act.
57. Considering the above facts and circumstance and after going through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, case diary, chargesheet and other documentary evidence recorded by the NIA it is evident that there is direct and serious allegation against the appellant that in connivance with A-11 Sukhram Ramtai, the present appellant supplied potash, explosive chemical at Chakradharpur station to CPI Maoist A-7 and further it was handed over to A-3, A-33, A-34 and A-42 to deliver the same to the armed cadres of CPI A-13, A-14 and A-42 who used the said Potash in IED blast on 04.3.2021 when armed troops were moving on the forward slope of Lanji forest hills under PS Toklo in which three security personnel were killed and few became seriously injured. Therefore, allegation against petitioner appears to be very serious in nature and a prima facie case is made out against him.
58. So far as the argument regarding reliance having been placed upon the judgment of Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb (Supra) is concerned, this Court is of the view that in the facts and circumstances the aforesaid judgment will not be applicable herein since in the said case altogether 276 charge-sheeted witnesses were to be examined and on the pin-pointed question by the Hon‟ble Apex Court, the investigating agency has submitted that there is no question of reducing the number of charge-sheeted witnesses and in view thereof and considering the period of custody, i.e., more than 5 and half years and also taking into consideration the spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution of India the Hon‟ble Apex Court has not interfered in the order by which the bail was granted to respondent-accused.
59.While, the fact of the instant case is that there are only 169 witnesses which is very much less in comparison to
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB 276 witnesses of aforesaid case and the present appellant is having two criminal antecedents of like nature.
60.Further, in the instant case it has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the state on instruction that in course of trial, the number of charge-sheeted witnesses may also be reduced depending upon the situation and trial may be concluded in shortest time period."
42. It is evident from the aforesaid paragraphs that while dismissing the said appeal this Court has also considered the applicability of Section 43D(5) of the Act, 1967, as also the judgment rendered in the case of National Investigation Agency Vrs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, reported in [(2019) 5 SCC 1] wherein the requirement as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, 1967 in the matter of grant of regular bail fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court.
43. This Court has also considered the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713.
44. This Court has already given its finding regarding applicability of Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, 1967 in the matter of consideration of bail to an accused, against whom material has been found in course of investigation regarding the commission of crime under the UA(P) Act, 1967.
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45. This Court has already expressed its view that parameter as has been laid down under Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, 1967 i.e., if the allegation is not found to be prima facie true then only the consideration of bail is to be there.
46. This Court has come to the conclusion that on the basis of material collected in course of investigation, as had dealt with at paragraph 57 of order dated 10th January, 2024 in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1141 of 2023 that the allegation against the appellant is direct and serious and the appellant in connivance with A-11 Sukhram Ramtai, supplied potash, explosive chemical at Chakradharpur station to CPI Maoist A-7 and further it was handed over to other accused persons i.e., A-3, A-33, A-34 and A-42 to deliver the same to the armed cadres of CPI A-13, A-14 and A-42 who used the said Potash in IED blast on 04.3.2021 in which three security personnel were killed and few became seriously injured.
47. This Court has also considered the principle as has been laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb (supra) as would be evident from paragraph 58 to 60 of order dated 10th January, 2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1141 of 2024 and accordingly, the case of the appellant has been
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB distinguished to that of case of appellant in K.A. Najeeb (supra).
48. Thereafter, again the appellant renewed the prayer for bail by filing appeal being Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1277 of 2024 which was rejected vide order dated 22.10.2024 considering the case on merit as also taking note of the fact that earlier vide order dated 10th January, 2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1141 of 2024 the case of the appellant has been considered and rejected the prayer for bail.
49. Thus, this Court in its earlier order considering the proposition of law as laid down in the case of National Investigation Agency Vrs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) has found ample material against the appellant and as such come out with the opinion of availability of material against the appellant and as such the case has been prima facie found to be true against the appellant. Accordingly, prayer for regular bail was rejected vide order dated 10th January, 2024 in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1141 of 2023 and vide order dated 22.10.2024 in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1277 of 2024.
50. The question, which has been raised that as of now 37 witnesses were examined and now the number of witnesses has been pruned to 78, as has been submitted
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB on behalf of learned counsel for the NIA, that now the learned Special Judge has exclusive jurisdiction to try the cases of the nature of UA(P) Act, 1967 and the trial is at progress.
51. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gurwinder Singh Vs State of Punjab and Another reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 109 wherein while dealing with the principle that „bail is rule‟, the same has been differed so far as ingredient if attracted under the offence as stipulated under the UA(P) Act, 1967 is concerned.
52. It needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in a very recent judgment rendered in Gurwinder Singh Vs State of Punjab and Another (supra) while taking in to consideration of the judgment as rendered in the National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (Supra) has observed that, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail and lays down that if the Court, 'on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure', is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB true, such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond.
53. In the aforesaid background, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the test for rejection of bail is quite plain and Bail must be rejected as a 'rule', if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It has further been observed that it is only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied - that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in accordance with the 'tripod test' (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence).
54. For ready reference following paragraphs of the aforesaid Judgment are being quoted herein under:
"27. A bare reading of Sub-section (5) of Section 43D shows that apart from the fact that Sub-section (5) bars a Special Court from releasing an accused on bail without affording the Public Prosecutor an opportunity of being heard on the application seeking release of an accused on bail, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail. It lays down that if the Court, „on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure‟, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond. It is interesting to
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB note that there is no analogous provision traceable in any other statute to the one found in Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act. In that sense, the language of bail limitation adopted therein remains unique to the UAP Act.
28. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase - „bail is the rule, jail is the exception‟ - unless circumstances justify otherwise - does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP Act. The „exercise‟ of the general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope. The form of the words used in proviso to Section 43D (5)- „shall not be released‟ in contrast with the form of the words as found in Section 437(1) CrPC - „may be released‟ - suggests the intention of the Legislature to make bail, the exception and jail, the rule.
29. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task on hand. In dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the courts are merely examining if there is justification to reject bail. The „justifications‟ must be searched from the case diary and the final report submitted before the Special Court. The legislature has prescribed a low, „prima facie‟ standard, as a measure of the degree of satisfaction, to be recorded by Court when scrutinising the justifications [materials on record]. This standard can be contrasted with the standard of „strong suspicion‟, which is used by Courts while hearing applications for „discharge--"
55. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid position of law and the factual aspect as has been gathered against the appellant is now proceeding to examine as to whether the prayer of the instant appeal is fit to be allowed or not.
56. Since no fresh ground or change in circumstance is available herein therefore, the learned counsel for appellant
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB has taken the ground of long custody and probable delay in conclusion of trial has also been taken as one of the grounds.
57. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer herein that only the long incarceration is not the ground to be looked into for enlarging the accused on bail rather the accusation so made against the accused persons as also societal impact is also to be taken care of.
58. As per the settled proposition of law as discussed referred hereinabove in the preceding paragraph the test for rejection of bail is quite plain. Bail must be rejected as a 'rule', if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. This position is made clear by Sub-section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on granting of bail specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grant of bail.
59. In the present case, it is apparent from the appellant/accused has been charged for offences punishable under Sections of the UA(P)Act 1967, having maximum punishment of imprisonment for life.
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60. Although, the culpability of the present accused/appellant has already been dealt with by this Court on two occasions while rejecting the prayer for bail but at the cost of repetition same has been reiterated herein in precise form.
61. So far as the fact of the present case is concerned, the nature of the allegation is quite serious and sufficient material has surfaced in course of investigation in which the appellant has been found to supply potash, the explosive chemical which was subsequently handed over to other accused persons and they used the said Potash in IED blast, when armed troops were moving on the forward slope of Lanji forest hills under PS Toklo, in which three security personnel were killed and few became seriously injured. Further the present appellant is also having two criminal antecedents.
62. The learned counsel for the appellant has renewed the prayer for bail mainly on the ground of long incarceration and probable delay in trial but it is settled position of law that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail,
63. It requires to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab(supra) taking into consideration the ratio of
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB judgment of Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb, (supra) has observed that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail, for ready reference, the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
"46. As already discussed, the material available on record indicates the involvement of the appellant in furtherance of terrorist activities backed by members of banned terrorist organisation involving exchange of large quantum of money through different channels which needs to be deciphered and therefore in such a scenario if the appellant is released on bail there is every likelihood that he will influence the key witnesses of the case which might hamper the process of justice. Therefore, mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid argument on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted."
64. Further the Hon'ble Apex Court in its recent judgment in the case of Gulfisha Fatima versus State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1 while appreciating the implication of Article 21 vis-vis Section 43D (5) of the Act 1967 and taking into the consideration the ratio laid down in the case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) has categorically observed that if prosecutions alleging offences which implicate the sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State, delay does not operate as a trump card that automatically displaces statutory restraint, for ready reference, the relevant
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are being quoted as under:
"32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, this Court recognised a constitutional safeguard that cannot be ignored: statutory restrictions cannot be applied so as to render the guarantee of personal liberty illusory. It was held that where the trial is not likely to commence or conclude within a reasonable period, constitutional courts retain the jurisdiction to grant bail notwithstanding statutory restraints. The decision thus operates as a protection against unconscionable detention and there can be no second opinion on the said principle.
33. The same decision, however, does not indicate as laying down a mechanical rule under which the mere passage of time becomes determinative in every case arising under a special statute. The jurisprudence of this Court does not support a construction whereby delay simpliciter eclipses a statutory regime enacted by Parliament to address offences of a special category.
35. The proper constitutional question, therefore, is not whether Article 21 is superior to Section 43D (5). The proper question is how Article 21 is to be applied where Parliament has expressly conditioned the grant of bail in relation to offences alleged to implicate national security. The law does not contemplate an either-or approach. Nor does it contemplate an unstructured blending of statutory and constitutional considerations. What is required is disciplined judicial scrutiny that gives due regard to both.
47. A closely allied consideration is the role attributed to the accused. Prosecutions under the UAPA may allege varying degrees of participation, ranging from peripheral acts to strategic, organisational, or ideological centrality. The constitutional significance of prolonged incarceration cannot be assessed uniformly for all accused regardless of role. Where the attribution suggests a central or organising role in the alleged design, the need for circumspection before constitutional intervention displaces a statutory embargo is correspondingly greater. Conversely, where the role is
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB peripheral or episodic, prolonged incarceration may more readily assume a punitive character.
56. It therefore becomes necessary to state, with clarity, the governing approach. In prosecutions alleging offences which implicate the sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State, delay does not operate as a trump card that automatically displaces statutory restraint. Rather, delay serves as a trigger for heightened judicial scrutiny. The outcome of such scrutiny must be determined by a proportional and contextual balancing of legally relevant considerations, including (i) the gravity and statutory character of the offence alleged, (ii) the role attributed to the accused within the alleged design or conspiracy, (iii) the strength of the prima facie case as it emerges at the limited threshold contemplated under the special statute, and (iv) the extent to which continued incarceration, viewed cumulatively in the facts of the case, has become demonstrably disproportionate so as to offend the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21.
58. In Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, this Court expressly cautioned against the mechanical invocation of prolonged incarceration as a ground for bail in cases involving serious offences under special enactments. The judgment reiterates that the gravity of the offence, the legislative context, and the prima facie material on record cannot be eclipsed merely because the trial has taken time.
59. This Court in CBI v. Dayamoy Mahato reiterated that while Article 21 remains paramount, it does not operate in a vacuum divorced from competing constitutional interests. The Court emphasized that claims to liberty must be examined in the totality of circumstances, particularly where allegations implicate organised criminality or matters of public interest. Delay, though undoubtedly significant, was held not to assume the character of an absolute or solitary determinant. The emphasis, once again, was on structured judicial reasoning rather than on formulaic outcomes."
65. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid settled position of law, it is evident that mere delay in trial pertaining to
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB grave offences, as one involved in the instant case, cannot be used as a ground to grant bail.
66. There is no dispute and it cannot be disputed that the jurisprudence of Article 21 has, as it develops, recognised various facets to be intrinsic to the right to life and liberty such as speedy trial, timely completion of investigation, fair trial etc. but at the same time circumspection in granting the relief of bail in offences that harmful to society such as in this case, stems from a place of concern, understandably legitimate at that, about public order, societal security, overall peace and the general deterrent force in criminal law.
67. The scales of justice must balance on the one hand- the constitutionally consecrated and jealously guarded right under Article 21 and on the other, the recognition that individual liberty is not absolute and is subject to just exceptions i.e. the paramount considerations of national interest and societal interest.
68. There can be no manner of doubt on the proposition that Article 21 rights are placed on a pedestal, and rightly so, at the same time, though, the individual cannot always be the centre of attention. We observe, therefore, that while Article 21 rights must always be protected, but however, in cases where the security of the society and nation is called
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB into question, the long incarceration cannot be the sole ground of consideration.
69. The act of the accused persons must be looked at, on the whole, and all relevant factors must be given due consideration while granting or denying bail. Needless to add, any Court seized of bail application(s) arising out of such offences must record, in their order the reasons and factors that weighed with them in the ultimate outcome.
70. In view of the discussion made above it is the settled fact that the rights of an individual are always subservient to the nation/societal interest.
71. Further, in the case of Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expressed its concern to the threat raised by terrorist organizations and held that where the accusations against the respondents are prima facie true, the mandate contained in the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act would become applicable and the accused would not be released on bail.
72. Herein, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted at Bar that 37 witnesses have already been examined and number of witnesses have been pruned from 169 to 78 and all endeavor has been taken for expeditious conclusion of the trial therefore taking into consideration
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB the aforesaid submission, the apprehension of appellant in probable delay in trial is not fit to be accepted.
73. Further it has been submitted by the respondent that if the present appellant is allowed to be released on bail, then, he will get all opportunities to tamper with the evidence as well as influence the witnesses or he may abscond.
74. Thus, from the aforesaid discussion it is evident that the nature of the allegation against the appellant is quite serious and sufficient material has surfaced in course of investigation in which the appellant has been found to supply potash, the explosive chemical which was subsequently handed over to other accused persons and they used the said Potash in IED blast, when armed troops were moving on the forward slope of Lanji forest hills under PS Toklo, in which three security personnel were killed and few became seriously injured. Further the present appellant is also having two criminal antecedents, therefore, it is considered view of this Court that prayer for bail of the appellant on the ground of custody or delay in trial, is not fit to be accepted.
75. This Court on the basis of discussion made hereinabove is of the view that the Constitution of India mandates to maintain core of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the matter of commission of crime but the issue
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB of national integrity is also to be taken care of so as to maintain the balance.
76. Herein the nature of allegation is serious and sufficient material has been found in course of investigation by the investigating agency and also the appellant is having two criminal antecedents of the like nature i.e., under the U.A. (P) Act, 1967 and further on earlier two occasion, the prayer for bail of the appellant was rejected by this Court on merit after due consideration of the culpability of the present appellant, therefore it is considered view of this Court the prayer for bail of the appellant is not fit to be accepted.
77. Further, this Court has gone through the order passed by the learned Special Judge and found therefrom that the learned Special Judge has considered the fact in entirety along with the allegation as per the first information report and the charge-sheet and rejected the bail application on the parameter as stipulated under Section 43(D)(5) of the U.A.(P) Act, 1967.
78. The learned Special Judge has also considered the complicity of the appellant as available in the evidences of the prosecution witnesses, case diary and other documentary evidences collected by the investigating agency.
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2026:JHHC:10397-DB
79. Thus, in view of the foregoing discussions, we find no illegality in the impugned order dated 10.10.2025 passed in Misc. Cr. Application No.1719 of 2025 by AJC- XVI-cum-Spl. Judge, NIA, Ranchi rejecting the application of the appellant, as such order impugned requires no interference by this Court.
80. In the result, we find no merit in instant appeal, hence, the same is dismissed.
81. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, also stands dismissed.
82. We make it clear that the prima-facie findings recorded in this judgment/order are only for considering the prayer for bail. The reasons are confined to the case of the appellant. The same will have no bearing on the trial and cases of the co-accused.
I Agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.) (Sanjay Prasad, J.)
10/04/2026
Alankar/ A.F.R.
uploaded on 10.04.2026
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